Ansari, J.:— The petitioners in Civil Writ No. 1337/73 are (1) Shri R. P. Kapur, (2) Smt. Kaushalya Devi, (3) Smt Sheila Kapur, (4) Shri Vivek Kapur, and (5) Smt. Kiran Sibal, Respondent No. 1 is the Delhi Development Authority represented by Shri Jag Mohan. Vice Chairman of the said Authority. Respondent No. 2 is the Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing. Respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are M/s. Ram Parkash, Baldev Raj and Sukh Dev of Steel and Sanitary Emporium, G-II, Hauz Khas, New Delhi, M/s. Hans Raj Mulkh Raj of Shiv Steel and Hardware, G-9, Hauz Khas, New Delhi, and M/s. Manohar Lal of Shiv Sanitary Store, G-7, Hauz Khas, New Delhi respectively, who are alleged to be in occupation of certain plots of land belonging to the petitioners and who are alleged to be using the said plots for commercial purposes. Respondent No. 6 is the Delhi Municipal Corporation represented through its Commissioner, who was added as a respondent after the filing of the writ petition.
2. The petitioners in Cr.M (M) No. 207/73 are (1) Shri R.P Kapur, (2) Smt. Kaushalya Devi, (3) Smt. Sheila Kapur and (4) Shri Vivek Kapur. Respondent No. 1 is the Delhi Development Authority represented through Shri Jag Mohan, Vice Chairman, respondent No. 2 is the Delhi Administration represented through the Home Secretary of the said Administration and respondent No. 3 is Shri S.P Sharma, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Delhi. The Writ petition as well as the Cr.M (M) petition were originally heard by Mr. Justice H.L Anand, sitting singly, and after hearing these two petitions, he was of the view that these petitions involve the interpretation of the provisions of Sections 14 and 29 (2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (hereinafter called as the Act) and that having regard to the importance of the question, its implications and certain decisions of the learned single Judges of this Court which appeared to him to need reconsideration, these petitions deserve to be considered by a larger Bench. Therefore, these petitions have been placed before this Division Bench for hearing. Although the learned single Judge has in his referring order expressed his views on some of the points that arose for determination in the petitions, he has, however, referred the whole case to a larger Bench and the petitioners as well as the respondents have agreed that the whole case is before this Bench for disposal. As the reliefs sought by the petitioners in Cr.M (M) No. 207/73 are included in the reliefs sought by them in C.W No. 1337/73 and as the facts relevant to the said reliefs are identical in both the petitions, they are disposed of by a common judgment.
3. The Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the DDA) has filed separate complaints against each of the petitioners under Section 29(2) read with section 14 of the Act. The allegations made in these complaints are that the petitioners being the owners of land of the area of about 600 sq. yds. in Khasra Nos. 373, 374 and 375 in Village Kherada permitted the use of this land as godowns which was a commercial purpose in contravention of the Master Plan of Delhi inasmuch as the said land was earmarked in the Master Plan to be used for residential purposes. These complaints are now being tried in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate Ist. Class, Delhi, and after the appearance of the petitioners in the said Court, the prosecution has so far examined two witnesses and some more prosecution witnesses remain to be examined. It is at this stage that the petitioners have filed the present petitions for quashing the proceedings pending against them in the said Court. This is the relief which is sought by the petitioners both in the writ petition as well as in the Cr.M (M) petition. In addition, the petitioners have prayed for certain other reliefs in the writ petition, namely, that the DDA should be directed to take action under Section 30 of the Act against the persons who, according to the petitioners, are using the land for commercial purposes without the permission of the petitioners. The petitioners have further prayed that the Municipal Corporation of Delhi should be directed to take action under Sections 314, 322, 347 and 461 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act to prevent the misuse of the Kaushalya Park residential colony and of its municipal roads and open spaces.
