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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent landlord filed a petition for eviction against the appellant tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent arrears from 17-12-1960. Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 required the landlord to serve a notice of demand on the tenant in the manner provided by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which contemplates three alternative modes of service: (1) by post, (2) by delivery to the addressee or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (3) by affixation to a conspicuous part of the property.

The landlord adopted all three modes. A notice of demand dated 11-12-1964 was sent under a certificate of posting (Exhibit A5) and also sent by registered post. The registered envelope was returned with remarks that nobody inside replied; before the return, the registered letter had been taken to the tenant's house on 15th, 16th and 17th December 1964. As it could not be delivered on 17-12-1964, a copy of the notice was affixed to the tenant's house in the presence of the landlord's lawyer.

The Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal held that the notice had been properly served and that the petition for eviction was in order under the proviso to section 14(1). Because the tenant had already enjoyed the benefit of section 14(2) in an earlier proceeding, the Controller passed an order for eviction which the Tribunal upheld. The tenant filed a second appeal contending, among other points, that service had not been properly effected and that the earlier finding about section 14(2) was wrong.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notice of demand was validly served in the manner required by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (i.e., by post, by delivery at residence, or by affixation) so as to satisfy clause (a) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
  2. Whether the presumption of delivery arising under section 114(f) of the Evidence Act was rebutted by the tenant's denial of receipt.
  3. What role, if any, section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 plays vis-à-vis the presumption of delivery where a letter is sent by registered post.
  4. Whether the appellant may challenge the concurrent finding that he had previously enjoyed the benefit of section 14(2) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Tenant)

  • The notice posted under certificate of posting on 11-12-1964 was not received by the tenant; the tenant denied receipt and therefore rebutted the presumption under section 114(f) of the Evidence Act.
  • Relied on Bhagwanti v. Waryam Singh (1965 PLR 12, Short Notes) to support his position on post-related endorsements/evidence.
  • Invoked section 27 of the General Clauses Act to argue that a presumption regarding delivery arises only when a letter is sent by registered post.
  • Contended the affixation of the notice on 17-12-1964 was invalid because, on that date, the landlord did not yet know that personal delivery was impracticable (the registered post's final return occurred on 21-12-1964).
  • Challenged the finding that the tenant had previously enjoyed the benefit of section 14(2) and argued that the concurrent findings on that point were wrong.

Respondent's Arguments (Landlord)

  • The landlord followed all three alternative modes of service: posting under certificate of posting, sending by registered post, and affixing the notice to a conspicuous part of the property when personal delivery was impracticable.
  • Attempts to effect delivery by registered post were made on 15th, 16th and 17th December 1964 and proved unsuccessful; consequently, affixation on 17-12-1964 was justified and valid.
  • The registered envelope was eventually returned with the postman's report that nobody responded—this confirmed the impracticability of personal delivery and supported the affixation.
  • Before the Controller and Tribunal the tenant had conceded that he had earlier enjoyed the benefit of section 14(2), and on that basis the landlord treated the previous concession as binding.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagwanti v. Waryam Singh, 1965 PLR 12 (Short Notes of Cases) Cited by appellant to challenge the presumption of delivery where postal endorsements exist (relates to registered letter returned with postman's remark of refusal). The Court distinguished the Punjab decision: there the letter was admittedly not delivered and the issue was whether the postman's endorsement could outweigh the addressee's denial. In the present case the presumption under section 114(f) applied and the Punjab decision was held not to be in point.
Gauri Shanker v. M/s. Hindustan Trust, 1972 R.C.R. 483 Authority for the principle that a concession made before a lower forum is binding and may preclude a party from taking a contrary stand on appeal. The Court applied this precedent to hold that because the tenant had conceded before the Controller and the Tribunal that he had obtained the benefit of section 14(2) earlier, he could not contest that finding in the second appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise fashion, applying statutory presumptions and evaluating the factual record of attempts to serve the notice:

  1. On the presumption of postal delivery: The Court held that posting a letter gives rise to a presumption under section 114 illustration (f) of the Evidence Act that the common course of business was followed (i.e., that the letter was delivered in the ordinary course). To rebut that presumption, evidence of an interruption of the usual course of business — some extraordinary happening or event — is required. The tenant's personal denial of receipt, while he was admittedly out of town, without supporting testimony from family members or from the postman, did not suffice to rebut the presumption. The Court noted that no member of the tenant's household or the postman was examined to contradict the presumption.
  2. On section 27 of the General Clauses Act: The Court explained that the presumption under section 27 (which deems service by registered post to be effected when a letter is properly addressed, pre-paid and posted) is distinct from the presumption under section 114(f). The two presumptions are independent and not mutually exclusive. The section 27 presumption arises only when the letter is sent by registered post and not otherwise. In the present case the registered letter had been returned with an endorsement that it could not be delivered, so the section 27 presumption did not arise in favour of the landlord. The Court concluded, however, that the simpler presumption under section 114(f) did arise from posting.
  3. On the necessity for affixation: Section 106 provides affixation as a third mode only when tender or delivery is not practicable. The Court examined the chronology: the postman had attempted delivery on 15th and 16th December but had failed to obtain anyone from inside; the landlord (who lived in the same building) became aware of this and, believing delivery impracticable, affixed the notice on 17-12-1964 in the presence of his lawyer. The final postal report (returned on 21-12-1964) confirmed that delivery had not been practicable. The Court held the landlord was justified in affixing the notice on 17-12-1964 because multiple unsuccessful delivery attempts had already been made and thereby established impracticability.
  4. On the combined modes of service: The Court concluded that service was effected in two authorised ways under section 106 — (1) by posting under a certificate of posting (giving rise to the section 114(f) presumption), and (2) by affixation to a conspicuous part of the property when personal delivery was impracticable.
  5. On the challenge to the finding about section 14(2): The Court gave three reasons why the appellant could not successfully contest that finding: (a) the appellant was not seeking the benefit of section 14(2) in the present case, so the point was irrelevant to his present position; (b) the appellant had conceded before both the Controller and the Tribunal that he had previously obtained the benefit of section 14(2), and a party cannot resile from such a concession on second appeal (citing Gauri Shanker v. Hindustan Trust); and (c) the point had not been raised in the grounds of appeal either before the Tribunal or in the second appeal, so it could not be entertained at this stage.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF — The appeal is dismissed.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The appellate court upheld the concurrent findings of the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal that the notice of demand had been properly served. Specifically, the court found valid service by posting under a certificate of posting (giving rise to the presumption under section 114(f) of the Evidence Act) and by affixation to a conspicuous part of the property when personal delivery was impracticable.
  • The tenant's challenge to the prior enjoyment of the benefit of section 14(2) was precluded for the reasons stated by the Court (irrelevance to present relief, prior concession, and absence of challenge in grounds of appeal), and the tenant cannot reopen that point in this second appeal.
  • The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.

The opinion does not announce any broader or novel precedent beyond applying and distinguishing existing statutory presumptions (section 114(f) Evidence Act and section 27 General Clauses Act) and applying established principles on the binding effect of concessions in earlier proceedings (as illustrated by Gauri Shanker v. M/s. Hindustan Trust). No new legal principle was declared beyond the Court's factual application of those authorities.

