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  • sub-sec. (R) of S. 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • S. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act
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  • sub-sec. (R) of S. 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • S. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act
Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary — Revision under S.25B, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a revision petition under the proviso to sub-section (8) of S.25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, challenging the Rent Controller's order dated 31 July 1980 which dismissed the tenant's application for leave to contest an ejectment petition. The respondent-landlord, Shri S.L. Sarna, had earlier filed an ejectment application against the tenant Shri S.K. Arora under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S.14 (bona fide personal requirement), and because that ground was invoked the matter proceeded under the summary procedure in Chapter III-A (S.25B).

Landlord's case (as alleged in the ejectment petition): the first-floor premises (description and rent: Rs. 925 per month) were required for his bona fide personal requirement — he and his wife are elderly (about 80 and 75 years old), in ill health, and need constant nursing and attendance by family (sons/daughters). The landlord alleged he had inadequate accommodation on the ground floor and therefore needed the first-floor premises vacated so that a son or a daughter and their family could stay and provide care.

Landlord produced a medical certificate for his physical ailments and later filed additional affidavits (including an affidavit of his daughter Smt. Shakun Vohra) and a letter from his son’s employer indicating the son's transfer to Delhi was under consideration (subject to the son arranging his own accommodation).

Tenant responded by filing an application under S.25B for leave to contest, with an affidavit (dated 25 Feb 1980) alleging mala fide motive on the landlord's part: that the real object was to coerce an increase in rent after the landlord's requests were refused; that there was other accommodation available on the ground floor (recently re-let after a prior tenant vacated in Oct 1979) and an additional room over the garage; and that the landlord's children were well-settled elsewhere and not genuinely dependent or intending to reside with him.

Procedurally: The tenant's application for leave to contest was considered by the Rent Controller, who heard further affidavits (landlord's additional affidavits and the daughter's affidavit) and arguments; the Controller denied leave to contest. The tenant invoked revision jurisdiction under the proviso to S.25B(8). The revising court considered statutory provisions (S.25B(5)), the parties' affidavits and documents, and relevant precedents before dismissing the revision and affirming the Controller's approach.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenant's affidavit filed under S.25B for leave to contest disclosed facts that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining recovery of possession on the ground of bona fide personal requirement (clause (e) proviso to S.14(1)).
  2. Whether the Rent Controller may, at the leave-to-contest stage, consider affidavits and documents filed by the landlord (including additional affidavits and documentary material) in order to determine whether the tenant's defence is sham, frivolous or raises triable issues.
  3. Whether the landlord's requirement to have a son/daughter (and their family) — who are not presently living with him but are to be brought to live and nurse him — falls within the expression "himself" in proviso (e) to sub-sec. (1) of S.14 of the Act (i.e., whether that need is a bona fide personal requirement for the landlord "himself").
  4. On the admitted facts, whether the accommodation actually available to the landlord (size and nature of rooms on ground floor, the small "puja" room, rear rooms vacated and re-let, room over the garage) is reasonably suitable for accommodating the proposed family who would nurse the landlord.
  5. Whether the landlord's conduct (e.g., letting out rear portion in Oct. 1979, alleged prior rent demands) establishes mala fides sufficient to deny leave to contest or to render the eviction petition non-bona fide.

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant's (Applicant in Revision) Arguments

  • Tenant alleged the ejectment petition was filed with mala fide intent — primarily to coerce an increase in rent after landlord's demand for higher rent was refused (tenant alleges landlord demanded rent be raised from Rs. 925 to Rs. 1,500 in June 1979; tenant refused).
  • Tenant emphasized the landlord had sufficient accommodation on the ground floor, noting that a rear portion (vacated by Shri S.K. Vasan) had been re-let in Oct. 1979, and that landlord had also constructed/let a room above the garage; these facts showed the requirement was not sudden or bona fide.
  • Tenant contended that under S.25-D (and the summary process) the tenant's averments in the leave application should be taken as true for the purpose of deciding leave to contest, and that the Controller should not go beyond those pleadings to accept additional material from the landlord.
  • Tenant argued that the question of bona fide necessity and the landlord's shifting stand could not be decided without evidence and a full trial — i.e., the leave question involved disputed facts and therefore required trial rather than dismissal of leave.
  • Tenant contended that family members not ordinarily residing with the landlord should not be treated as included within the expression "himself" in proviso (e) to S.14(1).

