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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — H.L. Anand, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1971 the petitioner, an eligible medical student, was admitted to Maulana Azad Medical College against a seat reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates on the basis of his application representation that he belonged to the Julaha caste and on production of a certificate from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi (Annexure P-2). The admission was expressly provisional and subject to verification of the petitioner's caste status.

During the petitioner's first year, verification allegedly revealed that he was not a member of any Scheduled Caste and the Principal cancelled the provisional admission by an order dated 18 November 1971. After a representation by the petitioner the cancellation was rescinded in February 1972 and the petitioner was readmitted provisionally pending the Deputy Commissioner's decision on his representation.

Between 1972 and 1975 verification proceeded slowly. A reference was made to the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, who replied that no details were available to establish that the Patoli community of Multan (which the petitioner claimed) belonged to a weaving caste and added that the petitioner had obtained a certificate with the connivance of certain officials. On that basis the Deputy Commissioner informed the college authorities that the petitioner was not a member of the Julaha community and thus not a Scheduled Caste member. The University advised cancellation and the college cancelled the admission on 9 June 1975 (Annexure 'A').

By June 1975 the petitioner had completed more than four years of the five-year M.B.B.S. course and was in the final year. He filed the present petition in 1975 challenging the cancellation and related proceedings. The court issued a Rule Nisi and permitted the petitioner to appear in the final examination and later in a supplementary examination; however, the petitioner's result was withheld pending determination of the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned action cancelling the petitioner's admission suffers from any legal infirmity and is liable to be quashed.
  2. If such legal infirmity exists, whether there is any constitutional impediment to the grant of appropriate relief to the petitioner (in particular, whether relief can be granted under Article 226 because the matter involves fundamental rights under Article 19(1) and Article 21 or is barred as not involving a statutory breach under Article 226(1)(b)).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner challenged the cancellation of his admission on the ground that he had been granted admission (provisionally) and later allowed to continue studies over a long period; the proceedings culminating in cancellation were infirm because of inordinate delay and procedural defects. The petition filed in 1975 sought quashing of the cancellation order.
  • The petitioner placed on record material (including records relating to his grandfather) asserting that the term "Patoli" could be construed as analogous to a weaving profession and thus part of the Julaha community recognised as a Scheduled Caste.
  • The petitioner contended that the impugned action involved infringement of a fundamental right; specifically, he urged that his right to pursue higher/professional education and the consequent right to carry on a profession were protected by Article 19(1) and Article 21 and therefore actionable under Article 226(1)(a).
  • The petitioner also contested aspects of the verification process and whether he had been afforded reasonable opportunity by the various authorities at different stages.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that the authorities were justified on the material before them in concluding that the petitioner did not belong to the Julaha community and hence was not a Scheduled Caste member.
  • The respondents asserted that the proceedings and the decisions of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes and the Deputy Commissioner supported cancellation and that the petitioner had been associated with the enquiry at various stages (i.e., procedural opportunities were given).
  • On the constitutional question the respondents argued that because there was no violation of any statute the petitioner's case did not fall within Article 226(1)(a) (fundamental rights) but rather within Article 226(1)(b), and therefore no writ or order under Article 226 could properly be issued in his favour.
  • The respondents also clarified that they had never conceded that the petitioner had a fundamental right to higher or professional education.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.K. Gopalan Represents the judicial current inclined to extend or widen the scope of fundamental rights (theory of emanation/extension). The Court placed this decision in the category of authorities that favour widening the scope of fundamental rights; used as background in discussing whether the right to education can be treated as an integral fundamental right.
Kharak Singh (majority) Included among decisions that favour extension of scope of fundamental rights. Characterised as part of the first current of judicial thought supportive of extension; used to frame the debate on scope of fundamental rights.
Kharak Singh (minority — Subba Rao, J.) Represents the cautious approach to not extend fundamental rights beyond their explicit text. Placed in the second current of judicial thought to show contrasting approaches in jurisprudence.
Satwant Singh Sawhney Represents a cautious judicial approach resisting unnecessary extension of constitutional guarantees. Used as an example of the second current of judicial thought that counsels restraint in judicial expansion of fundamental rights.
Govind (observations of Mathew, J.) Contains cautions or observations that align with the restrictive current of thought on fundamental rights' extension. Referred to as part of the jurisprudential context against which the Court evaluated the issue of whether educational rights can be treated as fundamental rights.
Maneka Gandhi Holds that a right not specifically named may still be a fundamental right if it is an integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character. The Court treated Maneka Gandhi as seminal authority endorsing the principle that certain unenumerated rights may be fundamental if integral to an enumerated right; used to justify considering interference with professional education as an infringement of the right to carry on a profession.
Anand Vardhan Chandel (Division Bench of this Court) Held that the right to receive higher or professional education is itself a fundamental right, derivable from clauses of Article 19(1) read with Article 21, even independently of Article 41. The Court relied on this decision as supportive of the proposition that interference with completion of professional studies which directly entitles a student to practice a profession can attract fundamental-right protection (right to carry on profession).
Punjab High Court (decision referenced) In a somewhat similar setting the High Court looked unfavourably on late cancellations of admission after prolonged continuation of studies. The Court regarded the Punjab High Court's approach as supportive of the view that inordinate delay in determining status disentitles authorities to revoke admission after the student has continued and nearly completed the course.
Superior Court (observations referenced) Observations regarding cancellation of admission of a student in the context of facts and circumstances (unnamed superior court referenced by the Division Bench). The Court noted that certain observations of the Superior Court were invoked in support of the Punjab High Court's approach; these observations were used by the High Court for guidance in a similar factual matrix.
Calcutta High Court (decision referenced) Took a contrary view in a case where verification had concluded at the initial stage; thus it permitted cancellation when verification completed early. The Court distinguished that authority on its facts (where verification was completed at the initial stage) and noted it took an opposite view; used to contrast outcomes based on timing of verification.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two sequential analytical stages corresponding to the two main questions before it: first, whether the impugned cancellation suffered from legal infirmity; and second, whether any constitutional bar existed to granting relief.

