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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from an award of an Additional District Judge, Delhi, on a reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appellant, Daryodh Singh, was a tenant in possession of 42 bighas of land in village Rajpur Chhawni (Delhi). The land belonged to Goverdhan Dass Motilal Mohatta Trust, Mohd. Yusuf, and the Jaitley brothers (C.S., D.S. and V.S. Jaitley).

The owners instituted an ejectment suit against Daryodh Singh on July 17, 1956. While the suit was pending, the parties compromised on July 30, 1959: an ejectment decree was to be passed but not executed before 15 July 1960, and the plaintiffs were to pay Rs. 4,500 to the defendant two months prior to that date. Clause 6 of the compromise provided that if the Government acquired the property the owners would be entitled to all compensation payable to the tenant in respect of levelling, improving, developing or tenancy rights; clause 7 preserved only the tenant's right to any standing crop but prohibited cutting or removing trees or superstructures.

Out of the tenant's land 32 bighas and 14 biswas were acquired by the Delhi Administration (notification under section 4 on 11 January 1956; Collector's award on 28 April 1961). Total compensation assessed by the Land Acquisition Collector was Rs. 1,15,565/-. The Collector noted disputes as to apportionment among the owners and between owners and tenant and therefore made a reference under section 30, depositing the compensation under section 31.

Before the Additional District Judge (reference disposed 12 December 1962) the owners agreed the inter se shares. The appellant claimed Rs. 92,400 as his share under multiple heads (deprivation of tenancy rights, improvements, trees, pathway, etc.). The owners resisted, contending the compromise had made them entitled to any compensation payable to the tenant.

The Additional District Judge held that (a) the owners had deposited Rs. 4,500 in terms of the decree so the decree became operative on 15 July 1960; (b) through the compromise the tenant had relinquished his right to share in compensation; and (c) the tenant was not entitled to any share of the compensation. The Collector's compensation award was ordered to be paid to the owners according to their agreed shares. The tenant's appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the terms of the July 30, 1959 compromise and the payment of Rs. 4,500, the tenant (appellant) had relinquished his right to share in compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act when the land was acquired.
  2. Whether the deposit of Rs. 4,500 made on 16 May 1960 satisfied the requirement to pay "two months prior to 15th July, 1960" in the compromise (i.e., was the payment timely)?
  3. Whether clauses of the compromise (notably clause 6) were inadmissible in evidence or void for want of registration under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, or otherwise illegal or without consideration.
  4. Whether the Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenants' Relief Act, 1961, which came into force on 4 December 1961, altered the tenant's rights so that clause 6 could not operate to extinguish compensation rights that accrued under that later Act.
  5. Whether compensation payable on acquisition is to be regarded as immovable property for purposes of the Registration Act (and hence whether a contract affecting it would require registration).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The Additional District Judge erred in holding that the appellant had relinquished his right to compensation under the compromise.
  • The payment of Rs. 4,500 was not made two months prior to 15 July 1960; it was made one day late (deposited 16 May 1960 while appellant contended 15 May 1960 was required), and the late payment should not be relied upon.
  • Clauses of the compromise other than those strictly relevant to the ejectment (including clause 6) were inadmissible in evidence because the deed was not registered, invoking section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act (i.e., the deed purported to affect immovable property and so required registration).
  • The terms of the compromise that made the owners entitled to all compensation (except standing crops) were without consideration, illegal or void.
  • The Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenants' Relief Act, 1961 vested additional tenancy rights in the appellant after the compromise; accordingly clause 6 could not be read so as to relinquish compensation rights which arose under the later Act.

Owners' Arguments (as recorded)

  • The appellant had given up his right to receive compensation by the terms of the July 30, 1959 compromise; specifically, clause 6 made the owners entitled to any compensation payable to the tenant for levelling, improving, developing or tenancy rights.
  • The owners deposited Rs. 4,500 in terms of the compromise and therefore the ejectment decree became operative in time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sankaran Unni (minor) v. Kum makattil Ezhuvan Kandan's son Raman, AIR 1926 Mad. 748 Equitable principle (and Section 10, General Clauses Act) that a party prevented by the court being closed from performing an act is entitled to do it at the first subsequent opportunity; payment on the court re-opening day can be sufficient compliance with a decree. The court relied on this principle to hold that a payment made on the first subsequent working day (here, deposit on 16 May 1960 when 15 May 1960 was a Sunday) could be treated as timely under the compromise.
Puran Chand v. Mohd. Din, AIR 1935 Lah. 291 Application of equitable principles (Section 9 of the General Clauses Act) in construing decrees. The decision was relied upon for applying equitable construction to the timing requirement in the compromise/decree; it supported treating the deposit as made in due time.
Mrinalini Dasi v. Abinash Chandra Dutt, 11 Cal. LJ. 533 Illustrative facts where land sold without necessity was later acquired and the transferee withdrew compensation; court directed bringing money into court under section 32 Land Acquisition Act. The court noted the facts were entirely different and held the case was of no assistance for the proposition that compensation under the Land Acquisition Act can be regarded as immovable property for Registration Act purposes.
Gadadhar Bhatta v. Laht Kumar Chatterji, 1909 4 IC 434 Upheld a condition in a permanent lease that on acquisition the whole acquisition money would be payable to the landlord. The decision was cited to support the validity of clause 6 of the compromise (i.e., that a contractual arrangement making acquisition money payable to the owner can be valid).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of legal analyses anchored to the text of the compromise, timing of payment, statutory provisions and precedent:

  1. Timing of deposit: The compromise required payment "two months prior to 15th July, 1960." The deposit was actually made on 16 May 1960. Applying the ordinary accepted meaning of "calendar month" (citing Halsbury's description), one month counted back from 15 July 1960 is 16 June 1960 and the second month is 16 May 1960; thus the deposit on 16 May 1960 satisfied "two months prior to 15th July, 1960."
  2. Equitable construction: Even if deposit on 15 May 1960 were strictly required, the court invoked the equitable principle embodied in Section 10 (and Section 9 illustrations) of the General Clauses Act and the Sankaran Unni decision to hold that payment on the first subsequent opportunity (the next working day after a Sunday) sufficed. Therefore the deposit could be treated as timely.
  3. Formalities of record: Defects in ancillary records (e.g., absence of a copy of the challan in the Assistant Collector's court records or an incomplete bank register entry) were held to be irrelevant to the legal question whether payment had been made in terms of the decree/compromise.
  4. Effect of the Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenants' Relief Act, 1961 on execution: The owners sought execution of the ejectment decree only on 28 July 1962, after the 1961 Act had come into force (effective 4 December 1961). Sections 3 and 4 of the 1961 Act restricted grounds for eviction and provided for abatement of certain proceedings. The court noted the execution application was dismissed by the Additional Revenue Assistant on 6 November 1962 under the 1961 Act. That dismissal meant the appellant continued in possession for purposes of the 1961 Act, but the court held that this statutory development did not invalidate the contractual relinquishment of compensation rights effected earlier by the compromise.
  5. Admissibility and registration: The appellant contended clause 6 was inadmissible/unregisterable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act because it purported to affect immovable property. The court held compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act is not immovable property; rather it is movable money. Consequently section 17(1)(b) (and the registration requirement) did not apply to clause 6. The court distinguished Mrinalini Dasi (different facts) on this point.
  6. Validity, consideration and scope of clause 6: The court found clause 6 was supported by consideration (the Rs. 4,500 payment and relinquishment of rent until 15 July 1960), was neither illegal nor void, and did not contravene the Delhi Tenants' Relief Act, 1961. Significantly, the court interpreted clause 6 as covering not only tenancy rights as they existed on July 30, 1959, but any tenancy rights the appellant might possess at the time when compensation became payable upon acquisition. Thus the clause encompassed the additional protections that might have accrued under the 1961 Act.
  7. Trees and other items: Clause 7 expressly prohibited the defendant from cutting or removing trees or damaging superstructures; the court held that if the appellant lacked the right to cut or remove trees he could not claim compensation for them as owner would take the compensation assessed for those trees.
  8. Conclusion from application of contract and timing principles: Given that payment was made in due time and the compromise validly and effectively transferred to the owners the compensation rights (as interpreted), the appellant was not entitled to any share of the Collector's compensation award of Rs. 1,15,565/-. The Additional District Judge's conclusion in that regard was affirmed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The appellant (Daryodh Singh) is held not to be entitled to any share of the compensation amount of Rs. 1,15,565 awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector; the compensation was ordered to be paid to the owners in accordance with the inter se shares they had agreed.
  • The compromise dated 30 July 1959 (particularly clause 6) was held valid, supported by consideration, not rendered inadmissible by non-registration, and operative to relinquish the appellant's rights to compensation (including rights that might have arisen by virtue of later statutory protections). Clause 7 barred the appellant from claiming compensation for trees he was not entitled to cut or remove.
  • The timing/technical defects in ancillary records relating to the deposit (missing challan copy, bank register entry detail) were held irrelevant to the legal effectiveness of the deposit.
  • Costs: The parties were left to bear their own costs of the appeal.
  • No broader precedent was announced beyond the application of the statutory and equitable principles discussed; the decision addresses the application of the compromise, timing of the deposit, registration rules and the interplay with the Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenants' Relief Act, 1961, as applied to the facts of this case.

    Daryodh Singh v. Union Of India

    Jagjit Singh, J.:— This appeal is against the award of an Additional District Judge, Delhi, on a reference made under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Daryodh Singh is the appellant. He was in possession of 42 Bighas of Land situated in village Rajpur Chhawni (Dilhi) as a tenant. The land, on a portion of which some trees had been planted and there were some superstructures, belonged to Goverdhan Dass Motilal Mohtta Trust; Mohd. Yusuf, C.S Jaitley, D.S Jaitley and V.S Jaitley.

