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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Appeal against refusal to grant maintenance under Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (wife) filed this first appeal against an order of the Subordinate Judge I Class Delhi dated 3 September 1975, which declined to grant maintenance to her under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, pending a decision on the legality of her marriage to the respondent.

Material undisputed facts: the appellant was previously married on 7 March 1944 to Dr. B.N. Zutshi and had children; that marriage was divorced by decree on 18 November 1968. The appellant and respondent thereafter married in 1969 and cohabited until 27 February 1974. The appellant instituted a petition under Section 10 (judicial separation) on 7 August 1974 alleging cruelty and simultaneously applied under Section 24 for maintenance pendente lite and litigation expenses.

The respondent contested the claimed date of marriage and argued the marriage occurred on 25 July 1969 (earlier than the appellant's pleaded date of 25 November 1969), asserting that, if true, the marriage was within one year of the earlier divorce and therefore void under Section 15 of the Act. The trial court declined to order maintenance pending determination of the marriage's legality. The appellant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the marriage between the appellant and the respondent was performed on 25 November 1969 (as alleged by the appellant) or on 25 July 1969 (as alleged by the respondent), a question affecting the legality/validity of the marriage in view of Section 15 of the Act.
  2. Whether, notwithstanding the respondent's defence challenging the legality of the marriage, the appellant is entitled to maintenance pendente lite and litigation expenses under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act while the main petition is pending.
  3. Whether the court below was correct to postpone consideration of the Section 24 application until the final determination of the marriage's legality (i.e., whether refusal to make an interim order was justified pending resolution of the contested factual/legal issue).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant pleaded that she married the respondent on 25 November 1969 at Delhi, after the earlier divorce (18 November 1968), and therefore the marriage was legally valid.
  • She applied under Section 24 for maintenance pendente lite and litigation expenses during the pendency of her Section 10 petition (judicial separation) on grounds of cruelty.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent averred that the marriage occurred on 25 July 1969 (at his cousin's house in Delhi), i.e., within one year of the prior divorce, and was solemnised according to Anand Karaj.
  • He contended that the marriage was therefore void under Section 15 of the Act (due to the proviso to Section 15) and that the appellant was not a legally wedded wife entitled to maintenance; the respondent also said he had been misled by the appellant into marrying within one year of the previous divorce.
  • The respondent's factual attack focused on the date and legal consequences of the marriage; he did not assert that the appellant had independent means sufficient to meet her needs and litigation expenses.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Banshidhar Jha v. Chhabi Chatterjee, AIR 1967 Pat 277 Deals with marriages performed within one year of a decree of divorce and their legal consequences under Section 15; addresses entitlement to maintenance where statutory prohibition is involved. The court noted this authority (with others) addresses whether a marriage within one year is a nullity and the question of entitlement to permanent maintenance, but held these authorities were not germane to the immediate point of the Section 24 application.
Naurang Singh Chuni Singh v. Sapla Devi, AIR 1968 All 412 Same general topic: effect of marriages within one year of divorce and related entitlement to maintenance. Referenced along with similar authorities; the court observed that the lower court was unduly influenced by these cases when deciding the pendente lite application.
Uma Charan Roy v. Kajal Roy, AIR 1971 Cal 307 Addresses whether marriages contravening the proviso to Section 15 are nullities and consequences for maintenance. Cited among authorities on the legal effect of marriages within one year; the bench stated these were not directly relevant to whether Section 24 relief should be granted pending trial.
Patel Dharamshi Premji v. Bai Sakar Kanji, AIR 1968 Guj 150 Example where permanent alimony was awarded even where marriage had been annulled by a decree. Used by the court to show that in some cases permanent alimony had been awarded despite annulment — to illustrate that deciding validity does not automatically preclude relief on other grounds.
Durga Das v. Tara Rani, AIR 1971 Pun & Har 141 (FB) Illustrative authority on awarding permanent alimony despite annulment in certain circumstances. Invoked to support the proposition that awards of permanent alimony can be made even when a marriage has been annulled; cited to show complexity of related legal consequences.
Dayal Singh v. Bhajan Kaur, AIR 1973 Punj & Har 44 Another case showing permanent alimony awarded in contexts where marriage validity was in question. Cited similarly as example that the legal consequences of annulment and maintenance can vary; court used it to demonstrate that validity issues do not automatically foreclose maintenance relief.
Dr. Yoginder Pal Soni v. Smt. Padma Soni, 1970-72 Pun LR 878 para 6 Support for the view of Section 24: that it provides monthly income and litigation expenses to an indigent spouse to enable prosecution or defense of matrimonial proceedings. Cited to reinforce the court's interpretation of Section 24 as a provision to prevent indigent spouses being disabled from prosecuting or defending matrimonial cases for lack of funds.
Surendra Kumar Asthana v. Smt. Kamlesh Asthana, AIR 1974 All 110 Holds that Section 24 relief is not dependent on the merits of the petition, decision of particular issues, or the ultimate success of the petition; the affluent spouse's duty to maintain an indigent spouse is unaffected by pleas such as objections to jurisdiction. The court relied on and quoted this decision extensively to support holding that the grant of relief under Section 24 does not depend on merits or pending determination of jurisdictional issues and that such objections are merely issues for trial.
Smith v. Smith, 1923 P 128; Johnstone v. Johnstone, 1929 P 165; Ronalds v. Ronalds (1875) 3 P & D 259 English authorities establishing the principle that pleas as to jurisdiction in matrimonial matters do not affect the power of the court to allow alimony pendente lite. Noted as the English decisions followed in Surendra Kumar Asthana and used to support the rule that jurisdictional pleas do not preclude interim maintenance orders.
B. Iswarayya v. Swarnam Iswarayya, AIR 1931 PC 234 Illustrates the appellate court's powers under Section 107 and Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure to pass orders which the trial court ought to have passed. Cited to justify the appellate court exercising its powers to not only reverse but to pass such orders as should have been passed by the court below; used by the bench in support of deciding the Section 24 application itself rather than remitting it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in the following analytical steps strictly on the material before it:

  1. Identification of the real dispute: the court observed the parties admitted the factum of marriage but disputed the date of marriage (25 November 1969 per appellant vs. 25 July 1969 per respondent), which affects the legal consequence under Section 15 (one-year proviso after divorce). The legality and validity of the marriage are mixed questions of law and fact dependent on evidence to be led at trial.
  2. Construction of Section 24: the court set out Section 24's text and interpreted it to mean that jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 24 arises as soon as any proceedings under the Act are instituted and continues while those proceedings are pending, provided the applicant lacks independent income sufficient for support and litigation expenses.
  3. Distinction from Section 25: the bench emphasized that Section 24 is wider and different from Section 25 (permanent alimony and maintenance); Section 24's object is to furnish a monthly income and litigation expenses to an indigent spouse to enable prosecution/defence of matrimonial proceedings so that lack of funds does not disable access to justice.
  4. Reliance on authority rejecting merits-dependence: the court relied on Surendra Kumar Asthana (AIR 1974 All 110) and the English authorities it followed to hold that grant of relief under Section 24 is not dependent on the merits of the petition, decision of particular issues (including jurisdictional pleas), or the ultimate success of the petition — such pleas remain issues for trial.
  5. Critique of lower court's approach: applying the above principles, the court concluded the Subordinate Judge erred in postponing the Section 24 application until the final determination of the marriage's legality; doing so effectively deprived the appellant of relief and delayed the proceedings unfairly.
  6. Decision to exercise appellate powers: after setting aside the lower court's order, the appellate court considered whether to remit the matter or decide the Section 24 application itself. It noted the parties' competing interests (respondent's impending retirement) and the appellate court's power under Section 107 and Order 41, Rule 33 CPC (illustrated by B. Iswarayya) to pass orders that ought to have been passed below. The court concluded it was appropriate in the interests of justice to decide the application on its merits.
  7. Assessment of incomes and entitlement: the bench summarized the income contentions — appellant alleged respondent's salary was Rs. 1,700/month and that under Army practice one-third of pay might be payable to the wife; respondent stated basic pay Rs. 1,500 plus allowances of Rs. 200, netting Rs. 950 after deductions, but it was also stated at bar that salary had since risen to about Rs. 2,000. The respondent did not assert that the appellant had independent income sufficient to meet needs. On these materials the court found the appellant indigent and entitled to maintenance pendente lite.
  8. Quantification: the court fixed maintenance at Rs. 350 per month pendente lite and litigation expenses at Rs. 1,000 to cover the trial in the court below; the maintenance was directed to be calculated from the date of application (7 August 1974) until the trial court's decision, with arrears and litigation expenses to be paid by 6 April 1976 and future monthly payments within ten days of becoming due.
  9. Liberty to trial court: the bench provided that the court below could modify (increase or decrease) the maintenance order on sufficient cause as if the order had been passed by it, thereby preserving the trial court's supervisory role.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal was allowed. The impugned order of the Subordinate Judge (postponing the Section 24 application until determination of the legality of the marriage) was set aside. The respondent-husband was directed to pay the appellant litigation expenses of Rs. 1,000 and maintenance pendente lite of Rs. 350 per month from 7 August 1974 until the trial court's decision. Arrears (including litigation expenses) were to be paid by 6 April 1976, and future monthly maintenance within ten days of becoming due. The court below was given liberty to modify the order on sufficient cause. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of this appeal to the appellant.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the appellant receives interim monetary relief while the main petition (judicial separation and related issues including the legality of marriage) proceeds to trial.
  • The judgment reaffirms the principle — as applied in this case — that an application under Section 24 is to be decided on the applicant's indigence and the pendency of proceedings and is not defeated merely because the opposing party raises a substantive defence (including a jurisdictional or validity plea). The court exercised appellate powers to grant the relief rather than remitting the matter.
  • The opinion does not purport to set a novel binding precedent; it applies and follows previously decided authorities (as summarized above) to the facts at hand and clarifies the application of Section 24 in circumstances where the validity of the marriage is contested.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No facts or legal propositions have been added beyond those present in the opinion.

