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Summary of Opinion — Prakash Narain, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decree of a learned Single Judge (original side) that had decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The agreement (referred to as Exhibit P.W 8/28) is described at one point in the opinion as dated August 26, 1976. The terms and subsequent events in the record, however, repeatedly reference 1971 deadlines (for example, payment by September 6/30, 1971 and execution of the sale-deed on or before October 31, 1971).

Under the agreement the appellant (vendor) agreed to sell a freehold plot bearing No. 30, Block K, Green Park, New Delhi (311 sq. yards with a double-storeyed residential house) to the first respondent, Smt. Chand Rani, for Rs. 1,78,000. The second respondent, Shri Niranjan Nath, is the first respondent's husband. At the time of the agreement Rs. 30,000 was paid; Rs. 98,000 was stipulated to be paid within 10 days of the agreement; the balance of Rs. 50,000 at registration. The property was mortgaged to the Life Insurance Corporation of India (L.I.C.) and the vendor was to redeem the mortgage (by paying Rs. 25,000 out of the Rs. 30,000) and obtain an income-tax clearance certificate. Possession of the first floor was to be delivered by September 30, 1971 and the front part of the ground floor at registration; the sale-deed was to be executed by October 31, 1971. Clause 5 of the agreement stipulated that if the vendee failed to pay the balance consideration and get the sale-deed executed within the specific period mentioned, the earnest money of Rs. 30,000 shall stand forfeited to the vendor and the agreement deemed null and void.

The respondents filed a suit for specific performance on November 27, 1971, alleging the vendor failed to complete the sale and had, by letter dated September 15, 1971, purported to rescind the contract and forfeit Rs. 30,000 on the ground that Rs. 98,000 had not been paid within 10 days. The appellant denied that Rs. 98,000 had been tendered within 10 days and contended that payment within 10 days was of the essence and, hence, the contract had become void and Rs. 30,000 was rightly forfeited. On the pleadings the trial court framed and adjudicated five issues and the Single Judge concluded payment of Rs. 98,000 by September 6, 1971 was not of the essence and decreed specific performance in favour of the respondents. The appellant appealed that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff No. 1 (first respondent) was ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement?
  2. Whether it was of the essence of the contract that out of the balance amount of Rs. 1,48,000 the sum of Rs. 98,000 was to be paid within 10 days of the execution of the agreement? If so, what is its effect?
  3. Whether the sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid as earnest money?
  4. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled?
  5. Relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Vendor's) Arguments

  • Admitted execution of the agreement and receipt of Rs. 30,000, but contended that payment of Rs. 98,000 within 10 days was of the essence of the contract and, because that amount was not paid within the stipulated time, the contract became null and void and Rs. 30,000 stood forfeited.
  • Maintained that she was obliged to redeem the property and deliver documents and possession by specified dates only upon payment of Rs. 98,000 within 10 days; therefore non-payment released her from further obligations.
  • Denied the respondents ever tendered Rs. 98,000 within the 10-day period; asserted that the respondents sought to vary the contract by insisting on immediate possession of a room on the ground floor in advance of payment, which was contrary to the contract.
  • Explained motive for urgency in payment: intended to invest proceeds (including Rs. 98,000) in another business and needed funds within a short time; the word "only" in the clause was used to qualify the time and the amount.

Respondents' (Vendees') Arguments

  • Alleged they were ready and willing to perform the contract and had repeatedly called upon the appellant to complete the sale; asserted various letters and notices to that effect were sent.
  • Contended that they had offered to pay the remaining consideration at the time of execution of the sale-deed and, on some visits, offered money (cash, cheques, fixed deposit receipts) but the appellant avoided performance.
  • Claimed the appellant resiled from the contract by letter dated September 15, 1971, stating non-payment of Rs. 98,000 was a breach and forfeiting Rs. 30,000; respondents' lawyer replied denying these allegations and called upon appellant to perform.
  • Testimony of respondents indicated they were unwilling to pay Rs. 98,000 unless certain assurances (redemption of mortgage, income-tax clearance, and/or possession of a room) were given — the respondents characterized these conditions as prudential but the trial record shows they were insisted upon prior to unconditional payment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, AIR 1967 SC 868 Used to support the proposition that a stipulation as to time may not always be of the essence and that the word "only" in a clause may be interpreted as qualifying the amount rather than making time of the essence. The Single Judge relied on this decision to hold payment within 10 days was not of the essence. The appellate court accepted the general principles but emphasized that Gomathinayagam Pillai also relied on Privy Council dicta and that the true construction depends on surrounding circumstances; the appellate court ultimately disagreed with the Single Judge's factual reading of the clause.
Nauik Lal Karmarkar v. Shankar Lal Shah, AIR 1962 Calcutta 103 Recognizes that where there are reciprocal promises, tender of consideration may be essential before the party can claim specific performance; relies on Privy Council dicta (Edridge v. R.D. Sethna). The appellate court noted and accepted the rule but applied it to conclude that whether time is of the essence depends on whether reciprocal promises required performance in a particular sequence; the court used this principle to analyze whether payment within 10 days was a condition precedent here.
