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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent plaintiff, Tara Mani, a widow residing in New Delhi, filed a suit in Delhi against the petitioners defendants based on a promissory note executed on 9-6-1978 in Bangalore. The note was payable on demand "at Bangalore or any part of India." Tara Mani was living in New Delhi with her relative and attorney, B.S. Gupta, who sent a demand for payment to the defendants on 12-3-1981. Subsequently, on 11-5-1981, Tara Mani's advocate issued a payment notice to the defendants. When no payment was made, the suit was filed on 28-5-1981. A preliminary issue was raised regarding the jurisdiction of the Delhi court. The lower court held that since the defendants agreed to pay on demand at any part of India, the plaintiff was entitled to sue in Delhi, a decision challenged by the defendants through this petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Delhi court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit on a promissory note payable on demand "at Bangalore or any part of India," when the plaintiff resided in Delhi and demanded payment there.
  2. Whether the common law rule that a debtor must seek the creditor applies to promissory notes payable on demand without a specified place of payment.
  3. The applicability of Sections 47, 48, and 49 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in determining the place of performance and jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The defendants agreed to make payment on demand at any part of India, including Delhi.
  • The common law rule that the debtor must seek the creditor applies, meaning the debtor should pay at the creditor's place of residence or business.
  • Since the demand for payment was made from Delhi and the plaintiff resided there, the place of payment and cause of action arose in Delhi.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Haldane v. Johnson (1853) 8 Exch. 689 Obligation of debtor to seek the creditor within the realm for payment. Illustrated the common law rule that the debtor must find the creditor for payment.
Walton v. Mascall (1841) 13 M. & W. 452 No notice or request needed unless stipulated; debtor must find creditor. Supported the principle that debtor is bound to find creditor and pay debt when due.
Robey & Co. v. The Snaefell Mining Co. Ltd. (1888) 20 QBD 152 Duty of debtor to send or bring money to creditor where no place specified. Confirmed debtor's duty to pay at creditor's location.
Thorn v. City Rice Mills (1889) 40 Ch.D 357 Place of payment fixed by creditor if multiple places named. Established creditor's right to select place of payment.
Thompson v. Palmer (1893) 2 QBD 80 Place of payment inferred from contract and circumstances. Rejected idea that payment tendered anywhere binds creditor; must be at reasonable place.
The Eider (1893) CA 119 Debtor must follow creditor when no place specified. Reaffirmed debtor's obligation to seek creditor unless creditor appoints place.
Soniram Jeet Mull v. R.D Tata and Co. Ltd., AIR 1927 PC 156 Place of payment implied as place where creditor's firm was located. Privy Council recognized implication of place of payment from contract terms.
Firm Hira Lal Girdhari Lal v. Baij Nath Hardial Khatri, AIR 1960 Punjab 450 Factors to determine place of payment and jurisdiction. Court must consider contract, circumstances, creditor's residence and dealings.
Manohar Oil Mills v. Bhawamdin, AIR 1971 All. 326 Common law rule as rule of evidence in certain contract cases. Rule applies not as law but as evidential presumption where statute silent.
National Building Contraction Corporation Ltd. v. The Vydsa Bank Ltd., ILR 1981, 1 Delhi 623 Common law rule partially applicable as part of contractual law. Supported limited application of debtor must seek creditor rule in India.
State of Punjab v. A.K Raha (Engineers) Ltd., AIR 1964 Cal. 418 Debtor must seek creditor where no place of payment specified. Reaffirmed universal application of common law rule in India.
