AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of Sections 49 and 59 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act,
  • provision similar to section 49 (3) of the Supply Act. Whereas under section 49 (3) of the Supply Act
  • SECTION 283 DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT 1957
  • section 286 of the Corporation Act, the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C read with section 41 of the Arbitration Art,
  • section 49 (1) and (2), of the Supply Act. The Municipal Corporation Act
  • Indian Electricity Act. 1910 or the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948
  • provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act X of 1940)
  • SECTION 20 ARBITRATION ACT
  • Corporation Act the provisions of section 283
  • provisions of sub-section (1) of section 49.
  • provisions of subsection (3) of Section 49.
  • section 283 of the Corporation Act
  • DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Sections 49 and 59 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act,
  • provision similar to section 49 (3) of the Supply Act. Whereas under section 49 (3) of the Supply Act
  • SECTION 283 DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT 1957
  • section 286 of the Corporation Act, the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C read with section 41 of the Arbitration Art,
  • section 49 (1) and (2), of the Supply Act. The Municipal Corporation Act
  • Indian Electricity Act. 1910 or the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948
  • provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act X of 1940)
  • SECTION 20 ARBITRATION ACT
  • Corporation Act the provisions of section 283
  • provisions of sub-section (1) of section 49.
  • provisions of subsection (3) of Section 49.
  • section 283 of the Corporation Act
  • DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners (including Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd.) entered into an agreement dated 26 September 1972 with respondent No. 2 (Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking — D.E.S.U.) for the supply of electric energy. Clause 15(a) of the agreement required the consumer to pay monthly charges computed in accordance with the Rate Schedule LIP annexed to the agreement; the parties agreed that that Rate Schedule was identical to the Tariff fixed by respondent No. 2 for the year 1982–83.

The Tariff for Large Industrial Power (LIP) included fixed demand charges and energy charges and contained a formula (clause 1 of the Tariff) permitting adjustment of energy charges based on average fuel and purchase costs and actual fuel/energy purchase costs; the Tariff permitted the D.E.S.U. Management to make provisional adjustments (incorporated in monthly bills) which, when finalised, would have retrospective effect for that financial year.

Chronology of relevant events set out in the opinion:

  • In 1980–81 D.E.S.U. levied a fuel adjustment charge of 9.87 paise per unit; on 25 August 1981 this was enhanced to 20.44 paise per unit and suits were filed (including Suit No. 1219-A of 1981) under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act invoking clause 25 of the agreement to refer disputes to arbitration; interim relief fixed payment at 16.50 paise per unit pending disposal.
  • On 12 March 1983 D.E.S.U. purportedly increased fuel adjustment charges to 27.97 paise per unit and issued supplementary/further bills (March 1983).
  • Suit No. 518-A of 1983 (the present petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act) was filed on 6 April 1983 seeking reference to arbitration; an interim stay was granted subject to payment at 16.50 paise per unit. D.E.S.U. further increased the provisional rate in May and July 1983 at various figures; subsequent orders varied the rates to be paid pending resolution.
  • D.E.S.U. opposed the arbitration application as not maintainable, contending that the levy was made in exercise of statutory powers under Section 283 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and therefore was not arbitrable.

The single judge court heard the issues, allowed the petition to refer a defined dispute to arbitration, appointed an arbitrator, and dealt with an interim application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 C.P.C. read with section 41 of the Arbitration Act concerning stay of recovery of additional fuel adjustment charges. The court ultimately vacated the interim orders staying realization of the additional charges, directed limited protections for the petitioners in the event they succeed, and gave directions about payment and arbitration procedure (including consolidation of related suits and time limits for the award).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dispute concerning the demand by D.E.S.U. for increased fuel adjustment charges (in particular whether those charges were fixed and demanded in accordance with the Tariff and its formula) is referable to arbitration under the arbitration clause (clause 25) of the parties' agreement.
  2. Whether interim relief (an injunction restraining respondents from realising the additional fuel adjustment charges) should be granted under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 C.P.C. read with section 41 of the Arbitration Act.
  3. Whether provisional fuel adjustment charges can be levied (and whether they can be given retrospective effect), i.e., the permissibility and limits of provisional/revisionary billing under the Tariff.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The chargeable rates are governed by the Rate Schedule annexed to the agreement; disputes about levy under that Schedule are referable to arbitration under clause 25 of the agreement.
  • Alternatively, the arbitration clause is comprehensive enough to encompass all disputes connected with or arising out of the agreement, including disputes about fixation or computation of fuel adjustment charges.
  • For the interim application, the petitioners contended prima facie illegality: the demanded amounts were not calculated in accordance with the Tariff formula because provisional demands were based on budget estimates (projections) rather than on actual fuel/energy costs.