Landlord's Arguments

  • Landlord maintained the petition was bona fide: he (about 80) and his wife (about 75) are aged, in poor health (medical certificate produced), and need constant nursing and attendance from family members.
  • Landlord asserted his on-site accommodation (two bedrooms, drawing-cum-dining, plus a small puja room) was inadequate for his status and for the family who could come to nurse him; he denied having three proper bedrooms as alleged by tenant and explained the "puja room" could not be used as a bedroom.
  • Landlord denied the allegation of mala fide rent motive; he denied ever demanding an increase in rent (contrary to tenant's allegation), and denied letting out ground-floor rear accommodation at an enhanced rent (explaining that the rear portion was small and unsuitable for his purposes or those of the daughter's family).
  • Landlord filed additional affidavits including (a) an affidavit that his daughter Smt. Shakun Vohra (and her husband, a Regional Manager drawing approx. Rs. 60,000/year) was willing to shift to the premises to look after him and his wife, and (b) a letter from his son’s employer (TELCO) confirming that transfer to Delhi was under consideration but that the son would need to make his own accommodation arrangements.
  • Overall, landlord argued the need to have a family (daughter and her husband or son's family) come and reside was a bona fide requirement of the landlord "for himself" within proviso (e) to S.14(1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Om Prakash v. Bishan Lal (1977) 2 Ren CJ 267 Approach that the Controller ought to adopt when considering leave: examine whether the tenant's defence is sham or improbable; if defence raises triable issues leave should be granted. The court cited this case to support the proposition that the Controller should assess whether the tenant's defence is genuine or merely a sham; the court accepted the approach as correct and applicable.
Smt. Leela Wati v. Smt. Ganga Devi, AIR 1980 Delhi 209 Under S.25B the Controller must find whether there is a case requiring trial and should not decide matters on imaginary evidence; outrageous defences can be summarily rejected, plausible defences require trial. The court relied on this authority to emphasize that the Controller's task is to see if recorded facts would require a trial, and that plausible defences should lead to leave being granted; used as guidance for the Controller's approach.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. T.S. Bhatia (1977) 1 Ren CJ 902 : (AIR 1978 NOC 45) Observation that at the preliminary stage the Controller should not determine contested facts or consider documents such as to decide the factual controversy conclusively. The court discussed this decision but rejected an absolute reading that documents cannot be considered; it held that while preliminary assessment is required, relevant documents may be inspected to see if a defence is sham or improbable.
Smt. V.L. Kashyap v. R.P. Puri, ILR (1977) 1 Delhi 22 : (AIR 1977 NOC 205) The opinion cited this authority in the context of what sort of defence a tenant must plead to obtain leave to contest. The court referenced this decision along with others to show judicial analysis of defences at the leave stage; no additional specific principle beyond citation was stated in the opinion.
C.L. Davar v. Amar Nath Kapur, (1962) 64 Pun LR 521 Cited among authorities addressing the meaning and scope of "himself" in proviso (e) to S.14(1) (i.e., family members and who counts as part of landlord's requirement). The case was listed among prior authorities considered in construing "himself"; the opinion invoked it as part of the body of precedent on interpretation, but did not recite detailed holding beyond its relevance.
Jaswant Singh v. Smt. Prem Kumari, (1964) 66 Pun LR 881 Cited in the context of authorities dealing with who forms part of the landlord's family for the purpose of proviso (e). Cited as part of the authorities backgrounding the court's interpretation; the opinion did not elaborate a separate rule from this case beyond the general list.
Bhagwan Dass v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi, C.R. 411-D/61 (decided 22-10-61) Earlier authority holding that "himself" includes family members who have always been living with the landlord. Used by the court as precedent supporting the proposition that family members residing with the landlord fall within "himself".
T.C. Rekhi v. Uma Gujral, 1970 Ren CR 292 Decision cited for the meaning of "himself" to include family members living with the landlord. Referenced in support of the court's interpretation that family living with the landlord are included in "himself".
Vas Dev Dhawan v. Triloki Nath, (1967) 69 Pun LR (D) 260 Cited among decisions relating to the construction of the proviso and who constitutes family for "himself". Cited as supporting authority in the line of cases consulted; the opinion did not extract a separate detailed rule beyond that general theme.
J.L. Mehta v. Hira Devi, 1970 DLT 484 Authority (Sachar, J.) cited for the view that "his own use" includes the landlord and the members of his family when they already reside with him. The court relied on this decision to support the construction of "himself" covering resident family members and to show similar judicial reasoning.
Lala Ram v. Kalawati, 1974 Ren CJ 405 Earlier decision by the same judge construing "himself" to include family members already living with the landlord; distinguished the present factual situation and provided a baseline construction. The court explained that this prior decision concerned family members already living with the landlord and used it as a foundation to extend the reasoning to cases where the landlord requires a family (not currently residing) to come and live to nurse him — treating that need as landlord's "himself" requirement.
P.D. Sharma v. Ram Lubhaya, 1370 Ren CJ 160 (as cited in the opinion) Cited among authorities treating family members living with the landlord as within "himself". Included in the list of precedents the court relied upon for construing the proviso; the opinion did not give additional elaboration for this case specifically.
Shri Gobind Dass v. Shri Kuldip Singh, 1970 Ren CR 511 : (AIR 1971 Delhi 151) Cited regarding aspects of family-membership and landlord's requirement under the proviso. Referenced as part of the jurisprudence considered on the meaning of "himself"; the opinion invoked it as supportive authority.
Smt. Krishna Devi v. Smt. Rameshwari Devi, (1978) 1 Ren CR 3 Decision (Sachar, J.) supporting the view that where the landlady wanted her married daughter and her family to live with her, the requirement was the landlady's own requirement (not the daughter's). Employed by the court to support the conclusion that requiring a married daughter and her family to live with the landlord is a bona fide requirement of the landlord "himself".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in structured steps that followed the statutory text, the Controller's factual findings, and precedent:

  1. Statutory framework: The court began by identifying the statutory test in S.25B(5) — the Controller must grant leave to contest if the tenant's affidavit discloses facts that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession on the ground specified (clause (e) to proviso of S.14(1)). The chapter's heading ("Summary trial of certain applications") and the purpose of a summary procedure were noted as guidance for the scope of inquiry.
  2. Scope of preliminary inquiry: The court examined competing views about how much inquiry the Controller may undertake at the leave stage. It reviewed authorities (including Om Prakash, Leela Wati, Delhi Cloth & General Mills v. T.S. Bhatia) and rejected any rigid rule that the Controller must consider only the tenant's affidavit and nothing else. The court concluded that the Controller may, consistent with natural justice, receive and consider affidavits and documents from either side to the extent necessary to determine whether the tenant's defence is merely sham, vague or mala fide or whether it raises triable issues.
  3. Review of admitted facts and material evidence: The court set out admitted facts: landlord's advanced age and ill health; dimensions and nature of the landlord's accommodation (two bedrooms, a drawing-cum-dining room, and a small "puja" room); existence and description of the rear ground-floor rooms vacated by the previous tenant (S.K. Vasan) and subsequently re-let; and that the landlord had a small room over the garage typically used for a servant.
  4. Evaluation of tenant's allegations of mala fides: The court considered the tenant's allegations that the landlord sought eviction to coerce a rent increase and that the landlord had other suitable accommodation (rear portion or garage room). The Controller's findings — that the rear portion was too small and unsuitable for the landlord's purposes and that the garage room was intended for servants (not suitable for a person of the landlord's status) — were accepted. The tenant had not established on the record that the landlord's re-letting of the rear portion demonstrated mala fides or that the landlord had vacated that portion in contemplation of immediate occupation by the landlord.
  5. Interpretation of "himself" in proviso (e): Central to the dispute was whether a landlord's requirement that a son or daughter (and their family) — who are not presently residing with the landlord — be allowed to come and reside to nurse the landlord counts as a bona fide requirement "for himself". The court reviewed earlier decisions and the judge's own prior ruling in Lala Ram v. Kalawati. The court explained that where the landlord requires premises for his own use, that concept may encompass the landlord's need to have another person or family live with him to meet his needs (for example, to nurse him). The court reasoned that if the landlord's requirement is that a family be accommodated to look after him, that requirement is one of the landlord "himself" and not necessarily a separate requirement of the family members.
  6. Application to the facts: Applying the principles, the court found (a) the Controller correctly treated the daughter's intention to move and nurse as the landlord's requirement, (b) the landlord's affidavits and the daughter's affidavit were properly considered under the summary process (not violative of natural justice), and (c) the tenant's averments did not disclose facts that would, if accepted, disentitle the landlord to the relief. The court concluded that the tenant's defences were not so plausible as to mandate trial; the Controller's assessment that the landlord genuinely required the premises for himself (so family could look after him) was sustained.
  7. Conclusion on leave to contest: The court held there was no reason to disturb the Controller's decision refusing leave to contest. The revising court found no error warranting interference under the proviso to S.25B(8).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Revision dismissed. The revising court affirmed the Rent Controller's order refusing the tenant leave to contest the ejectment petition, concluding that the tenant's affidavit did not disclose facts that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining relief under clause (e) of the proviso to S.14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, and that the Controller was entitled to consider the affidavits and documents filed by the landlord in the summary process.