    Mrs. Arti Singh v. Lt. Col. Kanwar Pal Singh .

    This first appeal from order has been filed by the wife against the order of the Subordinate judge I Class Delhi, dated 3rd September 1975, by which he has declined to grant maintenance to the appellant wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act 25 of 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), till the decision of the legality of the marriage of the appellant with the respondent.

    2. The material facts of the case are that the appellant, who is said to be a Bengali lady, was first married on 7th March, 1944, to a Kashmiri gentleman, by name Dr. B.N Zutshi from whom she had children. On 18th November, 1968, that marriage was annulled by a decree for divorce granted by the District Judge at Jaipur. There is no dispute between the parties with regard to these facts. It is also not disputed that thereafter, sometime in 1969 the appellant and the respondent were married and they cohabited and lived together as husband and wife for a long period until 27th February, 1974. The appellant thereafter instituted a petition under Section 10 of the Act for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty. During the pendency of the petition she applied to the court below for grant of maintenance pendente lite and expenses for litigation.

    3. The defence of the respondent husband is that the marriage between the parties to this appeal took place on 25th July, 1969 and not on 25th November, 1969, as alleged by the appellant and so the marriage in dispute having been performed before the expiry of one year from the previous divorce was void under Section 15 of the Act and as such the appellant is not a legally wedded wife of the respondent and is not entitled to grant of maintenance. The court below has declined to grant the application unless and until the issue with regard to the validity of the marriage was decided. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant wife has filed the appeal in this court. I have heard Mr. R.K Maheshwari in support of the appeal and Mr. M.C Gupta on behalf of the respondent, and have perused the record of the case.

    4. The appellant before me clearly stated in paragraph 2 of the petition that she had been married to the respondent on 25th November, 1969 at Delhi after the dissolution of the previous marriage. The respondent on the other hand, averred that his marriage with the appellant took place on 25th July, 1969 at Delhi at the house of his cousin and the marriage was solemnised according to Anand Karaj. He has further contended that he has been misled by the appellant into having the marriage within one year of the previous divorce and the marriage with him was, therefore, null and void, and as she was not a legally wedded wife, she was not entitled to any maintenance. The allegations made in the petition under Section 24 by the appellant as well as by those made by the respondent in the reply to the said petition on this point are substantially identical. The factum of the marriage is admitted; what is disputed is a question of fact with regard to the date of marriage and its legal effect.

