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citation codes
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  • S.59 of the T.P Act and Ss.17(b), 48 and 49 of the Registration Act.10.
  • S.17 of the Registration Act. Lord Carson,
  • PUNJAB RELIEF OF INDEBTEDNESS ACT 1934
  • S.48 of the Registration Act
  • S.17 of the Registration Act
  • S.17 Registration Act 1908
  • S.58(f) of the T.P Act)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S.59 of the T.P Act and Ss.17(b), 48 and 49 of the Registration Act.10.
  • S.17 of the Registration Act. Lord Carson,
  • PUNJAB RELIEF OF INDEBTEDNESS ACT 1934
  • S.48 of the Registration Act
  • S.17 of the Registration Act
  • S.17 Registration Act 1908
  • S.58(f) of the T.P Act)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Ishwar Dass Malhotra, filed a suit seeking recovery of Rs. 17,500 based on mortgages of two properties located in Rajouri Garden, New Delhi: house No. J-6/87 and house No. J-7/24. The defendant 1, Dhanwant Singh, was alleged to have taken loans from Malhotra secured by these mortgages. Defendants 2 to 5 were subsequent purchasers of the mortgaged properties. The trial court decreed the suit only against Dhanwant Singh and dismissed the suit against defendants 2 to 5 with costs. It was held that Dhanwant Singh was not competent to mortgage property No. J-6/87, and no enforceable mortgage existed over it, while the mortgage on property No. J-7/24 was recognized but the subsequent purchaser, defendant 5, was held not liable as a bona fide purchaser. Malhotra was awarded interest at 6% per annum instead of the claimed 7½%. Malhotra appealed against this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Dhanwant Singh validly created an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds over the two properties, particularly property No. J-6/87 and property No. J-7/24.
  2. Whether the subsequent purchasers of the mortgaged properties (defendants 2 to 5) are liable under the mortgage or protected as bona fide purchasers for value without notice.
  3. Whether the memorandum (Ex. P-2) evidencing the deposit of title deeds required registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, and if non-registration affects its admissibility and evidentiary value.
  4. The correct rate of interest to be awarded on the loan amount.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Malhotra contended that Dhanwant Singh took loans secured by equitable mortgages on the two properties by deposit of title deeds.
  • He alleged collusion between Dhanwant Singh and Smt. Indrawati regarding property No. J-6/87, as the sale deeds for both properties were executed on the same date, suggesting improper transfer of title deeds to enable mortgage creation.
  • Malhotra argued that the memorandum (Ex. P-2) evidencing the mortgage was contemporaneous and constituted the contract, thus requiring registration.
  • He claimed interest at 7½% per annum on the loan amounts.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Dhanwant Singh denied executing any mortgage by deposit of title deeds over property No. J-7/24.
  • Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, the subsequent purchaser of property No. J-7/24, claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of any mortgage, having received assurances that the property was free of encumbrances and having made independent inquiries.
  • Respondents contended that the memorandum (Ex. P-2) was not registered and thus inadmissible in evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.J Nathan v. S.V Maruthi Rao, AIR 1965 SC 430 Distinction between equitable mortgage under English law and mortgage by deposit of title deeds under Indian T.P. Act, Section 58(f). Clarified that mortgage by deposit of title deeds is a legal mortgage transferring interest in property; subsequent purchasers cannot avoid such mortgage by bona fide purchase without notice.
M. Subramanian v. M. L.R.M. Lutchman, AIR 1923 PC 50 Whether a memorandum evidencing mortgage requires registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Held that if the memorandum is the sole repository of the mortgage contract, it requires registration and is inadmissible if unregistered.
Rachpal Mahraj v. Bhagwandas Daruka, AIR 1950 SC 272 Requirement of registration for memorandum accompanying deposit of title deeds when it constitutes the contract. Established that such a memorandum integral to the mortgage contract requires registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act.
Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar, AIR 1931 PC 36 Nature of memorandum listing title deeds and whether it requires registration. Held that a memorandum not embodying terms of agreement does not require registration.
Hari Shankar v. Kedar Nath, AIR 1939 PC 167 Registration requirement for written contractual agreements integral to mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Confirmed that such written agreements must be registered as they create interests in immovable property.
United Bank of India v. Lekharam S. and Co., AIR 1965 SC 1591 Whether a letter accompanying deposit of title deeds requires registration. Determined that the letter was not integral to the transaction and thus did not require registration.
V.G Rao v. Andhra Bank, AIR 1971 SC 1613 Intention of parties to reduce bargain to document form and consequent registration requirement. Held that if parties intend to reduce the mortgage bargain to a document, registration is required; otherwise, the contract arises by implication from deposit.
Parkash Dev v. New Bank of India, AIR 1968 Delhi 244 Registration necessity when memorandum constitutes the bargain creating mortgage. Confirmed that registration is necessary when memorandum itself constitutes the mortgage contract.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the facts and legal principles as follows:

  • Regarding property No. J-6/87, since Dhanwant Singh had already sold it to Smt. Indrawati before purportedly mortgaging it, he lacked legal title to mortgage it. Malhotra's allegation of collusion was unproven, so no mortgage existed on this property, and subsequent purchasers could not be held liable.
  • For property No. J-7/24, the court found that an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds was created as evidenced by the pronotes, receipts, and continuous security of title deeds with Malhotra, despite the memorandum (Ex. P-2) being inadmissible due to non-registration.
  • The court rejected the trial court’s finding that the subsequent purchaser, Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, was not liable due to bona fide purchase without notice. Under Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 48 of the Registration Act, a mortgage by deposit of title deeds transfers interest in the property, and subsequent purchasers take subject to such mortgage regardless of notice or bona fide status.
  • On the issue of registration, the court extensively reviewed precedents to determine that the memorandum (Ex. P-2) was integral to the mortgage contract and thus required registration. Its non-registration rendered it inadmissible. However, the mortgage was also established on other documentary and factual evidence, including pronotes and continuous possession of title deeds by Malhotra, satisfying the essentials of mortgage by deposit of title deeds (debt, deposit, and intent).
  • The court apportioned the loan amount into two parts: Rs. 8,500/- (first loan) with interest at 6%, and Rs. 7,500/- (subsequent loans) secured by mortgage with interest at 7½% as agreed, applying the Punjab Relief and Indebtedness Act, 1934, as extended to Delhi.
  • The court also dismissed the appellant's objection to the trial court's acceptance of fee certificates filed before final hearing, holding that the relevant High Court Rules allowed such filing.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is partly allowed.

  • The appeal against defendants 2, 3, and 4 (subsequent purchasers of property No. J-6/87) is dismissed with costs, confirming they are not liable as no mortgage existed on that property.
  • The trial court’s decree for Rs. 9,300/- (Rs. 8,500 principal plus Rs. 800 interest) against defendant 1 (Dhanwant Singh) with interest at 6% per annum is affirmed.
  • The appeal against defendants 1 and 5 regarding Rs. 8,200/- (Rs. 7,500 principal plus Rs. 700 interest) is allowed, granting a mortgage decree with interest at 7½% per annum secured against property No. J-7/24, with an order that if payment is not made within six months, the mortgaged property may be sold to satisfy the amount due.

The decision clarifies that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is a legal mortgage transferring interest in the property and that subsequent purchasers take subject to such mortgage regardless of their bona fide status or notice. It also emphasizes the registration requirement of documents integral to such mortgage contracts and the evidentiary consequences of non-registration. No new precedent beyond application of established principles was set.