Respondents' Arguments

  • D.E.S.U. (respondent No. 2) contended the application for arbitration is not maintainable because the levy was made in exercise of statutory powers under Section 283 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — a statutory/legislative power which cannot be the subject-matter of arbitration.
  • The fixation of charges and the formula for computation were made under Section 283 and form part of the statutory Tariff, not the agreement; therefore disputes about fixation do not arise out of the contract and fall outside the arbitration clause.
  • With respect to the interim application, respondents contended that it is permissible to base provisional charges on budget estimates and that the Tariff formula need not be applied in identical terms for provisional fixation (and in the present case the D.E.S.U. had in fact followed the formula in arriving at provisional figures).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indian Aluminium Co. v. K. S. E. Board, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1967 Holds that where tariff/agreement is entered into by virtue of statutory power analogous to Section 49(3) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, the agreement-based tariff stands independent of the statutory provisions in sub-sections (1) and (2). The court considered the decision but distinguished it: Section 49(3) (Supply Act) has no counterpart in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (Section 283 lacks an equivalent to s.49(3)), so Indian Aluminium was of limited assistance to the petitioners here.
Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd., AIR 1963 S.C. 1128 Observation that no dispute between a consumer and the State Electricity Board can arise under the 1948 Act in the matter of the rates at which the Board supplies electrical energy. Relied upon by respondents to support the proposition that disputes about rates fixed under statutory scheme are not arbitrable; the court used it to underline that rates fixed/statutory method are not open to contractual arbitration in general, while distinguishing the present dispute about computation under an agreed formula.
Orissa Textile Mills Ltd. v. Orissa State Electricity Board, (1975) 2 SCC 437 Holds that a claim founded on the Supply Act to impose a surcharge is not a matter arising under an agreement and falls outside an arbitration clause in the agreement. The court cited it to support the proposition that claims founded on statutory powers fall outside arbitration; nevertheless the court distinguished the present situation where petitioners challenged computation under a formula applied by the Management (a party to the agreement).
M/s Shriram Bearing Ltd. v. Bihar State Electricity Board, AIR 1982 Patna 91 Interpreted a clause allowing provisional fuel surcharge: provisional bills can be issued and adjusted later; the time prescriptions in the clause were held not to be mandatory so as to nullify provisional bills. The court relied on this decision to hold that provisional charges with retrospective effect are not necessarily invalid and that similar provisional demands in the present case could not be struck down merely because of timing; it influenced the decision to refuse an injunction against retrospective provisional demands.
M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Chairman, B. S. E. B., AIR 1984 S.C. 657 Affirmed the Patna High Court's observations regarding provisional billing and adjustment. The court noted the affirmation and applied the combined authority to support the proposition that retrospective provisional demands are not necessarily void and do not warrant an injunction in the present circumstances.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria, AIR 1976 S.C. 2621 Discusses balance of convenience in cases where public authorities levy charges; emphasises that deprivation of revenue to civic bodies militates against granting interim relief unless clear irreparable injury is shown. The court applied the balance-of-convenience reasoning from this decision to conclude that a public utility should not be deprived of funds by an injunction unless the demand is clearly unreasonable; this supported vacating the interim stay.
Siliguri Municipality & Ors. v. Amalendu Das & Ors., (1984) 2 SCC 36 States courts should be slow to grant stays of recovery of taxes/rates; injunctions against recovery should be exceptional; courts must balance public interest and avoid paralyzing municipal functions. The court relied on these observations to reinforce that interlocutory stays of recovery should be exceptional and to justify refusing a stay of the additional fuel adjustment charges, subject to protection for petitioners in case they ultimately prevail.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded along two main thrusts: (A) whether the dispute is referable to arbitration; and (B) whether interim relief restraining recovery of the additional charges should be granted.

A. Arbitration — scope and application of the arbitration clause

  • The court first analysed the contractual provisions. Clause 15(a) requires the consumer to pay amounts calculated in accordance with the Rate Schedule annexed; it obliges the consumer to pay such amounts but does not itself confer on the Undertaking the statutory power to lay down rates or a method of calculation. The source of power to fix or alter rates lies in Section 283 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (a statutory power), exercised yearly by the Corporation (or Committee) in fixing the Tariff.
  • The court distinguished Indian Aluminium Co.'s case because that decision turned on Section 49(3) of the Electricity (Supply) Act (which allowed agreements fixing special tariffs) — no analogous sub-section exists in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act; thus the Tariff under Section 283 is a statutory tariff applicable to all consumers and not one created by a special agreement.
  • Having accepted that fixing of rates and the statutory formula are the product of statutory power (and not contract), the court examined the arbitration clause (clause 25). It observed that the clause is very broadly worded: any question or difference connected with or arising out of the agreement or the rights/duties/liabilities of the parties connected with it is referable to arbitration, unless the matter is one for which a specific procedure is laid down by statute.
  • The court drew an important distinction: it is not open to the petitioners to challenge the correctness of the tariff or the statutory formula (those are statutory acts), but it is open to the petitioners to contend that in applying the statutory formula the management (which is party to the agreement) has not followed the formula or has taken into account irrelevant or extraneous matters when computing the fuel adjustment charges. Such a challenge — i.e., whether the fuel adjustment charges have been computed in accordance with the Tariff/formula — concerns the petitioners' liability under the agreement and therefore falls within the arbitration clause.
  • The court furthermore noted that while the Committee/Corporation fixes the Tariff under Section 283, the Tariff empowers the D.E.S.U. Management to fix provisional fuel adjustment charges; the Management (being a party to the agreement) determines the amounts charged and is therefore subject to the arbitration clause for disputes about computation and demand.
  • Accordingly the court allowed the petition and referred to arbitration the specific question: "Whether the fuel adjustment charges have been fixed and are being demanded by respondent No. 2 from time to time, in accordance with the Tariff for the year in question." The reference was framed broadly enough to include provisional revision and retrospective effect issues.