S.P Consolidated Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1966 Cal. 259 Common law rule is universal, beneficent and founded on justice and equity. Held rule is not mere presumption but part of law unless place of payment indicated.
Bharumal v. Sekhawatmal, AIR 1956 Bom. 111 Common law rule applies in India in appropriate cases. Reiterated that debtor must find creditor and pay where creditor resides.
Jivatlal Purtapshi v. Lalbhai Fulchand Shah, AIR 1942 Bom. 251 Section 49 of Contract Act and common law rule do not apply to negotiable instruments. Held payment place is where demand communicated and received by debtor.
Sew Baran Saw & another v. Ram Charitra Dubey, AIR 1929 Cal. 306 Assignment recital of payment place does not confer jurisdiction. Confirmed that recital alone does not give right to sue at assignee's place.
Manek Devji v. Rathanbai, AIR 1950 Kutch 66 Kutch court lacked jurisdiction despite pronote payable anywhere. Held suit must be instituted where promisor resides if place not specified.
Sailum Eshwarayya v. Thakur Devi Singh, AIR 1953 Hyd. 289 Common law rule does not apply to promissory notes. Rejected applicability of debtor must seek creditor rule to pronotes.
J.N Sahni v. The State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1954 M.B 184 Common law rule inapplicable to pronotes payable on demand without specified place. Confirmed limitation of common law rule in such cases.
Md. Ishaq Khan v. Muhamad Islam Ullah Khan, AIR 1951 Lah. 481 Delhi court had jurisdiction when promissory note delivered and demand made in Delhi. Supported jurisdiction based on place of demand and residence.
Dorabji Nowrosjee Pajnigar v. Jamshelji Pestonji Mehta, AIR 1936 Bom. 218 Promissory note payable at multiple or unspecified places. Held no obligation on promisee to present note at specified place.
Chunilal Mayachand v. E.E Millard, AIR 1938 Bom. 278 Creditor's demand fixes place of payment for pronotes payable at any place. Confirmed creditor's demand location as place of payment.
Mehr Baksh v. Hari Chand, AIR 1935 Lah. 623 Definition of specified place depends on circumstances. Clarified concept of "specified place" equated to address.
Firm Sheikh Mohammad Ismail Maula Baksh v. Mian Abdul Majid Khan, AIR 1937 Lab. 259 Possession of promissory note sufficient if address unknown. Held no presentment necessary in such case.
Nanu Mal v. Finn Shibba Mal Nand Kishore, AIR 1939 Lah. 18 Payment presumed at usual place of business of creditor. Cause of action arises at creditor's business place; no presentment needed.
Srilal Singhania v. Anantlal Mondal, AIR 1940 Cal. 443 Common law rule applies to pronotes if no place specified. Supported application of debtor must seek creditor rule to pronotes.
Sha Dhanji v. She Newji Jivraj, AIR 1952 Kutch 58 Payment place stipulated specifically or generally in Khata. Contract to be performed at place selected by creditor.
Arunchalam Chettiar v. Muntgappa Chettiar, AIR 1956 Madras 629 Cause of action arises at place of note execution, delivery or payment. Suit may be filed at any of these places at plaintiff's option.
Bharumal v. Sekhawatmal, AIR 1956 Bom. 111 Common law rule that debtor should find creditor applies in India. Reiterated applicability of the rule in fit cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the jurisdiction issue under Section 20, Clause (G) of the Civil Procedure Code and relevant provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, focusing on the place of performance and payment. The promissory note was payable on demand "at Bangalore or any part of India," which the court interpreted as an indeterminate place or a place not specifically fixed. The court examined the established common law rule that the debtor must seek the creditor to make payment, a principle supported by various English and Indian authorities. However, the court noted that this rule does not generally apply to negotiable instruments such as promissory notes payable on demand without a specified place of payment.