Implications / Consequences:

  • The direct effect on the parties: The tenant's revision failed; the tenant was given three months from the date of the order to vacate the premises (the court considered urgency and the tenant's difficulty in finding alternative accommodation).
  • No order as to costs was made in relation to the present petition.
  • The court applied and clarified the scope of the leave-to-contest inquiry under S.25B(5): while the review at that stage is summary and focused on whether the tenant's affidavit shows a defence that, if accepted, would disentitle the landlord, the Controller may consider affidavits and documents from both sides to test whether the tenant's defence is sham or raises triable issues — subject to fairness and natural justice. The opinion expressly aligns with prior authorities while declining to adopt a rigid rule that documentary material may never be considered at the preliminary stage.
  • The court affirmed an interpretive position (building on earlier decisions) that a landlord's bona fide requirement "for himself" can include a requirement that a son/daughter and their family (even if not previously residing with the landlord) come and live with the landlord to nurse him — i.e., it is the landlord's need to have suitable persons resident to give him care that is relevant to clause (e).
  • The opinion did not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond interpretation and application of existing authorities; the court explicitly relied on and situated its reasoning within prior case law.

This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion. No facts or inferences beyond what appears in the opinion were added.

    J.S.K Arora v. S.L Sarna .

    This petition for revision is under the proviso to sub-sec. (R) of S. 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) against the order of the Rent Controller, Delhi dt. 31st July, 1980 dismissing the application filed by the petitioner-tenant for leave to contest the application for ejectment filed by the respondent-landlord on the grounds specified in cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Act.

    2. For a proper appreciation of the case of the parties it is necessary to deal with the pleadings and facts in detail.

    3. An application for ejectment was filed by the respondent-landlord, Shri S.L Sarna against Shri S.K Arora (tenant) for ejectment on the ground of bona fide personal requirement under the aforesaid provision. Since the petition for ejectment was filed on the aforesaid ground the application for ejectment was dealt with under the summary procedure for trial for such applications provided for by S. 25B.

    4. The case of the landlord in the application for ejectment was that the suit premises which are situated on the First floor of premises No. L-22, South Extension, Part II, New Delhi, was let out to the tenant on or about 7th May, 1973 for residential purposes. It was pleaded that the agreed monthly rent is at the rate of Rs. 925/- per month and the landlord pays house tax, ground rent etc. without charging the same from the tenant and the electric charges are paid by the tenant according to meter reading while the water charges are paid on the fixed rate of Rs. 50/- per month. That the demised premises consists of three bedrooms, one drawing-cum-dining room with attached kitchen with two bathrooms having attached toilets and a covered lobby. The premises demised are shown in red colour in the plan attached with the ejectment application situated in the first floor.

    5. The particulars of bona fide personal requirement are rather peculiar in this case. It was alleged in the petition “that the petitioner is an old man of about 80 years of age and usually and constantly does not keep good health. The petitioner's wife is also of 75 years of age and remains constantly ill and both of them are very weak and cannot look after themselves. The petitioner also suffers from eye trouble and has developed cataract in the eye and is a heart patient and in view of his advanced age, illness and physical ailments, the petitioner and his wife need constantly being looked after and being nursed by the other family members viz. daughters and sons.

    6. The petitioner has three sons and three daughters and it is of utmost necessity that one or the other sons and his wife and family members and daughter's husband constantly to stay with the petitioner and his wife with a view to nurse them without which the petitioner and his wife cannot survive and in that respect, the petitioner and his wife are dependent on the children and need their constant support and nursing.

    7. The petitioner has very meagre accommodation on the ground floor and has only two bedrooms and one Puja Room and drawing-cum-dining room as shown in the blue clour shown in the plan attached. But considering the advanced age of the petitioner and his wife and the high status and standard of living of the petitioner, the present accommodation with him is extremely meagre and most inadequate and apart from the sons and daughters and daughters-in-law and sons-in-law the petitioner has to accommodate other guests who come to meet the petitioner and his family from outstation and for that purpose the accommodation is most inadequate and hence this petition for eviction with respect to the first floor on the ground of bona fide personal necessity for the above said reasons.”

    8. It was also pleaded that the tenant has been requested several times to vacate the premises but he has not vacated the same and the landlord-petitioner does not have any other suitable residential accommodation which the landlord and his family members can avail of.

    9. Along with the petition for ejectment, apart from the documents of title, the petitioner also filed a copy of medical certificate from Prof. S.R.K Malik, M. S.F.R.C S., F A M S dt. 12th Nov. 1979 to the following effect :—

    “Sh. S.L Sarna was examined by me on 19-10-1979 with complaint of gradual diminution of vision both eyes. My observations are as under:—

    Vision : RE-3/60- no improvement with glasses LE-6/18 with glasses + 1.2 D.

    Cyl. 180° —6/6

    Immature cataract both eyes

    Tension — RE 20.6 mm./Hg. Schiotz

    LE 18.9 mm./Hg. Schiotz

    Fundus examination;

    RE— Circinate ratinopathy.

    LE— Honeycomb choroiditis.

    In view of the circinate retinopathy in the right eye the cataract operation is not indicated. Advised to show after six months.”

    10. At this stage before I deal with the application of the tenant for leave to contest the application for ejectment, I may point out that the application for ejectment as drafted and filed was for the bona fide requirement by the landlord for occupation as residence for “himself” and not “for the requirement of any family member dependent on him”, within the meaning of the grounds specified in cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Act.

    11. In substance, thus the plea was that the landlord, Shri S.L Sarna as well as his wife are a very old couple and having very weak health constantly remain ill and cannot look after themselves. The landlord suffers from eye trouble as well, as he is a heart patient. Both landlord and his wife need constantly being looked after and being nursed and for accommodating one of the sons or daughters that the accommodation is required as a “bona fide requirement for himself”.

    12. The summons being served on the petitioner-tenant in the prescribed form, he made an application u/s. 25-B of the Act for seeking leave to contest the petition. The application was accompanied by an affidavit of the tenant-petitioner dt. 25th Feb. 1980.

    13. In this affidavit the tenant purported to disclose such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining recovery of the possession of the premises. The facts in paras 1 to 3 of the affidavit of the tenant are as under :—

    “That the present petition has been filed with mala fide intentions, and the need of the petitioner is not at all bona fide. From his own showing, the petitioner is in occupation of three rooms and one drawing-cum-dining room. The family members of the petitioner are two, i.e, the petitioner himself and his wife. The petitioner has purposely not given the full particulars nor the names of his children. The petitioner's all daughters are married and are settled in their own families. Two of the daughters of the petitioner are staying in Delhi and own their own property. One daughter is staying at D-36, South Extension Part II, New Delhi whereas the other daughter is staying somewhere in Greater Kailash. The third daughter of the petitioner is married and does not stay in Delhi. To the best of my knowledge two sons who are married are settled abroad, and one of them married to a foreigner. Both these sons of the petitioner own their property abroad and they have no intention whatsoever of coming back and settling down in India and particularly with the petitioner. The third son of the petitioner is settled in Bombay, working there, and he has also no intention of coining and settling down with the petitioner. The two sons of the petitioner who are settled abroad have never visited the petitioner during the period of my tenancy, right from 1973. These sons who are fully independent are not dependent on the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. The present accommodation available with the petitioner and his wife is more than sufficient and he can accommodate his guests if they visit him.