1. On legal infirmity:

  • The Court reviewed the factual and documentary material on record and the manner in which the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, the Deputy Commissioner and college and University authorities had reached their conclusions.
  • The Court refrained from re-assessing disputed factual material or substituting its own conclusion for that of the administrative authorities where those authorities had reached conclusions reasonably on the record. The Court noted that the petitioner had been associated with the enquiry at various stages and had opportunities to place material in support of his claim.
  • The Court observed particular criticisms (for example, that an enquiry entrusted to local police had been held without the petitioner's knowledge) but held that those enquiries were conducted prior to the earlier cancellation and therefore did not form the basis for the impugned 1975 cancellation.
  • The Court examined the Commissioner's answers to specific questions and observed that the Commissioner had indicated lack of details and had also suggested that the petitioner had obtained a certificate with the connivance of certain officials; on this basis the Commissioner was unable to certify that the petitioner belonged to a Scheduled Caste.
  • Most critically, the Court identified a vitiating legal infirmity in the inordinate and prolonged delay in finalising verification — specifically a delay of about four years during which the petitioner continued uninterrupted in his studies and reached the final year. The Court held that despite the provisional character of the admission, such prolonged delay did not justify revoking an admission after the student had completed substantially the entire course. The Court concluded that authorities who had induced the petitioner to continue studies for four years were disentitled to turn around in the fifth year and cancel admission.
  • The Court relied on the reasoning of the Punjab High Court (and supportive observations of a Superior Court) in a similar factual context, while distinguishing a Calcutta High Court decision that reached an opposite result where verification had been completed at the initial stage.
  • On this ground of inordinate delay alone the Court held that the impugned cancellation was liable to be quashed.

