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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Sultan Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

M/s. Tanwar Finance Private Limited (a company) passed a special resolution on 16 November (year in text) for voluntary winding up and appointed a liquidator. Prior to that resolution, Kanwar Ram Chander obtained a money decree (decree dated 6 November 1967 for Rs. 13,000) and, on 15 July 1968, caused attachment of company land (22 Bighas, 8 Biswas, specified Khasra numbers) in execution of his decree. The executing court directed sale of the land on 6 September 1968 but the auction did not take place then.

The liquidator filed petitions under the Companies Act (including Section 518) seeking set-aside of attachment and stay of execution because notifications under the Land Acquisition Act had been issued. The Company Court (supervising the voluntary winding up) passed orders on 15 April 1969 staying execution of certain decrees and directing that properties should not be sold without leave under Section 537 of the Companies Act. On 19 January 1970 another Company Judge issued an order allowing six decree-holders (petitioners Nos. 2–7) to take out execution and have the land attached (subject to law in force and with no special priority).

Despite these orders, the executing court auctioned the property on 20 April 1971; the auction purchaser (Faquir Chand Gupta) was the successful bidder. The liquidator objected under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC; objections were dismissed on 23 March 1973 and the sale was confirmed by the executing court. The liquidator's appeal as filed in the wrong court was returned and not pursued further. The liquidator then filed C.A. No. 269 of 1973 before the Company Judge under various sections of the Companies Act seeking to set aside the sale and to declare the executing-court proceedings null and void. The Company Judge (impugned order dated 28 February 1979) held that he had jurisdiction, that res judicata did not bar proceedings, and that the sale was without leave and therefore void. The auction purchaser brought this appeal under Section 483 of the Companies Act challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Company Judge's order dated 19 January 1970 (in C.A. No. 190 of 1969) granted leave to any of the decree-holders to sell the land in execution of their decrees.
  2. Whether the Company Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the liquidator's application (C.A. No. 269 of 1973) to set aside an auction sale confirmed by the executing court, given the liquidator's failure to pursue an appeal against the executing court's confirmation.
  3. Whether Section 526(1) of the Companies Act (effect of supervision order) permits the liquidator, in voluntary winding up under court supervision, to assent to or be deemed to have consented to the sale (i.e., whether the liquidator waived rights by contesting but not successfully overturning the executing court's confirmation).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Auction Purchaser) — Principal Arguments

  • That the order dated 19 January 1970 amounted to an order granting leave to decree-holders (including Kanwar Ram Chander) to take out execution and to sell the property; therefore the sale before the executing court was valid.
  • That the Company Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the liquidator's later application because the liquidator failed to pursue his appeal against the executing court's order dismissing his objections; hence the liquidator is debarred from invoking the Company Court.
  • That the liquidator, acting in voluntary winding up under supervision (Section 526), had authority to act without court sanction and that by contesting the auction proceedings before the executing court but not pursuing the appeal, the liquidator waived any right to challenge the sale (i.e., consented either expressly or by implication to the sale).

Liquidator / Company (as made in the petition before the Company Court) — Principal Contentions

  • The liquidator applied under Sections 446, 513, 523 and 526 and Section 518 procedures seeking to set aside the attachment and the sale and praying that the sale certificate not be issued to the auction purchaser.
  • The liquidator filed objections under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC to the executing court's auction sale (those objections were dismissed by the executing court and the dismissal was not effectively pursued in a proper appellate forum).
  • The liquidator sought a declaration that proceedings before the executing court (conducting sale without leave of the Company Court) were null and void and asked the Company Court to exercise its statutory powers to set aside such attachments/executions under the Companies Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court’s reasoning proceeds in a sequence of discrete legal determinations, grounded in the statutory scheme of the Companies Act and the Code of Civil Procedure as reflected in the record:

  1. Interpretation of the Company Court's January 19, 1970 order: The court examined the order in context and concluded that it permitted the six decree-holders (petitioners Nos. 2–7) to take out execution and to attach the land, but it did not grant leave to any of the decree-holders to have the land sold in execution. The order expressly disallowed special priority, and read as a whole it did not authorize sale; therefore no leave to sell was granted to any of the seven decree-holders.
  2. Scope and exclusivity of Company Court jurisdiction: The court relied on statutory provisions (Sections 446 and 518 of the Companies Act) to explain that the Company Judge has wide, exclusive powers to entertain applications arising in the winding up process, including applications to set aside attachments, distress or executions levied after commencement of winding up. Under Section 518(2)/(3) an application to set aside attachment/execution levied by any court other than a High Court must be made to the court having jurisdiction to wind up the company (i.e., the Company Judge).
  3. Effect of sale held without leave: The court held that Section 537 of the Companies Act renders sales of company property, held after commencement of winding up, void if undertaken without the leave of the Company Court. Thus a sale conducted by an executing court without leave is void ab initio within the meaning of Section 537.
  4. Relationship between executing-court proceedings and Company Court proceedings: The court reasoned that execution proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure are distinct from proceedings under the Companies Act. Consequently, the executing court’s confirmation of sale (dismissal of the liquidator’s Order 21 Rule 90 objections) could not bind the Company Court on the question whether the sale was held with the requisite leave of the Company Court. Because the sale was void for want of leave, the executing court's order confirming that sale must be considered non est (of no legal effect) vis-à-vis the Companies Act provisions; the Company Judge's determination on the matter is binding on parties and executing courts.
  5. Res judicata argument rejected: The court found that res judicata did not apply because the executing court and the Company Court exercise different jurisdictions; the executing court lacked jurisdiction to decide questions arising under Sections 446/518 (i.e., whether leave was granted by the Company Court).
  6. On the contention under Section 526(1) (powers of liquidator under supervision): The court rejected the suggestion that the liquidator's contest in the executing court and the subsequent failure to pursue an appeal amounted to a waiver of the liquidator's statutory rights. The land was sold by the executing court (not sold by the liquidator), and the liquidator retained the statutory remedy of applying to the Company Court under Section 518 to seek that a sale conducted without leave be declared void. The court therefore held Section 526(1) inapplicable to the facts so as to validate the executing court sale by implied consent.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Applying the above legal framework, the court concluded that the Company Judge correctly held the executing-court sale to be void, that the Company Court had jurisdiction to decide the liquidator's application, and that the executing-court confirmation could not defeat the Company Court’s power to declare the sale null and void.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The sale of the company's land conducted by the executing court (auction of 20 April 1971) was held to be void because it was held without leave of the Company Court (contrary to Section 537 of the Companies Act).
  • The Company Judge had jurisdiction under Sections 446 and 518 of the Companies Act to entertain the liquidator's application and to declare the sale null and void; the executing court's confirmation of the sale does not bind the Company Court and is, in that respect, non est.
  • The appeal by the auction purchaser was dismissed and the court ordered no costs (the opinion states the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs).

Broader legal implications: The opinion emphasizes the exclusive and wide powers of the Company Court in voluntary winding up under supervision to protect company property and to set aside attachments/executions made without leave. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent beyond applying the statutory provisions to the facts; it decides the present dispute by reference to those statutory provisions and the parties' agreement and conduct.

This summary is confined strictly to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Faqir Chand Gupta v. Tanwar Finance Private Ltd.

    Sultan Siugh, J.:— This appeal under Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 is by the Auction Purchaser against the Judgment and order dated February 28; 1979 of the Company Judge declaring auction sale of the property in execution of money decree as invalid and void because it was held without leave of the Court.

