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Summary of Opinion — Sultan Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 brought by the tenants/appellants against the Rent Control Tribunal's judgment dated April 28, 1980, which confirmed the Additional Controller's order dated March 23, 1979. The orders below had directed eviction of the appellant under section 14(1)(a) read with the proviso to section 14(2) of the Act.

The appellant, Shashi Kumar, occupied a portion of the first floor of property at 176/23 Desh Bandhu Gupta Road, New Delhi, paying monthly rent of Rs. 140 plus utilities. The respondents purchased the property on July 2, 1975. The respondents alleged the appellant was in rent arrears from January 1, 1978 and that rent was payable in advance. They issued a notice dated February 18, 1978 claiming Rs. 280 for January and February 1978; the registered cover was returned undelivered and a copy was pasted at the premises on March 9, 1978 in the presence of two witnesses. The appellant sent a money order for Rs. 429.11 dated April 25, 1978 (Exhibit R-I) which was tendered to the respondents on April 29, 1978 and refused; the amount was repaid by money order coupon Exhibit R-2 on or about May 5, 1978. Respondents filed an eviction application on May 15, 1978, alleging the tenant had not paid or tendered arrears within two months of the notice dated February 18, 1978 and that the tenant had earlier benefited under section 14(2) in prior litigation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notice of demand dated February 18, 1978 was duly served on the appellant (by certificate of posting and/or by pasting) and, if so, on what date it is to be treated as served for the purposes of section 14(1)(a) of the Act.
  2. When the two-month period for payment or tender of arrears (under section 14(1)(a) of the Act) begins to run if notice is served by two different methods on different dates.
  3. Whether, as a matter of fact, the appellant paid or tendered the arrears of rent within the two-month period from the date of service.
  4. Whether the rent was payable in advance (which affects the quantum allegedly due) as contended by the respondents.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The notice dated February 18, 1978 was never properly tendered to the appellant, his wife, family member or servants at his residence; the contention as to pasting on March 9, 1978 is disputed.
  • The money order of Rs. 429.11 (Exhibit R-I) was dated April 25, 1978 and therefore constituted a tender of rent within two months of service (if service is taken as March 9, 1978).
  • The rent was not payable in advance; there is no oral or documentary evidence that rent was payable in advance and payment patterns (e.g., Exhibit A-I) do not prove an obligation to pay in advance.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The notice was sent by registered post and by certificate of posting; service through certificate of posting is valid and, on that basis, the notice should be treated as having been delivered around February 19–20, 1978.
  • Because the respondents used certificate of posting, the two-month period for payment should be counted from that earlier date, making any tender after that period ineffective.
  • The rent was payable in advance; relying on a rent receipt (Exhibit A-I dated May 21, 1977) the respondents contended that payment patterns show rent is payable in advance, which would increase the arrears allegedly due as of April 25, 1978 to Rs. 560 (four months at Rs. 140 each).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
O.P. Bahal v. A.K. Sharoff, 1972 R.C.R. 960 Service through a certificate of posting constitutes good service. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that sending notice under certificate of posting is effective service; the fact the address was correct and the certificate of posting was used meant mere denial of receipt by the appellant was insufficient to negate service.
Shri Kishan Chand Chopra v. Shri Satya Paul Chaddha and another, 1974 R.C.R. 578 Service through a certificate of posting is good service. The court cited this case alongside O.P. Bahal to uphold the legal principle that certificate of posting amounts to valid service for the purposes of notice under the Act.
Surinder Kumar v. Prem Kumar, 1980 (18) D.L.T. 255 When two simultaneous modes of service are prescribed and both result in due service on different dates, the period of time for any triggered statutory consequence may be taken from the later of the two dates. The court applied this reasoning to conclude that where both certificate of posting and pasting were used, the later date (pasting on March 9, 1978) should be treated as the operative date for the two-month period under section 14(1)(a).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step-by-step factual and legal analysis anchored on evidence and applicable legal principles:

  1. Service of the notice: The Tribunal and the Additional Controller found (on appreciation of evidence) that the notice was pasted at the premises on March 9, 1978. Testimony of witness AW3 recorded that the notice was tendered to the appellant's wife, she did not accept it, and thereafter the notice was pasted in the presence of two witnesses (AW2 and AW3). No cross-examination suggestion rebutted AW3's identification of the woman as the appellant's wife. The court accepted this factual finding that the notice was tendered to the wife and then pasted.
  2. Validity of service by certificate of posting: The notice was also sent under certificate of posting. Citing O.P. Bahal and Shri Kishan Chand Chopra, the court observed that service through a certificate of posting is good service; the address on the envelope was admitted to be correct and mere denial of receipt does not negate deemed service by certificate of posting.
  3. Which date to treat as date of service: When two methods were used (registered post/certificate of posting and pasting) and they resulted in service on different dates, the court adopted the principle from Surinder Kumar v. Prem Kumar that the later date of service should be treated as the operative date for purposes of computing the two months under section 14(1)(a). The court thereby accepted March 9, 1978 (the date of pasting/tender to the wife) as the effective date of service in the instant case.
  4. Whether rent was payable in advance: The court examined the parties' positions and evidence. The respondents relied on Exhibit A-I (a rent receipt dated May 21, 1977) to argue rent was payable in advance; the court rejected that inference because the receipt itself did not state rent was payable in advance and payment in advance is a matter of contract requiring evidence. The Tribunal had, by implication, treated the rent as not payable in advance when it calculated required tender for the period ending April 30, 1978. The court therefore held there was no evidence that rent was payable in advance.
  5. Whether the appellant tendered the arrears within two months: The court reviewed the money order dated April 25, 1978 (Exhibit R-I) for Rs. 429.11. Since the court treated March 9, 1978 as the date of service, the two-month period extended beyond April 25, 1978. The court computed arrears due as of April 25, 1978 on the accepted basis that rent was not payable in advance: arrears for January–March 1978 equalled Rs. 420 (3 × Rs. 140). The money order therefore constituted a valid tender within the two-month period. The respondents' refusal to accept the money order (tender) did not negate the fact of the tender; the Controllers below had misinterpreted the date (thinking tender occurred on May 5, 1978) and had treated the amount tendered as insufficient on that later date.
  6. Cause of action and entitlement to evict: Because the statutory cause of action for eviction under section 14(1)(a) requires both service of notice and failure to pay or tender arrears within two months, the court concluded there was no cause of action here: service was on March 9, 1978 and the appellant tendered the correct amount within two months of that date.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgments and orders of the Additional Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal are set aside and the eviction application filed by the respondents against the appellant is dismissed. The court ordered no order as to costs throughout.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the appellant will not be evicted pursuant to the challenged orders; the eviction application is dismissed.
  • The court clarified the application of governing principles in this factual matrix: (a) service by certificate of posting is valid; (b) where two modes of service yield different dates, the later date may be treated as the operative date for computing statutory time limits; and (c) payment in advance must be proved by evidence and cannot be inferred merely from a receipt showing a prior payment. These applications were used to resolve the dispute of fact and to determine that a timely tender had been made.
  • No broader new legal precedent beyond the specific application of the cited authorities is declared; the decision resolves the parties' dispute based on the cited authorities and the facts before the court.

    Shri Shashi Kumar /Tenant v. Shri Dharam Pal Sharma & Another /Landlord.

    Sultan Singh, J.:— This second appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) on behalf of the tenants/appellants is directed against the judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated April 28, 1980 confirming the judgment and order of the Additional Controller, Delhi, dated March 23, 1979 whereby an order of eviction was passed against the appellant under section 14(1)(a) read with proviso to section 14(2) of the Act.

    Shashi Kumar, appellant, is a tenant under the respondents in a portion on the first floor of property situated at 176/23, Desh Bandhu Gupta Road, Dev Nagar, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, on a monthly rent of Rs. 140/- besides electricity and water charges. The respondents had purchased the suit property on July 2, 1975. The appellant has been in arrears of rent since January 1, 1978. The respondents allege that the rent was payable in advance every month. A notice dated February 18, 1978, was issued by the respondents to the appellant alleging that the rent was payable in advance, that an amount of Rs. 280/- was due on account of rent for January and February, 1978. This notice was sent by registered post as well as under certificate of posting on February 18, 1978. The registered cover was received back undelivered. The respondents thereafter got a copy of the said notice dated February 18, 1978, pasted at the premises of the appellant tenant in the presence of two witnesses on March 9, 1978. The appellant on April 25, 1978 remitted a sum of Rs. 429.11 paise on account of rent by money order to the respondents vide receipt Exhibit R-I. It appears that the money order was tendered to the respondents on April 29, 1978, and it was refused. The amount of the money order was repaid to the appellant on or about May 5, 1978 vide money order coupen Exhibit R-2. It appears that the appellant had deducted a sum of Rs. 130.89 paise on account of alleged water charges payable by the respondents to him. The respondents filed the-eviction application under section 14(1)(a) of the Act on May 15, 1978 alleging that the appellant has neither paid nor tendered the arrears of rent inspite of the said notice of demand dated February 18, 1978 duly served upon him. It is further alleged that the appellant had enjoyed the benefit under section 14(2) of the Act in previous litigation between the appellant and his the then landlady Smt. Budhwanti in suit No. 195/72 decided on May 1, 1974.

    As already stated the Additional Controller and the Tribunal passed an order of eviction under section 14(1)(a) of the Act against the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the notice of demand was not served by pasting under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as alleged on March 9, 1978. His contention is that the said notice dated February 18, 1978 was never tendered to the appellant or to his wife or his family member or his servants at his residence. The Additional Controller and the Tribunal on appreciation of evidence on record have held that the notice was pasted on March 9, 1978, and it was duly served. It is in evidence of AW3 that the said notice was tendered to the wife of the appellant and she did not accept the same and thereafter the same was pasted in the presence of two witnesses i.e, AW2 and AW3. No suggestion was made to AW3 in cross-examination that the lady to whom the said notice was tendered was not the wife of the appellant. Thus it seems to me that the notice was duly tendered to the appellants wife on March 9, 1978 and when she did not accept it, the notice was duly pasted on that date. The notice as already stated was also sent under the certificate of posting and it is deemed to have been served upon the appellant, as held in O.P Bahal… v. A.K Sharoff…, 1972 R.C.R 960 and Shri Kishan Chand Chopra v. Shri Satya Paul Chaddha and another, 1974 R.C.R 578, that service through a certificate of posting is good service. The address on the envelope containing the notice is admitted to be correct. Mere denial by the appellant that the notice under certificate of posting was not received by him is of no assistance to him.