    Sh. Ishar Dass Malhotra v. Sh. Dhanwant Singh And Others

    D.P WADHWA, J.:— The appellant, Ishwar Dass Malhotra, filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 17,500/- based on the mortgage of two properties. Dhanwant Singh defendant 1 (respondent 1 herein) was the person stated to have taken loans from the plaintiff-appellant on the basis of these mortgages while defendants-respondents 2 to 5 were the persons who had allegedly purchased the mortgaged properties subsequently. The suit of Malhotra was decreed but only against defendant 1, Dhanwant Singh, and his suit as against defendants 2 to 5 was dismissed with costs. It was held that Dhanwant Singh was not competent to mortgage one property and as regards the other property no mortgage was enforceable. Malhotra was also awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum and not at 7½% per annum as claimed by him. Aggrieved Malhotra has appealed to this Court

    2. The two mortgaged properties are: (1) house No. J-6/37, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi, and (2) house No. J-7/24, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi. At the relevant time property No. J-6/87 was a plot of land and was owned by Dhanwant Singh who, by a sale deed dt. 11-3-1966 sold the same to Smt. Indrawati, respondent-defendant 2. The sale deed was registered on 17-3-1966. Smt. Indrawati constructed a single storeyed house thereon and sold the same to respondents-defendants 3 and 4 namely Smt. Basant Kaur and Smt. Harbans Kaur, respectively by a sale deed dated 10-10-1966. Incidentally, it may be noted, during the pendency of the present appeal Smt. Basant Kaur died and her legal heirs were brought on record. Reference to Smt. Basant Kaur would therefore mean reference to her legal representatives.

    Property No. J-7/24 at that time was single storeyed house and was owned by Smt. Indrawati. She sold this house along with the plot to Dhawant Singh on 11-3-1966, and the sale deed was also registered on the same date. Dhanwant Singh, in turn, sold this property to Harjeet Singh Dhanjal respondent-defendant No. 5 by a sale deed dt. 5-6-1975.

    3. The case of Malhotra is that on 18-5-1966 Dhanwant Singh took a loan of Rs. 8500/- with interest at the rate of 7½% per annum from him and executed a pronote and also deposited title deeds of the aforesaid two properties with him as security for repayment of the amount. Later on the same date Dhanwant Singh also gave a memorandum in writing regarding deposit of the titled deeds to Malhotra. This memorandum is Ex. P. 2 and is the subject-matter of considerable controversy between the parties. Dhanwant Singh took a further loan of Rs. 4500/- from Malhotra on 20-5-1967 and executed a pronote for Rs. 13,000/- which included the loan of Rs. 8500/- which had been advanced to him by Malhotra earlier. The title deeds were agreed to be kept as security for this loan of Rs. 4500/- as well. Again on 4-5-1971 Dhanwant Singh took yet another loan of Rs. 3000/- from Malhotra and executed a consolidated pronote of Rs. 16,000/- and allowed the titled deeds to be kept with the plaintiff as security for this loan as well. It was stated by Malhotra that Dhanwant Singh paid him interest up to 3-5-1971 and he also received a further sum of Rs. 39,000/- from Dhanwant Singh as interest on different occasions. A sum of Rs. 1500/- towards interest remained due to Malhotra from defendant Dhanwant Singh on the date of the institution of the suit apart from the principal amount of Rs. 16,000/-.

    4. A perusal of the facts narrated above would show that property No. J-6/87 had already been sold by Dhanwant Singh to Smt. Indrawati when Dhanwant Singh is stated to have deposited the titled deeds of this property with the plaintiff Malhotra. Since Dhanwant Singh was not having any legal title to this property, he could not create any mortgage by means of deposit of title deeds of this property or otherwise. Malhotra has alleged that there was a collusion between Dhanwant Singh and Smt. Indrawati. Otherwise, he claimed, there was no occasion for Smt. Indrawati to hand over the title deeds of this property to Dhanwant Singh for the purpose of creating the mortgage. In support of this submission Malhotra refers to the fact that the sale deeds in respect of both the properties were executed on the same date, i.e 11-3-1966, by which Smt. Indrawati sold her property (No. J-7/24) to Dhanwant Singh and Dhanwant Singh sold his property (No. J-6/87) to Smt. Indrawati. Smt. Indrawati has, however, denied any such collusion. Apart from making a bald averment in the plaint no evidence has been led to prove the alleged collusion between Dhanwant Singh and Smt. Indrawati. The collusion having not been proved, the question of there being any mortgage by deposit of title deeds in respect of property No. J-6/87 does not arise. Smt. Indrawati cannot, therefore, be held liable for the loan raised by Dhanwant Singh from Malhotra and property No. J-6/87 could not be the subject-matter of any mortgage. Similarly, defendants Smt. Basant Kaur and Smt. Harbans Kaur, who subsequently purchased property No. J-6/87 from Smt. Indrawati, also cannot be made liable. In fact, Mr. Bharat Inder Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, was himself not very enthusiastic about the mortgage being enforced in respect of property No. J-6/87, and we did not think it necessary to call upon counsel for defendants 2, 3 and 4 to address any argument on this point.