4. Apart from the legal contentions raised by the petitioners, it is their case that each one of them is the separate owner of different plots comprised in Khasra Nos. 373, 374 and 375, that the alleged misuse of the land is only in respect of the land belonging to petitioner No. 1, Shri R.P Kapur, that the other petitioners are not the co-owners of the said plots of land and that the proceedings against the petitioners other than petitioner No. 1 should be quashed on that ground alone. So far as petitioner No. 1 is concerned, it is his case that he did not permit respondents Nos. 3 to 5 in the writ petition or anyone else to use the land as godowns, and that respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were trespassers on the land against whom he has been taking steps for eviction from the lands. It is the petitioner's further case that he had complained to the DDA several times about the unauthorised occupation of the land by respondents Nos. 3 to 5 and has requested it to take action against them under Section 30 of the Act. According to the petitioners, therefore, they have not permitted the use of the land by respondents 3 to 5 in contravention of the Master Plan, and that they were, therefore, not liable to be prosecuted under Section 29(2) of the Act for the misuse of the land by respondents Nos. 3 to 5. The petitioners have further alleged that the prosecution against them has been instituted at the instance of Shri Jag Mohan, Vice Chairman of the DDA who on account of certain personal reasons has taken a vindictive attitude against the petitioners.
5. The case of the DDA, on the other hand, is that the petitioners were co-owners of the plot on which respondents Nos. 3 to 5 had constructed godowns that they had permitted respondents Nos. 3 to 5 to construct these godowns, and that, therefore, the petitioners have contravened the provisions of section 14 of the Act and were liable to be punished under Section 29(2) of the Act. With regard to the allegation that the petitioners had asked the DDA to take action against respondents Nos. 3 to 5 under Section 30 of the Act, it was stated that no action could be taken against them under Section 30 of the Act on the facts and circumstances of the case but that complaints had been filed under Section 29(2) read with Section 14 of the Act against respondents Nos. 3 to 5 also, and that these complaints were also pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate 1 Class, Delhi. The allegations of mala tides on the part of Shri Jag Mohan, Vice Chairman of the DDA, have been vehemently denied.
6. Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 in the replies filed by them have alleged that they had taken the land in question on lease from petitioner R.P Kapur for the purpose of using the said land as godowns. They denied that they were trespassers on the said land or that they were using it without the permission of the petitioners.
7. The main relief sought by the petitioners in these two petitions is the quashing of the criminal proceedings pending against them under Section 29(2) read with Section 14 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act reads as follows:—
“Section 14. Use of land and buildings in contravention of plans — After the coming into operation of any of the plans in a zone no person shall use or permit to be used any land or building in that zone otherwise than in conformity, with such plan:
Provided that it shall be lawful to continue to use upon such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by regulations made in this behalf any land or building for the purpose and to the extent for and to which it is being used upon the date on which such plan comes into force.”
8. Section 29(2) of the Act is in the following terms:—
“Any person who uses any land or building in contravention of the provisions of section 14 or in contravention of any terms and conditions prescribed by regulations under the proviso to that section shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees and in the case of a continuing offence, with further fine which may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees for every day during which such offence continues after conviction for the first commission of the offence.”
9. In the writ petition, the petitioners had challenged the vires of sections 14 and 29 (2) of the Act on the ground that they violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 (1)(f) of the Constitution. Mr. R.P Kapur, petitioner No. 1, who appeared in person and argued the case both on his behalf and on behalf of the other petitioners, did not press this ground at the time of the arguments in view of the Presidential Order suspending the invocation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution during the Emergency which was subsequently ratified by Parliament. Mr. Kapur, however, challenged the vires of Section 29(2) of the Act on the ground that it was an arbitrary piece of legislation and did not lay down any guidelines for the imposition of penalties provided under Section 29(2) of the Act. In support of this ground, he argued that the penalty provided under Section 29(2) of the Act was far too excessive considering the nature of the offence, and that a person convicted under this section was liable to be sentenced to the maximum penalty under the section irrespective of the gravity or otherwise of the offence committed by him. Even if we accept the argument that the penalty provided under the Act is too severe, Section 29(2) of the Act cannot be held to be ultra vires on that ground. The vires of the section cannot be challenged on the ground of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. So far as the contention that the penalty provided in the section is too severe considering the nature of the offence is concerned, this is a matter entirely within the competence of the Legislature which provided a particular penalty for a particular offence and it is not within the competence of the Court to say that the penalty for a particular offence is excessive. As regards the other contention that no guidelines have been provided in the section for the levy of the penalty, the simple answer is that no such guidelines can be provided as the penalty has to be levied only by a Court having regard to the facts and circumstances in each case under section 29(2) of the Act. We have, therefore, to hold that sections 14 and 29 (2) of the Act do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