    O.P Bahal v. A.K Sharoff

    V.S Deshpande, J. (Oral):— The respondent landlord filed a petition for eviction against the appellant tenant on the ground that the tenant had not paid arrears of rent from 17-12-1960. Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) requires the landlord to serve a notice of demand for the arrears of rent on the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the relevant part of which runs as follows:—

    “Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence, or if such tender or delivery is not practicable affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.”
    It will be seen that three alternative modes of service of notice are contemplated therein, namely:—
    (1) by post,
    (2) by delivery to the addressee or to one of his family or servants at his residence, and
    (3) by affixation to a conspicuous part of the property.
    The landlord adopted all the three modes. Firstly, the notice of demand dated 11-12-1964 was sent to the tenant at the address of the premises in which he lived under a certificate of posting which is Exhibit A5. Secondly, it was sent by registered post. But the registered envelop was returned with remarks that nobody from inside gave a reply and, therefore, the cover was being returned. The cover was, however, returned on 21-12-1964. But before the return, the registered letter was taken to the house of the tenant on the 15th, 16th and 17th of December 1964. As it could not be delivered to the addressee on the 17th December 1964, a copy of the notice was affixed by the landlord to the house of the tenant in the presence of the landlord's lawyer.
    The Controller as well as the Rent Control Tribunal held that the notice of demand had been properly served. The petition for eviction was, therefore, in order under clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. As the tenant had already enjoyed the benefit of section 14 (2) of the Act, an order for eviction was passed by the Controller and was upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal.
    Shri Yogeshwar Dayal for the appellant tenant in this second appeal urged that the notice of demand had not been properly served. Regarding the first method of service, namely, the posting of the notice under certificate of posting on 11-12-1964, learned counsel argued that the notice was not received by the tenant. Under section 114 Illustration (f) of the Evidence Act, there is a presumption that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases including this case of delivery of the letter by the postman to the addressee. It is well known that letters are delivered into the residence of the addressee and not personally to the addressee. The tenant was said to be out of town. If, so, the members of his family who were said to be residing in the premises should have received the letter in the common course of business. Learned counsel argued that the tenant went into the witness-box to deny that he received the letter and such denial should be sufficient to rebut the presumption raised by section 114 (f) of the Evidence Act. He relied on a short-note report of a decision by Falshaw, C.J in Bhagwanti v. Waryam Singh, 1965 PLR 12 (Short Notes of Cases) (1). In that case, the registered letter had been returned with the remark endorsed by the postman that the addressee had refused to accept the same. The learned Judge was of the view that the addressee could not produce any evidence other than his own that he has not refused to accept the letter. After such denial, it was for the sender of the letter to show that the addressee had refused to accept the letter. The Punjab decision is not in point. The question there was whether the endorsement made by the postman could prevail against the evidence of the addressee denying the refusal of the letter. The letter was admittedly not delivered to the addressee. On the contrary, the presumption under section 114 (f) of the Evidence Act is that the letter was delivered to the addressee. The question which arises for consideration is how the addressee can rebut this presumption. The answer is also given by the counter-illustration (f) below section 114 of the Evidence Act. The presumption that the usual course of the post was followed would not arise if it is shown that such usual course was interrupted by disturbances. To show that the common course of business was not followed in a particular case, some extraordinary happening, or event must be proved which prevented the common course of business being followed. In the present case, no such happening or event has been proved. The presumption that the common course of business must have been followed has not, therefore, been rebutted. The evidence of the tenant denying the receipt of the letter has no value because he was admittedly out of town when the letter would have been delivered at his residence. No member of his family has gone into the witness-box to deny the receipt of the letter. Nor has the postman been examined to show that in the ten days beginning with 11th December 1964 no such letter was delivered by him at the address of the tenant.
    Learned counsel then relied on section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which is as follows:—
    “Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or either of the expressions “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.”