    5. That takes us to the determination of the contest between the plaintiff Malhotra and Dhanwant Singh and Harjeet Singh Dhanjal in respect of property No. J-7/24, Dhanwant Singh admits the raising of loan but denies that he ever executed any mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Harjeet Singh Dhanjal who is the subsequent purchaser of this property states that he is the bona fide purchaser for value of this property from Dhanwant Singh and that when he brought it he was not having any notice of any mortgage and, on the other hand, assurances were given to him by Dhanwant Singh that the property was free from all encumbrances and that he (Harjeet Singh Dhanjal) also made independent inquiries to find out if the property was encumbered. According to Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, there was no equitable mortgage in respect of this property and that it was only Dhanwant Singh who could be personally liable.

    6. At the time when Dhanwant Singh took the loan of Rs. 8500/- from Malhotra a memorandum (Ex. P-2) evidencing deposit of title deeds was written by him to Malhotra. It will be appropriate to reproduce the said memorandum :

    “Shri Ishwar Dass Malhotra,

    3918, Near Jagat Cinema,

    Delhi.

    I have already created an equitable mortgage to you for Rs. 8500/- (Eight thousand five hundred only) together with interest @ 7½% P.A from 18-5-1966 till payment in full in respect of property—

    Single storey house built on plot No. J-7/24 area 146 square yards and plot No. 87 Block J-6, 160 yards free hold plot in Badi of Rajouri Gardens area of village Tatarpur, Delhi State and deposited the deeds as follows :—

    (A) Sale deed for Rs. 22,000/- dt. 11-3-1966 by Shrimati Indrawati in my favour registered vide No. 1591 Bahi No. 1 Vol. 464 pages 131 to 133 on 17-3-1966.

    (B) Sale deed fro Rs. 10,000/- dt. 12-4-1965 by Supreme Enterprises (P) Ltd., Gokhale Market, Delhi in favour of Shrimati Indrawati registered vide No. 1429 Addl. Book No. 1 Vol. 377 pages 111 to 113 on 19-4-1965.

    (C) (Illegible) sanctioned by MC Delhi vide orders dt. 26-7-1965.

    (D) Gift deed dt. 12-2-1965 for Rs. 3600/- of 1/2 plot No. 87 Block J-6 (J6/87) by S. Tripat Singh in my favour.

    (E) Sale deed dt. 9-2-1958 for Rs. 1257.62 by DLR in favour of myself and S. Tripat Singh.

    Dhanwant Singh

    18-5-1966

    At the time when the loan of Rs. 4500/- was taken on 20-5-1967 Dhanwant Singh wrote receipt Ex. P-6 which is as under:—

    “Received the sum of Rs. 13,000.00 (Rs. Thirteen thousand only) on account of pronote dated today as following:—

    Cheque No. 0041803 dt. 18-5-1966-on the Bank of India Ltd., New Delhi vide pronote dt. 18-5-1966 (for) Rs. Eight thousand and five hundred only (Rs. 8500/-).