Arun Prokash Boral v. Tulsi Charan Bose, AIR 1949 Calcutta 510 Holds that where the vendor is in default he cannot repudiate the contract by pleading time to be of the essence; the real intention must be gathered from all circumstances. The appellate court cited this decision for the general proposition, but distinguished the present facts because here the appellate court found the vendee (respondents) had not been ready and willing strictly according to the contract terms and had imposed conditions inconsistent with the contract.
Jamshed Kodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, AIR 1915 PC 83 (Privy Council) Dicta concerning construction of contractual terms as to time and the need to consider surrounding circumstances to determine whether time is of the essence. The appellate court noted that later authorities relied upon this Privy Council dictum; it used the underlying principle that intention on the point of time must be gathered from the contract and surrounding circumstances to construe Clause 1 of the agreement.
Edridge v. R.D. Sethna, AIR 1933 PC 233 (Privy Council) Authority for the proposition that where reciprocal promises exist, the party seeking specific performance must perform conditions precedent (including tender of consideration) before claiming relief. The appellate court recognized this principle (as applied in the Calcutta decision) and used it to analyze whether the vendee's tender or readiness to perform was effective in the circumstances; the court concluded that the respondents' conditional offers did not amount to unconditional readiness required by Section 16.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded stepwise and grounded on contract construction and the facts as elicited in evidence:

  1. Legal framework: The court began with Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which bars specific performance where the plaintiff fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract. The court observed established principles that time is not ordinarily of the essence in contracts for sale of land but that it may be treated as such where the contract language or surrounding circumstances show reciprocal promises or a clear intention to make time essential.
  2. Construction of Clause 1: Clause 1 required Rs. 98,000 to be paid within 10 days. The clause used the word "only" twice — once (uncontroversially) to qualify the amount in words, and a second time to qualify the 10-day period. The Single Judge had read "only" as qualifying the amount and not the time, but the appellate court closely examined the wording and accompanying evidence and concluded that the second use of "only" was employed to emphasize the limited time for payment.
  3. Evidence of vendor's purpose and parties' intentions: Appellant and her husband testified that the vendor required the money urgently to invest in a Poona business and desired prompt payment. The vendor initially sought payment within a week; at the respondents' request the period was extended to 10 days. The respondents did not provide an explanation for the second use of "only" and their witnesses admitted they were not willing to pay Rs. 98,000 without the redemption and income-tax clearance or without obtaining possession of a room. The court found these surrounding circumstances reinforced the reading that time was intended to be of the essence in this case.
  4. Readiness and willingness: The court accepted the legal distinction between (a) whether time is of the essence, and (b) whether the purchaser/plaintiff was ready and willing to perform. It found that the respondents were not ready and willing strictly as the contract required because they conditioned payment on the vendor giving possession of a room or on the vendor first obtaining redemption and the income-tax clearance certificate, or otherwise varied the terms in their own favor. Such conditional offers did not amount to unconditional readiness required by Section 16.
  5. Effect of non-payment within 10 days: On the factual and contractual construction adopted, non-payment of Rs. 98,000 by the respondents on or before the stipulated date entitled the appellant to treat the respondents as having committed a breach; the vendor's letter dated September 13, 1971 treating the contract as breached was not unjustified in the circumstances.
  6. Equitable considerations and forfeiture of earnest money: The court examined the Rs. 30,000 received by the appellant and accepted that Rs. 25,000 of it was used to redeem the mortgage to L.I.C., leaving only Rs. 5,000 as true earnest money. The court further applied equitable principles: earnest money is not intended to compensate loss but to secure performance; where the vendor had not suffered a loss (indeed, property values had increased) and no proof of loss was placed on record, the entire Rs. 30,000 should not be allowed to be forfeited.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • The appeal was allowed in part; the suit for specific performance was dismissed. The appellate court held that payment of Rs. 98,000 within the stipulated 10 days was, on the true construction of the agreement and having regard to surrounding circumstances, of the essence; the respondents had not shown unconditional readiness and willingness to perform and had placed conditions contrary to the contract, constituting breach.
  • The respondents were awarded a decree for Rs. 30,000 against the appellant. Although the court found that only Rs. 5,000 of the Rs. 30,000 constituted true earnest money (because Rs. 25,000 had been paid to redeem the mortgage), equitable considerations led the court to refuse to allow forfeiture of the entire deposit and to direct refund (a decree of Rs. 30,000) in favour of the respondents.

Consequences:

  • Direct effect on parties: The respondents will not obtain specific performance of the sale. The appellant must account for and pay Rs. 30,000 to the respondents (decree in their favour). Each party will bear its own costs throughout.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion applies and reaffirms established principles about (a) when time may be treated as of the essence in contracts for sale of land, (b) the necessity for a plaintiff to show unconditional readiness and willingness to perform under Section 16, and (c) equitable treatment of earnest money where no loss is shown. The court did not purport to create any new legal doctrine beyond applying these established principles to the facts of the case.