B. Interim relief — assessment under Order 39 & balance of convenience

  • For the interim application seeking injunction against realisation of additional fuel adjustment charges, the court applied the ordinary tests: prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. It held that the detailed contentions about correctness of computation and whether provisional charges were based on budget estimates (provisional figures) had to be gone into by the arbitrator.
  • The court observed that both sides had placed figures on record. D.E.S.U.'s affidavit (of T. D. Kathuria) stated that the provisional fuel adjustment charge of 29.95 paise per unit had been computed in accordance with the Tariff formula. Absent conclusive demonstration before the court that the figure was not arrived at per the Tariff, the court was not prepared to disbelieve that affidavit and to stay recovery of the demand.
  • On balance of convenience the court relied on authority (Municipal Corporation v. Jaipuria and Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das) emphasising that courts should be slow to stay recovery of taxes/levies and should not deprive public utility bodies of revenue except in exceptional circumstances. The court found that D.E.S.U., a public utility, should not be unnecessarily deprived of funds where it could not be said that the demand was plainly unreasonable or illegal.
  • On the question of provisional charges with retrospective effect, the court accepted the reasoning in Shriram Bearing and its affirmation (Rohtas Industries) that provisional billing and later adjustment is an enabling mechanism and that timing provisions are not necessarily mandatory so as to invalidate provisional bills; thus retrospective provisional demands were not per se invalid.
  • Because the petitioners had not conclusively shown that the provisional figure was not computed as per the Tariff, and balancing public interest and the need to avoid paralyzing a public utility, the court vacated the interim stay of recovery. However, to protect petitioners' eventual rights, it directed that if petitioners ultimately succeed the respondents must refund or adjust the excess amount and pay interest at 18% per annum from date of payment to date of repayment/adjustment.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition is allowed insofar as the court refers the following dispute to arbitration:

"Whether the fuel adjustment charges have been fixed and are being demanded by respondent No. 2. from time to time, in accordance with the Tariff for the year in question."

The court appointed Shri S. N. Andley (retired Chief Justice) as sole arbitrator, fixed his fee (Rs. 2,000 per day plus out-of-pocket expenses initially payable by the petitioners but subject to the arbitrator's eventual order as to costs), ordered consolidation of the related suits so that proceedings before the arbitrator proceed in Suit No. 518-A of 1983 with the arbitrator's decision to apply to the other cases, and directed that the arbitration award be made within four months of the arbitrator entering upon reference (subject to extension by mutual consent). There was no order as to costs in the reference.

As to interim relief, the court vacated interim orders staying realization of the additional fuel adjustment charges. The petitioners were granted four weeks to pay the amount which had been stayed and the court ordered parties to bear their own costs. The court provided protective relief: if petitioners ultimately succeed, respondents must refund or adjust any excess amount recovered and pay interest at 18% per annum from the date of payment till repayment/adjustment.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: the dispute over whether the demanded fuel adjustment charges were computed in accordance with the statutory Tariff/formula is to be decided by arbitration (not by this court). The petitioners must pay the stayed amounts within four weeks; if they later prevail they are entitled to refund/adjustment and interest at 18% per annum.
  • Procedure and administration: a sole arbitrator was appointed with specified fees and a four-month target for the award; related suits were consolidated for arbitration to avoid duplicate proceedings.
  • Broader legal implication: the court distinguished statutes that permit contract-based special tariffs (as in Indian Aluminium) from statutory tariff regimes (Section 283) and held that while the validity of statutory rates/formulae is not for arbitration, disputes as to whether a management or contracting party has correctly applied a statutory formula in computing charges can fall within a broadly worded arbitration clause. The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel legal rule beyond the application and distinction of authority; it applied existing precedents to the facts before it.

    Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. Petitioners v. Municipal Corporation Of Delhi & Anr. S

    B.N Kirpal, J.:— The only question which arises for consideration in this case and in the connected cases, which were all heard together, is whether the dispute with regard to the demand by Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking, respondent No. 2, for payment of increased fuel adjustment charges can be referred to arbitration or not.

    2. Main arguments were addressed in Suit No. 518-A of 1983 and, therefore, it is necessary to deal with the facts of this case only. It is agreed by the counsel for the parties that the decision in this suit will govern the other cases also.
    3. According to the petitioner, it entered into an agreement on 26th September, 1972 with respondent No. 2 for the supply of electric energy. Clause 15 (a) of the said agreement pertains to the payment for supply of energy. The said sub-clause reads as under:—
    “15 (a) The Consumer shall pay each month to the Undertaking for electrical energy supplied during the preceding month such amount as shall be calculated and ascertained in accordance with the Rate-Schedule LIP attached hereto. The rates contained in the schedule are those in force at the time of executing this agreement. The Consumer shall be eligible for whatever reduction or rebate as may be granted on the rates and shall be liable to pay for whatever surcharge or increase in those rates as may from time to time be levied or made by the Undertaking. Any other method if charging decided by the Undertaking shall also be applicable.”
    The Rate Schedule of LIP, which was annexed to the said agreement, has not been placed on record but it is an agreed case of the parties that the said Rate Schedule was identical to the Tariff which was fixed by respondent No. 2 for the year 1982-83.
    4. In its meeting held on 15th February 1982 the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, while exercising the powers of the Delhi Electric Supply Committee/Standing Committee/Corporation, fixed and approved the charges for the supply of electricity for the year 1982-83. With regard to large industrial power the provision in the said Tariff was as follows, which provision is identical to the Rate Schedule of LIP which was attached to the said agreement:—
    “B. Large Industrial Power (LIP):
    (a) Availability: Available as primary power to Large Industrial Consumers having connected load above 100 k.w
    (b) Character of Service: AC 50 cycles, 3 phase, 11KV
    (c) Tariff:
    Demand Charges:

    Demand Charges: First 500 K.W of billing demand for the month. Rs. 20.00 per K.W or part thereof. Next 1000 K.V.A of billing demand for the month Rs. 16.50 per KVA or part thereof. Next 5000 KVA of billing demand for the month. Rs. 16.00 per KVA or part thereof. All in excess of above billing demand. Rs. 15.50 per KVA or part thereof.

    plus
    Energy Charges:
    First 5,00,000 units per month at 27.5 paise per unit.
    Next 5,00,000 units per month at 27.0 paise per unit.
    Next 10,00,000 units per month at 26.5 paise per unit.
    All above 20,00,000 units per month at 26.0 paise per unit.
    Subject to:—
    1. An adjustment of energy charges as under:
    (i) The above energy charges are based on the basic average fuel and purchase cost of 15.25 paise per KWH.
    (ii) The actual cost of fuel used during any period shall be the amount in rupees of the cost of all types of fuel burnt in the Undertaking's Thermal Generating Plants in that period.
    (iii) The actual cost of energy purchased shall be the amount paid in rupees for import of energy for that period.
    (iv) The cost of energy per KWH sold shall be the quotient computed on dividing the sum of (ii) and (iii) by the KWH sold during the period.
    (v) The increase or decrease in cost of per KWH sold shall be the difference of (iv) and (i) above and accordingly shall be added or substracted to the above energy rates.
    Final adjustment on account of variation in energy charges will be made as soon as possible after the close of the period of account but adjustment may be provisionally fixed by the DESU Management from time to time will be incorporated as a part of the monthly bill and shall be payable by the consumer. Such provisional rates as and when finalised shall have retrospective effect from the beginning of that financial year.”
    5. A perusal of the aforesaid Tariff shows that, depending upon the quantum of electricity consumed, certain fixed charges had to be paid ranging from Rs. 15.50 per KW to Rs. 20 per KW and in addition thereto, the consumer also had to pay energy charges. The energy charges were also payable depending upon the units consumed and ranged from 26P. per unit to 27.5 B. per unit. The Tariff further provided that the energy charges so fixed were subject to adjustment. The dispute in the present case is with regard to the adjustment of the energy charges by increasing the same, which are sought to be made under clause 1 of the said Tariff.
    6. The aforesaid clause 1 provides that the fixed energy charges are based on the average fuel and purchase cost of 15.25P per KWH. The energy charges could be adjusted depending upon the variation of the actual cost of fuel burnt in the Undertaking's Thermal Generating Plants and the actual cost of energy purchased for import of energy during a particular period. The cost of the energy per KWH was to be the quotient computed by dividing the sum of the aforesaid two items by the KWH sold during the period. If the cost per KWH so worked out was more than 15.25 P. per KWH then there was to be an increase in the energy charges, and vice versa.
    7. The aforesaid Tariff further provides that final adjustment on account of variation in the energy charges is to be made as soon as possible after close of the period of account. Keeping in view the fact that there may be variation in the price during the account period the said tariff permits an adjustment to be fixed by the DESU Management provisionally, from time to time, and that adjusted amount is to form part of the monthly bill and is payable by the consumer. It is lastly provided that such provisional rates as fixed by DESU Management, as and when they are finalised, shall have retrospective effect from the beginning of that financial year.
    8. In the year 1980-81 respondent No. 2 levied fuel adjustment charges at the rate of 9.87 P. per unit. On 25th August, 1981 respondent No. 2, enhanced the levy of the fuel adjustment charges from 9.87P per unit to 20.44P per unit. Thereupon Suit No. 1219-A of 1981, and other suits were filed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act wherein clause 25 of the aforesaid agreement was sought to be invoked and it was prayed that the disputes be referred to arbitration. Interim applications were also filed and on 20th December, 1982 it was ordered that pending disposal of the suits, fuel adjustment charges at the rate of 16.50P per unit would be paid.
    9. On 12th March, 1983 the petitioners' lawyers received a notice from respondent No. 2 to the effect that the fuel adjustment charges were being increased from 20.44P per unit to 27.97P per unit. On 17th March, 1983 a supplementary fuel bill for the period April, 1982 to December, 1982 was received by the petitioners. On 25th March, 1983 the petitioners received a further bill whereby fuel adjustment charges were levied at the rate of 27.97P per Unit for the month of February, 1983.
    10. The present application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, being Suit No. 518-A of 1983, was filed on 6th April, 1983. Interim stay of payment of 27.97 P. per unit was granted but on the condition that the petitioners pay fuel adjustment charges at the rate of 16.50P per unit. On 1st May, 1983 the fuel adjustment charges were increased by respondent No. 2 from 27.97P per unit to 29.47P per unit which were again enhanced to 29.95P per unit. Vide order dated 30th August. 1983 the petitioners were asked to pay fuel adjustment charges at the rate of 20.44P per unit for July, 1983 and the rest of the demand was stayed.
    11. Respondent No. 2, in its reply to the application under section 20, has contended that the application is not maintainable. According to the respondents the levy has been made in exercise of the powers under section 283 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Act’) and the exercise of such power cannot be a subject-matter of arbitration.
    12. Before me it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the fuel adjustment charges have been fixed by respondent No. 2 in exercise of its powers contained in the Rate Schedule annexed to the agreement between the parties. A dispute with regard to the levy made under this Schedule is, it is submitted, referable to arbitration under clause 25 of the Arbitration Agreement. In the alternative, if was submitted that the arbitration clause is comprehensive enough to include within its ambit all types of disputes between the parties relating to the supply of electric energy, including the dispute with regard to the fixation of fuel adjustment charges.
    13. On behalf of the respondents, Shri V. P. Singh contended that Section 283 of the said Act gives the power to the Delhi Electric Supply Committee to fix charges for the supply of electricity by the Corporation. The said section provides that the charges shall be fixed at such rates as may be fixed by the Committee with the approval of the Corporation. According to the learned counsel, the fixation of such charges amounts to an exercise of legislative power. This legislative power is stated to have been exercised in the present case when the Tariff was fixed. It was further submitted that it was in further exercise of the legislative power that the fuel adjustment charges have been fixed in accordance with the formula laid down in the Tariff. According to the learned counsel, the dispute with regard to the fixation of the fuel adjustment charges does not arise out of the agreement between the parties, but is referable to the Tariff which has been laid down under Section 283 of the said Act.