    Cheque No. 0041821 dt. 20-5-1967 on the Bank of India Ltd., New Delhi (Ajmer Gate Extension Branch) for (Rs. Four thousand and five hundred only) Rs. 4500.00

    Delhi,Dhanwant Singh

    Dated 20-5-1967.20-5-1967

    Again, at the time when the loan of Rs. 3000/- was taken on 4-5-1971 Dhanwant Singh executed receipt Ex. P-8 which is as follows :—

    “Received the sum of Rs. Sixteen thousand only (16,000.00) on account of pronote dated today as following :—

    Rs. 13,000.00 (Thirteen thousand) on a/c of Dhanwant Singh's equitable mortgage dated today a 20-5-1967. Rs. 3000.00 (Three thousand) cash received today. Total Rs. 16,000.00—

    DelhiDhanwant Singh

    4-5-1971

    Reference may also be made to another documents being letter dt. 16-5-1970 which was written by Dhanwant Singh to Malhotra, the plaintiff. It is Ex. P-12. The relevant portion of this letter reads:—

    “With reference to your letter, telegram and notice I hereby inform you that I have made the following payments towards interest of equitable mortgage deed of 20-5-1967 for Rs. 13,000/- in your favour and request you to wait for another three months for full payment. Interest will be paid regularly...........”

    7. Various issues were framed by the Court. The trial Court held that there was an ‘equitable mortgage’ in respect of property No. J-7/24. It, however, held that the transfer of this property in favour of Harjeet Singh Dhanjal defendant 5, was not subject to equitable mortgage inasmuch as he was a bona fide purchaser for value of and taken all reasonable care and had acted in good faith. The trial Court negatived the contention of Dhanwant Singh that he had paid back the full amount of loan and interest to Malhotra. Accordingly, it passed a decree with costs for Rs. 17,500/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum in favour of the plaintiff and against Dhanwant Singh defendant 1 only.

    8. The expression ‘equitable mortgage’ does not find mention in the T.P Act, 1882. S.58(f) of the Act describes mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It is as good as any other mode of creating a legal mortgage whereunder there will be transfer of interest in the property mortgaged to the mortgagee. The expression ‘equitable mortgage’ which is known in the English law is loosely used to mean a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Rather it can be said that in India a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is commonly known as an equitable mortgage but its incidents are not the same as that of an equitable mortgage under the English law. In K.J Nathan v. S.V Maruthi Rao AIR 1965 SC 430, distinction between an equitable mortgage, as understood in the English law, and the mortgage by deposit of title deeds has been brought out by the Supreme Court. Subba Rao, J., (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court, observed as under :—

    “Under this definition (referring to S.58(f) of the T.P Act) the essential requisites of mortgage by deposit of title deeds are, (i) debt, (ii) deposit of title deeds and (iii) an intention that the deeds shall be security for the debt. Though such a mortgage is often described as an equitable mortgage, there is an essential distinction between an equitable mortgage as understood in English law and the mortgage by deposit of title deeds recognised under the T.P Act in India. In England an equitable mortgage can be created either, (1) by actual deposit of title-deeds in which case parol evidence is admissible to show the meaning of the deposit and the extent of the security created, or (2) if there be no deposit of title-deeds, then by a memorandum in writing, purporting to create a security for money advanced: see White and Tudor's Leading Cases in equity, 9th edition Vol. 2 at P. 77. In either case it does not operate as an actual conveyance though it is enforceable in equity; whereas under the T.P Act a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is one of the modes of creating a legal mortgage whereunder there will be transfer of interest in the property mortgaged to the mortgagee. This distinction will have to be borne in mind in appreciating the scope of the English decisions cited at the Bar. This distinction is also the basis for the view that for the purpose of priority it stood on the same footing as a mortgage by deed”.