Disposition as stated in the opinion: "Appeal partly allowed." The parties are to bear their respective costs.

    Kamal Rani v. Chand Rani S

    Prakash Narain, J.:— This appeal arises out of the judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge of this court sitting on the original side whereby a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immoveable property has been decreed.

    2. The appellant and the respondents entered into an agreement dated August 26, 1976 (Exhibit P.W 8/28) whereby the appellant agreed to sell her house and property comprised of a freehold plot bearing No. 30, Block K, Green Park, New Delhi, measuring 311 sq. yards with a double storeyed residential house constructed thereon along with fixture and fitting for a sum of Rs. 1,78,000 to the first respondent, Smt. Chand Rani. The second respondent, Shri Niranjan Nath, is the husband of the first respondent, Smt. Chand Rani. A sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid at the time of the execution of the agreement, Exhibit P.W 8/28. A further sum of Rs. 98,000 was stipulated as payable within 10 days of the execution of the said agreement and the balance of Rs. 50,000 was to be paid at the time of the registration of the sale-deed. It was agreed between the parties that the appellant would redeem the property by paying off a loan of Rs. 25,000 out of the sum of Rs. 30,000 paid at the time of the execution of the agreement. The property was mortgaged with the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The appellant was also to get the income-tax clearance certificate from the income-tax authorities. The sale-deed was to be executed on or before October 31, 1971. The first floor of the house was let out to tenants at the time of the execution of the agreement. It was stipulated by the said agreement that the appellant would hand over documents pertaining to the property in suit along with the vacant possession of the first floor by September 30, 1971 and possession of the front portion of the said property at the time of the registration of the sale-deed. The amount of Rs. 30,000 was to stand forfeited to the appellant if respondent No. 1 failed to pay the consideration and get the sale-deed registered within the agreed time.
    3. The respondents filed a suit for specific performance of the said agreement on November 27, 1971. It was alleged that though the respondents called upon the appellant to complete the sale and though various letters and notices were issued to her she failed to fulfil her part of the bargain and in fact by a letter dated September 15, 1971 resiled from the contract on the plea that the first respondent had failed to pay the stipulated amount of Rs. 98,000 within 10 days of the execution of the foresaid agreement, i.e by September 6, 1971 and, therefore, the agreement stood annulled and the sum of Rs. 30,000 stood forfeited to the appellant. In reply to the said communication the first respondent wrote to the appellant calling upon her to execute the sale-deed in her favour offering to pay the remaining consideration at the time of the execution of sale-deed. As the appellant failed to comply with the said demand the suit for specific performance was filed claiming specific performance of the said agreement or in the alternative damages in the sum of Rs. 1,50,000 including refund of Rs. 30,000.
    4. The appellant in reply to the suit admitted the execution of the agreement dated August 26, 1971 and receipt by her of the sum of Rs. 30,000. She, however, maintained that payment of Rs. 98,000 within 10 days of the execution of the agreement, Exhibit PW. 8/28, was essence of the contract and inasmuch as that amount was not paid, she was entitled to treat the contract as having become null and void. She admitted that she was to take necessary steps for redemption of the property in suit and the documents were to be delivered by September 30, 1971 but maintained that all this was to be done only on payment of Rs. 98,000 within 10 days of the execution of the agreement. As far as possession was concerned, she stated that she was bound to give possession of the first floor at the time of the registration of the sale-deed. The first floor had been got vacated from the tenants by September 20, 1971. The front portion of the house was in her possession and delivery thereof could easily be made at the relevant time. She denied that the respondents ever tendered her the sum of Rs. 98,000. It was her contention that the second respondent wanted possession of the ground floor before payment of Rs. 98,000 and this demand being against the terms of the contract, she was not willing to accede to the demand. In consequence, she prayed that the suit be dismissed and it be held that the sum of Rs. 30,000 stood rightly forfeited to her.
    5. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were settled:—
    “1. Whether the plaintiff No. 1 was ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement? O.P.P
    2. Whether it was of the essence of the contract that out of the balance amount of Rs. 1,48,000 the sum of Rs. 98,000 was to be paid within 10 days of the execution of the agreement? If so, what is its effect? O.P.D
    3. Whether the sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid as earnest money?
    4. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to?
    5. Relief.”
    6. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion on a reading of the agreement, Exhibit P.W 8/28, that payment of Rs. 98,000 by September 6, 1971 was not of the essence of the contract. He also came to the conclusion that the respondents were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and it was the appellant who had resiled from the sale. In consequence, he decreed the suit.
    7. Before us two points have been urged. First, that the readiness and willingness of a party to perform his or her obligations under the contract is to be judged by a reading of the contract and has to be of the contract as entered into (emphasis supplied), and not of the contract terms whereof have been varied by the tender to suit her convenience. Secondly, readiness and willingness to perform the contract is distinct from, what may be called, essence of the contract. The contention was that the vendee was not ready and willing to perform the contract from the beginning and her readiness and willingness now or after September 30, 1971 is not relevant.