10. The next contention of Mr. Kapur is that the provisions of section 14 of the Act do not apply to the petitioners as no zonal plan has been prepared for the area in which Khasra Nos. 373, 374 and 375 are situated, and that in the absence of a zonal plan for this area, it cannot be said that the petitioners have violated the provisions of section 14 of the Act by the alleged permission given by them to respondents 3 to 5 for the use of the land for commercial purposes. Mr. Kapur further contends that the prosecution of the petitioners is based upon an alleged use of the land in contravention of the purpose for which the land has been earmarked in the zonal plan, and that in fact no zonal plan had been published for the land in question. In this connection, he has referred to a zonal map filed by the prosecution in the course of the evidence of P.W 1, Shri Shamim Haider, which has been marked as Ex. P.W 1.C. It is first necessary to clarify the position on the basis of which Mr. Kapur appears to have advanced this argument. It is not the case of the prosecution that the petitioners have made use of the land in question in violation of any zonal plan. The case of the prosecution, on the other hand, is that the use of the land by the petitioners was in violation of the Master plan. Ex. P.W 1.C which is described as a zonal map is not the zonal development plan contemplated by Sections 8 and 14 of the Act, but is a map which is prepared as part of the Master plan itself. The nature of these zonal maps has been described by this Court in B.T Menghani…Petitioner v. The Delhi Development Authority… (AIR 1974 Delhi 159) (FB) as follows:—
“Then at pages 5 onwards it describes the land-use plan for urban Delhi. For this purpose, it is stated at page 7 that the city has been divided into eight planning divisions which are self-contained in the matter of employment, residential places, recreational areas, shopping and other requirements. These divisions which are eight in number are indicated by letters ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’ and ‘H’ on the Zonal Map which has been prepared for the Delhi urban area. This Zonal Map purports to show the broad outlines of these eight planning divisions and the various zones therein.”
11. Thus, the contention of the petitioners that the Zonal Map Ex. P.W 1.C is a map prepared under the Zonal Plan is based on a wrong premise. The complaints filed by the DDA against the petitioners specifically allege that the petitioners have permitted the use of their land in contravention of the Master Plan of Delhi. Therefore, the absence of a Zonal Development Plan for the area in question’ does not vitiate the prosecution. Section 14 of the Act refers to “the plans” in the plural which means that Section 14 applies even to a case where any land is used in contravention of the Master Plan. As observed by this Court in B.I Menghani's case—
“The prohibition contained in section 14 would, therefore, be effective in any zone if any of these plans has come into operation in such zone. It is not anomalous to say about the Master Plan that it has come into operation in a zone. The Master Plan is in operation in the entire area, that is, in all the zones, and, therefore, inevitably in each zone. If, therefore, there is a user of any land or building otherwise than in conformity with either the master Plan or the Zonal Development Plans or any of them after such plan has come into operation, it will be actionable under subsection (2) of Section 29 of the Development Act.”
12. According to the prosecution, the area in question has been earmarked in the Master Plan for residential purpose, that it has been permitted by the petitioners to be used for commercial purposes, and that such use was in contravention of the Master Plan and consequently, in contravention of the provisions of section 14 of the Act.
13. This brings us to the main question which arises for consideration in this case and which has necessitated the reference of this case by Mr. Justice Anand to a larger Bench. The question is whether Section 29(2) of the Act applies not only to a person who has himself used the land in contravention of the Master Plan or whether it applies also to a person who has permitted another to use the land in contravention of the Master Plan. The learned Judge, who has made the reference, has pointed out the difference in the language in Section 14 and section 29(2) of the Act. These sections have already been reproduced above and the difference in the language of the two sections is this, namely, that whereas Section 14 states that “no person shall use or permit to be used any land”, Section 29(2) states that “any person who uses any land xx. xx. xx.” shall be punishable under the section. The omission in Section 29(2) of the words “permit to be used” has raised the question whether it is the actual user of the land who can be punished under Section 29(2) or whether the person who, though not using the land himself but who has permitted any other person to use the land in contravention of the Master Plan, comes within the mischief of Section 29(2) of the Act. Mr. Justice Anand has referred to a number of single Bench judgments of this Court in which it has been held that a person who permits another to use the land in contravention of the provisions of the Master Plan is liable to be punished under Section 29(2) of the Act. The learned Judge has doubted their correctness as in none of these judgments had the significance of the difference in the language of sections 14 and 29 (2) of the Act been considered.