    The next question for decision is when the notice of demand is deemed to have been served. Notice under the certificate of posting in the ordinary course must have been delivered to the appellant after a day or two. The question for decision is from what date the period of two months for payment or tender by the tenant under section 14(1)(a) of the Act is to be counted. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that such period should be counted from March 9, 1978. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents submits that notice was duly served under the certificate of posting and the same must have been delivered to the appellant on or about 19th or 20th February, 1978 and therefore the period of two months should be counted from that date. Admittedly, the respondents sent notice by registered post and also under certificate of posting. The registered cover was received back undelivered. The respondents therefore thought that the notice of demand was not served and they adopted the method of pasting the notice in terms of second part of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. When a notice is sent to an addressee by two methods it seems to me that the date on which the notice is last served upon the addressee should be taken to be the date of service of notice for purposes of section 14(1)(a) of the Act. By such a notice a tenant is required to pay or tender the legally recoverable arrears of rent within two months from the date of service and therefore when he is deemed to be served twice, it would be just and proper to take the later date as the date of service of notice of demand. In Surinder Kumar… v. Prem Kumar…., 1980 (18) D.L.T 255, it has been observed that when two simultaneous modes of service have been prescribed, and if in both there is due service but on different date, then the tenant can contend that the time should run from the latter of the two. In the instant case the Additional Controller and the Tribunal have also taken into consideration March 9, 1978 as the date of service on the appellant. They have held so by implication.

    The next question is whether the appellant paid or tendered the arrears of rent. The Controller and the Tribunal were under the impression that the money order was remitted on May 5, 1978 on which date rent for four months i.e Rs: 560/- was due from the appellant. He had remitted only Rs. 429.11 paise. The amount tendered was thus held to be insufficient and therefore an order of eviction under section 14(1)(a) of the Act was passed. It was also held that the appellant had enjoyed the benefit of section 14(2) of the Act earlier. At the time of arguments both the counsel after examining the postal receipt remitting the amount of Rs. 429.11 paise by money order agreed that this postal receipt is dated April 25, 1978. Thus it has to be seen whether the amount remitted on April 25, 1978 was the correct amount payable by the appellant to the respondents. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that the rent was payable in advance and therefore rent for four months Rs. 560/- was payable by the appellant on April 25, 1978. The learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand submits that the rent was not payable in advance and no finding has been given to that effect either by the Controller or the Tribunal. There is no evidence either oral or documentary on record to show that the rent was payable in advance. The learned counsel for the respondents relies upon a rent receipt Exhibit A-I dated May 21, 1977 showing payment of rent for the month of May 1977. On the basis of this receipt it is contended by him that the rent was payable in advance. This receipt, however, does not mention anywhere that the rent was payable in advance. His argument is that the rent for May 1977 was paid on May 21, 1977 and therefore it must be held that the rent was payable in advance as it has been paid before May 31, 1977. I do not agree. Payment of rent in advance is a matter of contract. Without evidence it cannot be held that the rent was payable in advance. On the contrary the Rent Control Tribunal by implication held that the rent was not payable in advance when it determined that on May 5, 1978 a sum of Rs. 560/- was required to be tendered by the appellant for the period ending on April 30, 1978. I, thus, hold that the rent was not payable in advance.

    On April 25, 1978 rent for the months of January, February and March 1978 at Rs. 140/- per month was only payable by the appellant to the respondents. In other words on that date a sum of Rs. 420/- only was payable as arrears of rent by the appellant. Admittedly, the appellant remitted a sum of Rs. 429.11 paise by money order on April 25, 1978 which was refused by the respondents on April 29, 1978. Thus it seems to me that the notice of demand was served on March 9, 1978 and the appellant-tenant tendered the rent due on April 25, 1978 which the respondents did not accept. The cause of action for institution of an application for eviction on ground of non-payment of rent as mentioned in section 14(1)(a) of the Act consists of service of a notice of demand and the failure of the tenant either to pay or tender the arrears of rent demanded within a period of two months from the date of service. In the instant case the notice was served on March 9, 1978 and there has been a tender by the appellant-tenant within a period of two months from that date and therefore it seems to me that the respondents had no cause of action to institute the present eviction application against the appellant. I, therefore, find that the Controller and the Tribunal were not correct in holding that the appellant failed to pay or tender the amount due as they considered the date of tender as May 5, 1978 instead of April 25, 1978. The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments and orders of the Additional Controller and the Tribunal are set aside and the eviction application filed by the respondents against the appellant is dismissed with no order as to costs throughout.

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    Comments

    Shri Shashi Kumar /Tenant v. Shri Dharam Pal Sharma & Another /Landlord.
    (Jan 21, 1981)