2. On the constitutional question:

  • The respondents urged that no statutory violation occurred and therefore the petition could not be entertained under Article 226(1)(a) as a fundamental-rights case but fell under Article 226(1)(b). The petitioner urged that the cancellation infringed fundamental rights and thus fell within Article 226(1)(a).
  • The Court reviewed prevailing judicial approaches to the scope of fundamental rights in both foreign and Indian jurisprudence, identifying two currents: one favouring extension/emanation of rights and the other advocating restraint.
  • The Court placed particular reliance on Maneka Gandhi as establishing that a right not explicitly named could still be fundamental if it was an integral part of a named fundamental right or shared the same basic nature and character. The Court also relied on this Court's earlier Division Bench decision in Anand Vardhan Chandel, which had held that the right to receive higher or professional education could be regarded as a fundamental right flowing from Article 19(1) read with Article 21 (and independently of Article 41).
  • Applying those principles, the Court concluded that while it was not possible to hold categorically that every denial of higher or professional education would impinge fundamental rights, where the right to pursue professional studies is such that completion directly entitles the student to practise a profession (as in the present medical context), an improper interference with that pursuit would directly interfere with the fundamental right to carry on a profession. Consequently, there was no constitutional impediment to granting relief under Article 226 in this case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition succeeds. The Court quashed the impugned order of cancellation of the petitioner's admission and directed that the authorities declare the petitioner's result and treat him in accordance with law once the result is declared. The Court also ordered that the petitioner would not be awarded costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The cancellation of the petitioner's admission (Annexure 'A' dated 9 June 1975) is quashed; the petitioner is entitled to have his result declared and be treated in accordance with law on such declaration. The petitioner will not receive costs.
  • On precedent and doctrine: The Court endorsed the principle that where improper interference affects completion of professional studies which directly entitle a student to practise a profession, such interference can attract the fundamental right to carry on a profession (Article 19(1)(g)) and thereby be actionable under Article 226(1)(a). The decision thus applies the reasoning in Maneka Gandhi and Anand Vardhan Chandel to the facts of a long-delayed verification and cancellation.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to establish a universal rule that all delays or all cancellations will attract fundamental-rights protection; rather, it emphasises a case-by-case approach and relies on the specific factual circumstance of inordinate delay during which the student substantially completed the course.

Disposition: Petition accepted; petitioner allowed relief as indicated above. No order as to costs in favour of the petitioner.

    Inder Parkash Petitioner v. Deputy Commissioner & Others

    H.L Anand, J.:— 1. This petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, by a medical student, challenges the action of the University of Delhi and the authorities of the Maulana Azad Medical College, cancelling the admission of the petitioner as a medical student, on the ground that he had obtained admission on the basis of a false representation that he belonged to the Scheduled Caste and raises, inter alia, an important question as to whether the right to higher or technical or professional education could be treated as an integral part of either the fundamental right of freedom of expression and speech or to carry on any trade or profession and be themselves enforceable as fundamental rights.