    It will thus be seen that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is like any other mortgage and there is a transfer of interest in the property mortgaged to the mortgagee. The question, therefore, of the subsequent purchaser having bought the property subject to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds bona fide, with or without notice, is of no relevance. The subsequent purchaser cannot avoid the mortgage by leading evidence to show that he made all reasonable inquiries to find out if the property was subject to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds or not. S.48 of the T.P Act does not admit of any such exception. According to this section, when a person purports to create, by transfer at different times, rights in or over the same immovable property, and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created. Further, proviso to S.48 of the Registration Act enacts that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds shall take effect as against any mortgage deed subsequently executed and registered relating to the same property. Thus, a subsequent sale cannot have priority over a mortgage by deposit of title deeds created before the sale. In my view, therefore, the trial Court fell in an error in holding that Harjeet Singh Dhanjal the subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged property; was not liable on the ground that he took all reasonable care and acted in good faith.

    9. Before us the argument proceeded on a different line. It was argued by Mr. C.B Thanai, learned counsel for Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, that the memorandum (Ex. P-2) was compulsorily registrable under S.17 of the Registration Act and as the same was not registered, it was in-admissible in evidence and any oral evidence was barred under S.91 of the Evidence Act. At the time when P-2 was put in evidence it was objected to on the ground of admissibility. The trial Court has not touched this point in its judgment. It is a legal point, and a vexed one. The law relating to registration of a document, like in the instant case, is to be found in S.59 of the T.P Act and Ss.17(b), 48 and 49 of the Registration Act.

    10. There have been quite a number of cases in the High Courts all over the country, some of which reached the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, in which a mortgage, alleged to have been effected by deposit of title deeds, has been accompanied by a written document, and in which a question has arisen as to whether that document was of such a character as to require registration. The decision in each case has turned upon the nature of the document in question. It is, therefore, unnecessary to multiply the authorities, and it would be sufficient if reference is made to some of the cases decided by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court and also to one decision of this Court.

    11. In M. Subramanian v. M. L.R.M. Lutchman AIR 1923 PC 50, it was held that if the memorandum was of such a nature that it could be treated as the contract for the mortgage which the parties considered to be the only repository and appropriate evidence of their agreement, it would be the instrument by which equitable mortgage was created and would come within S.17 of the Registration Act. Lord Carson, speaking for the Board, observed:—

    “Turning to the document itself, one is led to the same conclusion. “We hand you herewith title deeds, etc.... This please hold as security, etc.... Please also hold this as further security.” Their Lordships have no doubt therefore that the memorandum in question was the bargain between the parties, and that without its production in evidence the plaintiff could establish no claim, and as it was unregistered it ought to have been rejected.”

    In Rachpal Mahraj v. Bhagwandas Daruka AIR 1950 SC 272, the Supreme Court dealt with question of registration of the memorandum given along with the titled deeds. Patanjali Sastri, J. (as his Lordship then was) who spoke for the Court, stated the law as under:—

    “When the debtor deposits with the creditor the title deeds of his property with intent to create a security, the law implies a contract between the parties to create a mortgage, and no registered instrument is required under S.59 as in other forms of mortgage. But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, the implication is excluded by their express bargain, and the documents will be the sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage. As the deposit alone is not intended to create the charge and the document, which constitutes the bargain regarding the security, is also necessary and operates to create the charge in conjunction with the deposit, it requires registration under S.17 Registration Act 1908 as a non-testamentary instrument creating an interest in immovable property, where the value of such property is one hundred rupees and upwards. The time factor is not decisive. The documents may be handed over to the creditor along with the title deeds and yet may not be registrable......”

    In Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar AIR 1931 PC 36 dealing with a memorandum which consisted of a list of the title deeds and contained a recital that ‘As agreed upon in person, I have delivered to you the undermentioned documents as security’-the Privy Council held that it recorded particulars of documents which, it stated, had been delivered as security in pursuance of an agreement reached in person. It did not state what were the terms of the agreement nor did it indicate the nature of the matter for which the deeds were deposited as security. Since the memorandum in question did not embody the terms of the agreement between the parties, it was held, that it did not require registration. In Hari Shankar v. Kedar Nath AIR 1939 PC 167, the Board was of the opinion that:—

    “....... Where, as here, the parties professing to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds contemporaneously enter into a contractual agreement, in writing, which is made an integral part of the transaction and is itself an operative instrument and not merely evidential, such a document must under the statute be registered.”