    2. M/s. Tan war Finance Private Limited a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter called ‘the Act)’ in a meeting held on 16th November, a special resolution that the company be wound up voluntarily and appointed Ch. Ram Singh son of Ch. Bhanwar Singh as liquidator. Prior to the passing of this resolution Kanwar Ram Chander had filed a suit against the said company for recovery of Rs. 13,000/- which was decreed on 6th November, 1967, and on 15th July, 1968 he got attached the land belonging to the company, measuring 22. Bighas, 8 Biswas bearing Khasra No. 31 and 410/28 situated at Azadpur, Delhi. The executing court by order dated 6th September, 1968 directed sale of the said land but auction did not take place. On 3rd January, 1969 the liquidator filed a petition under Section 518 of the Act alleging that Kanwar Ram Chander and six others had obtained seven money decrees against the company, that Kanwar Ram Chander, decree-holder got attached the said land, that the land had been acquired by the Union of India and notifications under Sections 4,6 and 9 of the Land Acquisition Act had been issued and prayed that the attachment and order for sale of the land passed by the court of Sh. Shamsher Singh, Sub Judge, Ist Class, Delhi in Suit No. 761 of 1977 and Execution case No. 77 of 1968 be set aside and the land be ordered to be released and that further proceedings in execution be stayed. The seven decree-holders filed application C.A No. 115 of 1969 before the Company Judge for the removal of the liquidator Ch. Ram Singh and for the appointment of the Official Liquidator as liquidator of the company. The Company Judge by order dated April 1, 1969, on the agreement of the parties, ordered that the voluntarily winding up would continue subject to supervision of the court and Ch. Ram Singh continued as liquidator of the Company. The Company Judge (S.K Kapur, J.) on April 15, 1969 on the agreement of the parties passed the following orders:

    “The learned counsel agree that:

    (1) in view of the provisions of sections 526 and 527 of the Companies Act, 1956, the execution of decrees obtained by respondents 1 to 7 against Tanwar Finance Private Limited (in voluntary liquidation) be stayed;

    (2) the decree-holders will not sell the properties in execution of the said decrees without obtaining leave of the court under section 537 or other relevant provision in this behalf; and

    (3) the question whether leave should be granted to the respondents for realisation of their amounts by sale of properties or whether it will result in undue preference to the respondents will be considered if and when the said respondents make an application in this behalf.

    3. In view of the agreement of the learned counsel, I direct that the execution of the decrees obtained by the respondents against Tanwar Finance Private Limited (in voluntary liquidation) be stayed and other question will be decided as and when an application is made by the decree holders for a permission to realise the amount. There will be no order as to costs”.

    4. Accordingly seven execution cases pending before the Sub Judge, Delhi were stayed. The decree-holders then filed application C.A No. 190 of 1969 before the Company Judge under Sections 526 and 537 of the Act on 21st May, 1969 seeking leave for the sale of the land attached in execution of the decree of Kanwar Ram Chander and also for the sale of the said land in execution of the other six decrees. They further prayed that after the sale in execution, preference may be given to them over other creditors in the matter of payment of the amounts due to them. On 19th January, 1970 the Company Judge (S.N Shanker, J.) passed the following orders:

    “The learned counsel for the petitioners are now agreed that the land sought to be attached is covered by the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. They, however, state that they are still entitled to attach the land in question with a view to leave no room for doubt in regard to their locus-standi for taking appropriate proceedings in case compensation of land is assessed and it is found to be necessary that application for enhancement of compensation is to be made. Mr. Mehra has no objection to this being done subject to the law of the land, but he says that this will not give any preference to these petitioners as far as their right to realise their debt from the company is concerned.

    I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The contention of the petitioners subject to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act seems to be justified. Petitioner Nos. 2 to 7 may be allowed to take out execution and to have attachment of the land in question subject to the law in force. This attach nent will not give them any special priority except to the extent permissible in law.

    The learned counsel for the parties are agreed that no further order is called for in C.A No. 190 of 1959. This application is, therefore, disposed of in terms of this order. No costs”.

    5. According to this order the remaining six decree-holders who were petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 in C.A No. 190 of 1969 were allowed to take out execution and to get the land attached. It however appears that Kanwar Ram Chander, decree-holder made an application to the executing court and got the attached land sold in execution of his decree on 20th April, 1971. The liquidator filed objections under Order 21 rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the executive court but the objections were dismissed on March 23, 1973 and the sale was confirmed. The liquidator filed an appeal before the District Judge, Delhi against the said order but his appeal was ordered to be returned on August 16, 1973 for presentation to the court having jurisdiction in the matter. It may be mentioned that the decree was for Rs. 13,000/- and prima facie the appeal was not maintainable before the District Judge. But in fact the liquidator did not pursue the appeal after its return by the Additional District Judge. The liquidator in the meantime however filed application C.A No. 269 of 1973 in this Court before the Company Judge under Sections 446, 513, 523 and 526 of the Act, for setting aside the sale held by the executing court in execution of the decrees in the suit, Kanwar Ram Chander v. Tanwar Finance Ltd. He further prayed that the sale certificate be not issued to Faquir Chand Gupta, the auction purchaser, who had given the bid for Rs. 90,000/- for the purchase of the said land. The liquidator also prayed that all proceedings before the executing court were null and void and be declared as such. The appellant-auction purchaser contested the claim of the liquidator. He submitted that the company court has no jurisdiction to set aside the sale held by the executing court, that the petition was barred by principles of res judicata and that the auction sale was valid. The Company Judge by the impugned order dated February 28, 1979 held that he had jurisdiction in the matter, that proceedings were not barred by principles of res judicata and that the sale was without leave and therefore void. The auction purchaser-appellant raises the following points.