14. Section 14 of the Act prohibits a person not only from using the land himself in contravention of the Master Plan but also from permitting another to so use the land. The question for consideration is whether having made such a prohibition under Section 14 of the Act, the intention of the Legislature was to penalise only the actual user of the land and not to penalise the person who permits another to use the land in contravention of the Master Plan. We see no valid reason for inferring such an intention on the part of the Legislature. The very purpose of the prohibition contained in Section 14 of the Act will be defeated if it can be circumvented by permitting another person to use the land in contravention of the Master Plan. A careful reading of the language of Section 14 and subsection (2) of Section 29 of the Act supports this view. It has to be noticed that the provision in the main part of Section 14 is a prohibition of the use of any land or building by a person otherwise than in conformity with the plans either (a) by himself or (b) through another person. Section 29(2) penalises a person who uses any land or building “in contravention of the provisions of section 14”, the said provision (so far as the main part of Section 14 is concerned) being, as stated above, the prohibition of the use of any land or building otherwise than in conformity with the plans either (a) by himself or (b) through another person. In other words, the main part of Section 14 contains a two-fold prohibition, and section 29(2) penalises the contravention of the entire two-fold prohibition in the main part of Section 14, i.e both the contravention by himself and the contravention through another person. As the language used in Section 29(2) clearly brings out the said effect that was intended by the Legislature, the words “or permit to be used” were not repeated in Section 29(2). Thus subsection (2) of Section 29 of the Act applies not only to a person who uses the land in contravention of the Master Plan but also to a person who permits another to use the land in contravention of the Master Plan. This, in our view, is the only reasonable construction to be put on the words used in sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act.
15. Such a construction is also in conformity with the scheme of the Act. Section 38 of the Act is applicable to offences committed by companies and sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the Act reads as follows:—
“Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”
16. Reading Sections 29 (2) and 32 (2) of the Act together, it would appear that in the case of offences committed by a company, the liability under Section 29(2) of the Act extends to an officer of the company who, even though not directly responsible for the commission of the offence by the company, has consented to such commission or to whose neglect the commission of the offence by the company is attributable. Therefore, the scheme of the Act is not only to punish the person who is directly responsible for the use of the land in contravention of the Master Plan but also to punish persons who indirectly committed the offence by permitting another person to use the land in contravention of the Master Plan.
17. Mr. Justice Anand in his referring order has referred to some of the judgments of this Court. In Ram Kumar v. Delhi Development Authority Cr.M (M) No. 72 of 1973 decided on 15-5-1973 (Delhi), it was urged that the opening words in sub-section (2) of Section 29 indicate that only that person will incur the liability who uses any land or building in breach of the obligations imposed by that provision and that the liability will not be incurred by a person who permits another to so use the land or building. Safeer, J. did not accept this argument and held that “the word ‘use’ as indicated in Webster's Third New International Dictionary would mean that it may be put to utilization according to the nature or purpose of the thing used” and that “where a landlord who has residential or business premises builds property for the purpose of letting it out to others for earning rent, it will be the utilization of the property if he lets it out and he will be held to have put the property to use.” In Vijay Chand Jain v. Delhi Development Authority, Cr.M (M) No. 97/69, decided on 23-7-1973 (Delhi) R.N Aggarwal, J., observed as follows:—
“The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is only the actual user of the property who can be prosecuted for using the property in contravention of the Master Plan has not appealed to me. The petitioner had let out the premises to the government for using it as their office. Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act provides that after the coming into operation of any of the plan in a zone no person shall use or permit to be used any land or building in that zone otherwise than in conformity with such plan. The allegations in the complaint disclose that the petitioner had permitted the tenant to use the building for a purpose other than that permitted by the Master Plan. The allegations of the prosecution, if believed, would bring the petitioner within the mischief of Section 14”.
18. In Shalinder Kumar v. Delhi Development Authority Cr.M (M) No. 315/73, decided on 20-1-1975 (Delhi), V.D Misra, J., held that Section 14 prohibited persons from using or permitting the use of any land or building in contravention of the Master Plan and that such use was punishable under Section 29(2) of the Act Although, as rightly observed by Anand J. in his referring order, in none of the judgments of this Court, referred to above, was the difference in the language of sections 14 and 29 (2) specifically examined, we are in respectful agreement with the ultimate view expressed by the learned Judges in the said judgments. We, therefore, hold that it is not only a person who actually uses a land or building in contravention of the Master Plan that commits an offence under Section 29(2) of the Act but also a person who permits another to so use the land or building. If, therefore, according to the prosecution, the petitioners have permitted respondents Nos. 3 to 5 to use the land in question for commercial purposes, they would be liable to be punished under Section 29(2) of the Act.