    8. The relevant clauses of the agreement, Exhibit P.W 8/28, which may be noticed are clauses 1,2,3, 5 and 6. Clause 1 of the agreement which mentions the payment of Rs. 98,000 reads as under:—
    “1. That in pursuance of the said agreement, the 1st party has received a sum of Rs. 30,000 (Rupees thirty thousand only) from the second party as earnest money the receipt whereof the 1st party hereby separately acknowledges. Rs. 98,000 (Rupees ninety eight thousand only) will be paid by the second party to the 1st party within a period of ten days only and the balance of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) at the time of registration of the sale deed before the Sub-Registrar, New Delhi.”
    Clause 2 without any stipulation as to time, inter alia, provides that the vendor shall take necessary steps for immediate redemption of the property from the mortgage and inform the vendee in writing about the completion of the redemption. Clause 3 lays down that the vendor shall immediately apply for permission to sell to the income-tax authorities and after getting the permission to sell by getting an income-tax clearance certificate complete the sale in favour of the vendee or her nominee/nominees on or before October 31, 1971.
    Clause 5 reads as under:—
    “5. That if the second party fails to pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale deed executed and registered within the specific period mentioned in para 3 above, the earnest money of Rs. 30,000 (Rupees thirty thousand only) shall stand forfeited to the 1st party and this agreement deemed null and void.”
    Clause 6 reads as under:—
    “6. That the 1st party shall pay all taxes, rates, municipal taxes upto the date of registration of the sale-deed and that the previous deeds and other documents pertaining to the said plot of 30, block ‘K’, sanctioned plan and completion certificate from the Municipal Corporation, Delhi in respect of the super-structure built on the said plot shall be handed over along with the vacant possession of first floor by 30-9-1971 and the front portion of the said property by the first party to the second party at the time of registration of the sale-deed.”
    9. Exhibit P.W 8/1 is a notice dated September 10, 1971 issued by the counsel of the first respondent pointing out to the appellant that under the agreement dated August 26, 1971 she was immediately to redeem the property by paying Rs. 25,000 to the life Insurance Corporation of India and inform the first respondent about completion of the redemption; she was to immediately apply to the income-tax authorities for grant of the income-tax clearance certificate and would execute the sale-deed on or before October 31, 1971; that the first respondent had been calling upon her to complete the sale in accordance with the agreement but she had been avoiding to do so and had not even redeemed the property though the sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid on the clear understanding that it will be utilised for redemption of the property; that the first respondent was ready and willing to pay the purchase price and her broker had even approached the appellant but she had been avoiding to complete the sale; and that she should forthwith comply with the requirements of the said agreement dated August 26, 1971 within 2 days and complete the sale. This notice was served on the appellant on September 14, 1971 having been posted on September 11, 1971 vide Exhibit P.W 8/2 and Exhibit P.W 8/3 respectively. Exhibit P. 3 is a telegram dated September 16, 1971 from the counsel of the first respondent to the appellant to the same effect. The notice sent on behalf of the first respondent crossed the notice dated September 13, 1971 issued by the counsel for the appellant to the respondents. Copy of this notice is Exhibit D.W 3/2. In this notice it was stated that as the respondents failed to pay the sum of Rs. 98,000, as stipulated in the agreement dated August 26, 1971, the appellant had forfeited unto herself the sum of Rs. 30,000 and the agreement stood anulled. Exhibit P.W 8/4 is the carban copy of the notice, Exhibit D.W 3/2, received by the Advocate of the respondents. The respondents Advocate on their instructions replied to the notice of the appellant by a letter dated September 18, 1971, Exhibit P.W 8/5. He denied the allegations made in the appellant's notice and reiterated the earlier stand of his clients. Exhibit P.W 8/8 is a letter dated September 16, 1971 from the advocate of the appellant to the advocate of the respondents by way of reply to the telegram given on behalf of the respondents, referred to earlier. This also reiterates the earlier stand. Thus, the diverse stands taken by the parties really revolve round the payment of Rs. 98,000.
