Harish Chandra, J.:— This is the landlady's second appeal against the dismissal of its application for ejectment of the respondent tenant under the provisions of Section 14 (1) (a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
2. Smt. Kaila Devi, the landlady preferred in 1968 an application for the eviction of Shri Banarsi Dass on two grounds set out in the application in the following words: 18 (a) The ground which the eviction of the tenant is sought.
(i) That the demised premises are required by the petitioner/landlady for occupation as a residence and as the residence of the other members of her family for whose benefit the property was acquired and who are dependent on her. The petitioner is the owner of the said premises. The petitioner has got the present accommodation which is not suitable and sufficient for herself and the other members of her family.
(ii) That the respondent is in arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 750/- for the period 1.1.1966 to 31.1.1968 (25 months) @ Rs. 30/- per month which he has failed to pay inspite of service of notice of demand.
3. The application was resisted and in the written statement the respondent tenant pleaded that ground (i) was not available to the landlady as the subject premises “are also commercial” and ground (ii) was not available as the application was premature haying been filed before the expiry of 3 months from the date of the service of notice. In the replication the appellant landlady re-iterated ground No. (i) by stating that:
“……The demised premises were let out for residential purposes and the respondent has been using the same for residential purposes only.”
4. Parties led evidence in support of their respective contentions. The appellant examined herself and two other witnesses. AW1 Chander Bhan and AW2 Mange Ram did not depose at all on whether the premises were residential or commercial and whether the same were let out for residence only and for residential-cum-commercial purposes while the appellant herself stated that the premises were residential. Other evidence adduced was about the rate of rent and her bonafide need of the premises for residence.
5. The respondent examined 5 witnesses and himself as RW 6. RW 4 Ram Lubhaya stated that the premises had been let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes. Respondent himself stated that he had taken the premises on rent for residential-cum-commercial purposes and was carrying on salt business therein.
6. The learned Rent Controller persued the evidence and noted that the appellant did not produce any evidence at all to the effect that the premises had been let out for residence only. Whereas the two witnesses were silent about the purpose of letting. She herself stated that the premises were residential and stopped short of saying that the premises were let out for residence or residence only. The learned Rent Controller constructed this lack of evidence on this ground with the statement of the respondent and RW 4 Ram Lubhaya who clearly deposed that the premises were let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes. The learned Rent Controller noted that there was not even a suggestion in the cross-examination of RW 4 to the effect that the premises in dispute had been let out only for residential purposes.
7. On this state of evidence the learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the Appellant had failed to prove that the premises in dispute had been let out for residential purposes alone and that the premises were let out for residential cum-commercial purposes. The requirements of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Rent Control Act not having been proved in this material respect, the application was dismissed.
8. It may here be mentioned that the other requirement of Section 14(1) (e) namely, bonafide need for residence, was held duly proved by the appellant. It may also be mentioned that ground (ii) for eviction was held not available as the application for eviction on that ground had been filed before the expiry of 2 months from the date of the service of the notice of demand.
9. In the first appeal under Section 38 of Rent Control Act, the finding on ground No. (ii) was not assailed and the only point urged before the learned Rent Control Tribunal was whether the premises had been let out only for residential purposes.
10. After going through the entire evidence the learned Rent Control Tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellant had produced no evidence that the premises in dispute had been let out for residential purpose and that there was no reason to disbelieve the statement of the respondent who stated on oath that the premises had been let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes. It was therefore held that the letting purpose was residential-cum-commercial and the appellant was not entitled to claim eviction under clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
11. It cannot be emphasised enough that in order to avail of clause (e) of section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the landlady has to establish that (i) the premises were let out for residential purposes, (ii) are required bonafide for occupation as residence, (iii) for herself or for any member of her family dependent upon her, and (iv) no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is available. The finding of the learned Rent Controller as well as of the learned Rent Control Tribunal is that the landlady failed to prove that the premises were let out for residential purposes. This finding cannot be disturbed in an appeal under Section 39 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In the face of this finding no question of law, let alone a substantial question of law can be said to arise and the appeal does not lie by virtue of Section 39 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
12. Before parting with the case I am temped to say that the appellant landlady not having averred or deposed that the premises in question were let for residence and the learned Rent Controller having given on evidence before it an unassailable finding that the premises were let for residence-cum-commercial purposes, the appeals before the learned Rent Controller as well as before this Court had to have a foregone conclusion and were uncalled for. May I express the hope that men of law would help reduce uncalled for litigation.