    In United Bank of India v. Lekharam S. and Co. AIR 1965 SC 1591 the Supreme Court examined the question as to whether the memorandum required registration. It held that: —

    “Applying the principle to the present case, we consider that the letter at Ex. 7(a) was not meant to be an integral part of the transaction between the parties. The letter does not mention what was the principal amount borrowed or to be borrowed. Neither does it refer to rate of interest for the loan. It is important to notice that the letter does not mention details of title deeds which are to be deposited, with the plaintiff-bank. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view of the High Court with regard to the construction of Ex.7(a) is erroneous and the document was not intended to be an integral part of the transaction and did not, by itself, operate to create an interest in the immovable property. It follows, therefore, that the documents Ex.7(a) did not require registration under S.17 of the Registration Act.”

    In V.G Rao v. Andhra Bank AIR 1971 SC 1613, Hegde, J., while dealing with the law relating to the nature of a memorandum given along with the deposit of title deeds or one filed thereafter, held as under:—

    “Therefore, the crucial question is : Did the parties intend to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit of the title deeds to the form of a document? If so, the document requires registration. If on the other hand, its proper construction and the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that the parties did not intend to do so, then, there being no express bargain, the contract to create the mortgage arises by implication of the law from the deposit itself with the requisite intention, and the document being merely evidential does not require registration.”

    In Parkash Dev v. New Bank of India AIR 1968 Delhi 244 a Division Bench of this court held that where the memorandum itself constitutes the bargain, registration is necessary.

    12. The question which falls for determination is whether the memorandum (Ex. P-2), having regard to its true construction and the circumstances in which it came into existence and passed into the hands of Malhotra, is an instrument which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, in respect of the property sought to be mortgaged. The memorandum has been reproduced above. It is of the same date on which the loan was raised and a pronote (Ex. P-1) was written by Dhanwant Singh in favour of the plaintiff Malhotra. Though this memorandum refers to the creation of an equitable mortgage it gives the particulars of the bargain/contract between the parties. Also, though it refers to a past transaction, if a reference is made to the statement of Malhotra, it shows that he admits that the pronote (Ex. P-1) and the memorandum (Ex. P-2) ‘were written at one and the same time at my house’. The document was contemporaneously written and cannot be said to record a past transaction. Applying the principles enumerated in the decisions mentioned above, the memorandum (Ex. P-2) contains the terms of the contract between the parties. It mentions the amount of loan, rate of interest and details of the property in respect of which ‘equitable mortgage’ is stated to have been already created. In my view, the answer would be in the affirmative, and this document required registration and is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. This, however, does not conclude the matter.