Applying the legal principles and the facts, the court found that the plaintiff, residing in Delhi, had made the demand for payment from Delhi, and the defendants had remained silent without specifying any other reasonable place for payment. Under Section 49 of the Contract Act, the debtor should have sought the creditor at the place indicated or reasonably chosen. Given the creditor’s residence and the demand made in Delhi, the court concluded that the place of payment was Delhi, and thus the cause of action arose there. This justified the Delhi court's jurisdiction. The court further clarified that the Negotiable Instruments Act’s exception to presentment requirements reinforced the conclusion that the place of presentment does not determine jurisdiction in such cases. Consequently, the defendants were bound to make payment in Delhi, validating the lower court’s assumption of jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

The petition is dismissed.

The court upheld the jurisdiction of the Delhi court to entertain the suit on the promissory note payable on demand at an indeterminate place, given the plaintiff’s residence and demand for payment in Delhi. The ruling confirms that where a promissory note is payable on demand without a specified place, and the creditor demands payment at a particular place consistent with their residence, the debtor must make payment there. This decision directly affects the parties by affirming the Delhi court’s jurisdiction and does not establish a new precedent beyond the application of existing principles to the facts of this case.

    L.N Gupta v. Tara Mani .

    M.L Jain, J.:— The respondent plaintiff Tara Mani, a widow living in D-II/160, Kaka Nagar, New Delhi, filed a suit in Delhi against the petitioners defendants on the basis of a pronote which was made and delivered on 9-6-1978 in Bangalore in her favour by the petitioners defendants payable on demand ‘at Bangalore or any part of India’. In New Delhi she was living with her relative and attorney B.S Gupta. On 12-3-1981 B.S Gupta wrote from New Delhi to the petitioners to remit the amount due to her within 30 days. On 11-5-1981 her advocate upon instructions from Smt. Tara Mani by a notice called upon the petitioners to pay the amount due within seven days. Since no payment was forthcoming, the present suit was filed on 28-5-1981.

    2. Upon an objection, a preliminary issue was framed whether the Delhi court had any jurisdiction. The learned Addl. District Judge was of the view that the defendants agreed to make payment on demand at any part of India. So, if payment could be demanded in Delhi in terms of the contract, suit could also lie at Delhi. The choice was left with the plaintiff on the basis of the contract between the parties and the defendants cannot now contend that the suit could be instituted only in Bangalore. By his order of 26-11-1982, the learned Judge decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, this petition.

    3. Upon hearing the counsel, I am of the view that the petition ought to be dismissed.

    4. Under Section 20, C1. (G), C.P.C, a suit can be filed in a court in whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. Place of performance in full or in part of a contract and, therefore, the place of payment or of part payment will give rise to a cause of action in that place. Such place can be specified at the time of making the contract, may be appointed later on, or may be implied. Indian Contract Act, 1872, Sections 47, 48 and 49 deal with the place of performance. So far as the stipulated place is concerned, there should ordinarily be no problem. But where the contract is silent about the place, and (i) the promisee is not required to indicate the place, the place of performance shall be the place at which the promise ought to be performed, or the promisor must ask the promisee for a reasonable place, and (2) where the promisee is required to specify the place, at the place appointed by him, provided such place is a proper place. Now, there may arise situations in which the promisee is not required to specify the place or if required does not so specify the place, or if the place so specified is neither reasonable nor proper, then the court may be called upon to look for loci solutionis, that is the proper place of performance. This the court can do by taking into consideration all the relevant factors.

    5. In England, in a situation of this kind one of the basic rules has been that the creditor should seek the debtor, worked out in practice, it means that the debtor should make payment at the place where at the relevant time the creditor lives, carries on business or works for gains as the case may be. Mr. Gopal Narain for the respondent urged that this rule is as well applicable to the case under consideration.