    5. The question which arises for consideration and decision in the main petition is whether the marriage in dispute between the appellant and the respondent was performed on 25th November, 1969, as alleged by the appellant or on 25th July, 1969 as alleged by the respondent and on this finding, the legality and validity of the marriage taking place after the first divorce on 18th November, 1968, is to be determined. The court below has referred to Banshidhar Jha v. Chhabi Chatterjee, AIR 1967 Pat 277, Naurang Singh Chuni Singh v. Sapla Devi, AIR 1968 All 412 and Uma Charan Roy v. Kajal Roy, AIR 1971 Cal 307, and the said authorities have been cited before me as well. These authorities deal with the question whether the marriage performed within one year of the decree of divorce in contravention of the proviso to Section 15 of the Act is or is not a nullity in view of clause (1) of Section 5 and Section 11 of the Act and whether a wife married in contravention of the statutory provision is or is not entitled to permanent maintenance. In my opinion, this is not the question which is germane to the point at issue arising before me. The legality and validity of the marriage and the allegations which are the foundations of the appellant's petition for judicial separation are mixed questions of law and fact which will be decided on the material placed before the court according to the provisions of law, I do not wish to express any opinion on the same. The court below has been unnecessarily influenced by these authorities. Suffice it to say that in some cases even where marriage has been annulled by a decree, permanent alimony has been awarded under Section 25. (See Patel Dharamshi Premji v. Bai Sakar Kanji, AIR 1968 Guj 150, Durga Das v. Tara Rani, AIR 1971 Pun and Har 141 (FB) and Dayal Singh v. Bhajan Kaur, AIR 1973 Punj and Har 44).

    6. The matter in issue is the application of the wife filed under Section 24 of the Act for grant of maintenance and litigation expenses pending the trial of the petition. Section 24 of the Act reads as follows:

    “Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner's own income and income of the respondent, it may seem to the court to be reasonable.” In my opinion, the jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 24 of the Act arises as soon as any proceedings are instituted under the Act in the court and lasts so long as the proceedings are pending. The conditions circumscribing the exercise of jurisdiction are that the applicant should not have any independent income sufficient for her or his support or necessary expenses of the proceedings. If the said conditions are satisfied, the Court has jurisdiction and power to order the opposite party to pay expenses of the proceedings and monthly maintenance of such sum as may be found reasonable by the court. This provision is wider and different from the provisions contained in Section 25 of the Act, which deals with permanent alimony and maintenance. The object of Section 24 of the Act is to provide a monthly income and expenses of the litigation to an indigent spouse to enable it to prosecute or defend the proceedings under the Act and the law sees that nobody is disabled from prosecuting or defending the matrimonial case by starvation or lack of funds. Also see Dr. Yoginder Pal Soni v. Smt. Padma Soni, 1970-72 Pun LR 878 para 6.

    7. The question that arises for consideration is whether the exercise of the power under Section 24 is dependent on the defence raised on behalf of the opposite party. An appropriate case came up for consideration before the High Court of Allahabad in Surendra Kumar Asthma v. Smt. Kamlesh Asthana, AIR 1974 All 110, where G.C Mathur, J., observed.

    “the grant of relief under Section 24 is not dependent either on the merits of the petition or on the decision of any particular issue or issues in the case or upon the ultimate success or failure of the petition .................., it is the duty of the affluent spouse to maintain the indigent spouse. This duty is unaffected by the pleas raised in the petition even it the plea be to the jurisdiction of the court. If on the face of the petition it is maintainable and the court has jurisdiction to entertain it, then the court has also the power to grant relief under Section 24 even if an objection to the jurisdiction is raised and even before such an objection is decided. Such an objection will be an issue in the case.”

    The learned Judge in delivering this opinion, followed the decisions of the English Court in Smith v. Smith, 1923 P 128 which was followed in Johnstone v. Johnstone, 1929 p 165 and Ronalds v. Ronalds, (1875) 3 P and D 259. These decisions point to the rule that the plea as to the jurisdiction of the court in a matrimonial case does not affect the power of the court to allow alimony pendente lite.

    8. In the case in hand, the legality or otherwise of the marriage in dispute between the parties is a mixed question of law and fact and it depends upon the determination of the performance of marriage whether it took place on the date alleged by the appellant or on the date alleged by the respondent. Even then the question that would arise for consideration is whether such a marriage is void or voidable and what is the effect of the parties living together as husband and wife for as long a period as more than four years. The question of fact between the parties is seriously disputed and it will take some time to be decided and in fact, this is a major issue which had been raised by the respondent and this would, therefore, be decided along with the whole petition and the trial cannot take place piecemeal. Even to fight out the aforesaid issue, the appellant is entitled to a decision of her application under Section 24 of the Act and the Court below has acted with material irregularity in postponing the orders on this application till the decision of the issue of the legality of the marriage, which will virtually terminate the proceedings. The order of the Court is not sustainable and is set aside.