    2. In the year 1971, the petitioner, who was admittedly eligible for admission for a medical course, was admitted in the Maulana Azad Medical College, against a seat reserved for scheduled caste candidate, on the basis of a representation in his application that he belonged to Julaha caste. The petitioner had enclosed with the application a certificate to that effect issued by the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi (Annexure P-2). According to the certificate the petitioner belonged to Julaha caste, which was recognised as a scheduled caste.
    3. The petitioner had, however, been admitted on a provisional basis subject to verification. It appears that while the petitioner was in the first year of the M.B.B.S course verification revealed that the petitioner did not belong to any scheduled caste. The provisional admission of the petitioner was accordingly cancelled by an order of the Principal of the college made on November 18, 1971. Subsequently in February, 1972 on a representation from the petitioner reiterating his claim of being a member of the scheduled caste, the cancellation was rescinded and the petitioner was provisionally readmitted subject to the decision of the Deputy Commissioner on the petitioner's representation. It appears that between the year 1972 and 1975 the process of verification went on at a rather leizurely pace in course of which a reference was made to the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes. The Commissioner answered in the negative the reference of the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, if a member of the Patoli community of Multan, to which the petitioner claimed to belong, was part of the “weaving caste”. The Commissioner expressed the view that the petitioner did not belong to any scheduled caste. On the basis of this conclusion of the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi informed the college authorities that the petitioner was not a member of the Julaha community and was, therefore, not a member of any Scheduled caste. It is on the basis of this finding and on the recommendation of the college authorities that the University of Delhi advised the college authorities to cancel the admission of the petitioner. Pursuant to this the admission of the petitioner was eventually cancelled by the college authorities by an order of June 9, 1975, Annexure ‘A’. It further appears that until the order made by the college authorities cancelling the admission of the petitioner, the petitioner continued to make progress in the studies and had already spent more than 4 years and was in the 5th and the final year of studies when he filed the present petition in 1975, challenging the cancellation of the admission and the proceedings leading thereto. On the Rule Nisi being issued the petitioner was allowed to appear in the final examination and has since appeared in the supplementary examination, subject to the decision of the petition, pending which his result has remained withheld.
    4. Rival contentions raise two questions for consideration:—
    (1) Whether the impugned action cancelling the admission suffers from any legal infirmity and is on that account liable to be quashed;
    (2) If so, whether there is any constitutional impediment to the grant of appropriate relief to the petitioner.
    Legal Infirmity:
    5. The first question that must, therefore, be determined is whether the impugned action of the University and the college authorities and the proceedings leading to the cancellation of admission suffer from such legal infirmity as would have a vitiating effect.
    6. There has been considerable controversy between the parties as to whether on the material on record the various authorities concerned with the matter were justified in arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner did not belong to the Julaha community and was, therefore, not a member of the scheduled caste. There was also considerable controversy between the parties as to the manner in which the decision with regard to the question was arrived at by the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi and the University and college authorities, in particular, whether the petitioner had been granted reasonable opportunity of being heard by the various authorities before arriving at a conclusion adverse to him with regard to his status as a member of the scheduled caste. None of these contentions are, however, of any avail to the petitioner. True, material, inter alia, consisting of copy of record of certain judicial proceedings involving the grand father of the petitioner was placed on the record which described the petitioner's grand father as belonging to the “Patoli” community of Multan and there may be some force in the contention that the expression “Patoli”, on a reasonable construction, could be said to be analogous to the profession of weaving and may, therefore, provide the basis for further contention that the Patoli Community of Multan constituted a class of weavers, forming part of the Julaha community, so as to quality for being considered one of the scheduled castes. It was, however, for the authorities concerned to arrive at a proper conclusion if the petitioner belonged to a scheduled caste or not end it was not for this Court to either re-assess the material on which the conclusion may be based or to substitute its own conclusion for that of the authorities. There is no substance in the criticism as to the manner in which the decision was arrived at because admittedly at various stages the petitioner was associated with the enquiry and was given an opportunity to produce such material as the petitioner may be advised to in support of his claim. There was some justifiable criticism of the manner in which the enquiry was entrusted to the local police and was held by it because this enquiry was behind the back of the petitioner; apparently from the neighbours of the petitioner and from the residents of the locality but that is of no significance either because this enquiry was conducted prior to the earlier cancellation of admission and could not, therefore, be said to form a basis for the impugned orders. The contention that the Commissioner's answer to the reference was not categorical is also devoid of any force. Three questions had been posed for the consideration of the Commissioner, namely :-
    “(1) Whether the members of Patoli Community of Multan be long to weaving caste.
    (2) If so, whether the members of this community can be treated to be members of Scheduled Caste in India.