    2. The mala fides of the petitioner is also proved from the fact that there is more accommodation available on the ground floor itself which he has let out lastly on or about 1st Oct. 1979 when Mr. S.K Vasan vacated the premises. The extra accommodation available on the ground floor is, two bedrooms with attached bathrooms, one kitchen and one covered verandah. Apart from this, the petitioner has constructed a full-fledged one room set in the garage which is again let out by him on or about Sept/Oct. 1978. The petitioner has been letting out the rear portion of the ground floor from time to time on increased rent. After Mr. S.K Vasan vacated the house who was paying approximate rent of Rs. 825/- per month, the petitioner again let out this premises in the month of Oct. 1979 at an enhanced rent. The need of the petitioner is not sudden and no changed situations have taken place from Oct. 1979 till the filing of the present petition. From his own showing the petitioner is eighty years and his wife is seventy-five years of age and the petitioner also does not keep good health, it would not therefore be convenient or advisable for the petitioner to occupy the first floor which would be against his interest. If the petitioner wanted genuinely more accommodation, firstly he would not have let out the rear portion of the ground floor in the month of Oct. 1979. Consequently if the need was so dire, he would have asked for the eviction of the tenants on the ground floor and not of the tenants of the first floor.

    3. The real bone of contention and the purpose of filing the present petition is that the petitioner wanted to coerce the respondent to increase the rent, since as per his words the rent in the area has increased substantially of similar buildings. The petitioner on or about 10th June, 1979 approached the respondent and told him that he should increase the rent of the premises in his occupation from Rs. 925/- to Rs. 1,500/-. The respondent categorically informed the petitioner that he was not in a position to increase the rent as demanded, but informed the petitioner that if he so agrees, he could increase the rent by Rs. 100/- or Rs. 150/-. The petitioner did not agree to this increase and insisted that the rent of the premises in occupation of the respondent cannot be less than Rs. 1,500/- and as the rent prevailing in the area of similar accommodation was about Rs. 2,000/-. When the respondent finally refused to accede to the demand of the petitioner of increasing the rent to Rs. 1,500/-, the petitioner threatened the respondent of eviction proceedings. The petitioner again approached the respondent on 23rd Sept. 1979 and told the respondent that the petitioner needed the accommodation for himself and therefore the respondent should vacate. The respondent immediately pointed out to the petitioner that since the tenants at the rear of the ground floor, Mr. S.K Vasan, was vacating his premises in the end of Sept., he should occupy the same as that is suitable and convenient to him and his wife. The petitioner however informed the respondent that he is going to let out that portion to somebody else which would fetch him higher rent, and in case the respondent was also ready to increase the rent as demanded earlier, he would not proceed against the respondent in the Court of Law. The respondent again informed the petitioner that under no circumstances he could increase the rent as demanded, but again gave his alternative offer of increasing the rent by Rs. 100/- or Rs. 150/-. The petitioner then told the respondent that he would get his house vacated from the Court by filing an eviction petition against him. The present petition has therefore been filed as a device to coerce the respondent to accede to the illegal and unjustified demand of the petitioner for increase of rent.”

    14. In view of the application of the tenant for leave to contest the ejectment application along with the affidavit an opportunity was given to the landlord to file his reply.

    15. The landlord filed an affidavit dt, 16th Apr. 1980 on 22nd Apr. 1980 and pleaded that the tenant has not disclosed any true facts and does not entitle him to get any permission to defend the petition and it was pleaded that it is entirely false on the part of the tenant to allege that the eviction petition has been filed with mala fide intention and/or is not bona fide. It was further stated by the landlord in his affidavit that he was not in possession of three bed rooms and one drawing-cum-dining room as alleged. The true fact is that he possesses only two small sized bed rooms and one small room which is a Puja Room used for the purposes of Puja only and cannot be used as bed room or for any other purpose and the drawing-cum-dining room is also very small although according to his status he needs a separate drawing room and separate dining room. It was again reiterated in the affidavit that he and his wife were very old, elderly and do not keep good health on account of advanced age and therefore have to be constantly escorted and nursed by the family members i.e sons, daughter-in-law, daughters and sons-in-law and the children and in fact he and his wife are wholly dependent on them. It was denied that his two sons have permanently migrated abroad and there is no intention of their coming back to India. It was also stated that only one of his sons is temporarily living abroad and keeps on visiting India and stays with him and even at that time the landlord is short of accommodation considering the status of his sons and sons-in-law. It was also stated that two of his sons live in India and temporarily get posted outside Delhi hut their main residence is in Delhi and they stay with him and keep on coming to Delhi even when they are temporarily posted outside Delhi as the landlord is dependent on his sons and daughter in-law on account of old age. It was also stated that it is wrong on the part of the tenant to allege that his youngest son i.e the third son, who is at present at Bombay is permanently settled there and has no intention of coming back and settling down in Delhi. It was also denied that two of his sons have settled abroad and have never visited him since 1973. It was also stated that his son V.K Saran, who is at present working as Controller of Coal Supplies with the Steel Authority of India Ltd.; and who is at present temporarily posted at Dhanbad, is not visiting him. It is also stated that his eldest son, K.K Sarna is temporarily staying in the United Kingdom and has been visiting him during the years 1974-75. Regarding the extenant Sh. S.K Vasan, it was stated that the fact stated in para 2 of the affidavit of the tenant was false and was denied. It was stated that S.K Vasan was a tenant with respect to a very small portion on the rear side of the building and had only one small room measuring 10′ × 10′ and a small living room which was wholly insufficient and unsuitable for his purposes and that of his family members and considering his status it was useless for him. It was denied that the said portion was let out at any enhanced rent. It was also denied that he got constructed any extra accommodation consisting of one room set over the garage and it was stated that the said room cannot be used by the landlord and is meant to accommodate the servant only and not for a person of the status of the landlord. It was then stated in reply that the ground floor portion held by him (landlord) would be used by him and his wife and his son and his wife to nurse him and/or his daughter and her husband and the first floor would be used to house his family members on whom he was dependent and who would nurse him and look after him. It was denied that he ever asked for any increase in rent by single penny much less to pay the increase sum of Rs. 100/- or Rs. 150/-.