    1. That order dated 19th January, 1970 passed by S.N Shanker, J. in C.A No. 190 of 1969 is an order granting leave to the decree-holders to take out execution and get the property attached and sold.

    2. The Company Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the application C.A No. 269 of 1973 of the liquidator on the ground that the liquidator having failed to file an appeal against the order of the executing court dismissing his objections against the auction sale, is debarred from moving the Company Judge to get the sale declared as null and void.

    3. The Liquidator in voluntary winding up proceedings is authorised to act under Section 526 of the Companies Act without any order from the Company Judge and that he waived his right, if any, when he allowed the executing court to conduct the auction sale.

    Point No. 1:

    6. The Company M/s. Tanwar Finance Private Ltd. is being wound up voluntarily under the supervision of the court. The attachment of the land belonging co the company had taken place on July 15, 1968 while the special resolution for voluntarily winding up was passed on November-16, 1968. The Company Judge by order dated April 15, 1969 on the agreement of the liquidator and the seven decree-holders stayed execution proceedings in their decrees and directed them not to get the property sold in execution without leave of the Court under Section 537 of the Act. He further directed that the question whether leave should be granted to them for realisation of their decretal amount by the sale of the properties or whether it would result in undue perference would be considered if and when an application is made by them. The decree-holders again approached for leave and the Company Judge in terms of the compromise between the parties passed an order dated January 19, 1970. It was brought to the notice of the Company Judge that the land is covered by notifications under Sections 4 and 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, that they were entitled to attach the land so that they might appropriate proceedings for enhancement of compensation, if necessary. The counsel for the liquidator did not 6bject to this prayer of the decree-holders. The said land had already been attached on July 15, 1968 in execution of the decree in favour of Kanwar Ram Chander while the other six decree-holders had not got the land attached in execution of their decrees. The company Judge therefore, only allowed the six decree-holders to take out execution and to get the land attached. The Company Judge further ordered that the attachment would not give any special priority to them. From the order it does not appear that he ever permitted the sale of the land in question. All that he said is that the six decree-holders other than Kanwar Ram Chander may take out execution and get the land attached. He never permitted them to get the land sold. Kanwar Ram Chander who pot the land attached on July 15, 1968 had also prayed for leave to sell the land but no leave was ever granted. The effect of order dated January 19, 1970 is that the land in question was allowed to be attached in execution of the decrees of the various decree-holders but no permission was given to any of them to get the same auctioned in execution of their decrees. The decree-holders were keen to protect their rights by getting the land attached. They were under the impression that by getting the land attached, they would be in a position to take proceedings for enhancement of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. When the idea of the decree-holders was to take proceedings for enhancement of compensation it must be presumed that they felt satisfied by getting the land attached. If the land had been allowed to be sold they would ceases to have any right to move for enhancement of compensation because in case of sale it is only the auction purchaser who might have the right in the land purchased to move for enhancement of compensation. As preference to the decree-holders was disallowed it is also obvious that the permission for sale was also refused to them. All these observations are based on the ground that there is no specific order granting leave to any of the decree-holders to get the land sold in execution of any decree. Reading the order dated January 19, 1970 as a whole the conclusion is that the six decree holders other than Kanwar Ram Chander were allowed to take out execution and attach the land in question. Counsel for the appellant-auction purchaser on the other hand contends that Kanwar Ram Chander had already got the land attached and therefore this order be deemed to have permitted him to get the land sold. There is no force in this argument. Kanwar Ram Chander got the property attached prior to winding up. He prayed for leave to get the property sold but no order was passed granting him such leave. The decree-holders i.e petitioner Nos. 2 to 7 in C.A No. 190 of 1969 were keen to get, some benefit by getting the land attached and therefore they only obtained leave for attachment of the land.