    He argued that it is only if the letter is sent by registered post that the presumption about its delivery to the addressee would arise under section 27 of the General Clauses Act. In my view, the two presumptions are distinct. The first presumption arises by posting of the letter in the ordinary course without registration under section 114 (f) of the Evidence Act. The raising of this presumption is not in any way prevented by section 27 of the General Clauses Act. The latter provision does not mean that no presumption of the delivery of letter can arise unless it is registered. The second presumption under section 27 of the General Clauses Act arises only when the letter is sent by registered post. But the provisions of section 114 (f) of the Evidence Act and section 27 of the General Clauses Act are independent of each other and can stand together. They are not mutually repugnant. Therefore, when the landlord adopted both the procedures, both the presumption could arise in his favour. The presumption of the delivery of the registered letter could have arisen if the said letter had not been returned with the endorsement that it could not be delivered. The presumption of the delivery of the notice, therefore, arose in this case only under section 114 (f) of the Evidence Act and not under section 27 of the General Clauses Act.
    The second mode of service is relevant in the present case only to show that it could not be effected by that mode and, therefore, the third mode of service became relevant. It was necessary for the landlord, therefore, to show that it was not practicable to deliver the notice to the tenant personally or to a member of his family or servants at his residence and, therefore, he had to resort to the third mode of service, namely, affixation of the notice to a conspicuous part of the property. The registered envelop was finally returned by the post-office on 21-12-1964 with the report that nobody from inside responded to the post-man. The postman had to effect the delivery of the registered letter either on the addressee himself or to one of his family or his servants. As no one came out from the house and the postman could not go inside it, he could not deliver the registered letter to any of the above-mentioned persons. This report was made by the postman after several fruitless attempts of service. But before the registered envelop was returned with the final report, the landlord effected service by affixation on 17th December 1964. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that on 17-12-1964, the landlord could not have known that it had not been practicable to deliver the registered letter to the tenant or to any one of his family or servants and, therefore, the affixation of the notice on 17-12-1964 was not valid service. This argument could have force if finally the postman had succeeded in delivering the letter after 17-12-1964. Such delivery would have deprived the landlord of any justification to effect the service by affixation of the notice. But the argument loses all force when it is seen that the postman went to the premises on the 15th and 16th of December, 1964 but could not succeed in delivering the letter to any one there. The landlord who lives in the same building became aware of this and, therefore, concluded that the delivery of the letter was not practicable. He was, therefore, justified in effecting the service by affixation on 17-12-1964. The final report of the postman showed that the anticipation of the landlord was correct.
    I am thus of the view that the notice of demand was served on the tenant in two ways authorised by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, namely:—
    (1) by being sent under a certificate of posting, and
    (2) by affixation of the same to a conspicuous part of the property.
    Learned counsel then tried to argue that the concurrent findings of the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal that the tenant had enjoyed the benefit of section 14 (2) of the Act in the previous proceeding was wrong. The appellant is, however, precluded from raising such a contention by the following reasons. Firstly, the appellant is not interested in paying the arrears of rent in the present case. It is only if he was wanting to obtain the benefit of section 14 (2) in the present case that it would have been material to enquire whether he was precluded from obtaining such benefit because he had once got it in a previous proceeding. As the tenant has not paid the rent arrears in the present case to obtain the benefit of section 14 (2), the question whether he is entitled to the benefit of section 14 (2) does not arise and, therefore, the enquiry whether he had already obtained such benefit in the past becomes unnecessary. Secondly, on behalf of the tenant it was conceded both before the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal that the tenant had obtained the benefit of section 14 (2) in the previous proceeding. In view of such concession the tenant cannot contend in the second appeal that he had not obtained such benefit in the previous proceeding (Gauri Shanker v. M/s. Hindustan Trust 1972 R.C.R 483). (2) Lastly, the finding of the Controller that the tenant had obtained such a benefit in the previous proceeding should have been disputed, by the tenant before the Rent Control Tribunal. But the grounds of appeal taken before the Tribunal are silent about this point. Similarly, the grounds of appeal in the second appeal also are silent on this point. A contention which was not raised before either the Controller or the Rent Control Tribunal cannot be allowed to be raised in the second appeal particularly because it has not been raised in the grounds of second appeal.
    The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs.
    Appeal dismissed
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    Comments

    O.P Bahal v. A.K Sharoff
    (Aug 3, 1972)