    (3) The nature of distinction between members of Vijh community of Punjab and members of Patoli Community in Multan.”
    These questions were answered by the Commissioner in the following manner :-
    “1. No such details are available with us.
    2. The question does not arise.
    3. No such details are available in this office.”
    While it is thus true that there was no categorical answer to the first question because all that the Commissioner said was that no details were available and there may be some substance in the contention that the Commissioner did not preclude the possibility of Patola community of Multan being synonymous with the weaving caste and be, therefore, entitled to be treated as a scheduled caste. It is, however, not possible to ignore the further observation of the Commissioner that the petitioner had been successful in getting a certificate with the connivance of certain officials which would justify an overall inference that on the basis of material available with the Commissioner, he was unable to certify that the petitioner belonged to the scheduled caste.
    7. There is, however, an aspect of the determination of the question of the petitioner's status which introduces a vitiating infirmity. The petitioner was granted admission in the year 1971, subject to verification with regard to his claim of being a member of the scheduled caste. This admission was cancelled in November 1971 but the cancellation order was rescinded following the petitioner's representation and the petitioner was readmitted, provisionally though, in February 1972. The admission of the petitioner was eventually cancelled in June 1975 by which time the petitioner had completed four years of studies in the medical college and was in the 5th and the final year. During this long period of four years not only the State had incurred considerable expenditure in imparting the requisite education to him, the petitioner had also spent four valuable years of his youth in the pursuit of medical studies and had successfully reached the final year. It is true that the initial admission of the petitioner was provisional and so was the re-admission, that would not justify a verification with regard to the status of the petitioner and the correctness of his representation in that behalf during a long period of four years. In the absence of any definite action after 1972 the petitioner was entitled to assume that by pursuing his studies he was not wasting his years. Having, therefore, thus virtually induced the petitioner to continue with the studies unhindered during a long period of four years, out of the total duration of the course of 5 years, it was not open to the authorities to turn round in the year 1975, when the petitioner had already reached the final year, to tell the petitioner that on verification it had been found that the petitioner did not belong to the scheduled caste and had obtained admission by a false representation. This is exactly how the Punjab High Court(1) looked at the matter in a somewhat similar setting of facts. The High Court rightly, with respect, sought support from certain observations of the Superior Court(2) made with regard to the cancellation of admission of a student in the context of facts and circumstances, which were slightly different.
    It is true that the Calcutta High Court(3) took a contrary view of the matter but that was where the verification had concluded at the initial stage itself. I would, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that on account of inordinate delay of about four years, during which the petitioner continued his studies, the authorities would be disentitled to revoke the admission of the petitioner, whatever may have been the nature of the petitioner's representation and whether or not the petitioner did or did not belong to the scheduled caste. The impugned order of cancellation of admission would, therefore, be liable to be quashed on this ground alone.
    Constitutional bar:
    8. If that be the serious infirmity from which the impugned action suffers, is there any constitutional impediment to the grant of appropriate relief to the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution, is the next question that must be considered. The respondents propose an affirmative answer to the question on the ground that, inasmuch as there was no violation of any statute, the case of the petitioner would be outside Article 226(1) (b) of the Constitution of India with the result that no writ or order could be issued to give the necessary relief to the petitioner. On behalf of the petitioner a negative answer is proposed on the ground that the case of the petitioner would be covered by Article 226(1) (a) of the Constitution, proposition which is vehemantly contested on behalf of the respondents.
    Right to receive education—how far a fundamental right:
    9. This raises an interesting question as to whether the right to higher education or professional or technical education, which is pre-requisite to the exercise of a number of fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and expression, and the right to carry on any trade or profession, could by themselves be considered fundamental rights capable of being enforced. On the enactment of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, a doubt rose if the petition involved the enforcement of any fundamental right, which the petitioner had until then not invoked, and I had, therefore, referred to a larger Bench the question as to whether in the circumstances the petition would abate in view of the Constitutional amendment. In the Full Bench, the parties agreed that the question of abatement need not be considered because the petition involved a fundamental right. Counsel for the respondents pointed out that there was perhaps some misunderstanding and that on behalf of the respondents it had never been conceded that the petitioner had any fundamental right to higher or professional education. Subsequently the petitioner was granted leave to urge the additional ground that the impugned cancellation involved an infraction of a fundamental right.
