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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • — Mr. Ishwar Sahai with Mr. Maheshwar Dayal, Advocates.
  • — Mr. G.L Rawal, Advocate.
Judges
  • Mr. Justice Prakash Narain
  • Mr. Justice P.S. Safeer
Acts
  • section 14 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
  • months.Sub-sections (1) and (7) of section 15
  • sub-section (1) of section 14,
  • provisions of section 14 (2)
  • provisions.8. Section 14 (2)
  • obtained.10. Section 14 (2)
  • Section 14 (2) in the Act
  • section 14 (2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • — Mr. Ishwar Sahai with Mr. Maheshwar Dayal, Advocates.
  • — Mr. G.L Rawal, Advocate.
Judges
  • Mr. Justice Prakash Narain
  • Mr. Justice P.S. Safeer
Acts
  • section 14 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
  • months.Sub-sections (1) and (7) of section 15
  • sub-section (1) of section 14,
  • provisions of section 14 (2)
  • provisions.8. Section 14 (2)
  • obtained.10. Section 14 (2)
  • Section 14 (2) in the Act
  • section 14 (2)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Reference on sections 14(2) and 15(1), Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment disposes of references made in S.A.O. No. 213 of 1969 and S.A.O. No. 231 of 1974. Both matters were taken up by B.C. Misra, J. on 26 March 1975, and references were made for authoritative interpretation.

S.A.O. No. 213 of 1969 arises from an appeal by a tenant against an eviction petition instituted by a landlord on 17 November 1965 for non-payment of arrears of rent (a ground falling under section 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958). A significant factual element was that the landlord relied on an earlier eviction petition (filed 13 August 1964) in which proceedings had ended with an order recorded on 28 November 1964 (Exhibit A.3) under section 15(1) and a later entry on 30 December 1964: "Dismissed. Announced." The landlord had stated he wished to withdraw the earlier petition because the tenant had deposited rent up to 30 November 1964 and sought payment of that sum to him.

In the second petition for ejectment (based on non-payment of arrears), the tenant contended that the dismissal of the earlier petition did not amount to the tenant having obtained the benefit within the meaning of section 14(2). The Additional Rent Controller rejected that contention; on appeal the Rent Control Tribunal upheld the tenant. The Single Judge (B.C. Misra, J.) considered an authoritative interpretation of sections 14(2) and 15(1) necessary and accordingly made the reference answered by this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the true interpretation of section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — specifically, what constitutes the "benefit" referred to in the proviso to section 14(2) and when is that benefit regarded as having been obtained?
  2. Whether, for the purposes of denying the benefit in a subsequent eviction proceeding, a specific order under section 15(1) of the Act must have been passed in the earlier proceeding (i.e., can a tenant be deprived of the benefit if the earlier proceeding ended by withdrawal or dismissal without a formal order under section 15(1)?)
  3. How should sections 14(2) and 15(1) be applied where payments are made or deposits are effected at different stages of eviction proceedings (before hearing, at hearing prior to an order under section 15(1), or pursuant to a formal order under section 15(1))?

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments / Views Presented to the Court