    16. The ejectment application thereafter came up for arguments before the Controller on 26th May, 1980. During arguments, counsel for the landlord, stated that one of the sons of the landlord has been transferred to Delhi and they would stay in the premises with the landlord and this development has taken place after the filing of the petition and, therefore, the landlord wanted to file an additional affidavit in this regard. This request of landlord was allowed subject to the right of the tenant-respondent to file counter-affidavit. It was directed that the landlord should also file the copy of the order of transfer of his son and the matter was adjourned to 9th July, 1980 for filing of the affidavit of the landlord and 24th July, 1980 for counter-affidavit of the tenant. On 9th July, 1980, on request of counsel for the landlord, the matter was adjourned to 14th July, 1980. On 14th July, 1980 the landlord filed a detailed affidavit and it was inter alia stated in paras 2 to 9 as under:—

    “2. That I have got three sons :— (a) Shri K.K Saara who is an Engineer in U.K and is of 56 years of age and is highly placed there; (b) Shri V.K Sarna who is Mining Engineer and is at present Controller of Coal Supplies posted at Dhanbad under Steel Authority of India and holds very senior post; (c) Shri P.K Sarna, Assistant Service Manager (Service Headquarters) with Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO) at Bombay and his remunerations at the present moment are Rs. 45,000/- per year. His services are likely to be transferred to various places.

    3. That I have got three daughters: (a) Mrs. Indra Mohindru, who is married to Shri J.R Mohindru working as Assistant Sales Tax Officer at Delhi. My daughter Indra Mohindru is also working in the Railways. Both of them are residing in Delhi but they both are employee; (b) Mrs. Shakun Vohra, who is wife of Shri R.P Vohra, Regional Manager with M/s. Ashok Leyland Ltd. posted at Delhi. His total remunerations are Rs. 60,000/- per year; (c) Mrs. Sunit Balaggan who is wife of Shri K.K Balaggan, a Senior Professor of Industrial Engineering in National Institute of Training Industrial Engineers (NITIE), Bombay.

    4. That I have already stated in my earlier affidavit that I am of 80 years of age and my wife is of about 75 years of age. We are both old people and immediately require the assistance of our near and dear relations for the purpose of being looked after in our life. My eye-sight is seriously affected and both myself and my wife are victims of many diseases natural to the old-age persons.

    5. That of all my sons and daughters, the only suitable person who can look after myself and my wife is my daughter Smt. Shakun Vohra, who, as stated, above, is the wife of Shri R.P Vohra. Regional Manager of M/s. Ashok Leyland Ltd. She has agreed to shift to my premises with her family so that she can remain with us and render all possible help and assistance required by us. Affidavit to that effect from my daughter Smt. Shakun Vohra, is also being filed herein.

    6. That Shri R.P Vohra, husband of my daughter, as stated above, is holding a senior post of Regional Manager with M/s. Ashok Leyland Ltd. and is drawing Rs. 60,000/- per year. The man of his Status requires a suitable and decent accommodation to live for himself and other members of his family. My daughter Mrs. Shakun Vohra and her husband who are parents of one daughter, need at least 3 bed room flat in the premises in dispute which are in occupation of the respondent.

    7. Efforts were made to get my son Shri P.K Sarna transferred from Bombay to Delhi. I was assured that such transfer will materialise but due to certain internal company matters, the transfer of my son from Bombay to Delhi is not likely to materialise in the near future. However the authorities of my son's employers have assured my son that he would be transferred to Delhi as and when it would be possible provided he makes his own arrangements of accommodation there. A letter to that effect issued by M/s. TELCO is also enclosed herewith.

    8. That my other daughter viz. Mrs. Indra Mohindru is living in Delhi with her husband Shri J.R Mohindru and other members of her family. It is not possible for her to look after me because as stated above, both of them are employees and they have to go to work everyday.

    9. That at this old age of both myself and my wife and with the failing health, I being the owner of the premises am finding it very difficult to continue living alone and I submit that first floor be got vacated so that I can accommodate my daughter Mrs. Shakun Vohra along with her family members to live there. She will be a source of great help and assistance to both myself and my wife.”

    17. Along with this affidavit the landlord also filed the original letter dated 16th June, 1980 received by his son Shri P.K Sarna from M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd., Bombay with whom his son was working to the following effect :—

    “Dear Mr. Sarna,

    This refers to your application dt 21st Apr. 1998 for transfer to our Delhi office, to enable you to look after your aged parents, who are keeping indifferent health.

    We have also discussed this matter with you. As explained to you, we shall advise you as and when we are in a position to transfer you to Delhi. However, please note that in case you are transferred to Delhi, you will have to make your own arrangements for accommodation.

    With best wishes,

    Yours sincerely,

    K.P Panthaky.

    Mr. P.K Sarna,

    Asstt. Service Manager,

    Service

    Bombay.”

    18. This letter shows the request of Shri P.K Sarna to his employers to transfer him to Delhi to enable him to look after his aged parents, who are keeping indifferent health and the fact that his transfer was under consideration subject to the rider that his employers are not in a position to give him accommodation in Delhi and that he will have to make his own arrangement for the accommodation.

    19. Along with his own affidavit and the aforesaid letter the landlord also filed an affidavit of his daughter, Smt. Shakun Vohra and it was stated in this affidavit that her brother Shri P.K Sarna is holding a senior post with TELCO at Bombay. All efforts are being made to get him transferred to Delhi so that he and his family members can look after his old parents. It was also pleaded by Smt. Shakun Vohra, daughter of the landlord that she was the only fit person to look after her old aged parents at the moment and she was married to Shri R.P Vohra, who is working as Regional Manager, Ashok Leyland Ltd., posted at Delhi and is drawing a total remuneration of Rs. 60,000/- per year. With that type of status and stretcher of her husband, they needed at least three bed rooms for their accommodation and they could stay in the demised premises to render all possible assistance to her parents who are living on the ground floor with only two living rooms. It was also stated that her brother Shri P.K Sarna is unable to come to Delhi for the time being and his employers would consider his transfer to Delhi only when he got his own arrangements for stay. It was stated by her that she was permanently staying with her husband in Delhi and would stay with her parents at the premises in dispute with a view to look after and nurse them at all times.

    20. After the two affidavits had been filed, one of the landlord and the other of his daughter, Smt. Shakun Vohra, an affidavit was filed by the tenant-petitioner dated 24th July, 1980 and it was stated therein that the landlord has misused the opportunity provided to him for filing additional affidavit regarding his transfer of one of his sons from Bombay to Delhi and instead filed his own affidavit and that of his daughter. It was stated that his daughter, Smt. Shakun Vohra was presently residing at 11 Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi and has fairly large accommodation provided to her husband by his employers. Not only this Smt. Shakun Vohra and/or her husband own a big residential property at Greater Kailash, New Delhi and Smt. Shakun Vohra has filed her affidavit in order to help her father to build up a better case for eviction. It was stated that the additional affidavit of the landlord cannot be taken note of in view of the orders passed by the Court dt. 26th May, 1980. it was stated that the petitioner has made a wrong statement on the last date of hearing when he informed this Hon'ble Court in so many words that his son has been transferred.

    21. Before the Rent Controller, following submissions appear to have been made on behalf of the tenant-petitioner for leave to contest the eviction petition :—

    “(1) That only daughters of the petitioner are staying in Delhi and have their own houses and the sons are not dependent upon the petitioner for any purpose and the petitioner has not disclosed in the petition as to which of the daughters wants to shift to him.

