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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A complaint under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was filed by R.N. Gujral, Assistant Municipal Prosecutor, against the proprietor of M/s. Gulati Stores alleging that a sample of tea purchased on 8 May 1980 by a Food Inspector was adulterated. On the accused's application under Section 13(2) of the Act, a counterpart of the sample was sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, Ghaziabad, who reported presence of eight extraneous iron particles (each less than 1 mm) amounting to 72.0 ppm on a 50 gm sample.

The Metropolitan Magistrate, relying on two letters from the Central Government recommending tolerance limits for iron fillings in tea (initially 250 ppm with particles not more than 1 mm; later increased to permit up to 2 mm under the tolerance), discharged the respondent on 20 May 1981 on the view that the Delhi Administration had no jurisdiction to prosecute samples within those administrative tolerance limits.

The Delhi Administration filed the present petition challenging the Magistrate's order. The State urged that the Magistrate erred in relying on administrative letters which have no statutory force and that the sample did not conform to the standard in item 1.14 of Appendix B to the Rules under the Act. The High Court considered prior decisions, the scope of Section 22-A of the Act, the content of the Central Government letters, and the factual findings about the iron particles in the sample, and proceeded to set aside the Magistrate's discharge while quashing the present prosecution in the exercise of the Court's inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate was justified in discharging the accused on the basis of Central Government letters (administrative instructions) that recommended not to prosecute tea samples containing iron filings within specified tolerance limits.
  2. Whether the Central Government, by administrative letters or instructions (including those issued under Section 22-A of the Act), could modify or override standards prescribed in the Rules framed under the Act.
  3. Whether, on the facts (small iron particles within the tolerance limit and not injurious to health), the present prosecution ought to be quashed in the interest of justice despite the invalidity of treating the administrative letters as modifying the Rules.

Arguments of the Parties

State's Arguments (Mr. Teja Singh Sodhi)

  • The Magistrate's reliance on the Central Government letters was not warranted because those letters are administrative instructions without statutory force and cannot modify the Rules made under the Act.
  • The standard for tea is prescribed in item 1.14 of Appendix B to the Rules; since the sample did not conform to that standard, it was adulterated and the Magistrate's quashing of the complaint was illegal and liable to be set aside.

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Sanghi)

  • Reliance on the Central Government instructions was justified; those instructions were, it was contended, issued under Section 22-A of the Act and were binding on the Delhi Administration (submission supported by reference to Rallis India Ltd. case, as argued by the respondent).
  • On that basis the respondent argued the State was prohibited from filing the impugned complaint where the iron particles fell within the tolerance indicated in those instructions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.N Gujral v. Mahabir Trading Co Establishes that the standard prescribed by the Rules can be modified by the Central Government only in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not by administrative/executive fiat. The Court relied on this decision to conclude that administrative letters cannot amend or override the statutory Rules; therefore the Magistrate was wrong to treat the administrative letters as removing the State's jurisdiction to prosecute.
R.N Gujral and another v. Shyam Sunder & others Similar proposition: central administrative instructions do not have power to modify standards laid down in the Rules unless done in accordance with the Act. Used by the Court to reinforce that directions issued by the Central Government cannot modify the Rules absent proper statutory procedure; thus the Magistrate's jurisdictional conclusion based on those instructions could not be upheld as law.
Rallis India Ltd. and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, 1979 (II) F.A.G 311 Holds that Committee observations or recommendations brought to State Health Authorities do not amount to modifying or overriding standards laid down in the Rules; recommendations may instead call for formal amendment to the Rules. The Court distinguished the present facts from Rallis: it held that Rallis did not support the respondent's contention that the administrative letters had the effect of modifying statutory standards; the Committee's recommendations were not a substitute for formal amendment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two parts: legal analysis of the force of the administrative letters, and a fact-driven exercise of its inherent power to secure justice.

Legally, the Court observed that Section 22-A permits the Central Government to issue directions to State Governments "with regard to carrying into execution all or any one of the provisions of the Act", but does not empower the Central Government to amend or modify the Rules by administrative instructions. The Court relied on its earlier decisions (R.N. Gujral cases) to hold that standards prescribed by the Rules can be modified only by following the statutory procedure under the Act and cannot be altered by "executive fiat."

The learned Magistrate's conclusion that the Delhi Administration lacked jurisdiction to file the complaint because of the Central Government letters was therefore legally unsound and could not be upheld.

Factually, the Court examined the content of the two Central Government letters placed on record. Those letters (dated 30 June 1976 and 26 March 1981) recorded the Central Committee for Food Standards' provisional conclusions that iron fillings are inevitably left in tea during processing, that a tolerance limit of 250 parts per million should apply, and that particles below certain sizes (initially under 1 mm, later up to 2 mm) were not considered injurious to health. The Director, Central Food Laboratory's report showed iron particles less than 1 mm and a total content of 72.0 ppm on the reported sample—within the tolerance discussed by the Committee.