  • One view urged was that once a tenant avoids eviction after institution of a petition (whether by making payment of rent or by depositing it following an order under section 15(1)), the tenant has obtained the benefit contemplated by section 14(2) and therefore cannot claim that benefit in any subsequent proceeding.
  • The contrary contention was that unless a specific order is passed under section 15(1) in the earlier proceeding, the tenant cannot be regarded as having obtained the benefit under section 14(2). Under this view, a dismissal of a petition in default (or a withdrawal by the landlord) differs from a formal compliance with an order under section 15(1), and only the latter can deprive the tenant of the statutory protection in later proceedings.
  • In the specific factual context of S.A.O. No. 213 of 1969, the tenant specifically argued that the earlier dismissal did not constitute the benefit within the meaning of section 14(2).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shrimati Rama Gupta v. Rai Singh Kain (1972 DL.T 375) Held that the proviso to section 14(2) applies only when the benefit of avoiding eviction has once been availed of; dismissal due to withdrawal was not equivalent to benefit under section 14(2). The Court noted D.K. Kapur, J.'s view that withdrawal by the landlord cannot be said to confer the statutory benefit on the tenant; this authority was discussed as supporting the position that voluntary withdrawal/dismissal is not the same as compliance with section 15(1).
Punjab National Bank, New Delhi v. The Rent Controller, Delhi (1974 Rajdham L.R. 435) Observed that an order under section 15 is not for the tenant alone and that even where the tenant had enjoyed the benefit under section 14(2) an order under section 15(1) should be passed; the opening phraseology of section 15 requires passing an order under that provision in every proceeding of the specified kind. The Court treated these observations as helpful only to a limited extent in determining the scope of sections 14(2) and 15; it recorded that the view emphasised the procedural role of section 15 but did not by itself decide the reference.
V.N. Vasudeva v. Kirori Mal Luhariwal, AIR 1965 S.C. 440 The Supreme Court observed that an order under section 15 to deposit arrears is not a final order but is preliminary, to be made at the initial stage of trial. The Court cited this authority for the proposition that the order under section 15(1) is preliminary in nature and is to be made early in proceedings; it informed the Court's understanding of the procedural character of a section 15 order.
Shri Ram Parkash v. Jagmohan Khanna and Ors (1974 R.C.R. 370) Observed that where a tenant avoided ejectment by entering into some other arrangement with the landlord, he should still be deemed to have obtained the benefit contemplated by section 14(2). The Court noted this view and indicated it would express itself regarding such observations when delivering the authoritative interpretation; it formed part of the spectrum of decisions considered.
Manohar Lal v. R.B. Jai Chand Luthra, IAS (Retd.) (1972 R.C.R. 696) Observed that where a landlord stated in presence of the tenant and counsel that arrears had been received as if under section 15, even without a formal order under section 15(1) the rent might be treated as accepted under section 15; thus there can be factual circumstances amounting to compliance. The Court cited this authority as an instance where factual statements in proceedings were treated as amounting to acceptance under section 15, and considered it relevant to whether substantive (deemed) compliance can sometimes be recognised even without formal order.
Smt. Sumitra Rani v. M/s. Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd. (1970 R.C.R. 566) Holds that even without strict procedural compliance with section 15, there can be situations of deeming compliance with the provisions. The Court referred to this line of authority as supporting the possibility of deemed compliance in certain factual settings, but made clear that authoritative clarification was still required regarding when non-formal compliance suffices to deny the benefit under section 14(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and functional analysis of section 14(2) and section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and proceeded by identifying the statutory scheme and the practical stages at which payments or deposits may be made in eviction proceedings.

  1. Structural reading: The Court observed that section 14(2) consists of two parts. The first part provides protection if the tenant "makes payment" (in which case no section 15(1) order is necessary). The second part contemplates the situation where a deposit is made "as required by section 15" — in that scenario an order under section 15(1) is necessarily involved and the petition for ejectment will be dismissed on compliance.
  2. Nature and timing of section 15(1) order: Section 15(1) mandates that the Controller, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make an order directing payment or deposit calculated at the rate the rent was last paid and specifying continuing monthly payments. Because the statute requires a hearing, the Court emphasized that an order under section 15(1) cannot normally be passed when the landlord withdraws or allows the petition to be dismissed in default without the hearing contemplated by section 15(1).
  3. Practical permutations: The Court identified three possible situations after a petition for eviction on the ground of non-payment is filed:
    • The tenant pays the arrears to the landlord out of court before the hearing;
    • The tenant pays or deposits arrears at the first hearing or at any time prior to the making of an order under section 15(1);
    • The tenant waits for an order under section 15(1) and deposits arrears and future rent in accordance with such an order.
    For the first two situations the landlord then may (a) withdraw the petition, (b) obtain dismissal in default, or (c) insist that an order under section 15(1) be passed.
  4. Central legal point: The Court concluded that a tenant is deprived of the protection afforded by section 14(2) in a subsequent proceeding only if, in the earlier proceeding, there was a specific and demonstrable order under section 15(1) and the deposit was made in compliance with that order. Mere payment to the landlord resulting in withdrawal or dismissal of a petition (without a section 15(1) order) does not automatically amount to the statutory "payment or deposit as required by section 15."
  5. Role of prior authorities: The Court reviewed earlier decisions that supported different positions — some treating withdrawal/dismissal/arrangements as conferring the benefit, and others requiring formal section 15(1) compliance — and found those observations instructive but not determinative. On balance, the Court resolved the conflict in favour of requiring a specific order under section 15(1) to deny the tenant the later benefit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the reference by holding that where a deposit of arrears of rent has been made by the tenant in compliance with an order specifically passed under section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act in the course of proceedings initiated for ejectment under section 14(1)(a), the tenant cannot avail of the benefit under section 14(2) in a subsequent proceeding for ejectment on the same ground. The existence and proof of such a specific order under section 15(1) in the earlier proceeding is essential to deprive the tenant of the protection of section 14(2).

