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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Basheshar Nath, filed a suit against the appellant, Ram Gopal, for eviction of a portion of house No. 854, Mohalla Haibatpura, Najafgarh, Delhi. The grounds pleaded were arrears of rent and bona fide requirement for the personal occupation of the landlord and members of his family. An order under sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1953 was passed and complied with, so the non-payment ground fell away; the Additional Rent Controller directed eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement on August 23, 1973. The tenant's appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal failed on November 18, 1977. The present matter is a second appeal to this court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the eviction petition was maintainable where the petitioner did not expressly allege that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation (ingredient of clause (e) of proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 of the Act).
  2. Whether a prior statement (Ex. R-1/2) by the respondent indicating possession of other plots constituted conclusive evidence that other reasonably suitable accommodation was available.
  3. Whether the respondent (petitioner-landlord) was the owner of the premises, in view of provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (notably sections 8 and 20) and related transfer formalities.
  4. Whether there was sufficient evidence that the premises were let for residential purposes (or were residential-cum-commercial) so as to sustain eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement.
  5. Whether the findings of bona fide requirement by the courts below were such as to warrant interference by this court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The eviction petition was not maintainable because the respondent failed to allege and prove absence of other reasonably suitable accommodation (an essential ingredient under clause (e) of sec. 14(1) proviso); reliance was placed on Abdul Hamid v. Nur Mohammad.
  • Document Ex. R-1/2 (a statement of the respondent before the managing officer dated January 16, 1959) showed the respondent had possession of other plots (Nos. 822–825) jointly with his brother and house No. 854 was also joint—this proved other accommodation was available.
  • The respondent was not the owner of the premises; reliance was placed on Sec. 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, and certain decisions of the Punjab High Court (Bhiru Mal alias Bhoju Mal; Mangal Sain) to argue that the managing officer, not the respondent, had authority over the property.
  • No evidence established that the premises were let for residential purposes exclusively; the tenant had described them as residential-cum-commercial and adduced evidence of carrying on business (buffaloes and vegetables).
  • The findings of bona fide requirement were not entitled to deference and should be interfered with by this court.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The eviction petition was properly framed under sec. 14(1)(a) and (e) and described the premises as residential; the omission to expressly state that no other reasonably suitable accommodation existed was implied by the invocation of clause (e) and was not a fatal defect, particularly because the objection was not raised below and an application for amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC was filed.
  • Authorities such as Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander and related decisions support treating pleadings in these proceedings comparatively informally and not allowing a technical omission to defeat substantive rights.
  • Regarding Ex. R-1/2, the respondent explained that the plots were purchased by his brother and the respondent had no other building in possession except three rooms and a store in the disputed house; the lower courts accepted this explanation.
  • Title and ownership were validly transferred in compliance with the Displaced Persons Act: the Settlement Commissioner directed sale against compensation, and the managing officer executed a conveyance deed on March 25, 1969, transferring title to the respondent.
  • Even if there were incidental commercial activities (selling milk and vegetables), the premises were let for residential purposes and any commercial use was incidental; lower courts' factual findings on this point were not unreasonable and should stand.
  • The landlord's requirement was bona fide: the landlord had a wife, three married sons (one posted outside, one without quarters) and three daughters; these family circumstances supported bona fide requirement and were accepted by the courts below.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Hamid v. Nur Mohammad (1976 R.C.J 738) That all three ingredients of clause (e) (ownership, bona fide requirement, no other reasonably suitable accommodation) must be alleged and proved. The court noted this authority was relied upon by the appellant but observed later authorities diminished its force in the context of the procedural informality of rent-control petitions; the court did not treat the omission as fatal here.
Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander (1976 R.C.R 355) The Act contemplates no elaborate pleadings; particulars in a proforma replace a plaint; omissions of specific averments in such petitions should not be exaggerated into a fatal infirmity. The court relied on this decision to justify a liberal approach to the omission of an express averment that the petitioner had no other reasonably suitable accommodation and to refuse to treat the omission as fatal.
Dr. Hans Raj Dawar v. Shyam Kishore (1977 (2) R.L.R. 253) Observed that the weight of Abdul Hamid had been shaken in view of Rattan Lal. The court cited this to support the proposition that strict pleading requirements (as in Abdul Hamid) should not be applied rigidly in the present context.
Smt. Sahabzadi etc. v. Kahd Ram (1968 (2) D.H.C Notes 169, C.R 363-D) Pleadings should be construed practically and rationally; matters of form should not defeat justice when substance is clear and parties are not prejudiced. The court invoked this authority to justify construing the petition liberally and to refuse to allow a formality to defeat the landlord's substantive claim when no prejudice was shown.
Gurdial Nagdev v. Smt. Debi Bai (1979 (1) R.C.R. 119 I) A landlady's failure to aver absence of other accommodation may be excused where facts imply the other accommodation was not available; technical objections should not be entertained if tenant was not surprised and no prejudice resulted. The court relied on its prior holding to support the view that omission to plead absence of other accommodation could be excused and that tenants should not be permitted to raise such technical objections belatedly.
Biswanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad ((1974) 1 SCC 78 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 117) A party's admission is evidence by itself and need not be put to him when he enters the witness-box; admissions can be substantive and in some circumstances conclusive; the party producing the admission should explain it. The court referred to this principle while considering Ex. R-1/2 (a prior statement by the respondent). It held that although the document was not put to the respondent in his examination, the respondent's subsequent explanation (that plots were purchased by his brother and he had no other building save three rooms and a store) was accepted by the lower courts, and thus the admission did not upset the finding of no other suitable accommodation.
Naqubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 593) Supports deference to concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in appropriate cases. The court cited this case to justify not disturbing the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the landlord had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.
Nanak v. Basanta (A.I.R. 1976 All. 157) Authority for upholding factual findings regarding availability of accommodation and related issues. Used alongside Naqubai Ammal to support the decision not to disturb the findings below on the issue of other reasonable accommodation.
Dr. Dip Kaur Savitri Devi (1978 (2) R.C.R 149) Discusses requirement, in some cases, that premises be shown to be exclusively let for residential purposes for certain contentions. The court considered this decision but held that in the present case one admitted purpose of letting was residence and any commercial use was incidental; therefore eviction on bona fide requirement was sustainable.
Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd. v. Labour Appellate Tribunal (A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 68) Definition of "incidental": a thing is incidental to another when it appertains to the principal thing. The court applied this principle to hold that the alleged sale of milk and vegetables was incidental to residence and did not negate the character of the premises as let for residential purposes.
Bhiru Mal alias Bhoju Mal v. The Financial Commissioner (1967) 69 P.L.R. 656 Relevant decisions of the Punjab High Court pertaining to administration/sale of property in the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons Act (cited by appellant). The court noted these authorities were cited by the appellant but declined to enter into their facts; instead it examined statutory compliance under sections 8 and 20 of the Displaced Persons Act and accepted that the transfer in this case complied with the Act.
Mangal Sain v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner (A.I.R. 1960 P. 626) Another Punjab High Court decision on similar subject-matter concerning compensation-pool transfers (cited by appellant). The court similarly recorded that these authorities were cited but concluded that in the present case statutory requirements were satisfied and the conveyance executed by the managing officer conveyed a good title to the respondent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each contention sequentially and applied statutory provisions and cited authorities where relevant:

  1. Maintainability / omission to aver absence of other accommodation:

    The court analysed clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 and acknowledged that traditionally three conditions must be alleged and proved: ownership, bona fide requirement, and absence of other reasonably suitable accommodation. The appellant relied on Abdul Hamid for strict pleading. The court, however, relied on Rattan Lal and subsequent authority (Dr. Hans Raj Dawar), and its own prior decisions (Smt. Sahabzadi; Gurdial Nagdev), to adopt a practical, non-technical approach to pleadings in rent control proceedings. Because the petition was expressly framed under sec. 14(1)(a) and (e) and described the premises as residential and asserted bona fide requirement, the court held that the omission to expressly aver lack of other accommodation was implied and not fatal, particularly as the point was not taken below and an amendment application had been filed.

  2. Effect of Ex. R-1/2 (prior statement suggesting possession of other plots):

    The court considered Biswanath Prasad's principle that admissions are substantive evidence and need not always be put to the witness in court. It observed that the landlord had explained in cross-examination that the plots referred to had been purchased by his brother and that he himself had no other building except three rooms and a store in the disputed house. The lower courts accepted this explanation. The court therefore found no basis to disturb the concurrent factual findings that the landlord had no other reasonably suitable accommodation; it cited Naqubai Ammal and Nanak v. Basanta to reinforce the deference to such findings. Consequently, the court rejected the respondent's (landlord's) amendment application as unnecessary.

  3. Ownership under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act:

    The court examined statutory provisions—section 8 (authorising the Settlement Commissioner to pay compensation by sale from the compensation pool and set off purchase money) and section 20 (authorising allotment/transfer by managing officer subject to rules). The court found the direction to sell the disputed property against the compensation payable to the petitioner was made by the Settlement Commissioner and that the managing officer executed a conveyance deed on March 25, 1969, on behalf of the President of India, thereby transferring a good and perfect title to the respondent. On these facts, the court held the petitioner was the owner and rejected the appellant's challenge based on the Displaced Persons Act authorities cited.

  4. Character of letting (residential vs. residential-cum-commercial):

    The court noted the tenant's pleading and testimony that the premises were residential-cum-commercial and that he carried on activities relating to buffaloes and vegetables (or selling milk and vegetables). The court observed that the tenant admitted residence as one letting purpose. Applying the principle from Hukumchand Jute Mills (that something is incidental when it appertains to the principal thing), the court held that any commercial activity was incidental to the principal residential use. The court emphasised that the lower courts' findings on this factual question were neither arbitrary nor perverse and thus not liable to be disturbed.

  5. Bona fide requirement:

    The court treated the determination of bona fide requirement as a finding of fact. It recorded the family circumstances proved at trial: the landlord's wife, three sons and three daughters (all married), with one son posted outside Delhi, another son without quarters, and a third living with the landlord. The court rejected the appellant's submission that the need of sons posted outside or temporarily living elsewhere should be disregarded. Finding nothing arbitrary, perverse, or unreasonable in the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the court declined to interfere.

  6. Conclusion:

    After addressing the contentions, the court concluded there was no force in the appellant's submissions and that the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications

  • The dismissal upholds the concurrent findings of the lower courts: that the respondent-landlord was the owner, that the premises were let for residential purposes (any commercial use being incidental), and that the landlord's requirement for the premises was bona fide.
  • As a direct effect, the eviction order made by the Additional Rent Controller (and affirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal) stands; the tenant's challenge fails.
  • The court emphasised that the appeal raised no substantial question of law; the decision rests on deference to findings of fact by the courts below and a pragmatic approach to pleadings in rent-control proceedings. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying and reconciling earlier authorities in the context of the pleadings and evidence before it.

This summary was prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not include any information beyond that text.

Show full summary ...

    Ram Gopal v. Washeshwar Nath .

    1. The respondent Basheshar Nath filed a suit against the appellant Ram Gopal for eviction of the premises, a portion in house No. 854, Mohalla Haibatpura, Najafgarh, Delhi, on the basis of arrears of rent and bonafide requirement for his own use and the members of his family. Since an order under sub-sec (1) of sec. 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1953, (herefter the Act), was passed and complied with, the ground of non-payment of rent was not available, but eviction was di ected on the second ground by the Addl. Rent Controller on August 23, 1973. The tenant lost his appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal on November 18, 1977. Hence, this second appeal.