    10. A review of the history of judicial thought in the United States, as indeed in this country, reveals two distinct currents in judicial as well as juristic thinking with regard to the content, scope and the frontiers of fundamental rights embodied in the Constitutional law of these countries. While one view has been to extend and widen the scope of the fundamental rights so as to extend the area of constitutional protection with the aid of the theory of emanation or extension or the need to make the embodied fundamental rights more effective or to treat certain rights as forming an integral part of the named fundamental right, even though such rights are not specifically mentioned, the other line of thinking represents a cautious approach to the interpretation of the constitutional guarantees and represents an attempt to discourage unnecessary judicial extension of the embodied constitutional guarantees. The decisions of the Supreme Court with regard to the fundamental rights are not wanting in instances of these apparently conflicting trends. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of A.K Gopalan(4) and the majority judgment in Kharak Singh's case(5) would fall in the first category, while the minority judgment of Subha Rao, J. in Kharak Singh's case (supra), the decision of the Supreme Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney(6) and certain observations of Mathew, J. in the case of Govind(7) would appear to represent the second current of thought. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the famous case of Maneka Gandhi(8) would appear to have affixed its seal of approval on the principle that even if a right was not specifically named in the fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution, it may still be a fundamental right covered by some clause of its various articles, if it was an integral part of a named fundamental right or partook of the same basic nature and character as an embodied fundamental right, even though it was not enough that the right claimed merely flows or emanates from a named fundamental right or that its existence was necessary in order to make the exercise of the named fundamental right meaningful and effective. Following this decision, a Division Bench of this Court, to which I was a party, held in the case of Anand Vardhan Chandel(9) that the right to receive higher or professional education was itself a fundamental right, which would be spell out of a number of clauses of Article 19(1) read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, even independently of Article 41 of the Constitution. If the right to receive higher education or a professional education, which is a pre-requisite to practising a particular trade or profession or to exercise some of the fundamental rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, be in themselves fundamental rights on the basis of the aforesaid theory, there would be no escape from the conclusion that when the petitioner was sought to be deprived of the opportunity to pursue medical education by an improper order, the impugned action would constitute an infraction of his fundamental right. However, in the present state of the law, it is not easy to hold either with reference to the theory of emanation or extension or that of the integral part of a named fundamental right to say that any or every denial of an opportunity to carry out professional or technical education or studies would necessarily impinge on the fundamental right to carry on any trade or profession for which such technical or professional study may be a pre-requisite. Such a conclusion would perhaps have to wait for further developments in law and the law in this behalf would have to develop on a case to case basis. There can, however, be no doubt in the context of the legal position that obtains today that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi (supra) and the legal thought that has been thrown up by the decision of this Court in the case of Anand Vardhan Chandel (supra) that where the right to pursue professional or technical studies, the completion of which would directly entitle a student to practise a profession, as in the present case, any improper interference in such a pursuit would attract the fundamental right to carry on the profession because the right to carry on the profession would be directly interfered with by such an improper action. In this view of the matter, there would, therefore, be no constitutional impediment to the grant of appropriate relief to the petitioner and the relief would, therefore, be justified in the enforcement of the fundamental right.
    11. In the result, the petition succeeds, the impugned order of the cancellation of admission is quashed. The authorities would declare the result of the petitioner and he would be treated in accordance with law on the result being so declared.
    12. On the constitutional changes brought about during the Emergency, it almost appeared that the petition was perhaps liable to abate and the case of the petitioner was lost beyond any possible hope or redemption. It was, therefore, referred to a larger Bench in the hope that there may perhaps be some silver lining in the otherwise dark horizon. There was some ray of hope when it was suggested that the petition involved a fundamental right which became brighter on account of recent judicial thinking incorporated in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi (supra) and, following that, the decision of this Court in the case of Anand Vardhan Chandel (supra), with the result that by the piecing together of logic, reason and certain principles, it has been possible to arrive at the happy conclusion so as to save the career of a young medical student from cloud, if not virtual oblivion.
    13. It must, however, be pointed out in all fairness to the University and the college authorities that, apart from the delay involved in the determination of the status of the petitioner, the authorities acted without any animus and in a just and fair manner. The educational authorities are in locus perentis to the students, who enter the portals of these temples of learning and is for this reason that courts are very reluctant to interfere in the domestic affairs of such institutions. Where, however, such interference is necessary in the interest of justice, as in the present case, such interference becomes a duty. Nevertheless, the anxiety of the University and the college authorities to take a serious view of the misrepresentation that may have been made by the petitioner probably in his anxiety to secure admission, which otherwise may not have been possible, is quite understandable and the relief that this Court is granting to the petitioner should not in any manner be understood as condoning any such act, for, whatever be the end, no end would justify the means. In the circumstances, the petitioner would not have his costs.
    J.N.A Petition accepted
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    Inder Parkash Petitioner v. Deputy Commissioner & Others
    (Aug 31, 1978)