    (2) That the accommodation on the ground floor available with the petitioner is sufficient and adequate for them as his family consists of himself and his wife and even if one of his daughter shifts to his residence, the same accommodation would also be sufficient for their family.

    (3) That the main object of the petitioner is to increase the rent as in June, 1979, the petitioner had approached the respondent for increasing the rent from Rs. 925/- to Rs. 1,500/- but the respondent informed that he was not in a position to increase the rent and this gave rise to the present petition and further that some extra accommodation available to the petitioner on the ground floor, which was vacated by Shri S.K Vasan in 1979, but the petitioner let out the same lastly at enhanced rent and this shows that the requirement of the petitioner is not bona fide.

    The Rent Controller also noticed that “the petitioner has admitted having let out the portion vacated by Shri S.K Wason but the explanation given by the petitioner in the affidavit is that S.K Wason was a tenant in a small portion on the rear side of the building in question and had only one small room measuring 10′ × 10′ and a small living room which was insufficient and unsuitable for the petitioner's purpose as well as for the purpose of the family of his daughter and that was why he let out that portion to some other tenant”.

    22. After noticing the aforesaid pleas the controller held that the plea, that the daughter of the petitioner who wants to shift in the suit premises also owns a house, will not be available to the tenant in view of the fact that the landlord and his wife are running in their eighties and their sons are out of Delhi. They do require somebody to look after them. For that purpose, the married daughter is also a member of the family of the landlord and therefore, the landlord has every right to accommodate any of the daughters in the premises for being looked after. The Controller also found that the accommodation with the landlord has also been admitted though the Puja Room in occupation of the landlord is denied. He has proceeded to observe that “let us assume that there are three rooms with the petitioner as disclosed by the respondent in the affidavit. The petitioner and his wife are old persons. They do require separate accommodation because of their having various ailments. Three rooms accommodation is most unsuitable for a family of the petitioner, his wife and daughter and her husband who is Regional Manager of some private limited company and is getting about Rupees 5,000/- per month and, therefore, his status is also to be looked into. He is already living in three bed rooms accommodation on rent. Thus we have to see whether the accommodation which is in the present occupation of the petitioner is also reasonably suitable for the family of the daughter or not.”

    23. The Controller also found that the premises which were vacated by Shri S.K Wason was re-let and the re-letting has been satisfactorily explained. It was observed that “the premises in occupation of the said tenant Sh. S.K Wason were admittedly only one room and kitchen on the rear side of the building. Thus accommodation on the ground floor was obviously neither reasonable nor sufficient for the family of the daughter of the petitioner. The landlord has every right to let out the premises which are not suitable to him and which cannot be used by him or his family members.”

    24. The Controller also observed further that “the petitioner who has gone very old and his wife is also very old, and they cannot look after themselves of their own and as such they have every right to be looked after by their children. The need of such a child who may be independent for accommodation purposes or otherwise, does come within the ambit of the need of the landlord “himself”.

    25. While challenging the impugned order of the Controller, refusing leave to the tenant to contest the eviction petition, Mr. Vinay Bhasin, learned counsel for the tenant made the following submission :—

    (i) The Court cannot go into the averments beyond the ejectment application and can at the most look to the reply to the application for leave to contest.

    (ii) Under S. 25-D the tenant has to plead such facts, which if accepted, would disentitle the petitioner to the relief prayed for and for this the averments made by the tenant in its application will be deemed to be correct and on the admitted facts it will have to be decided whether the leave to contest should be granted or not.

    (iii) The question of bona fide necessity cannot be decided without taking evidence when the petitioner's requirement was disputed and particularly so when the stand of the landlord has been shifting.

    (iv) That the family members who were not normally residing with the landlord cannot come within the meaning of the expression “himself” contained in proviso (e) to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Act.

    26. Before dealing with the submissions certain facts admitted by the parties have to be stated.

    27. The first admitted fact is that the landlord is a retired gentleman who had got up his sons very well, educated them very highly and they are all very well placed in life.

    28. The second admitted fact is old age and ill health of both the landlord and his wife. Landlord is more than 80 years old and his wife is more than 75 years old. Both are having numerous ailments and constantly do not keep good health. They have got no family member to look after. All their sons are out of Delhi and all the daughters are married, living comfortably in their own houses. It can just be assumed that they are in dire need of a person/or persons who can look after them.

    29. The other admitted fact is the extent of accommodation with the landlord. The accommodation with the landlord consists of two bed rooms and drawing-cum-dining room. They also have another room, which is described as a Puja Room by the landlord but which is called by the tenant as a living room. This so-called third living room is 6.4′ × 9′. The size of the drawing-cum-dining is 14′ × 18′ and the bed rooms are 12′ × 12′ and 12′ × 12.6′.

    30. The premises vacated by Shri S.K Wason were situate on the rear side of the building, are two rooms besides kitchen and bathroom. The two rooms were described by the landlord as one small room measuring 10′ × 10′ and a small living room. The tenant described the two living rooms as two bed rooms. It is also common case that the landlord has one room set over the garage. It is also admitted that Shri S.K Wason was paying Rs. 825/- per month and soon after its vacation it was let out in Oct. 1979.

    31. The dispute thus centres round the following questions :—

    (A) What is the nature of the third room?

    (B) Is the third room sufficient for the requirement of the landlord for having some person/persons to look after him and his wife?

    (C) Can it be said that though the petition for eviction was filed in Dec. 1979, the petition is mala fide as the landlord had let out the rear portion of the accommodation on the ground floor vacated by Shri S.K Wason to another tenant in Oct. 1979?

    (D) Can the accommodation built on the garage be said to be suitable for the landlord for accommodating the person/persons whom they require for looking after him and his wife?

    (E) Can the requirement of landlord to keep the family of his son or daughter, who are not living with the landlord, to look after him and his wife come within the expression “himself” occurring in proviso (e) sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Act.”

    32. Before dealing with these disputes I find it appropriate to deal with the submission made by learned counsel for the tenant, which I noted earlier.

    33. So far as the statutory provisions are concerned it will be noted that Chapter III-A which provides the procedure how an application by landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 is headed as “Summary trial of certain applications” and sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 25-B merely states as under :—

    “25B (5). The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14, or under S. 14A”.

    34. When the leave is granted, the Controller is expected to commence the hearing of the application for ejectment as early as possible. But how the application for leave to contest is to be decided or the procedure to be dealt with by the Controller for deciding the application for leave to contest is not mentioned. But the clue to it can be gathered from the heading of Chapter-IIIA, namely “Summary trial of certain applications”.