    9. I have given very anxious thought to the question, whether having set aside the order, I should direct the court below to award maintenance and expenses or I should do it myself. One fact that has been brought to my notice is that the respondent, who is Lt. Colonel in the Army, is due to retire in September 1976 and for this reason both the parties have got opposing interests in the matter. The appellant wants to have the same decided expeditiously, so that she may be able to realise the amount awarded from the funds of the respondent available with the Army authorities. For the same reason, the respondent wants to delay a decision so that he can collect all his moneys and may defeat or delay his complying with the order of the court directing payment of the maintenance, if any.

    10. The marriage between the parties and their living together as husband and wife for a period of more than four years is admitted. The cause of action arose on 27th February, 1974, and the petition under Section 10 was instituted on 7th August, 1974, and the petition under Section 24 of the Act was also filed on the same date. The replies were filed by the respondent on 11th October, 1974. The respondent has, however, succeeded in preventing an order of maintenance being passed for all this period and the order that has been passed by the court below is mere postponement of orders on the application till the decision of final issue in the matter, which will substantially determine the date of the whole case. I am, therefore, of the view that the matter should not be allowed to be delayed any further. In hearing an appeal, the appellate court possesses under Section 107 and Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, powers do not only reverse the order but to pass such orders as ought to have been passed by the court below (see B. Iswarayya v. Swarnam Iswarayya, AIR 1931 PC 234). In Surendra Kumar's case (AIR 1974 All 110) (supra) the learned single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad also passed an order in revision. After setting aside the order of the court below that the application under Section 24 would be decided after the question of jurisdiction had been determined, the learned Judge exercising the powers under Section 115 of the Code, was pleased to pass an order allowing expenses for litigation. Even the counsel for the respondent has not seriously contested my jurisdiction or power as the court of appeal to award the amount of maintenance and litigation expenses. Under the circumstances, I consider it fit and proper and in the interests of justice to decide the application on merits.

    11. The appellant in her application has alleged that the respondent was drawing a salary of Rs. 1,700/- per month besides having an income from a plot of land and according to the rules and practice of the Army, 1/3rd of his pay was payable to the wife and she claimed a sum of Rs. 800/- per month on account of maintenance pendente lite and Rs. 2,100/- on account of litigation expenses. The respondent in the reply to the said petition stated in paragraph 7 that his basic salary was Rs. 1,500/- per month and his allowances made another Rs. 200/-, which after deductions on account of house rent, insurance and income-tax, comes to Rs. 950/- per month. It was further averred at the bar that the salary of the respondent has since increased to about Rs. 2,000/- per month. It is significant to note that the respondent does not have any children to maintain and in the reply the respondent has not stated that the appellant was not indigent or had any independent source of maintenance or meeting litigation expenses. His whole attack was directed against the legality of his marriage and her poor status prior to the marriage with him. Assuming the gross income of the husband to be Rs. 1700/- per month as alleged by him and considering his net income. I am of the view that the appellant wife is entitled to a sum of Rs. 350/- per month on account of maintenance during the pendency of the petition. So far as the litigation expenses are concerned, a sum of Rs. 1,000/- would cover the entire litigation expenses of the trial of the petition in the court below.

    12. As a result, I allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the court below and direct the respondent husband to pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 1,000/- on account of litigation expenses and a sum of Rs. 350/- per month calculated from the date of the application, viz., 7th August, 1974, till the decision of the case by the trial court, the arrears (along with litigation expenses) to be paid by 6th April, 1976 and future maintenance within ten days of its becoming due every month. The court below is given the liberty to modify this order and increase or decrease the amount of maintenance on sufficient cause being shown as if the order had been passed by it.

    13. The appeal is disposed of and the respondent will pay costs of this appeal to the appellant.

    Appeal allowed.
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    Comments

    Mrs. Arti Singh v. Lt. Col. Kanwar Pal Singh .
    (Feb 27, 1976)