    7. We, therefore, hold that no leave was granted to get the land sold in execution of any of the seven decrees against the company.

    Point No. 2:

    8. The executing court auctioned the property on April 20, 1971. The liquidator filed objections under Order 21 rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which were dismissed on March 23, 1973. The decree was for Rs. 13,000/. The appeal against this order, being of the value of more than Rs. 10,000/- lies to this court and not to the District Court but the liquidator filed the same before the District Judge on April 20, 1973 and the same was returned to him vide order dated August 6, 1973 for presentation to the court having jurisdiction in the matter. It appears that the liquidator did hot pursue the appeal further and it is admitted that no appeal is pending. The argument of the appellant's counsel is that the liquidator having failed to challenge the order of the executing court is debarred from approaching the Company Judge and therefore the Company Judge has no jurisdiction in the matter. When any property is auctioned, it is conducted according to the procedure prescribed under October 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The aggrieved party has a right to file objections under Order 21 rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The liquidator accordingly filed objections but the objections were dismissed. The executing court interpreted the order dated January 19, 1970 of the Company Judge as an order granting leave to the decree-holder to get the property sold in execution of the decree. The executing court further held that the order dated April 15, 1969 passed by S.K Kapur, J. stood superseded by the order dated January 19, 1970 of S.N Shanker, J. and held that as there was no stay for the auction of the land, the sale held by the court was not wrong. All other objections raised by the liquidator were also rejected by the executing court. The question however remains whether the proceedings under the Companies Act are in any way barred by the proceedings before the executing court. Execution proceedings are entirely different from the proceedings under the Companies Act by the Company Judge under Section 446(2) (d) read with Section 518 of the Act. No proceedings can be taken against the property of the company except by leave of the court. As a matter of fact no proceedings can be initiated after the winding up order and if any proceedings are pending at the date of the winding up order the same cannot be continued except by the leave of the Court. Further the Company Court has been given absolute powers to entertain or dispose of any suit pending before any court against the company. The Company Court has also power to transfer a case pending in any court to its own file and to dispose it of. Section 518 of the Act reads:

    “Power to apply to Court to have questions determined or powers exercised.

    518(1) The liquidator or any contributory or creditor may apply to the court—

    (a) to determine any question arising in the winding up of a company; or

    (b) to exercise, as respects the enforcing of calls, the staying of proceedings or any other matter, all or any of the powers which the Court might exercise if the company were being wound up by the Court.

    (2) The liquidator or any creditor or contributory may apply to the Court specified in sub-section (3) for an order setting aside any attachment, distress or execution put into force against the estate or effects of the company after the commencement of the winding up.

    (3) An application under sub-section (2) shall be made—

    (a) if the attachment, distress or execution is levied or put into force by a High Court, to such High Court; and

    (b) if the attachment, distress or execution is levied or put into force by any other Court, to the Court having jurisdiction to wind up the company.

    (4) The Court, if satisfied on an application under sub-section (1) or (2) that the determination of the question or the required exercise of power or the order applied for will be just and beneficial, may accede wholly or partially to the application on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, or may make such other order on the application as it thinks just.

    (5) A copy of an order staying the proceedings in the winding up, made by virtue of this section, shall forthwith be forwarded by the Company, or otherwise as may be prescribed, to the Registrar, who shall make a minute of the order in his books relating to the company.”

    9. Section 446(2) of the Act reads:

    Suits stayed on winding up order:

    446(1)xxxx

    (2) The Court which is winding up the company shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, jurisdiction to entertain, or dispose of—

    (a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company;

    (b) any claim made by or against the company (including claims by or against any of its branches in India);

    (c) any application made under section 391 by or in respect of the company;

    (d) any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in course of the winding up of the company;

    whether such suit or proceeding has been instituted or is instituted, or such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made before or after the order for the winding up of the company, or before or after the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960.”