Implications:

  • The decision requires a formal section 15(1) order (and compliance with it by deposit in accordance with that order) in an earlier proceeding before a tenant can be said to have used up the protection of section 14(2) and thus be denied that protection in later proceedings on the same ground.
  • The Court clarified that payments made to the landlord resulting in withdrawal or dismissal of an earlier petition do not, by themselves, necessarily constitute the statutory "payment or deposit as required by section 15" so as to invoke the proviso to section 14(2).
  • The holding addresses the direct effect between the parties in the referenced appeals: proof of a specific section 15(1) order is a necessary factual and legal element to deny the statutory protection on subsequent proceedings. The opinion therefore lays down the authoritative interpretation for the operation of sections 14(2) and 15(1) in the described circumstances.

Reference answered accordingly.

Show full summary ...

    Shri Kahan Chand Makan v. Shri B.S Bhambri

    Pritam Singh Safeer, J.:— This judgement will dispose of the reference made in S.A.O No. 213 of 1969 as well as S.A.O No. 231 of 1974.

    2. S.A.O No. 213 of 1969 was taken up by B.C Misra, J. on 26th of March, 1975 and he made a reference in terms of the order passed on that date. S.A.O No. 231 of 1974 was also taken up by him on the same date and in accordance with the order he passed it was observed that a reference had been made in the earlier case and the appeals would be heard on merits after the reference has been answered.
    3. We need not notice the facts with which the two appeals are concerned, because we are to answer the reference only.
    4. A careful perusal of the detailed order, of reference made in S.A.O No. 213 of 1969 leads to the conclusion that the learned. Judge was faced with the question as to what would be the true interpretation of section 14 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The concerned provisions may be noticed at once. section 14 (2) in the Act is: —
    “14. Protection of Tenants against eviction. — (1)
    (2) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by section 15:
    Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of those premises for three consecutive months.”
    Sub-sections (1) and (7) of section 15 read: —
    “15. When a tenant can get the benefit of protection against eviction. — (1) In every proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, the Controller shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make an “order directing the tenant to Pay to the landlord or deposit with the Controller within one month of the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the arrears of rent were legally recoverable from the tenant including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made and to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.”
    “ (7) If a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by this section, the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application.”
    5. Although detailed facts have not been noticed, it would be expedient to mention that S.A.O 213 of 1969 was an appeal by a tenant which was concerned with the institution of a petition for eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. The landlord had instituted a petition for eviction on 17th of November, 1965 on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. The ground pleaded was covered by section 14 (1) (a) of the Act. A significant plea raised, however, was that the tenant had taken the benefit of section 14 (2) in an earlier proceeding and, therefore, was not entitled to it any more. A certified copy of the earlier petition for eviction was proved on the record. The earlier petition for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent had been filed on 13th August, 1964. The tenant contested the same by filing a written statement. In the course of the proceedings on the 28th of November, 1964, the Additional Rent Controller passed the order Exhibit A. 3 under sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Act. On 30th December, 1964, he passed the order: “Dismissed. Announced.” Before the passing of that order, the landlord had made a statement to the effect that he wanted to withdraw the petition because the tenant had deposited the rent till 30th November, 1964, which, it was prayed, be ordered to be paid to him.
    6. In the course of the proceedings initiated by the second petition for ejectment based on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent a plea was raised by the tenant that the dismissal in the earlier case did not constitute the benefit to the tenant within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act. The contention was rejected by the Additional Rent Controller but on appeal was upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal. The learned Single Judge (B.C Misra, J.) while hearing the appeal came to the conclusion that there ought to be an authoritative interpretation of sections 14 (2) and 15 (1) of the Act. The learned Single Judge was of the view that it needed to be determined finally as to what was the real meaning of the word “benefit” used in the proviso contained in section 