| N.K. Vasuraj v. Delhi Development Authority and others (ILR (1971) II Delhi 21) |
Division Bench held that prosecutions could be legal because section 14 applies "after the coming into operation of any of the plans", and since the Master Plan had come into operation prosecutions were sustainable even though zonal plans were not yet framed. It also discussed scope of Article 226 vs. criminal courts and described "true review" in criminal courts. |
The Full Bench distinguished Vasuraj: it held that Vasuraj treated the principal question as involving questions of fact appropriate for criminal courts, but in the present cases the Full Bench considered the central question to be one of construction (a pure question of law) and hence maintainable in the High Court. The Full Bench rejected respondents' reliance on Vasuraj as misconceived in these circumstances. |
| Sudershan Kumar…Petitioner v. Union Of India & Ors. (ILR (1973) II Delhi 158 (2)) |
Observation that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and that where alternative remedies (e.g., a suit) were availed, High Court may decline to exercise writ jurisdiction; need for full evidence to decide some pleas. |
The Full Bench held this decision inapplicable because in Sudershan Kumar the petitioners had availed the alternative remedy (a suit). Here, by contrast, many prosecutions were pending on an identical question of law affecting many persons. |
| G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.; AIR 1952 Supreme Court 1923 |
Principle that Article 226 jurisdiction is not so wide as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal to re‑examine factual decisions; High Court's jurisdiction is peripheral, restricted to legality/constitutionality. |
The Full Bench cited it to emphasize that it was not converting itself into an appellate criminal court; rather it was deciding a single question of law going to the root of many prosecutions. |
| Dr. Bishambar Nath v. The State of Punjab and another; AIR 1953 Punjab 77 |
Observation that normally a person prosecuted should raise objections before the trial court and seek revision or use Article 228; High Court may withdraw a case only if a substantial question of law as to the Constitution is involved. |
The Full Bench noted that if the matter were a solitary prosecution it might have followed that course, but given the multiplicity (about a thousand) of prosecutions raising the same legal question, invoking Article 226 was appropriate to avoid many inconsistent results and harassment. |
| K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income‑tax Investigation Commission and others; AIR 1954 Supreme Court 207 |
Cited as a case discussing exercise of constitutional remedies where alternative remedies existed (the court noted distinctions in prior practice). |
Referenced to show that prior authorities exist where Article 226 was employed even though alternative remedies existed; used to support the Court's view that recurring liability is a valid circumstance to exercise Article 226. |
| Sitaram Chhawehharia and another v. The State of Bihar and another; (1969) 1 SCWR 213 |
Case where High Court declined to entertain Article 226 petition on ground that prescribed criminal procedure (section 432 CrPC) provided remedy; Supreme Court did not find High Court's discretion erroneous. |
The Full Bench observed that Sitaram Chhawehharia does not preclude Article 226 intervention in all cases; the Supreme Court only affirmed the discretionary refusal in that particular case. |
| M/s. Tilkchand Motichand and others v. H.B. Munshi and another; AIR 1970 Supreme Court 898 |
Observation (in context of Article 32) that extraordinary remedies should not replace ordinary remedies except in rare cases where ordinary process is inefficacious. |
The Full Bench invoked the "rare case" exception: where many identical prosecutions exist and ordinary remedies would be inefficient and cause harassment, Article 226 may properly be exercised. |
| Rashid Ahmed v. The Municipal Board, Kairana; (1950) Supreme Court Reports 566 |
Cited as authority that recurring questions or liabilities justify consideration of extraordinary writ jurisdiction even if an alternative remedy exists. |
Used to support the proposition that the High Court may exercise Article 226 when the liability is recurring and many persons are affected. |
| Engineering Traders v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another; 1973 Allahabad Law Journal 197 |
Authority for proposition that recurring questions justify High Court jurisdiction under Article 226 despite alternative remedy. |
Relied on as additional authority supporting exercise of Article 226 in recurring liability situations. |
| Technological Institute of Textile v. The Inspector, Central Excise; 1968 (IV) Delhi Law Times 206 |
Authority cited for recurring‑liability justification to exercise writ jurisdiction. |
Used to bolster the Court's view that recurring prosecutions provide a valid circumstance to entertain Article 226 petitions. |
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kishan Dass and another; AIR 1969 Supreme Court 386 |
Held that the Master Plan gives a broad outline and that non‑preparation of Zonal Development Plans is significant because site‑level and specific land reservations (e.g., for roads) are shown in Zonal Plans. |
The Full Bench cited this to show that the Master Plan is broad and that detailed site/use prescriptions are intended to appear in Zonal Development Plans. |
| Bhagwanti Malhotra v. Delhi Development Authority; 1973 Rajdhani Law Reporter col. 661 |
A judge had expressed the view that "land" in section 14 would include buildings thereon. |
The Full Bench disagreed with that view on the facts of the wording of section 14 (where both "land" and "building" are used), holding that in section 14 the words should be read distinctly. |
| Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot; AIR 1973 Supreme Court 921 |
Contained observations (later deleted on application by the Authority) commenting that the Master Plan did not amount to a plan prohibiting the use of a particular building under section 14 because Zonal Development Plans had not been prepared. |
The Full Bench noted the observations but also observed they were deleted in the Supreme Court record; the Court considered the deleted observations not binding but found its conclusions broadly consonant with those observations. |
| State Of Kerala v. P.P. Hassan Koya; AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1201 |
Authority for the proposition (from Land Acquisition Act context) that "land" may include buildings; cited as background on definition of "land". |
The Full Bench relied on analogous authorities to show that under the Land Acquisition Act "land" can include buildings, but concluded that in section 14 both "land" and "building" are used separately and should be given ordinary distinct meanings in that section. |
| Province of Sind v. Harkrishindas Gulabrai; AIR 1940 Sind 58 |
Cited along with other authorities to show that in Land Acquisition Act context "land" includes buildings in some contexts. |
Used as supporting material for the Court's discussion of statutory definitions, before the Court concluded that the specific wording of section 14 requires separate meanings for "land" and "building". |
| Government of Bombay v. Esufali Salebhai; ILR 34 Bombay 618 |
Another authority referenced about the inclusive meaning of "land" in Land Acquisition Act jurisprudence. |
Referred to as part of the background for interpreting "land" but the Court concluded this inclusive meaning did not apply to the separate use of "land" and "building" in section 14. |
| Damodar Das v. Secretary of State; AIR 1939 Allahabad 106 |
Authority cited on inclusive meaning of "land" under Land Acquisition Act. |
Included in the panel of authorities concerning the meaning of "land" prior to the Court's textual distinction between "land" and "building" in section 14. |