    2. The first question that has been raised on behalf of the appellant is that the petition for eviction was not maintainable as the respondent-petitioner has failed to allege and prove that he had no other reasonable suitable accommodation available, which is one of the main ingredients of the ground under cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-sec (1) of sec. 14 of the Act. For this proposition, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Abdul Hamid v. Nur Mohammad. 1976 R.C.J 738. According to said cl. (e), three conditions are necessary for obtaining eviction, (i) that the landlord is the owner of the premises in question, (ii) that his requirement of the same for occupation as residence is bonafide, and (iii) that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. All the three ingredients must be alleged and proved. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, pointed out that the eviction petition has been entitled as one under sec. 14 (1) (a) and (e) of the Act. In para 4 thereof, the premises have been described as “Residential”, and in para 18 (a) in the grounds of eviction, it has been stated that the premises which are residential and were let out to the respondent only for residence are required bonafide by the petitioner landlord for occupation as a residence for himself and for the other members of his family including his sons who are members of the joint Hindu family with him. He has no doubt omitted to say that he had no other reasonably suitable accommodation, but that is implied under cl. (e) aforesaid, under which the petition has been made. This objection was not raised before the Addl. Rent Controller or the Tribunal. Otherwise, the petitioner would have amended his petition and rectified the defect. The respondent has also moved here on February 9, 1978, an application under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C, for amendment of the petition. In Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander, 1976 R.C.R 355, the Supreme Court observed that the Act contemplates no elaborate pleadings but filling out of particulars in a proforma which takes the place of a plaint. No specific averment of forfeiture and consequent determination of the lease was made in that petition. The Supreme Court held that having regard to the comparative informality of these proceedings and the quasi-judicial nature of the whole process, such an omission cannot be exaggerated into a lethal infirmity. In Dr. Hans Raj Dawar v. Shyam Kishore, 1977 (2) R.L R. 253, it was observed that in view of Rattan Lal's Case (supra), the weight of the authority of Abdul Hamid (supra) had been shaken. This court in Smt. Sahabzadi etc. v. Kahd Ram 1968 (2) D.H.C Notes 169, C.R 363-D of 1961, decided on May 27, 1968, by I.D Dua, C, J., has held that pleadings had to be construed in a practical and rational way and a matter of form should not be permitted to defeat the cause of justice where the substance clearly brought out the essential facts affecting the rights of the parties. This is all the more so where the parties have not been prejudiced by such a construction of the pleadings. In Gurdial Nagdev v. Smt. Debi Bai 1979 (1) R. C. R. 119 I had to deal with a similar problem. In that case also, the landlady had failed to aver that she had no other accommodation, but I held that the very fact that the premises in occupation were not sufficient implied that the other accommodation was really not available and there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of sec. 14 (1)(e). I had further said that the tenant had sufficient notice of the case set up by the landlady and both the parties knew well the points of controversy between them and no one was taken by surprise. It will be an improper exercise of discretion if the tenants were now permitted to raise such a technical objection. Moreover, failure to plead the ingredients does not necessarily result in dismissal of the petition. If the tenant had raised this objection in his written statement, the mistake could be rectified in time by an amendment of the petition. Though normally all the ingredients require to be alleged and proved but it does not mean that the letter of the law and not the spirit thereof must be complied with. When the petitioner moved the petition under Sec. 14 (1) (e), it. was implied very much that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

    3. The learned counsel for the appellant then drew my attention to a document Ex. R-½ produced by him in the court of the Addl. Rent Controller It is a statement alleged to have been made by the respondent before the managing officer on January 16, 1959, that he was in possession of plots Nos. 822, 823, 824 and 825, in Najafgarh jointly with his brother Hari Chand. House No. 854 is also joint with his brother for which rent has been paid. Though this statement was not put to the landlord-petitioner at the time of his examination, but according to Biswanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, (1974) 1 SCC 78 : A. I. R 1974 S.C 117, a party's admission being evidence proprio vigore need not be put to him at the time he enters the witness-box and since the admission is a substantive and in certain circumstances conclusive piece of evidence, it was the duty of the petitioner to explain his admission when the documents were produced along with the written statement. This statement was not denied not controverted. It proves, it was urged, that the respondent had other accommodation available. It is true that the landlord has not cared to explain the circumstances in which the admission was made several years ago, but the courts below have believed him when he said that he needed accommodation for himself and members of his family and in the cross-examination, that the plots were not purchased by him but were purchased by his brother and he had no other building in his possession except 3 rooms and a store in the disputed house. Thus, he has proved that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation Therefore, it will not be proper to disturb the concurrent findings arrived at by the courts below in this respect, vide Naqubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 593, and Nanak v. Basanta, A. I. R. 1976 All. 157. Now, there is no need to decide the application of the respondent for amendment of his petition so as to include the ingredient that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; the application is rejected.