    10. D.R Puri appeared as P.W 2. According to him though the respondents only wanted to pay Rs. 5,000 they had been prevailed to pay Rs. 30,000 at the time of the execution of the agreement dated August 26, 1971 because the appellant had said that she wanted money to redeem the mortgage from L.I.C After the execution of the agreement he accompanied the respondents when they visited the appellant on August 30, 1971. The respondents had asked the appellant and her husband whether the income-tax clearance certificate had been obtained and whether the property had been redeemed from the Life Insurance Corporation. At that time the respondents had carried three fixed deposit receipts and cheque book and some cash also, with them. They were willing to pay the balance of the sale price on the appellant obtaining the clearance certificate from the income-tax department and on their getting the property redeemed from the L.I.C As the appellant wanted some more time to get the income-tax clearance certificate and redemption documents, they came back. He again accompanied the respondents when they visited the appellant on September 3 and September 10. The appellant and her husband informed the respondents in his presence that some more time was required to get income-tax clearance certificate and the redemption documents. The second respondent thereupon offered to help the appellant in this regard but was told that the appellant and her husband would manage it by themselves. According to this witness on September 3 the respondents were ready and willing to pay the balance of the sale price. On September 10, 1971 the appellant resiled from the contract and said that she had forfeited the deposit of Rs. 30,000. In cross-examination he admitted that he did not know how much money the respondents had on September, 3 and September 10, 1971. The respondents were willing to pay the money by cheque and some money in cash. He was not aware of the terms of the agreement. He denied that the appellant and her husband said that they would get the income-tax clearance certificate and redemption documents by the end of September, 1971. M.M Sharma, appearing as P.W 3, said that he was the husband of the sister of the first respondent. He stated that he and Mr. Puri had accompanied the respondents when they went to visit the appellant and her husband on September 10, 1971. According to him the respondents took money with them and tendered the same to the appellant but she declined to accept the same on the ground that she had forfeited the amount of Rs. 30,000 and the contract was at an end. In cross-examination he said that when the respondents asked the appellant whether she had got the property redeemed and obtained the income-tax clearance certificate her only answer was that she had forfeited Rs. 30,000. The first respondent appeared as her own witness as P.W 7. She said that she was a resident of Kanpur. They had a chemichrome industry she was a Director of that company. About D.R Puri she said that he was a friend of her husband and he had introduced them to a broker. According to her she had agreed to pay Rs. 5,000 as advance to the appellant but as she wanted Rs. 30,000 to clear her mortage debt to the Life Insurance Corporation she agreed to pay Rs. 30,000. According to her the balance amount of the sale consideration was to be paid after the appellant had got the property redeemed from the Life Insurance Corporation and after she had obtained the income-tax clearance certificate. She said that she and her husband were visiting the appellant daily and asking her to complete the sale. On these visits they used to carry cash and cheque books and fixed deposit receipts. She said that she was always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. Regarding the payment of Rs. 98,000 her statement was, “The defendant asked us to pay Rs. 98,000. We were willing to pay this amount provided possession of one room of the suit property was given to us. The defendant did not deliver the possession of the room to us and put us off by saying that the sale will be completed after original documents of title are returned to her by the Life Insurance Corporation.” She deposed that in September, 1971 the appellant declined to complete the sale and told her that the sum of Rs. 30,000 had been forfeited. On this she caused notices to be served on the appellant to complete the sale. She visited the appellant even after her refusal to complete the sale but without any success. She deposed in cross-examination that she did not know about the terms of the agreement of sale. She, however, admitted that the balance of Rs. 98,000 was to be paid within 10 days from the date of the agreement of sale. According to her she approached the appellant 2 days prior to the expiry of 10 days in the company of her husband and Mr. Puri and offered the amount of the balance consideration. What she says in this behalf is, “we said to the defendant that she should accept the amount of Rs. 98,000 from us and should deliver to us vacant possession of one room ......... According to the agreement possession of one room was to be delivered to us by the end of September, 1971. Possession of the remaining portion was to be given at the time of the execution of the sale-deed....... We demanded the vacant possession of one room which was in the possession of the defendant on the ground floor. I do not know what was the term as to delivery of possession in the agreement. The defendant asked me to pay the amount of Rs. 98,000 to her but she was not willing to deliver possession of one room. We then did not pay the amount to the defendant. I, therefore fell ill and my husband used to go to the defendant....... The defendant was willing to give possession of a store. This was not acceptable to us since we wanted her to deliver possession of one room.” The second respondent appeared as P.W 8. He admitted signing the agreement dated August 26, 1971. About the payment of Rs. 98,000 he said, “The defendant demand that we should pay Rs. 98,000 more. We were willing to pay this amount provided the property is redeemed, the document of sale is ready for execution and the income-tax clearance certificate has been obtained. ..... We went to the defendant on 30th of August, 1971. I, my wife and Mr. Puri went to the defendant. I asked the defendant to accept the amount of Rs. 98,000. She was not willing to accept the same. She told us that she will first get the property redeemed and obtain the clearance certificate from the income-tax and then she will write to us...... Again I visited the defendant on 3rd September, 1971. My wife, Mr. Sharma and Mr. uri accompanied me ....... On 3rd September, 1971 also I offered the defendant to take Rs. 98,000....... We again went to the defendant on 10th September, 1971 two times, once in the morning, once in the evening...... The defendant has not told us till today whether she has got the property redeemed and whether she has obtained the income-tax clearance certificate.” In cross-examination this witness stated, “Since the defendant had not obtained the income-tax clearance certificate we were not willing to pay the amount of Rs. 98,000 to her. According to her agreement it is true that Rs. 98,000 was to be paid within 10 days to the defendant whether the property is redeemed or the income-tax clearance certificate is obtained or not within that time. We, however, were not willing to pay the amount of Rs. 98,000 unless the property is redeemed and unless a certificate of income-tax clearance is obtained........ In the agreement of sale the defendant had promised to deliver possession and, therefore, we asked for vacant possession. According to the agreement of sale, possession was to be delivered to us on 30th of September, 1971. We served a notice on the defendant dated 10th September, 1971 after our visit on that day to the defendant...... On 3rd September, 1971 and 10th September, 1971 and also on other subsequent visits we have been demanding possession from the defendant......... . I did not offer to pay Rs. 98,000 without the redemption of the property and the clearance certificate.......... I did not tell the defendant that we will pay her the money without redemption and without the certificate.”