Although the administrative letters could not legally amend the Rules, the Court noted the practical and scientific findings of the Central Committee over repeated tests across a decade indicating that such iron fillings are unavoidable and, within the tolerance, not harmful. The Court observed the State's apparent failure to follow the administrative directions, with the State counsel explaining uncertainty as to the statutory status of the instructions.

Balancing legal principle and the ends of justice, the Court concluded that while the Magistrate's jurisdictional rationale (relying on the administrative letters) was incorrect in law, the prosecution itself should be quashed because the sample's iron particles were within the tolerance and not injurious to health and because the presence of such particles is an inherent manufacturing inevitability.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The Court held that the Magistrate's discharge order was legally unsustainable to the extent it rested on the view that administrative letters deprived the State of jurisdiction; however, in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court quashed the present complaint/prosecution.

Direct consequences:

  • The order of discharge passed by the Magistrate is liable to be set aside on the legal point that administrative instructions cannot modify Rules made under the Act.
  • Notwithstanding the above, the instant prosecution/complaint is quashed in the interest of justice because the iron particles found were within the tolerance limit identified by the Central Committee and not injurious to human health.
  • The petition (revision) is disposed of on those terms.

Broader implications: The opinion reiterates that administrative instructions or letters cannot amend or override Rules made under the Act; modification of standards must follow the statutory procedure. The Court did not purport to lay down a new rule of law beyond applying earlier decisions and quashing the particular prosecution on the specific factual matrix, so no broader change to the statutory amendment process was created by this judgment.

    State v. Charanjit Singh .

    Charanjit Talwar, J.:— By this petition the Delhi Administration is seeking to challenge the order passed on 20th May, 1981, by Shri J.P Sharma, Metropolitan Magistrate discharging the respondent herein for an offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (herein called ‘the Act’). A complaint for this offence was filed by Mr. R.N Gujral, Assistant Municipal Prosecutor in the Court of the Magistrate against the accused in his capacity as the proprietor of M/s. Gulati Stores, Naya Bans, Delhi, on the allegation that the sample of tea purchased from him on 8th May, 1980 by a Food Inspector was found to be adulterated on analysis.

    2. On an application moved by the accused, under Section 13(2) of the Act, one counter part of the sample was sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, Ghaziabad who opined, “the sample shows presence of extraneous iron particles. The size of the iron particles is however, less than 1 mm.” The Director found that the sample contained ‘'Eight iron particles of size less than 1 mm present in 50 gm. sample: Total iron content of the extraneous iron particles (on sample basis): 72.0 ppm.”

    3. The learned Magistrate in support of his decision relied on two letters issued by the Central Government to the State Governments wherein after noticing the fact that “during the processing of tea a certain quantity of iron fillings is left in the tea powder due to friction of machinery parts and despite all efforts, the entire quantity of iron fillings deposited during the processing cannot be removed,” it was recommended to the State Governments that prosecutions be launched only in cases where the samples of tea were found to contain iron fillings of more than 2 mm. in size subject to the condition that total content of those fillings was not more than 250 parts per million (ppm.).

    4. The learned Magistrate was of the view that as the iron filings in the present sample were within the tolerance limit and were less than 1 mm. in size, the Delhi Administration had no jurisdiction to file the present complaint. He accordingly discharged the accused.

    5. In support of the revision petition it is urged by Mr. Teja Singh Sodhi that reliance by the Magistrate on those letters was not warranted as those letters contain instructions purely of administrative nature which have no statutory force. He urged that the standard prescribed for tea was laid down only in item 1.14 of Appendix B to the Rules framed under the Act. He submitted that the standard prescribed by that item did not contain the tolerance limit as envisaged by the said administrative instructions. According to him the instructions issued by the Central Government cannot modify the Rules. The sample in question, he urged, not conforming to the standard laid down, was obviously adulterated and, therefore, the order quashing the complaint was illegal and was liable to be set aside.

    6. The proposition of law propounded by the counsel for the State has already been dealt with by this Court in two decisions. In Criminal Revision No. 10 of 1981 (R.N Gujral v. Mahabir Trading Co), decided on 23rd July, 1981 and Criminal Revision No. 5 of 1981. (R.N Gujral and another v. Shyam Sunder & others) decided on 3rd August, 1982, it has been held that the standard prescribed by the Rule can be modified by the Central Government only in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not by an executive fiat.