    14. Clause 15 of the agreement between the parties stipulates that the consumer will pay the amount of electricity charges as ascertained according to the rate fixed in the Schedule attached to the agreement. It is specifically mentioned that the rates which are set-out in the Schedule to the agreement are those which are in force at the time of the execution of the agreement. The later part of clause 15 (a) refers to the liability of the consumer to pay the rates which are fixed by the Undertaking from time to time. The rates which have to be so paid, may vary by increase or decrease which may be ordered by the Undertaking from time to time or the rates may be such as may have to be calculated in a manner different from what is provided in the Schedule and which manner of charging may be decided by the Undertaking. It is not because of this provision contained in the agreement that the Undertaking gets a right to vary the amount which is to be charged for the electricity supply. The source of power of the Undertaking to lay down a new method by which the calculation of electricity rates is to be made or to vary the rates is not contained in clause 15 (a). Clause 15 (a) has been inserted so as to make it clear to and incumbent upon the consumer to pay such amount of electricity charges as may be levied by the Undertaking from time to time.
    15. The Undertaking gets the power to levy and alter the rates which are fixed or the method in which it is to be calculated, by virtue of Section 283 of the Act. It is in exercise of that statutory right that the Tariff is fixed by the Corporation every year. The power to fix the rates and charges is a statutory right, and the same is not controlled or circumscribed by the provisions of clause 15 (a) of the agreement.
    16. On behalf of the petitioners, relying upon the decision in the case of Indian Aluminium Co. v. K. S. E. Board, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1967 (1), it was strenuously urged that, like in that case, the power to fix the rates is by virtue of the agreement between the parties and not by virtue of Section 283 of the Act.
    17. In Indian Aluminium Co.'s case, and in the other cases connected with it, the Supreme Court was concerned with the provisions of Sections 49 and 59 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, as it stood at the relevant time, read as under:—
    “49. Provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees — (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of regulations, if any, made in this behalf the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs.
    (2) In fixing the uniform tariffs the Board shall have regard to all or any of the following factors, namely:—
    (a) the nature of the supply and the purposes for which it is required;
    (b) the co-ordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner, with particular reference to such development in areas not for the time being served or adequately served by the licensee;
    (c) the simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such supplies;
    (d) the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsely developed areas.
    (3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of the section shall derogate from the power of the Board. If it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors.
    In the case of Indian Aluminium Co. (supra), there was an agreement which had been entered into between the Board and the Company. It was held by the Supreme Court that the said agreement was entered into by virtue of the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 49. It was further held that when such an agreement is entered into, the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) do not apply. The statute itself, namely, section 49 (3), gave the power to the Board to fix special tariff. Thereafter, if the tariff had to be changed, it could not be done under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 49. In the present case, however, by virtue of section 286 of the Corporation Act, the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act are not applicable. In the Corporation Act the provisions of section 283 are somewhat analogous to section 49 (1) and (2), of the Supply Act. The Municipal Corporation Act does not have any provision similar to section 49 (3) of the Supply Act. Whereas under section 49 (3) of the Supply Act the Board could, by an agreement, fix different tariff for the supply of electricity to any person, under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act different tariff cannot be fixed. The tariff which is fixed under section 283 of the Corporation Act is applicable to all the consumers and the statute, namely the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, does not recognise tariff being fixed under an agreement. This being so, the decision in Indian Aluminium Co.'s case (supra) can be of little assistance to the petitioners.
    18. Shri V. P. Singh then strenuously contended that the revision of rates under the formula is a dispute which is not referable to arbitration. Strong reliance was placed by him on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bongalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. and others, AIR 1963 S.C 1128 (2), in which it was observed at page 1140 by Hidayatullah, J. as follows:—
    “It is, therefore, quite clear that no dispute between a consumer and the State Electricity Board can arise under the 1948 Act in the matter of the rates at which the Board supplies electrical energy.”
    Reliance was also placed by him on the case of Orissa Textile Mills Ltd. v. Orissa State Electricity Board and another, (1975) 2 S.C.C 437 (3) where at page 442 it was observed as follows:—
    “The question as to whether the Board had the power under Sections 49 and 59 and the Sixth Schedule to the Supply Act to levy the coal surcharge is not a question, matter or thing arising under the agreement. It is a claim founded on the provisions of the Supply Act to impose the coal surcharge in addition to the rates payable by the appellant to the Board under the agreement. Such a claim clearly falls outside the ambit and coverage of the arbitration provision contained in clause (23) of the agreement”.
    In the present case, however, there is no challenge to the power of the respondents to levy and impose the surcharge. There can also be no dispute with regard to the rate at which the consumer is required to pay electricity charges. Fixing of rates and the method in which the rates are to be determined, are decided by the Corporation in exercise of its powers under section 283 of the Act. To my mind, there can be no dispute, with the rates so fixed or the method of computation, which can be referred to arbitration.