    6. In 1481 in his Estates and Tenures, Sir Thomas Littleton observed “the feoffor is bound to seek the feoffee, if he be then in any other place within the realm of England”. According to Sheppard's Touchstone, “when an obligation is to pay a sum of money, do any like transitory thing to the obligee on a day certain, but no place is set down, it must be done to the person of the obligee wheresoever he be, and for this purpose, the obligor must at his peril seek out the obligee if he be intra qua-tuor maria (infra regnum Angliae) but if he be not within the kingdom, he is not bound to seek him, and yet the condition is not broken. And if the thing to be done be either local, i.e such a thing as must be done in or at a place certain, as the making of a feo:7ment of land, payment of rent or the like, in this case the thing must be done at that very place and a tender of doing it in that place is a sufficient performance of the condition.” The simple reason for this is that the obligee has contracted to do so: Haldane v. Johnson, (1853) 8 Exch. 689. In 1844, in Walton v. Mascall, (1841) 13 M. & W. 452, Parker B. said: “A request for payment of a debt is quite immaterial, unless the parties to the contract have stipulated that it shall be made; if they have not, the law requires no notice or request but the debtor is bound to find out the creditor and pay him the debt when due.” “It behoveth him that made that obligation to seek him to whom the obligation is made, if he be in England.”: Fessard v. Mugaier (1865) 18 C.B (N.S) 286. In Robey & Co. v. The Snaefell Mining Co. Ltd., (1888) 20 QBD 152, there was no definite agreement as to where the money was to be paid. Stephen J. observed that the debtors having to pay for the goods it was their duty to send or bring the money to the creditors. This, in practice, would impose little inconvenience on the defendant. In Thorn v. City Rice Mills, (1889) 40 Ch.D 357, there were two places named. It was held that it was for the person to whom payment is to be made to fix the place at which he will be paid. Until he has selected the place at which he will be paid, there can be no default. In Thompson v. Palmer and another, (1893) 2 QBD 80, there was no express provision as to the place of payment. Lopes L.J said that we must draw the best inference we can from the terms of the contract and to some extent from the surrounding circumstances. The reasonable inference in the case was that the payment was to be made in a place where the plaintiff carried on business, and he would probably be and could give a discharge for the moneys or where he would have an agent who could. He rejected the suggestion that the payment might be tendered at any place and that the plaintiff would be bound to take it, if so tendered. In The Eider (1893) CA 119, there was no place specified in the contract for payment. What then is the ordinary rule? Lord Esher M R. answered that the debtor must follow his creditor, and must pay where the creditor is. Bowen L.J answered that the general rule is that where no place of payment is specified either expressly or by implication, the debtor must seek his creditor. “If no certain place be appointed in the contract for performance, and it requires the presence of the promisee, it must in general, be made or tendered to him, wherever he may be; subject to the condition in some cases of his appointing a proper place.”: Leake on Contracts (1921 ed.). These are the dimensions of the rule.

    7. Despite Soniram Jeet Mull v. R.D Tata and Company Ltd., AIR 1 27 PC. 156, a controversy has been carried on whether this principle is applicable in India. The contract in that case did not say where the moneys were to be paid. The Privy Council observed that the implication was indisputable that they were to be paid at the place where the respondent's firm was. Such inference can justly be drawn from the terms of the contract itself or from the necessities of the case, involving in the obligation to pay the creditor, the further obligation of rinding the creditor so as to pay him. A Full Bench decision in Firm Hira Lal Girdhari Lal and another v. Baij Nath Hardial Khatri, AIR 1960 Punjab 450, came to hold that in order to find whether the money was agreed exoressly or impliedly to be paid within its territorial jurisdiction, the court is entitled to take into consideration the contract, its attending circumstances, the creditor's ordinary place of residence or business and the course of dealings between the parties including all the other factors relevant in a given case, but it cannot assume jurisdiction solely on the basis of the English common law rule that where there is no express agreement that payment is to be made at a particular place, a debtor must seek his creditor as that rule is not applicable in India, as a matter of law, to determine the forum where the suit is to be instituted. Manohar Oil Mills and another v. Bhawamdin AIR 1971 All. 326, and Ram Subramaniam v. Ranga rathan, 1978 Ker. L.T 906, have found that to the cases in which Section 49 of the Contract Act does not apply, the common law doctrine applies ‘not as a rule of law but as a rule of evidence’. I am in respectful agreement with the statement, but partly. What is a rule of evidence, if it is not a rule of law? 1, therefore, agree that the common law rule should be invoked in such cases not merely as a rule to help locate the forum but as a part of the law relating to contractual obligations where the statute is silent in the matter. Avadh Behari J. has, therefore, with his usual caution concluded that we cannot totally exclude the application of this rule from our law: National Building Contraction Corporation Ltd. v. The Vydsa Bank Ltd., ILR. 1981, 1 Delhi 623. In State of Punjab v. A.K Raha (Engineers) Ltd., AIR 1964 Cal. 418, it was observed:

    “Where no place of payment is specified in the contract either expressly or impliedly, the debtor must seek the creditor; the obligation to pay the debt involves the obligation to find the creditor and to pay him at the place where he is when the money is payable.”