    7. Mr. Sodhi is right to the extent that the finding of the Magistrate that because of the aforeasid instructions the Delhi Administration had no jurisdiction to file the present complaint, cannot be upheld in law. The reliance by Mr. Sanghi, counsel for the respondent, on the decision in Rallis India Ltd. and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others, 1979 (II) F.A.G 311 in support of the contention that the said instructions prima facie having been issued under Section 22-A of the Act, were binding on Delhi Administration and as such they were prohibited to file the impugned complaint, is misplaced. In Rallis India Ltd.'s case (supra) the question for consideration was different. The prosecution was relying on the standard laid down for “sauce” to prove that the sample in question of chillies sauce was adulterated. The Committee's observation to the effect that chillies sauce was different than “sauce” as it was neither derived from fruit nor from vegetables, did not amount to modifying or over-riding the standard laid down for “sauce”. Its recommendation that this position be brought to the notice of “All State Health Authorities” could not be construed to modify the standard laid down. In fact the Committee went on to recommand that the standard of chillies sauce to be incorporated in the Rules by an appropriate amendment.

    8. It may be noted here that under Section 22-A, the directions which can be issued by the Central Government to the State Governments can only be with regard to “carrying into execution all or any one of the provisions of the Act”. A bare reading of this provision shows that the Central Government has no power to modify or amend the Rules by means of Administration instructions. The standard prescribed by the Rules can be modified only in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

    9. In this view of the matter the impugned decision is liable to be set aside. However, in my opinion to secure the ends of justice, the present prosecution has to be quashed for the following reasons.

    10. The Central Government by its letter dated 30th June, 1976, addressed to All Secretaries to State Governments Union Territories (Medical and Public Health Department) informed them that the tea industry had brought to its notice that during processing of the tea certain quantity of iron fillings was left in the tea powder due to friction of machinery parts during the manufacturing process and that despite all efforts those iron fillings could not be removed. It is stated therein that the matter was considered by the Central Committee for Food Standards who have come to a provisional conclusion that it was not possible to completely remove the iron fillings from tea. Accordingly the tolerance limit of iron fillings was recommended. That limit provided was 250 parts per million subject to the iron particles being not more than 1 mm in size. It was the considered opinion of the Sub-Committee that these iron particles of less than I mm in size within the tolerance limit would not be injurious to human health. However, the letter goes on to say that till further tests were carried out, it was not possible to modify the standard for tea in the Rules. Nevertheless, it was recommended that the prosecution should be launched only in those cases where the samples exceeded the tolerance limit. By a subsequent letter dated 26th March, 1981, it was further recommended that iron particles within the tolerance limit of 250 parts per million should not be more than 2 mm in size.

    11. Apparently, on further tests it was considered by the Committee that even iron fillings of 2 mm in size in tea were not dangerous to human health. It was, therefore, requested by the Central Government that “instructions may be issued accordingly to the enforcement staff and the public analysts appointed under the prevention of Food Adulteration Act”.

    12. It is obvious from the two letters which were brought on record in the trial Court that during the manufacturing process of tea certain quantity of iron fillings is bound to be left in the tea powder because of friction of machinery parts and that despite all efforts those fillings cannot be removed. Within the tolerance limit of 250 p.m, it was firstly considered that the size of the iron fillings less than 1 mm in size were not injurious to human health. Later on, after further tests were carried out, it was found that even iron fillings of the size of 2 mm., within the tolerance limit were not injurious to human health. In spite of recommendation issued under Section 22-A of the Act, not to launch prosecution this complaint has been filed. When pointedly asked as to why these unambiguous directions were not being complied with by the State, learned counsel submitted that the State Government is not sure whether these instructions were statutory and would stand judicial scrutiny. As held by this Court in the earlier two decisions, referred to above, these directions are statutory and till such time the standard as suggested in these letters is incorporated in the Rules, in accordance with the law, no judicial cognizance of these directions can be taken. But I cannot help noticing the fact that on repeated tests carried out during the last 10 years it has been found by the Central Committee for Food Standard which is the apex body in these matters to assist the Central Government that despite efforts, all the iron fillings cannot be removed from the manufactured tea. In the present case as noticed by the Director, Central Food Laboratory, the iron particles which are within the tolerance limit and are in size less than 1 mm., are not injurious to human health. As it is well-high impossible for any manufacturer of tea to remove the iron fillings which are bound to be present because of the manufacturing process and further that consumption of tea cannot be banned. I consider that to secure the ends of justice the prosecution launched in the present case be quashed. Accordingly, although the order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate is liable to be set aside, yet in exercise of inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, I quash the instant complaint.

    13. The petition stands disposed of in these terms.

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    Comments

    State v. Charanjit Singh .
    (Aug 17, 1982)