    11. The appellant also examined several witnesses. One of them was her husband, R.S Bhardwaj, who appeared as D.W 3. He deposed that at the time when the agreement, Exhibit P.W 8/28, was executed his wife, appellant, was a partner in motor parts business along with her cousins, which was being carried on at Ambala. The husband of the appellant's sister was doing business of motor parts at Poona along with some other persons. As that partnership was to be dissolved, Mr. Kailash Dutt, the sister's husband, was agreeable to take the appellant as partner in that business provided she invested Rs. 1 lakh in the business within a week. It was for this reason that he and the appellant agreed to sell the house in suit. They had earlier decided to wind up their business in Ambala which in fact they did on August 30, 1971. The house was agreed to be sold for Rs. 1,78,000 and Rs. 30,000 was received at the time of the execution of the agreement of sale. Though the appellant had asked the respondents to pay another sum of Rs. 98,000 within a week they had agreed to pay the same only within 10 days and that balance of the sale price was to be paid at the time of the registration of the sale-deed. According to the witness the payment of Rs. 98,000 was to be made within 10 days and was the essence of the contract and that is why the word “only” was introduced. The sum of Rs. 98,000 was not paid within 10 days as stipulated and so, Rs. 30,000 was forfeited and the agreement became in-operative. The house was mortgaged to L.I.C and was to be redeemed by the September 30, 1971. In order to reduce the property he wrote a letter dated August 28, 1971, Exhibit DW. 3/1. A reply was received from the L.I.C stating what amount was remaining due from the loan. This letter is dated September 8, 1971, Exhibit D.W 1/2. He denied that the respondents ever offered to pay Rs. 98,000, as alleged or ever expressed their readiness and willingness to pay the said amount within 10 days of the agreement. With regard to possession he deposed that Mr. Nigam was occupying the first floor and as possession had to be handed over by September 30, 1971 Mr. Nigam vacated the said portion by September 20, 1971. That portion remained vacant for three to four months thereafter. He deposed that he along with his wife was living on the ground floor in the front portion while the back portion on the ground floor was occupied by one Mr. K. Ramanathan. So far as the portion on the ground floor was concerned possession of the same was to be given by October 31, 1971. He denied that Rs. 30,000 was paid at the time of the execution of the agreement to enable the appellant to pay off the loan to the L.I.C and redeem the property. He also denied that there was any condition that Rs. 98,000 was to be paid only after obtaining of the income-tax clearance certificate and redemption documents from the L.I.C He said that though the L.I.C wrote to him vide Exhibit D.W ½ on September 8, 1971, he did not consider it necessary to inform the respondents about it as by that time they had already committed breach of the contract. He denied that the respondents ever met him as alleged on September 3, 1971 or earlier. According to him the respondents only came on September 9 or September 10, 1971 by which time the period of 10 days to pay Rs. 98,000 had already expired. He maintained that income-tax clearance certificate and redemption documents were to be obtained by September 30, 1971. Regarding partnership of Kailash Dutt in Poona, although he had earlier stated that it was dissolved on September 30, 1971, he later clarified that it was dissolved on August 31, 1971, Banarasi Dass, Broker, appeared as D.W 4. He deposed that Rs. 30,000 was paid by way of earnest money. Rs. 98,000 was to be paid within 10 days and the balance of the sale consideration at the time of the registration of the sale-deed. According to him there was no special reason why Rs. 98,000 had to be paid within 10 days. He maintained that there was no time limit to redeem the property from L.I.C excepting that it had to be redeemed prior to the registration of the sale-deed. He claimed to be a draftsman of the agreement, Exhibit P.W 8/28. In cross-examination he admitted that payment of Rs. 30,000 at the time of the execution was necessary because Rs. 25,000 had to be paid to L.I.C According to him the respondents never met him after execution of Exhibit P.W 8/28 prior to September 8 or September 10, 1971. According to him the word “only” had been written to qualify the amount, in the first part of the clause and the word “only” was written in the second part of the clause “so that there may not be misunderstanding that Rs. 98,000 had to be paid within 10 days.” According to him the second respondent had ring him up from Kanpur and asked him whether there would be any objection to payment of Rs. 98,000 one or two days later as he was busy and held up in Kanpur. He assured the second respondent that the appellant would not be too particular about that. He further admitted that he gave this assurance without talking to the appellant. On September 8 or September 10, 1971 the respondents came and said that they were willing to pay Rs. 98,000 and the appellant was also willing to accept it but the difficulty was that the respondents were willing to give the money if they were given possession of at least one room on the ground floor whereas the appellant was willing to give possession of one store only and not a room. The appellant appeared in the witness box as D.W 5. She reiterated what her husband had deposed as to the purpose of selling the house and having a clause inserted regarding payment of Rs. 98,000. She admitted that Rs. 25,000 had to be paid to the L.I.C to clear the loan. She asserted that the respondents never came to tender Rs. 98,000 within 10 days of the agreement. They never came till on or about September 9 or September 10, 1971. With regard to the controversy about giving possession of one room she said that even on September 9 or September 10, 1971 the respondents insisted on possession of a room while she was willing to give possession only of a store as accommodation with her was insufficient. Possession of the first floor was to be given by September 30, 1971 and of the rest by October 31, 1971. She supported what her husband had said about her business interest and the intension to invest the money in the Poona business.