    8. The position of law could not have been stated more categorically than it was done in S.P Consolidated Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and another, AIR 1966 Cal. 259. The learned Judge said:

    “The English Common Law Rule that ‘a debtor must seek the creditor’ is universal in its application, since it is founded on justice and equity. It is surely not a technical rule of English law, wrongly made applicable to India. It is a beneficient rule, inflexible and is of universal application. The rule cannot be said to be nothing more than a presumption rebuttable by contrary evidence. When there is evidence to indicate the place where the parties to a contract intended that the debt was payable, then the court will hold that such place of payment has been indicated in the contract itself, though not expressly but by implication. The occasion for applying the rule, as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience, would arise only when the court finds that no place of payment is expressly stated in the contract nor is it possible to find such place of payment indicated in the contract by necessary implication, on the relevant evidence on record.”

    9. Following Bharumal v. Sekhawatmal, AIR 1956 Bom. 111, it was held in Shobasingh and Sons v. Saurashtra Iron Foundary and Steel Works (Pvt.) Ltd. AIR 1968 Guj. 276, that the common law rule that the debtor should find the creditor and pay the debts where the creditor resides, applied in India in fit cases. I am in respectful agreement with this reiteration.

    10. But a further question still survives whether the rule is applicable to promissory notes. Can a payee file a suit in the place where he lives, carries on business or works for gain, for recovery of money payable on demand but without specifying the place of payment? Jivatlal Purtapshi and others v. Lalbhai Fulchand Shah, AIR (29) 1942 Bom. 251, laid down that Section 49 of the Contract Act, 1872 and common law rule that the creditor must seek out his creditor in order to pay him, did not apply to negotiable instruments. The moneys due under the pronote being payable on demand, the natural inference was that the moneys were payable at the place where the demand was communicated to and received by the debtor. In that case the demand for payment was made from Bombay by notice addressed to the debtor at Ahmedabad. No reply was sent to that notice by the debtor. It was held that the moneys were payable at Ahmedabad and the court at Bombay had no jurisdiction. As per Sew Baran Saw & another v. Ram Charitra Dubey and others, AIR 1929 Cal. 306, where the creditor recited in the assignment that the money due on the promissory note assigned should be paid at the place where the assignee resides, it cannot give the assignee a right to sue on the promissory note in the court of that piace. In Manek Devji v. Rathanbai w/o Khetu Devji, AIR (37) 1950 Kutch 66, the plaintiff brought a suit in the Kutch court on a promissory note executed in Bombay by the defendant who was a resident of Bombay. There was a recital in the pronote that the amount was payable anywhere. It was held that the Kutch court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Sailum Eshwarayya v. Thakur Devi Singh, AIR 1953 Hyd. 289, laid down that the common law rule does not apply to pronotes. J.N Sahni v. The State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1954 M.B 184, said that it does not apply to a pronote payable on demand and which is not payable at a specified place. On the other hand, in Md. Ishaq Khan v. Muhamad Islam Ullah Khan and others, AIR 1951 Lah. 481, the plaintiff had executed a pronote in U.P but had delivered the pronote at Delhi to the payee who was a widow, living in Delhi, and she made demands upon the defendant from Delhi and it was held that the Delhi court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