    19. The question in the present case, however, is slightly different. In the exercise of its statutory power the Corporation has fixed the rates and specified a formula on the basis of which the amount to be charged by way of fuel adjustment charges can be varied. The dispute in the present case is really as to whether the variation of fuel adjustment charges has been done in accordance with the formula or not. The petitioners are ready and willing to pay the energy charges which are fixed in accordance with the said formula. To my mind, though it is not open to the petitioners to challenge the correctness of the rates fixed or the formula which is laid down for computing the amount of the energy charges, but it is open to them to contend that, in working out the formula, irrelevant or extraneous considerations have been taken into account or that the formula has not been properly followed while computing the fuel adjustment charges which are now being demanded. While considering whether the said charges have been worked out in accordance with the formula or not, it is not open to challenge the correctness of the accounts or the figures of respondent No. 2 but, as already noted, it can be contended that some relevant factors have not been taken into consideration or irrelevant factors have been taken into account.
    20. The question is as to how can the fixation of these charges be challenged. Ordinarily a challenge to fixation of the charges may be by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or by a suit or by arbitration. The fixation of different rates or the formula by the M.C.D under Section 283 of the Act would clearly be outside the scope of the arbitration clause, because such fixation has nothing to do with the agreement between the parties. The statutory right of the Corporation to fix different rates or formula is not and cannot be controlled by any contract, because a contract, whereby different rates can be fixed, is not envisaged by the statute. Whether the manner in which the statutory formula has been worked out can be challenged in arbitration proceedings is a question which can be answered only by referring to the arbitration clause.
    21. The arbitration clause in the present case is very widely worded. It is as follows:—
    “If any question or difference whatsoever arises between the parties to these presents or as to any clause or thing herein contained or the construction hereof or as to any other matter in any way connected with or arising out of these presents or the operation hereof or the rights duties or liabilities of either party in connection herewith, then, unless the procedure for settling such a question or difference is laid down by the Indian Electricity Act. 1910 or the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 as the case may be or otherwise specifically by this agreement, in every such case the matter in difference shall be referred to Arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act X of 1940) thereof shall apply to any such arbitration.”
    Bare perusal of the aforesaid clause shows that any question or difference arising between the parties as to any matter in any way connected with or arising out of the agreement or with regard to the rights, duties and liabilities of either party in connection with the agreement is referable to arbitration. The dispute in the present case is with regard to the liability of the petitioners to pay the fuel adjustment charges. The quantum of the liability is disputed. To my mind, this is a matter which would squarely fall within the provisions of clause 25 of the agreement, which contains the arbitration clause. In the arbitration proceedings it will be open to the petitioners to contend before the Arbitrator that the fuel adjustment charges have not been computed in accordance with the formula. Such a dispute would be one which would be connected with the agreement because it would pertain to the liability of the petitioners to pay charges for the consumption of electricity. It will, of course, not be open to the petitioners to contend before the Arbitrator that the rate fixed in the Tariff is high and nor will it be open to the petitioners to challenge the formula which has been laid down. It will also be outside the scope of the arbitration to ask the Arbitrator to enquire into the correctness of the accounts of D.E.S.U
    22. The problem may be viewed from another angle. Under Section 283 it is the Delhi Electric Supply Committee constituted under Section 44 (b) of the Act which is empowered to fix, with the approval of the Corporation, the rates or to lay down the method of computation. Under the Tariff, which has been prescribed, it is the Management of D.E.S.U, and not the said Committee, which has been empowered to fix the provisional fuel adjustment charges. It is with this entity, which is to determine such charges, with whom the petitioners have an agreement containing the arbitration clause. The exercise of power by the management, even though under or by virtue of a statutory Tariff can be the subject matter of arbitration as it would pertain to liability of the petitioners to pay fuel adjustment charges which are being demanded by the management of D.E.S.U, which management has fixed the fuel adjustment charges and which has also entered into the agreement with the petitioners for the supply of electricity.
    23. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is allowed. The arbitration agreement be filed in this Court and the following dispute is referred to arbitration:—
    “Whether the fuel adjustment charges have been fixed and are being demanded by respondent No. 2. from time to time, in accordance with the Tariff for the year in question.”
    This reference is, to my mind, comprehensive enough to include all questions which can be raised before the Arbitrator, including the question as to whether provisional revision of such charges can be made, from time to time, with retrospective effect.
    24. In the arbitration agreement no arbitrator is named. Considering the magnitude of the stakes involved and the importance of the case, I appoint Shri S. N. Andley, retired Chief Justice of this Court, as the sole-arbitrator. He shall be paid a fee of Rs. 2000 per day of hearing plus all out of pocket expenses. This fee will, in the first instance, be paid by the petitioners but will be subject to such orders as to costs as the Arbitrator may eventually pass.
    25. It was agreed to by the counsel for the parties that if the petition is allowed then, though all the cases would be referred to arbitration, before the arbitrator the proceedings shall take place only in one case i.e Suit No. 518-A of 1983 (Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another) and the decision of the arbitrator in this case would be equally applicable in the other cases and a similar award would be made in those cases, without any further or formal trial. The counsel for the parties are agreed that the cases before the arbitrator be consolidated and tried together and counsel in all the cases be given liberty to represent their points of view. Ordered accordingly.
    26. The arbitration award be made within four months of the Arbitrator's entering upon the reference or within such time as the parties may, by mutual consent, extend from time to time. There will be no order as to costs.