19. On the facts, it is contended by Shri R.P Kapur, that the prosecution of the petitioners is liable to be quashed as, according to him, the F.I.Rs and the complaints filed by the prosecution as well as the evidence adduced so far by it does not make out a prima facie case against the petitioners under Section 29(2) of the Act. In support of this contention, he has relied upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of R.P Kapur v. State Of Punjab. (AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960 Cri LJ 1239) which explained the scope of Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898:—
“It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, xx. xx. xx. xx. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases whether the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish case, under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. La cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point”
20. It is Mr. Kapur's contention that neither the facts which have been alleged in the writ petition and which have not been controverted nor the allegations made in the F.I.Rs and the complaints nor the evidence so far adduced by the prosecution, make out a prima facie case against the petitioner under Section 29(2) of the Act and that there is justification for quashing the criminal proceedings pending against them. In this connection, Shri R.P Kapur has contended that petitioners 2 to 5 are not the owners of the land in question and that he alone is the owner of the said land. Reference is made to para 1 of the writ petition in which it is averred as follows:—
“That the petitioners are owners of separate plots of land in the colony known as Kaushalya Park, Hauz Khas, New Delhi, and under law are entitled to the legally permitted use and enjoyment of their property.”
21. It is pointed out by him that this avernment has not been specifically denied by the DDA in the reply affidavit filed by it and that it must be assumed that the DDA has admitted that petitioners 2 to 5 are not the owners of the land in question. In reply to para 1 of the writ petition, this is what is stated in the affidavit of Shri H.N Fotedar, filed on behalf of the DDA:—
“That in reply to para 1 of the petition, it is submitted that the petitioners are being prosecuted for permitting to be used the land measuring approximately 600 sq. yards in violation of the provisions of the Master Plan and the Act.”
22. Again in para 2 of the reply affidavit, it is stated as follows:—
“However, according to the report of the field staff of the Authority, the 600 sq. yds. of land was found to be misused by different occupiers and permitted to be used by the petitioners.”
23. The DDA has filed separate complaints against the petitioners on the basis that all of them are the owners of the land in question. The DDA has also relied upon certain documents filed by respondents 3 to 5 along with their counter-affidavits. One of these documents is a copy of the plaint in the suit filed by the second petitioner, Smt Kaushalya Devi, against respondent No. 4. In the very first paragraph of this plaint, it is stated as follows:—
“That the plaintiff is co-owner of Khasra Nos. 373, 374 and 684/375 of village Kherara, Tehsil Mehrauli.”
24. This plaint is verified by the first petitioner, Shri R.P Kapur, and in his verification, he has stated that the contents of paras 1 to 6 in the plaint were true to his knowledge. It is, of course, open to the petitioners to prove before the learned Magistrate in whose court the prosecution against them is pending that they are not the co-owners of the land in question and that the land belongs exclusive to the first petitioner, Shri R.P Kapur. But at this stage, it cannot be said that the prosecutions launched against petitioners 2 to 5 are misconceived on the ground that they are not the owners of the land in question. Shri Kapur referred to the several F.I.Rs filed by the DDA against the petitioners which, according to him, show that only Shri R.P Kapur was the owner of the land in question and that the other petitioners were not concerned with the letting out of this land to respondents Nos. 3 to 5. We have perused the F.I.Rs filed by the DDA. But we find nothing in them to support the contention of the petitioners. In each of the F.I.Rs each of the petitioners is shown to be the owner of the land in question which means that all the petitioners are alleged to be co-owners of the land in question.
25. It is next contended by Shri R.P Kapur that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against any of the petitioners that they had permitted respondents 3 to 5 for using the land for commercial purposes. In this connection, be has referred to the evidence of P.W 1 Shri Shamim Haider, who has admitted that he has no personal knowledge that any of the petitioners had permitted respondents Nos. 3 to 5 to use the land for commercial purposes. But then, the prosecution evidence is not closed and it is open to the prosecution to prove by other evidence that the petitioners or any one of them had permitted the land to be used by respondents 3 to 5 for commercial purposes. This contention of the petitioners is, therefore, premature.