    13. It is nobody's case that the documents, receipt Ex. P-6 receipt Ex. P-8 and letter Ex. P-12 required registration.

    The fact remains that the title deeds were with Malhotra. He has stated that when further loans were raised the same were done on the security of these documents of title. Admittedly, it is not necessary that a memorandum in writing should pass while creating a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Three things are requisite for such a mortgage: (1) debt, (2) deposit of title deeds, and (3) an intention that deeds shall be security for the debt. In K.J Nathan's Case (AIR 1965 SC 430) (supra), the Supreme Court has held that physical delivery of document by the debtor to the creditor is not the only mode of deposit. There may be a constructive deposit. The court will have to ascertain in each case whether in substance there is delivery of title deeds by the debtor to the creditor if the creditor was already in possession of the title deeds, it would be hypertechnical to insist upon the formality of the creditor delivering the title deeds to the debtor, and the debtor delivering them back to the creditor. When the loan of Rs. 4500/- was taken by Dhanwant Singh on 20-5-1967 a consolidated pronote of the previous loan of Rs. 8500/- and the present loan of Rs. 4500/- was executed. Similarly, when further loan of Rs. 3000/- was taken on 4-5-1971, another consolidated pronote of Rs. 16000/- was written by Dhanwant Singh in favour of Malhotra. The receipt dated 4-5-1971 refers to a sum of Rs. 13,000/- on account of ‘equitable mortgage’ created on 20-5-1967 for Rs. 13000/-. This receipt is for a total amount of Rs. 16,000/-. The letter D/-16-5-1970 also refers to the ‘equitable mortgage’ of 20-5-1967 for Rs. 13000/-. Malhotra has said in his statement that the subsequent amounts were advanced on the security of the title deeds already lying with him, and since he has not been cross-examined on this point, his statement has to be believed, and it has to be held that there was a mortgage by deposit of title deeds for a sum of Rs. 7500/- (comprising the two subsequent loans of Rs. 4500/- and Rs. 3000) in respect of property No. J-7/24 Rajouri Garden, New Delhi. It follows, therefore, also that Malhotra is entitled to interest at the rate of 7½% per annum on this amount of Rs. 7500/- as was agreed to between him and Dhanwant Singh. This rate of interest is permissible under S.5 of the Punjab Relief and Indebtedness Act, 1934, as extended to Delhi. The first loan of Rs. 8500/- was advanced on 18-5-1966 when document Ex. P-2 was stated to have been executed. In the documents, Exs. P-6 P-8 and P-12, there is no reference to any ‘equitable mortgage’ of 18-5-1966. Since document Ex. P-2 has been held to be inadmissible in evidence the judgment of the trial court decreeing the suit of Malhotra to the extent of Rs. 8500/- with interest against Dhanwant Singh has to be affirmed, though on a different ground. Now, since the principal amount of Rs. 16,000/- has been held to consist of two distinct transactions of Rs. 8500/- (Ex. P-1) and Rs. 7500/- (Exs. P-6 and P-8), it appears fair that the claim of interest of Rs. 1500/- in the suit is split up into two respective amounts of Rs. 800/- and Rs. 700/-. Thus for the amount of Rs. 9300/- (Rs. 8500/- + Rs. 800/-), there is no mortgage, and only the amount of Rs. 8200/- (Rs. 7500/- + Rs. 700/-) is secured by mortgage of property stated above.

    14. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that while drawing up the decree the trial Court has taken into consideration the certificate of fee filed by counsel for the defendants which fee certificates, according to the counsel, were submitted after the commencement of the argument, and ought not to have been allowed. This argument overlooks the relevant cls.16 and 17 of Chapter 168 of vol. I of the High Court Rules and Orders. According to cl.16, the fee certificate has to be filed before the final hearing. The import of the words ‘before the commencement of the arguments’ is therefore not correct.

    15. For the reasons recorded above, it is held as under:—

    (1)The appeal against defendants-respondents 2, 3 and 4 is dismissed with costs.

    (2) The judgment of the trial Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff to the extent of Rs. 9300/- with costs against defendant-respondent 1 only and also awarding interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the principal amount of Rs. 8500/- from the date of the institution of the suit till realisation is affirmed.

    (3) The appeal against defendants-respondents 1 and 5 for the amount of Rs. 8200/- is, however, allowed with costs, granting a mortgage decree for the amount of Rs. 8200/- together with interest at the rate of 7½% per annum on the principal amount of Rs. 7500/- from the date of the institution of the suit till recovery. The plaintiff-appellant is accordingly granted the usual mortgage decree under O.34, R.4 of the Civil P. C., and it should be stated in the decree that if the defendants-respondents 1 and 5 do not pay the amount within a period of six months from today, the mortgaged property No. J-7/24, Rajouri Gardan, New Delhi, as described in the plaint, would be sold for the satisfaction of the amount due to the plaintiff-appellant.

    The appeal is partly allowed.

    Appeal partly allowed.
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    Sh. Ishar Dass Malhotra v. Sh. Dhanwant Singh And Others
    (Oct 4, 1983)