    I.A No. 1635 of 1983.
    27. For disposing of the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C read with section 41 of the Arbitration Art, wherein the claim is that the respondents should he restrained from realising the additional fuel adjustment charges which are now being demanded, it is not necessary to reiterate the facts which have already been referred to hereinabove.
    28. In support of the contention that the respondents should be injuncted from realising the additional fuel adjustment charges, it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that prima facie the demand is illegal. In this connection it was contended that the amount which is now being demanded has not been calculated in accordance with the prescribed formula because, it is submitted, the fuel adjustment charges can be demanded, even provisionally, only on the basis of the actual cost of fuel consumed or the energy purchased. The demand cannot, it is submitted, be based on the budget estimates which are only provisional and which are projections for the future. It is also the case of the petitioners that the balance of convenience is also in their favour.
    29. Shri V. P. Singh, on the other hand, has strongly contended that even though the budget estimates are based on provisional actual cost but, in any case, it is permissible to the respondents to demand fuel adjustment charges calculated on the basis of the budget estimates. It is also contended by the learned counsel that the formula laid down in the Tariff for calculating the fuel adjustment charges is not applicable while fixing the said charges provisionally though, in the present case, the said formula has in fact been followed.
    30. To my mind, the aforesaid contentions which have been raised are those which have to be gone into and decided by the arbitrator. For the purpose of deciding this application what has ordinarily to be seen is whether the petitioners have been able to make out a prima facie case for the grant of interim relief and, further, in whose favour is the balance of convenience.
    31. Both the petitioners as well as the respondents have placed on record their figures calculating as to what amount can be charged by way of fuel adjustment charges. The fuel adjustment charges are to be computed by D.E.S.U on the basis of the figures available with it. As already noted, the figures which have been placed on record by DESU do indicate that the fuel adjustment charges being demanded by it are in accordance with the said formula. In the affidavit of Shri T. D. Kathuria, Assistant Executive Engineer (Commercial), Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking dated 21st September, 1983 it has been stated that the fuel adjustment charges, which are being demanded at 29.95 P. per unit (provisional), have been worked out in accordance with the said formula. Till the petitioners conclusively show before the Arbitrator that this figure has not been arrived at as per the Tariff, it will not be proper for me, at this stage, to disbelieve the affidavit of Shri Kathuria and to stay the entire additional demand which is being raised.
    32. In such cases it is importance to see the balance of convenience. Reference may usefully be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria and another, AIR 1976 S.C 2621 (4). In that case demand for house tax was disputed by the respondents. They filed a suit and prayed for an interim injunction. The trial Judge vacated the interim injunction which was granted and an appeal was filed to the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court then quoted the following findings of the Appellate Court on the question of balance of convenience:—
    “The balance of convenience is also in favour of the defendant. The defendant renders services as a civic body and most of the amount which it spends has to come from owners of property in the form of property taxes. If the plaintiffs do not pay the property tax then the defendant might not be able to carry out its duty. The plaintiffs have also been unable to show that they would suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is not granted to them. If they ultimately prove that they are not liable to pay full amount demanded by the defendants as property tax then the plaintiffs could compel the defendant either to refund the amount realised in excess or to adjust the amount recovered in excess towards property tax for future years. The plaintiffs do not suffer irreparable injury if they are not granted the temporary injunction”.
    The High Court, while agreeing with the view of the appellate court that the balance of convenience was in favour of discharging the interim injunction, nevertheless held that prima facie the assessment had been erroneously made and accordingly the High Court had observed that the principles of balance of convenience did not apply. The Supreme Court, however, held that the balance of convenience could not be ignored in such cases and that the High Court had erred in holding that it could be. It is clear from the aforesaid that the observations of the appellate court were approved.
    33. To my mind also, the balance of convenience would demand that respondent No. 1, which is a public utility service, should not unnecessarily be deprived of funds when it cannot, on the face of it, be said that the demand being raised by DESU is highly unreasonable or illegal. In this connection judicial notice can be taken of the fact that ordinarily when there is an increase in such tariff the burden is usually passed on to the consumer by the manufacturer who has to pay more for the electricity. More often than not, the increase in tariff or charges is not paid by the manufacturer, like the petitioners, out of its own pocket. Such increase is usually taken into account, along with the prices of the other raw-materials, while fixing the sale price. Furthermore, as per the aforesaid they would have had to pay in other Metropolitan Cities of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. Furthermore, as per the aforesaid affidavit of Shri Kathuria the LIP consumers, like the petitioners, in Delhi are getting electricity at lower rates than Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. It is, therefore, not unjust or unfair, at this stage, to ask the petitioners to pay the demands of electricity.
    34. It was also contended that the aforesaid tariff does not permit the provisional charges to be made with retrospective effect. The tariff empowers the DESU Management to fix the charges provisionally from time to time. The said charges are to be incorporated as a part of the monthly bill. The said clause does not specifically permit or prohibit the demand of provisional charges with retrospective effect. The question as to how this clause is to be interpreted has to be decided by the arbitrator. For the purposes of deciding this application, however, it is sufficient, to my mind, to refer to the decision in the case of M/s Shriram Bearing Ltd. v. Bihar State Electricity Board. AIR 1982 Patna 91 (5). In that case also the Board had the power to raise provisional bills. Dealing with a similar question, namely, that provisional charges cannot be realised with retrospective effect, the Patna High Court, while considering a clause similar to the present, observed as follows:—