    4. The second contention raised by. the learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent is not the owner, of the premises. His contention is mainly based upon Sec. 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 according to which it is the managing officer who is authorised to sell the property in the compensation pool One S.B Lal, a clerk of the Regional Settlement Commissioner, came and deposed that it was the Assistant Settlement Commissioner who had made the order of transfer of the property to the respondent against the claims of the respondent-petitioner Certain decisions of the Punjab High Court, vide Bhiru Mal alias Bhoju Mal v. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Haryana, Chandigarh, (1967) 69 P. L. R. 656, and Mangal Sain v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi,, A. I. R. 1960 P. 626, were cited in support of this proposition, but I need not go into the facts and discussion of these rulings, as it appears to me quite manifest that Sec. 8 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act authorises the Settlement Commissioner to pay compensation amount, inter alia, by sale to the displaced person of any property from the compensation pool and setting off the purchase money against the compensation payable to him. section 20 of this act also provides that subject to any rules, a managing officer may transfer any property out of the compensation pool by allotment of any such property to a displaced person on such valuation as the Settlement Commissioner may determine. Now, what I find is that requirements of both the sections have been proved to have been complied within this case, as the direction to sell the disputed property against the compensation payable to the petitioner was made by the Settlement Commissioner and the managing officer executed the conveyance deed on March 25, 1969, on behalf of the President of India, so as to transfer a good and perfect title to the respondent. That is in strict compliance of the law. In face of these facts, it is useless to examine as to how the landlord came into possession of the property and had it sold out to himself. Therefore, it will not be true to allege that the petitioner was not the owner of the disputed premises.

    5. It was next urged that there is no evidence that the premises were let out for residential purposes and until this is proved, the landlord cannot seek eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement. There is no doubt that in the written statement the tenant appellant said that the premises were resi-dential-cum-commercial. He did not say what commerce he was carrying on in those premises, but at the time of his deposition, he stated towards the end of the examination-in-chief that he carried on the business of buffaloes and vegetables in the premises. His counsel says that what he meant was that he carried on the business of selling milk and vegetables in the premises. Reliance for this purpose was placed upon a decision of this court in Dr. Dip Kaur. Savitri Devi, 1978 (2) R.C.R 149. It was urged on the basis of this decision that in order to succeed the landlord must show that the premises were exclusively let out for residential purpose. After consideration, I am inclined to think that, so far as this case is concerned, the appellant has admitted that one of the letting purposes, no doubt was residence. What seems to me is this that the commercial purpose, if at all there was any, was just incidental to residence. According to Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd. v. Labour Appellate Tribunal, A. I. R. 1958 Cal. 68, a thing is said to be incidental to another when it appertains to the principal thing. Carrying on of the alleged sales of milk and vegetables appertain to the principal purpose of residence. There is no averment that the premises were not let out for residential purposes What was averred is that the premises are residential-cum-commercial and have been so used since the inception of occupation by the tenant. That confirms that the premises were let out for residence, but subsequently they came to be used, if at all, for some incidental purpose. I may also add that the findings of the courts below in this regard are also findings of fact and these findings cannot be disturbed because they are not unreasonable, arbitrary or perverse.

    6. Lastly, it was urged that the findings of bona fide requirement were such as called for an interference by this court. “It has been held in several decisions of the Supreme Court and the various High Courts that the finding whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide or not is a. finding of fact and does not involve any question of law. The two courts have concurrently held that the requirement of the petitioner landlord, was genuine. What is proved is that the landlord had his wife, three sons and three daughters All are married. No doubt one of the sons is a Deputy Superintendent of Police and is posted outside Delhi, but his family keeps on coming. One other son is a sub-inspector of police without any quarters and has to live with his father-in-law because no accommodation was available to him in his father's house. The third son lives with him and is married, and his daughters also visit him. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the question of requirement of the son who is posted outside and of the other son who is living with his father-in-law as a “Ghardamad” cannot be taken into account. These are essentially questions of fact and there is nothing on the basis of which it can be said that the findings are “arbitrary or perverse or unreasonable. If accommodation for married daughters who come to visit their parents can be held to be personal requirement of the landlord, then the case of the sons who live outside on account of service is all the more genuine. Sons have to live with the father and they have to come to see the parents more often than the married girls can normally do.

    7. I, therefore, find no force in any of the submissions. This appeal raises no substantial question of law. It is hereby dismissed with costs.

    8. Appeal Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Ram Gopal v. Washeshwar Nath .
    (Jun 1, 1979)