    35. Mr. Bhasin, learned counsel for the tenant, wanted that the Controller should merely look at the application for leave to contest and the affidavit accompanying it, as filed by the tenant, and the reply thereto filed by the landlord. If I were to accept this submission in this form the whole purpose of providing for summary trial of applications based on the grounds mentioned earlier will become a farce. It will then result in one party saying yes and other party saying no. It is true that the tenant is bound to disclose such facts as would disentitle the landlord for obtaining orders for recovery of possession, but it does not show what facts or material the landlord should place on record in order to defeat the application of the tenant. To illustrate, suppose the landlord claims to be the owner but tenant disputes the title. It in this situation the landlord asserts his title and also produces prima facie documents of title, can it be said that still the leave must be granted because tenant is disclosing a fact which is essential for landlord to prove. The only answer can be that the landlord is entitled to not only reply to the facts averred by tenant but also to place on record material which can prima facie show that the plea by the tenant is negative in character or vague or mala fide or sham, only to gain time. It is not, as suggested by learned counsel for the tenant, that tenant should aver facts which have to be accepted and then considered whether such facts would disentitle the landlord for obtaining the order of eviction. The landlord is equally entitled to refute those facts and this application by its very nature has to be decided summarily. But while deciding it summarily it does not mean that the landlord cannot place facts or documents to defeat the application of the tenant. In law there is no limitation or bar to the parties from bringing on record documents in support or opposition to the application and/or from filing further affidavits. All that is required is that the Controller should observe the rules of natural Justice.

    36. In this connection I was referred to the decisions, namely; Om Prakash v. Bishan Lal (1977) 2 Ren CJ 267; Smt. Leela Wati… v. Smt. Ganga Devi…, AIR 1980 Delhi 209; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. T.S Bhatia (1977) 1 Ren CJ 902 : (AIR 1978 NOC 45) (Smt. V.L Kashyap…Petitioner v. R.P Puri…, ILR (1977) 1 Delhi 22 : (AIR 1977 NOC 205).

    37. In Om Prakash v. Bishan Lal (1977) 2 Ren CJ 267 (supra) Kapur, J. pointed out what the approach of the Controller ought to be and no exception can be taken to the approach pointed out by learned Judge and it was rightly observed that it will depend on circumstances of each case and the extent that it is necessary to examine the defence and if the defence is not sham or improbable and raises triable issues leave will have to be granted.

    38. Again in Smt. Leela Wati… v. Smt. Ganga Devi…, AIR 1980 Delhi 209 (supra) Kapur. J. pointed out that u/s. 25-B of the Act, the Rent Controller has only to find out whether there is a case requiring trial and not to decide the ease on imaginary evidence to reach the conclusion that it is not triable. It was also observed by learned Judge that the trial court should not to decide the falsehood or correctness of what has been stated but should see that if these facts are on record what would happen. Of course, there may be some completely outrageous defence which may be summarily rejected by the Controller. In the plausible defence, it is the duty of the Controller to put the matter for trial and allow leave to defend.

    39. Both these cases again do not lay down the procedure as to be followed for deciding the application for leave. They only indicate the correct approach to be adopted for deciding such applications.

    40. The decision of Anand. J. in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. T.S Bhatia (1977) 1 Ren CJ 902: (AIR 1978 NOC 45) (supra) however, throws some light. The learned Judge observed as under :—

    “That the only question that the Additional Rent Controller was required to determine at the preliminary stage of the proceedings was if the affidavit filed by the petitioner disclosed a case which if accepted would non-suit the respondent. For consideration of such a question it was not open to the Controller to consider the documents filed on the record by the respondent or to decide the question of fact in controversy between the parties as the Additional Rent Controller appears to have done. Both the questions raised by the petitioner as to the bona fides of the respondent and the sufficiency of the accommodation available to the respondent, including the subsidiary questions which were raised at the hearing in this Court as to whether the sons could be treated as members of the family dependent on the respondent and if the respondent was entitled to live in his own house, whether or not the present accommodation was sufficient for his requirement, involved controversies of fact and of law which would require careful consideration and even involve evidence. None of these questions could be said to raise sham issues or to be described as frivolous pleas, which may justify their rejection out of hand.”

    41. The observations of the learned Judge on the facts of the case are unexceptional but with due respect it cannot be stated as a rule of law “that for consideration of questions by the Controller it was not open to the Controller to consider documents filed on the record.” To illustrate, suppose in an application on the ground of personal bona fide requirement one of the points in dispute is as to the purpose of letting. In order to claim the relief to defend the eviction application the tenant raises a defence that the premises were let out for residential-cum-commercial purpose or merely commercial purposes and not for residential purposes and to meet this defence the landlord not only says on affidavit that the premises were let out for residential purposes but also files on record the rent note or lease deed which mentions the purpose of letting and which had never been disputed earlier when occasion arose earlier or which in other proceedings had been admitted as a genuine document, will it be possible in such a case for a tenant to deny the execution of the lease deed or rent note and the Controller will shut its eyes to the document and grant leave, I am afraid, proposition position so stated by the learned Judge is rather broad. It will, of course, depend on each case but it cannot be said that the document produced by either party with the affidavit cannot be looked into. In fact, very often, it is necessary to look into those documents to see if the defence raised is deliberately false, mala fide, sham or bogus. It will thus depend in each case as to what extent the Controller would entertain affidavits and or documents to decide each applications for leave and no hard and fast rule can be laid that the party cannot file more than one affidavit or place further documents whatsoever in support of his case.

    42. B.C Misra, J. in Smt. V.L Kashyap v. R.P Puri, ILR (1977) 1 Delhi 22 : (AIR 1977 NOC 205) (supra) analysed what sort of defence is to be pleaded by the tenant to enable him to be granted permission to defend the petition for ejectment.

    43. The plea of the landlord in the ejectment application was that because of his and his wife's ill-health and advanced age he required either a family of a son or a daughter to look after him. This necessarily meant son or daughter whom he found convenient and who was willing to stay with the landlord. This was mentioned clearly by the landlord in his ejectment application. The tenant's case in the affidavit was that the sons cannot stay with the landlords since they are all out and daughters cannot stay as they are very well settled with their husbands. At one stage the landlord was hopeful that his son who was in Bombay will be in a position to get transferred to Delhi and can stay and look after him and his wife. But it so happened that for the present it was not possible for his son at Bombay to come and stay. There was nothing illegal in landlord filing the affidavit of his daughter living in Delhi to volunteer to shift to the premises in dispute to look after her parents in case they are vacated. The procedure followed by the Controller was just and in no way violative of the procedure prescribed. I also do not find any merit in the submission of learned counsel for the tenant that the averments made by tenant in his application will have to be deemed to be correct. If this proposition is accepted it will completely defeat the purpose of summary trial. Due to paucity of accommodation the tenant is likely to plead facts if, they are to be deemed to be accepted in every case for the purpose of deciding applications for leave, hardly any application would fail. This certainly is not the idea behind this provision. In my view while deciding these applications for leave to contest, all that is required for the Controller is to observe rules of natural justice i.e hear both the parties and give opportunity to party to produce the material on which he relies and also grant opportunity to opposite party to rebut that material. I thus, find, that there was nothing wrong in the Controller in entertaining the affidavit of the landlord and his daughter Smt. Shakun Vohra on 14th July, 1980.