26. The next grievance of the petitioners is that two complaints have been filed against the first petitioner, Shri R.P Kapur, in respect of the same offence and this, according to him, violates Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. That Article contains the following prohibition:—
“No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.”
27. The scope of this Article has been explained by the Supreme Court in S.A Venkataraman v. 1. Union Of India, (AIR 1954 SC 375). The Supreme Court observed thus—
“In order to enable a citizen to invoke the protection of clause (2) of Art. 20 of the Constitution, there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of, the same offence. The words ‘prosecuted and punished’ are to be taken not distributively so as to mean prosecuted ‘or’ punished. Both the factors must co-exist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted”
28. Therefore, even if we assume for a moment that the first petitioner is being prosecuted in two cases for the same offence, such a prosecution itself is not vitiated. What is prohibited by Article 20 (2) is his punishment in both the cases. In this connection, it is pointed out on behalf of the DDA that both the complaints filed against the first petitioner are being tried together and that there was an offer made by the DDA at one stage to withdraw one of the complaints which was, however, opposed by the first petitioner himself. We have no doubt that the learned Magistrate will take note of the provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution in dealing with these cases against the first petitioner.
29. The last ground on which the petitioners challenge the prosecution pending against them is that the proceedings are vitiated by mala fides. According to the petitioner, Shri Jag Mohan, Vice-Chairman of the DDA, was having animosity against the first petitioner and that he has filed these cases against the petitioners in order to harass them. Apart from the fact that Shri Jag Mohan has denied the allegation of. mala fides made against him by the petitioners, the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners cannot be quashed on the ground of mala fides. If the prosecution makes out a prima facie case against the petitioners under Section 29(2) read with Section 14 of the Act, then there would be no justification for interfering with such proceedings even if such proceedings have been launched by Shri Jag Mohan on account of his personal ill-feelings against the petitioners as alleged by them.
30. As a result of the above discussion, we must hold that the petitioners have not made out any case for our interference at this stage with the criminal proceedings now pending against them under section 29(2) of the Act.
31. The petitioners have also sought some other reliefs in the writ petition. One of the reliefs sought is that a writ of. mandamus should be issued to the DDA to take action against respondents Nos. 3 to 5 under Section 30 of the Act. That section empowers the DDA to order the demolition of any building which has been constructed in contravention of the Master Plan or the Zonal Plan. The relevant portion of this section is reproduced below:—
“30. Order of demolition of building.—
(1) Where any development has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in contravention of the master plan or zonal development plan or without the permission, approval or sanction referred to in Section 12 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such permission, approval or sanction has been granted—
(i) in relation to a development area, any officer of the Authority empowered by it in this behalf,
(ii) in relation to any other area within the local limits of a local authority, the competent authority thereof,
32. May, in addition to any prosecution that may be instituted under this Act, make an order directing that such development shall he removed by demolition, filling or otherwise by the owner thereof or by the person at whose instance the development has been commenced or is being carried out or has been completed, etc.”
33. This is an enabling provision and it does not cast a statutory obligation on the DDA which can be enforced by a writ of mandamus. It is left to the DDA to take action under this section or refrain from taking action under this section in suitable cases. In the present case, the DDA has launched the prosecution against respondents 3 to 5 and the DDA cannot be compelled in addition to take action against these respondents under Section 30 of the Act. Further, Section 30 does not confer any legal right on the petitioners to compel the DDA to take action under this section against respondents 3 to 5.
34. Similar is the position with regard to the other relief sought by the petitioners, namely, that a writ of mandamus should be issued against the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to take action against respondents 3 to 5 under Sections 214, 322, 347 and 461 of the Municipal Corporation Act These provisions are also in the nature of enabling provisions under which the Corporation is empowered to take action in suitable cases. These sections also are not in the nature of statutory obligations cast upon the Corporation which can be enforced by a writ of mandamus nor do these sections confer any right on the petitioners which can be enforced in a court of law. Further, the relief which the petitioners seek against the Municipal Corporation of Delhi is not in respect of the land in respect of which they are being prosecuted but in respect of some other land. The petitioners cannot be permitted to seek reliefs arising out of different causes of action in one and the same writ petition. Although the Municipal Corporation of Delhi has not filed any counter affidavit nor entered appearance before us, we cannot grant a relief against it which is on the face of it untenable. The petitioners are, therefore, not entitled to have these relief at the hands of this Court.
35. In the result, both the writ petition as well as the criminal miscellaneous (main) are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.