    11. It seems to be that under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the place of presentment of a promissory note largely determines the place of payment, but the exception to Section 64 of the said Act provides that where a promissory note is payable on demand and is not payable at a specified place, no presentment is necessary in order to charge the maker thereof. What should then be done in such a case? I think in such a case the common law rule can legitimately be invoked. In Dorabji Nowrosjee Pajnigar v. Jamshelji Pestonji Mehta, AIR 1936 Bom. 218, the money was payable at “Poona, Bombay or elsewhere”. It was held that the pronote no doubt could have been presented at Bombay or Poona but being payable elsewhere it is also payable at a place not specified. It does not make it incumbent upon the promisee to present it at any specified place. In Chunilal Mayachand v. E.E Millard, AIR 1938 Bom. 278, in a similar type of a pronote, it was held that it was a promote payable on demand at any place and since the creditor demanded payment in Bombay that fixes the place of payment and makes it unnecessary for the promisor to apply to the promisee to fix a place for payment under Section 49 of the Contract Act. There was no option with the creditor to make a demand upon the debtor to pay him at such place as he chose. According to Mehr Baksh v. Hari Chand, AIR 1935 Lah. 623, what constitutes a specified place depends upon the circumstances of each case. Specified place is equal to “address.” If that is not known, mere possession is sufficient and no presentment is necessary: Firm Sheikh Mohammad Ismail Maula Baksh v. Mian Abdul Majid Khan and another, AIR 1937 Lab. 259. According to Nanu Mal v. Finn Shibba Mal Nand Kishore and others, AIR 1939 Lah. 18, where a pronote does not specify any place where the payment was to be made, it should be presumed that the payment was to be made at a usual place of buiness of the creditor and the cause of action arises in that place because no presentment is necessary when the suit is against the maker of a pronote In Srilal Singhania v. Anantlal Mondal, AIR (27) 1940 Cal. 443, it was held that the common law rule applies to pronotes if no place for payment is specified. In Sha Dhanji and another v. She Newji Jivraj and another, AIR 1952 Kutch 58, it was held that a Khata may contain a stipulation for payment at any place specifically or generally. In such a case the contract is to be performed at a place at which the creditor wants the payment to be made. In Arunchalam Chttiar and another v. Muntgappa Chettiar and another, AIR 1956 Madras 629, it was observed that if a note is executed at one place and delivered at another or made payable at another place, part of the cause of action arises at each one of those places and the suit may be filed at any place at the option of the plaintiff.

    12. Now, in the present case, the moneys were payable on demand “at Bangalore or at any part of India”. Any place in India is apparently an indeterminate place. It amounts to a place not specified. No presentment is necessary under the law as the suit was against the maker of the pronote. The place of payment has, therefore, got to be ascertained. It seems to me that if the payee chooses to exclude Bangalore, the other alter native place will be a place appointed by mutual agreement and if not, then, by the creditor. Since the widow lived in Delhi, and she sent the demand notices from Delhi, it is clear that the money was to be paid to her in Delhi. That is confirmed by the discreet silence on the part of the defendants. If they had any doubt about the place of payment, was it not their obligation to apply to her that either she should accept payment at Bangalore or she should specify any other reasonable place in terms of Section 49 of the Contract Act? All the surrounding circumstances and silence on the part of the drawer indicate that payment was to be made at Delhi. Exception to Section 64 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, further makes it clear that the place of presentment in such a case will not determine the place of payment. It was not a pronote endorsed and the defendants could not complain that he could not run after the assignee, as his obligation under the common law was only to find the original creditor. Where two places are named for payment or performance, the choice lies presumptively with the creditor or promisee who must give notice of the place as a condition of charging the debtor or promisor in default: Leake on Contracts, P. 640 (1921 ed.) (Rippinghall v. Llyod), (1834) 5 B & Ad. 742). I am, therefore, of the view that the rule that the debtor must find the creditor is applicable to promissory notes payable on demand in which the place of payment is not specified or where alternative places are mentioned. As a result of the discussion of law and the facts of this case, one can safely say that the defendants were bound to make payment in Delhi.

    13. I, therefore, hold that the learned lower court was correct in assuming jurisdiction and dismiss this revision petition. The costs here shall abide the result of the suit.

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    Comments

    L.N Gupta v. Tara Mani .
    (May 9, 1983)