14 (2) of the Act. One of the views urged was that there after the institution of the petition for ejectment on the basis of non-payment of rent a tenant escapes eviction, whether by making payment of the rent or otherwise depositing it after an order under section 15 (1) of the Act, he gets the postulated benefit and cannot claim the same in any subsequent pleadings. The other contention was that unless there is a specific order passed under 15 (1), the benefit that can be taken by the tenant in terms of section 14 (2) cannot be denied to him. The dismissal of a petition in default will fall in a different category than the withdrawal of a petition by the landlord. The dismissal on account of the default will be in a situation where the Rent Controller will be having no petitioner before him, and will be making the order on the basis that the petition was not pursued. The withdrawal will be a positive act of the landlord. Whatever their nature, we have to deal with the question as to whether it can be held that even without there being a specific order under section 15 (1) there can be a substantial compliance with the provisions of section 14 (2) and any adjudication can be made on that basis.
    7. Several cases have been cited before us and some of them deserve to be noticed. In 1972 DL.T 375, Shrimati Rama Gupta… v. Rai Singh Kain…. (1), a Single Judge of this Court held that the provide to section 14 (2) of the Act would be applicable only when the benefit of avoiding eviction has once been availed of. The previous petition had been dismissed because the landlord had withdrawn the same. It was not dismissed on account of a deposit having been made in compliance with an order passed under section 15 (1) of the Act. D.K Kapur, J. in the course of his judgment observed: —
    “It is impossible to come to the conclusion that the tenant got a benefit under section 14 (2) when the case was withdrawn. The previous ejectment petition was not dismissed on the ground that the tenant had made a deposit but on the ground that the landlord withdrew the ejectment petition. This voluntary act of the landlord cannot be said to be a benefit to the tenant under section 14 (2) of the Act.”
    It was observed by V.D Deshpande, J. in 1974 Rajdham Law Reporter 435, Punjab National Bank, New Delhi… v. The Rent Controller, Delhi… (2), that an order of deposit made under section 15 of the Act is not only for the benefit of the tenant alone because the landlord gets the benefit of having the rent deposited, and that even where the tenant has enjoyed the benefit under section 14 (2) and is not entitled to that benefit again, the proviso in section 14 (2) of the Act will still apply and an order under section 15 (1) should be passed. The view expressed is only to the effect that the opening phraseology employed in section 15 requires the passing of an order under that provision in every proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act. The observations are helpful only to a limited extent to us for determining the scope of sections 14 (2) and 15 of the Act.
    In AIR 1965 S.C 440, V.N.Vasudeva v. Kirori Mal Luhariwal (3), the Supreme Court observed that the order under section 15 of the Act to deposit the amount of arrears of rent was not a final order but was preliminary in the sense that it was to be made at the initial stage of the trial.
    In 1974 R.C.R 370, Shri Ram Parkash v. Jagmohan Khanna and Ors. (4), a Single Judge of this Court in paragraph 24 of the judgment observed that where a tenant avoided his ejectment by entering into some other arrangement with the landlord, he should be still deemed to have obtained the benefit contemplated by section, 14 (2) of the Act.
    We will be expressing ourselves in respect of these views a little later. The provisions have come in for direct interpretation and we are to lay down clear law.
    In 1972 R.C.R 696, Manohar Lal v. R.B Jai Chand Luthra, IAS (Retd.) (5) observations were made to the effect in paragraph 7 of the judgment that on a perusal of the statement of the counsel reproduced earlier made it was obvious that the landlord had received the arrears of rent as if under section 15 of the Act and that the statement having been made in the presence of the tenant and his counsel, even though a formal order under section 15 had not been specifically passed by the Controller, it could be taken that the rent was being accepted under section 15 of the Act. The court further observed that in the circumstances of that case, it could not be said that the tenant had not made payment or deposit as required by section 15 of the Act. The observation went to the extent: —
    “Sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act docs not in terms speak of a formal order under section 15. It only mentions payment ‘as required by section 15.’”
    The law laid down in 1970 R.C.R 566, Smt. Sumitra Rani v. M/s. Bennet Coleman and Co. Ltd., (6) is also to the effect that even in the absence of compliance with the strict procedural requirements of section 15, there can be a situation where there may be a deeming compliance with the provisions.
    It is because of the observations made in the foregoing manner that we have been called upon to record a final interpretation of the concerned provisions.