    10. Under clause (d) of sub-section 2 of Section 446 read with clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 518 of the Act the Company Judge on the application of the liquidator has wide and extraordinary powers on any matter arising in the course of winding up. An application for setting aside attachment, distress or execution conducted by court other than High Court, is to be made to the court having jurisdiction to wind up the company. The Company Judge therefore is the only competent Court to set aside the auction sale conducted without leave. Under Section 537 of the Act sale of any property of the Company held after the winding up order of the court without its leave is void. Thus it will be seen that proceedings under Section 446 read with section 518 of the Act are independent of the proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure before the executing Court. If the Company court comes to the conclusion by interpreting its own order that no leave was granted for the sale of the property the sale shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of Section 537 of the Act. The question for decision is what is the effect of the order dated 23rd March, 1973 passed by the executing court confirming the auction sale. The order of the executing court in view of Section 537 read with Sections 446 and 518 of the Act must be held to be non est because the sale was void having been held without leave of the Company Court. The order of the executing court thus cannot be said to be binding upon the Company Court. On the other hand the order passed by the Company Judge would be binding upon the parties and the executing court because the Company Judge has power to decide such question notwithstanding any other provision contained in, any other law. Thus it must be held that the Company court has jurisdiction to determine whether the sale of the property belonging to a company after the commencement of the winding up is in accordance with the provisions of the companies act or not and if the court finds that the same is contrary to the provisions of the companies act, it has power to declare the same as null and void. In fact the various provisions of the companies act relating to winding up under the supervision of the court are extraordinary provisions and are meant to protect the property of the company under voluntary liquidation.

    11. The next argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the judgment of the executing court operates as res judicata. There is no question of res judicata involved in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The jurisdiction of the executing court is different from the jurisdiction of the company court. The executing court has no jurisdiction to determine matters arising out of Section 518 or Section 446 of the Act. It is only the company court which has jurisdiction to determine whether leave is to be granted by it for the sale of the property belonging to the company.

    12. We, therefore, hold that the Company Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the application of the liquidator to determine whether the sale held by the executing court is void. The Company Judge by the order under appeal rightly held the sale to be void.

    Point No. 3:

    13. Section 526 of the Companies Act reads as under: Effect of supervision order.

    “526(1) Where an order is made for a winding up subject to supervision, the liquidator may, subject to any restrictions imposed by the Court, exercise all his powers, without the sanction or intervention of the Court, in the same manner as if the company were being wound up altogether voluntarily.

    (2) Except as provided in sub-section (1), any order made by the Court for a winding up subject to the supervision of the Court, shall for all purposes, including the staying of suits and other proceedings, be deemed to be an order of the Court for winding up the company by the Court, and shall confer full autohrity on the Court to make calls or to enforce calls made by the liquidators, and to exercise all other powers which it might have exercised if an order had been made for winding up the company altogether by the Court.

    (3) In the construction of the provisions whereby the Court is empowered to direct any act or thing to be done to or in favour, of the liquidator, the expression “liquidator” shall be deemed to mean the liquidator conducting the winding up, subject to the supervision of the Court”.

    14. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the liquidator in voluntarily winding up of the company subject to the supervision of the court has wide powers within the meaning of sub-section (1). His contention is that no restrictions were imposed upon the liquidator by the Court and therefore when the liquidator contested the auction proceedings before, executing court he is deemed to have power to consent to the sale either expressly or by implication. By ‘implication’ he means that the liquidator contested the auction sale by filling objections against the sale and when his objections were dismissed and no appeal was pursued, he is deemed to have consented to the sale by the executing court. In other words the liquidator waived his right to object to the sale. There is no force in this argument. The liquidator has not sold the land in question. The land was sold by the executing court and therefore there is no question of application of Section 526 (1) of the Companies Act to the facts of the present case. The liquidator after the sale by the executing court filed objections but the same were dismissed. The liquidator being under the supervision of the court and thus accountable to it could move the court under Section 518 of the Act and pray that sale of the property belonging to the company conducted without leave be held to be void. It is not necessary in this case to further comment upon, what are the powers of a liquidator, in voluntary winding up under the supervision of the court, relating to sale of property belonging to the company.

    15. We, therefore, hold that there is no force in the appeal. We agree with the order of the Company Judge and dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs.

    16. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Faqir Chand Gupta v. Tanwar Finance Private Ltd.
    (Apr 30, 1980)