    “From the aforesaid clause it is apparent that till actual calculation of the fuel charge for a financial year in the manner laid down in the Tariff is made, a fuel surcharge during that financial year will be levied at a rate provisionally calculated. This is an enabling provision under which the Board can issue a provisional bill and difference, if any, with the final bill, can the adjusted later. It also presupposes that such bills are submitted within the financial year in question. To that extent there has been a breach of the said provision in the present cases. But, can such provisional bills be quashed or be declared to be invalid being in contravention of requirement of Cl. 16-7-4? This leads to the question whether the said provision is mandatory or directory. In my view, it cannot be held to be mandatory so as to nullify the bills solely on this ground. It is well known that merely because a Statute provides a time limit for performance of an act or duty, such provision cannot be held to be mandatory.”
    The aforesaid judgement was affirmed in appeal in M/s. Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Chairman, B. S. E. B., AIR 1984 S.C 657 (6). In view of the aforesaid observations, with which I see no reason to disagree for the present, no exception can be taken to the demands which have been made in this case with retrospective effect.
    35. It has also been averred by Shri Kathuria in his affidavit that the generation cost in 1982-83 was 48.33P per unit. After adding to it the other charges, the cost of DESU, according to Mr. V. P. Singh, was 60.48P per unit. According to the learned counsel what is now being demanded from the petitioners is much less. He submitted that in fact respondent No. 1 is incurring a loss. It is not necessary to go into the correctness of this averment but I have referred to this submission only for the reason that the balance of convenience is, in my opinion, in favour of D. E. S. U.
    36. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion I have borne in mind the observations of the Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Siliguri Municipality and others v. Amalendu Das and others, (1984) 2 SCC 36 (7). In that case the Calcutta High Court had restrained the Siliguri Municipality from recovering a gradual consolidated rate on the annual value of the holdings. The Supreme Court observed at page 438 as follows:—
    “We are constrained to make the observations which follow as we do deal dismayed at the tendency on the part of some of the High Courts to grant interlocutory orders for the mere asking. Normally, the High Courts should not as a rule, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution grant any stay of recovery of tax save under very exceptional circumstances. The grant of stay in such matters, should be an exception and not a rule.”
    The observations of the Supreme Court made in connection with the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution would apply with equal force to the proceedings under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C. At page 439 the Supreme Court also observed as follows:—
    “The main purpose of pushing an interim order is to evolve a workable formula or a workable arrangement to the extent called for by the demands of the situation keeping in mind the presumption regarding the constitutionality of the legislation and the vulnerability of the challenge, only in order that no irreparable injury is occasioned. The Court has therefore to strike a delicate balance after considering the pros and cons of the matter lest larger public interest is not jeopardized and institutional embarrassment is eschewed.”
    The Supreme Court with great force emphasised that the Courts should be slow in granting injunctions in cases like this. At page 438 the Supreme Court held as follows:—
    “It is needless to stress that a levy or impost does not become bad as soon as a writ petition is instituted in order to assail the validity of the levy. So also there is no warrant for presuming the levy to be bad at the very threshold of the proceedings. The only consideration at that juncture is to ensure that no prejudice is occasioned to the rate payers in case they ultimately succeed at the conclusion of the proceedings. This object can be attained by requiring the body or authority levying the impost to give an undertaking to refund or adjust against future dues, the levy of tax or rate or a part thereof, as the case may be, in the event of the entire levy or a part thereof being ultimately held to be invalid by the court without obliging the tax-payers to institute a civil suit in order to claim the amount already recovered from them. On the other hand, the Court cannot be unmindful of the need to protect the authority levying the tax, for, challenge may or may not succeed. The Court has to show awareness of the fact that in a case like the present a municipality cannot function or meet its financial obligations if its source of revenue is blocked by an interim order restraining the municipality from recovering the taxes as per the impugned provision. And that the municipality has to maintain essential civic services like water supply, street lighting and public streets etc., apart from running public institutions like schools, dispensaries, libraries etc. What is more, supplies have to be purchased and salaries have to be paid. The grant of an interlocutory order of this nature would paralyze the administration and dislocate the entire working of the municipality. It seems that these serous ramifications of the matter were lost sight of while making the impugned order. (Emphasis added).”
    37. Fallowing the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, in my opinion, this is not a fit case where the injunction prayed for should be granted. In order, however, that the interests of the petitioners are protected it is directed that in the event of the petitioners succeeding and if it is held that any part of the additional fuel adjustment charges is not in accordance with the law then the excess amount so realised will either be refunded by the respondents or, at the option of the petitioners, be adjusted against future demands. In addition thereto, in such eventuality arising, the petitioners would also be entitled to interest at the rate of 18% per annum calculated from the date of the payment made by the till the date of repayment or adjustment, as the case may be.
    38. With the aforesaid observations the application for interim relief is disposed of and the interim orders staying the realisation of additional fuel adjustment charges are vacated. The petitioners are, however, granted four weeks' time to pay the amount which had been stayed. Parties to bear their own costs.
    Petition allowed.
    Interim orders vacated.
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    Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. Petitioners v. Municipal Corporation Of Delhi & Anr. S
    (May 23, 1984)