    44. Again it is not correct to state that the stand of the landlord was shifting. In the beginning in his petition he was wanting any of son's family or any of his daughter's family to come and reside. At one stage landlord felt that his son posted in Bombay could come and look after him but the son was not able to come. Merely because daughter is able to come and stay with him does not mean that his stand was shifting.

    45. It is clear from the size of the third room that the third room is neither a proper living room nor it is sufficient for need of any relation who may come and reside with the landlord to look after him and his wife.

    46. It will also be noticed that the premises vacated by Shri Wason, on the rear portion of the ground floor, was already on rent. The landlord had denied that the premises had been let out at higher rent. The tenant has not even disclosed as to at what higher rent it has been let out. It was also not the case of the tenant that the landlord had got the premises vacated from Shri Wason for his bona fide personal requirement. In fact there is no such plea. It is also proved from the size of accommodation vacated by Shri Wason that it would not have been suitable for the purpose of which the landlord now requires the premises in dispute. The plea as to the accommodation built by the landlord on the garage is only to be noticed to be rejected. Such accommodation over the garage is built by the landlord, as pleaded by him, for servants and certainly it would not be suitable for the purpose of which the ejectment of tenant is sought.

    47. There is thus no merit to the first three submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant.

    48. The real question is whether the requirement of the landlord to keep the family of his son or daughter, who are not, living with the landlord, to look after him and his wife come within the expression “himself” occurring in proviso (e) to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Act. In this connection I was referred to the decisions reported as, C.L Davar v. Amar Nath Kapur, (1962) 64 Pun LR 521, Jaswant Singh v. Smt. Prem Kumari, (1964) 66 Pun LR 881, Bhagwan Dass v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi, C.R 411-D/61 decided on 22-10-61 by Khosala, C.J, T.C Rekhi v. Uma Gujral, 1970 Ren CR 292; Vas Dev Dhawan v. Triloki Nath, (1967) 69 Pun LR (D) 260; J.L Mehta… v. Hira Devi….. 1970 DLT 484; Lala Ram… v. Kalawati…., 1874 Ren CJ 405; P.D Shanna v. Ram Lubhaya, 1370 Ren CJ 160; Shri Gobind Dass v. Shri Kuldip Singh, 1970 Ren CR 511: (AIR 1971 Delhi 151); and Smt. Krishna Devi v. Smt. Rameshwari Devi, (1878) 1 Ren CR 3.

    49. I had an occasion to consider the meaning of the expression “himself” appearing in the proviso (e) to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Act, in the case of Lala Ram… v. Kalawati…., 1974 Ren CJ 405 (supra). That case was decided by me after taking into consideration most of the cases which were cited at the Bar in this case as well as the decision of Sachar, J. in J.L Mehta… v. Hira Devi…., 1970 DLT 484 and in this connection I had an occasion to observe as under :—

    “7. It has already been held by this court in numerous cases that the expression himself appearing in the proviso (c) to S. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act includes all members of the family of the landlord who had always been living with the landlord whether as dependent or otherwise. See Bhagwan Dass v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi (C.R 411-D/61, decided on 22-10-61 by Khosala C.J), T.C Rekhi v. Uma Gujral (1970 Ren CR 292) and P.D Sharma v. Ram Lubhaya (1970 Ren CJ 160). These cases were followed by Sachar, J. in the case of J.L Mehta v. Hira Devi (1970 DLT 484). It has been held in the aforesaid cases that the correct reading of proviso (e) to S. 14(1) means that where the landlord (or the landlady as in this case) requires premises for his/her own use then “his own use” includes the use of himself and the members of his family. The second part of the proviso comes into operation when the landlord requires the premises himself as well as for the benefit of such family members who had not been living with him earlier but who are in some way dependent on him either financially or for purposes of residence or for any other sufficient reason. In that case it is essential that the member must be dependent on him, otherwise order for ejectment will not be made but as in the present case the landlady herself resides in the house along with her daughter and her husband, it is not necessary that those members who reside with her should be in some way dependent upon her. In the present case the family consists of landlady, and her married daughter along with her husband and children, In this case the requirement of the landlady will be treated as “his or her own use” because she and her daughter's family will be treated as “self.

    50. At this stage relevant part of proviso (e) to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Art may be noticed :—

    “(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has not their reasonably suitable residential accommodation.”

    51. Case of Lala Ram v. Smt. Kalawanti (1974 Ren CJ 405) (Delhi) (supra) decided by me earlier really construed the expression “himself” as opposed to the requirement of landlord “for any member of his family dependent on him”. There the question involved was which family members would come within the expression “himself and it was held that family members already living with the landlord would be covered by the expression “himself.”

    52. The question which has arisen in the present case had not arisen when I decided the aforesaid case of Lala Ram… v. Kalawati…. (supra). As I noticed earlier this case is concerned with the “bona fide requirement by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself”. This case is not concerned with the “bona fide requirement for any member of his family dependent on him”. The requirement in this case of the landlord that his son or daughter, not living with him, should come and live with him is a requirement of the landlord himself and is not the requirement of any member not living with him but dependent on him. Here the landlord is dependent on a member of the family whom he wants to come and reside with him for his own needs. In such a situation the expression “himself” is wide enough to include such requirement of the landlord “himself”. It will be noticed that the requirement is not for the children but for a family which is required to come and live in the premises so as to look after the landlord. If in the situation, like the present, landlord wanted a Doctor or a nurse or their family to stay with him, the requirement would still have been of the landlord itself. But instead of calling a Doctor or nurse to look after him and his wife, the landlord decides that the suitable person to look after him would he his son and his family or a daughter and her family. I think it should come in the expression “bona fide requirement as a residence for himself”. It is not a question of splitting a family or reuniting the family. It is purely a question of the requirement of the landlord.

    53. Decision of Sachar, J. in Smt. Krishna Devi v. Smt. Parameshwari Devi, (1978) 1 Ren CR 3 (supra) also supports by aforesaid view. Sachar, J. observed “where landlady wanted the premises so that her married daughter and her family should live with her is the requirement of the landlady herself and not that of daughter.”

    54. I am, therefore, in complete agreement with the observations of the learned Rent Controller that the present case fulfills the test of “bona fide requirement by landlord for occupation as a residence for himself.” I am also in agreement with the learned Rent Controller that no facts have been disclosed by tenant in his affidavit as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises.

    55. There is thus no merit in the sub-missions of learned counsel for the petitioner and I also feel that it is not a fit case for interference in revision under the proviso to sub-sec. (8) of S. 25-B of the Act.

    56. The revision petition thus fails and is dismissed.

    57. Looking at the urgency of the requirement of the landlord as well as the difficulty for the tenant to find out another accommodation the petitioner is allowed three months' time from the date of this order to vacate the premises.

    58. There shall be no order as to costs for the present petition.

    Revision dismissed.
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    Comments

    J.S.K Arora v. S.L Sarna .
    (Sep 24, 1981)