    8. section 14 (2) falls into two parts. The first part is over if payment is made and there is no occasion for an order being passed under section 15 (1) of the Act. The second part of the provision contemplates a situation in which an order under section 15 (1) is necessarily to be passed. In that case, if the deposit is made by the tenant in accordance with the order passed under section 15 (1) of the Act, the petition for ejectment will be dismissed.
    9. It must be appreciated that a significant aspect of section 14 (2) is that the benefit covered by the proviso in it can be had only once. The reference requires that it may be clearly determined as to when would it be taken that the benefit has been obtained.
    10. section 14 (2) is a provision creating an additional protection against eviction on the ground specified in section 14 (1) (a) of the Act. Such a protection can be had by the tenant if: —
    (i) he makes payment of the rent, or
    (ii) he deposits rent as required by section 15 of the Act.
    It may become necessary for the landlord to file a petition for eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. If the tenant on acquiring the knowledge that such a petition has been filed, makes payment of the entire rent due to the landlord and the landlord does not attend to the proceedings at all, there would be a dismissal of the petition in default. The occasion for passing the order under section 15 (1) would not arise in that case. The language used in section 15 (1) is: —
    “The Controller shall, after giving the parties, an opportunity of being heard.....”
    The order under section 15 (1) is to be passed after hearing both the parties. That occasion will not arise in a case where after the institution of the petition, the rent due is paid to the landlord and he abstains from pursuing the petition for ejectment, which may be pending before the Controller. A close scrutiny of section 14 (2) and section 15 (1) of the Act leads us to the conclusion that in order to deprive the tenant of the benefit given by section 14 (2) in any proceeding for his eviction on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent, there should have been a specific order passed under section 15 (1) in the earlier proceeding.
    11. In order to pass an order under section 15 (1) of the Act, the Controller has to determine as to at which rate the rent was last paid. After that determination an order can be made that the amount is to be calculated on that basis and deposited for the period for which the arrears of rent were legally recoverable as well as for the subsequent period till the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit is made. The tenant is to continue to pay or deposit the rent before the 15th of each succeeding month in terms of section 15 (1) of the Act.
    12. When a landlord files a petition for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent covered by section 14 (1) (a) of the Act, three possible situations can arise. First, the tenant on coming to know of the filing of the petition either on receipt of a notice from the Rent Controller or otherwise, may pay the arrears of rent due to the landlord out of court prior to the hearing fixed before the Rent Controller; secondly, the tenant may pay the arrears of rent doe or deposit the same on the first date of hearing before the Rent Controller or at any time prior to the making of an order under section 15 (1) of the Act; and thirdly, may wait for an order to be made under section 15 (1) of the Act and deposit the arrears of rent mentioned in the said order and future rent specified by the order in terms of the said order under section 15 (1) of the Act. In the first two situations, mentioned above, the landlord may act in any of the following manners, namely, —
    (a) withdraw his petition for eviction;
    (b) get his petition dismissed for default or as not pressed; and
    (c) press for an order under section 15 (1) of the Act still being passed.
    The occasion for insisting for an order under section 15 (1) of the Act may arise because the tenant may be contesting the ground of eviction or the landlord may like to ensure that in case of a future default in payment of rent and he being compelled to come to court, he should be able to plead the proviso to section 14 (2) of the Act. In case no order under section 15 (1) of the Act is made, or claimed that it should be made by the landlord, the payment or deposit of rent by the tenant cannot be regarded as having been made “as required by section 15”.
    13. We, therefore, hold that where a deposit of arrears of rent has been made by the tenant in compliance with an order specifically passed under section 15 (1) of the Act in the course of proceedings initiated for his ejectment under section 14 (1) (a), the benefit cannot be availed of in a subsequent proceeding for his ejectment on the same ground. The existence and proof of such an order in an earlier proceeding covered by section 14 (1) (a) is essential in order to deprive the tenant of the protection which section 14 (2) gives him.
    Reference answered accordingly.
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    Comments

    Shri Kahan Chand Makan v. Shri B.S Bhambri
    (Apr 4, 1977)