    12. The second respondent, Niranjan Nath, appeared as P.W 8, once again in rebuttal. At this time he admitted that his wife had asked the appellant to give possession of at least one room but did not remember on what date this conversation took place. He also admitted that the appellant was willing to offer some place underneath the stairs for keeping the luggage which was not acceptable. He further deposed that the appellant was not willing to give one room as he was unwilling to accept the place under the stair-case.
    13. The principles on which specific performance of a contract of sale of immoveable property should be granted or should not be granted are well-settled. Section 16 of the Specific relief Act, 1963 reads as under:—
    “16. Personal bars to relief.—Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person—
    (a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or
    (b) who has become incapable of performing or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance, with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract, or
    (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
    Explanation—For the purposes of Clause (c), —
    (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the Court;
    (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.”
    What we have to see is whether any of the parties have committed a breach of agreement, Exhibit P.W 8/28, and what is its true construction. According to the learned Single Judge though payment of Rs. 98,000 was stipulated to be made within 10 days there was no specific agreement that the said amount had to be paid within only 10 days and non-payment of the amount within 10 days did not frustrate the contract. According to him the work “only” appearing clause 1 of the agreement was meant to stress and qualify the amount of Rs. 98,000 and could not be read to mean as if payment within 10 days was the essence of the contract. Reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge on Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, AIR 1967 SC 868(1) to come to this conclusion.
    14. Before as the respondents counsel also cited Nauik Lal Karmarkar v. Shankar Lal Shah, AIR 1962 Calcutta 103(2) and Arun Prokash Boral v. Tulsi Charan Bose, AIR 1949 Calcutta 510(3) in further support of the above proposition.
    15. The rules ennuciated in the above decisions are undoubtedly the law of the land. A careful reading of the decisions would, however, show that whether payment within a stipulated time is of the essence of the contract or not is to be gleaned not only from the phraseology of the terms of the contract. The intention about time being essence of the contract may be evidenced either by express stipulations or by circumstances which sufficiently strong to displace ordinary presumption that in contracts for sale of land stipulation as to time is not of the essence. Indeed, in Gomathinayagam Pillai's case (supra) the Supreme Court has relied upon this dicta laid down by the Privy Council in Jamshed Kodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, AIR 1915 PC 83(4).
    16. In the Calcutta decision relied upon, the Bench following another dicta of the Privy Council in Edridge v. R.D Sethna, AIR 1933 PC 233 (5) had observed that the party aspiring specifically to enforce the contract must perform the condition precedent on his part before he becomes entitled to the relief. This observation was made in the context of whether tender of consideration money would be the essence of the contract if there were reciprocal promises to be performed on a true construction of the contract.
    17. In the other Calcutta decision relied upon, it was the vendor who was in default and it was held that being in default he could not claim to repudiate the contract by pleading that the time was of the essence of the contract. It was further observed that the real intention has to be gleened from all the circumstances taken together.
    18. Therefore, the law as we understand it, is that though generally in suits for agreements of sale of immovable property time will not be of the essence of the contract, it could, however, be held to be so even with regard to payment of consideration if from a reading of the agreement and the appreciation of the surrounding circumstances it appears that reciprocal promises had to be performed, in order that the transaction contemplated by the agreement is completed Accordingly, the first thing that comes up for consideration is to construe clause 1 of the agreement, Exhibit P.W 8/28.
    19. We have already Clause 1 earlier. The word “only” occurs twice and in two different contexts. The first time that the word “only” occurs is to specify the amount of Rs. 98,000 in words. At this stage there can be no doubt that the word “only” has been used, as observed by the learned Single Judge, to qualify the amount. The amount having been qualified, there was no sense in using the same word again a second time. On the second occasion the word “only” is used to qualify the period of 10 days. To say that the word “only” though used a second time in this clause still only qualifies the amount of Rs. 98,000 would not be a correct reading of Clause 1 of the agreement. Why this word was so used is explained by the appellant and her witnesses in their testimonies which we have extracted at some length earlier. The respondents or their witnesses do not give any explanation as to why the word “only” was used again in the context of the time within which Rs. 98,000 was to be paid. It seems to us that the contention of the appellant is correct. The purpose why she wanted Rs. 98,000 has been disclosed by her. She had to invest Rs. 1 lakh in the business at Poona and indeed wanted the money within one week. She was selling her house only for this purpose. It is clearly in evidence that the appellant and her husband wanted Rs. 98,000 to be paid within a week but at the request of the respondents the period of 10 days was stipulated in the agreement of sale. We are, therefore, in respectful disagreement with the learned Single Judge that the word “only” has been used in the context of specifying the amount and not in the context of specifying the time for performance of an obligation.
    20. In our view non-payment of Rs. 98,000 by the respondents entitled the appellant on or before September 6, 1971 to treat as a breach committed by the respondents. The surrounding circumstances which have come out in the evidence further fortify us in coming to this conclusion. Possession of the first floor was to be given by September 30, 1971. The first floor had been got vacated well before that date. Possession of the front portion of the ground floor was to be given at the time of the registration of the sale-deed. The respondents agree that such were the stipulations. Despite this the respondents started insisting upon the appellant giving possession of one room on the ground floor as a condition precedent to their paying Rs. 98,000. The appellant who was apparently quite serious about selling her property had agreed to give a store instead by way of accommodating the respondents. They, however, continued to insist on possession of one room which was rightly declined by the appellant. Such a condition precedent in violation of the terms of the contract could not be put forward by the respondents. It seems the implementation of the contract of sale ran into heavy weather right from the beginning. The insistence of the respondents, as deposed to by them, that the appellant and her husband should first obtain income-tax clearance certificate and redemption of property before they paid Rs. 98,000 was also unjustified. Perhaps, as prudent persons the respondents did not want to further invest Rs. 98,000 having paid 30,000 earlier, till they were sure that the property had been redeemed and the income-tax clearance certifi- had been given. May be it was a sensible approach to investing money but it was certainly not justified in terms of the agreement between the parties. The redemption of the property had to be effected by September 30, 1971. The income-tax clearance certificate was only required for the purposes of registration of the sale-deed. Despite the terms being such insisting that these two documents be obtained prior to giving of Rs. 98,000 can only be regarded as trying to vary the terms of the agreement. In these circumstances, when the appellant caused the letter dated September 13, 1971 issued to the vendee, it cannot be said that her having treated the contract as having been breached, the stand was un-justified. If the vendee, namely, the respondents, wanted to keep the contract alive even after September 13, 1971 they could have offered Rs. 98,000 unconditionally but as admitted by the respondents in their testimony in court they still put the condition of the appellant giving possession of one room on the ground floor and obtaining income-tax clearance certificate and redemption documents from the L.I.C as conditions precedent to the payment of Rs. 98,000. Such action can only be regarded as breach of the contract by the respondents. Therefore, we find force in the contention on behalf of the appellant that readiness and willingness is distinct from the essence of the contract. The respondents were never willing and ready to perform their part of the contract as entered into. They were ready and willing to go through with the sale transaction by varying the conditions to suit their convenience. Equity, therefore, is certainly not in their favour. Indeed, as a reading of Section 16 of the Specific relief Act would show vendee could not act at variance with the contract. That the appellant had not moved by the middle of September to get the income-tax clearance certificate or to get the property redeemed cannot be held against lier. She was required to have these only by September 30, 1971, in the case of redemption and by October 31, 1979 in the case of income-tax clearance certificate.
    21. Normally, a vendor will not be allowed to resile from the contract of sale by merely pleading time as the essence of the contract. If, however, circumstances so warrant the vendor will be entitled to be free from the obligations under the agreement of sale provided there is no mala fide act on the part of the vendor. In the present case we find none. It is not anybody's case that within three or four weeks that dispute arose between the parties the price of the property had gone up so much that the vendor had second thoughts. The transaction seems to have failed primarily on account of non-payment of Rs. 98,000 by September 6, 1971. By the appellant treated it as a breach is understandable and cannot be said to be unjustifiable.
    22. In these circumstances we are unable to grant to the respondents a decree for specific performance. We accordingly accept the appeal and dismiss the suit for specific performance.
    23. Next comes the question of Rs. 30,000. The appellant herself admitted that out of Rs. 30,000 Rs. 25,000 had been taken for the purpose of redemption of the property by payment to the L.I.C Thus, the earnest money was really only Rs. 5,000. This is clear not only from the appellant's own testimony but also from the brokers. The appellant, therefore, in our opinion, is not entitled to forfeit Rs. 30,000. She could at best forfeit only Rs. 5,000. He would have been persuaded to allow her to do so but for the fact that it is in evidence that since, 1971 the values of the properties have gone up considerably. She has actually suffered no less nor has any proof of loss been placed on record. Although earnest money is not meant to compensate loss and is not in lieu of damages, nonetheless on equitable principles if a party has not suffered loss but gain on account of frustration of the contract, in our opinion, the earnest money should not be allowed to be forfeited.
    24. Accordingly, while accepting the appeal we grant to the plaintiff/respondents a decree of Rs. 30,000 in their favour and against the appellant. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout.
    Appeal partly allowed
    R.S
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