    2. On July 17, 1956 the owners of the land instituted a suit for ejectment of Daryodh Singh from the land and for recovery of arrears of rent. While that suit was pending in the court of the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Delhi, the parties entered into a compromise. In terms of that compromise, dated July 30, 1959 the ejectment of the tenant was ordered but the plaintiffs were required to pay an amount of Rs. 4,500/- to the defendant “two months prior to 15th July, 1960 “, before which date the decree was not to be executed. The operative part of the decree was as under:—

    “It is ordered that decree of ejectment in respect of Garden and land together with super-structure and two wells is passed against the defendant. It is further ordered that the decree shall not be executed till 15-7-1960 and the plaintiff shall pay Rs. 4,500/- to the defendant. So long the plaintiff does not pay Rs. 4,500/- to the defendant two months prior to 15-7-1960, he shall not be entitled to possession.”

    3. Out of the land which formed part of the tenancy of Daryodh Singh 32 Bighas and 14 biswas were acquired by the Delhi Administration for the public purpose of construction of Delhi Transport Service Staff Quarters. Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on January 11, 1956 and the Land Acquisition Collector pave his award on April 28, 1961. Market value of 30 Bighas and 14 Biswas of land, which was Nehri was assessed at Rs. 3,000/- per bigha and for the remaining two Bighas of Gairmumkin land the value was determined at Rs. 2,500/- per Bigha. Fifteen per cent was also awarded on the market value of the land in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. In addition to that Rs. 1000/- were allowed as compensation for wells and Rs. 2,900/- as compensation for the standing trees. Thus the total compensation payable by the Government came to Rs. 1,15,565/-.

    4. In his award the Land Acquisition Collector noted the fact that there was dispute regarding, the apportionment of the compensation between the three Jaitley brothers and also between the owners and the tenant. Under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act a reference was, therefore, made and under section 31 of that act the amount of compensation was also deposited in the Court to which the reference was made.

    5. The reference so made was disposed of by Shri Hans Raj, Additional District Judge, on December 12, 1962. Before the Additional District Judge the owners settled amongst themselves the shares to which they were entitled in the compensation payable to them. It was agreed amongest them that the share of Goverdan Dass Motilal Mohatta Trust was one-half that of Mohd. Yusaf was one fourth and of C.S Jaitley, D.S Jaitley and V.S Jaitley to be one-fourth. The inter-se share of C.S Jaitley, V.S Jaitley and D.S Jaitley in the one-fourth share of the compensation payable to the owners was to be equal.

    6. So far as Daryodh Singh was concerned he claimed an amount of Rs. 92,400/- as his share of the compensation in respect of his interest in the acquired land under the following heads:—

    (i) Compensation for deprivation of tenancy rights;

    (ii) expenses incurred on the land for making it fit for cultivation;

    (iii) Compensation in respect of about 700 fruit trees alleged to have been planted by him on the land:

    (iv) Compensation for right of “pathway” through Khasra No. 104, which was part of the acquired land to his residential house;

    (v) Compensation in respect of the old water channel passing through Khasra No. 104 to the land under his cultivation which had not been acquired.

    7. The claim of Daryodh Singh to a share in the amount of compensation was resisted by the owners on the ground that in the litigation for his eviction he had given up his right to receive compensation and through a compromise had agreed that if the land was acquired by the Government the owners would be entitled to all compensation which may be payable to him in respect of levelling, improving and developing or in respect of the tenancy rights.

    8. Thus the only dispute which survived for determination by the Additional District Judge was as to whether Daryodh Singh was entitled to a share in the amount of compensation and if so to what amount. While Daryodh Singh claimed the bulk of the amount as due to him the owners of the land disputed his right to get any share, whatsoever, in the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector.

    9. By his award the Additional District Judge held that the owners of the land had deposited Rs. 4500/- in terms of the decree passed on the compromise between the parties and, therefore, the decree had become “operative” on July 15, 1960. Further through that compromise Daryodh Singh was considered to have relinquished his right to share in the compensation payable on acquisition of the land under his tenancy and, therefore, not to be entitled to any share in the compensation under any of the heads of. his claim. The dismissal of the application filed by landlord-owners for execution of the ejectment decree, on account of the provisions of the subsequently enacted Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenants' Relief Act, 1961, was found to be of no consequence. In the result the claim of Daryodh Singh for a share in the amout of compensation was held untenable and the compensation amount was ordered to be paid to the owners according to trie shares to which they had agreed.

    10. As already mentioned the owners of the land had filed a suit for ejectment of Daryodh Singh appellant. That suit was disposed of by Shri S.C Vajpayee-, Assistant Collector First Class, Delhi, on the basis of a compromise which had been entered into between the parties on July 30, 1959. The compromise provided for a decree for ejectment to be passed against Diryodh Singh tenant but the decree was not to be executed before July 15, 1960 Daryodh Singh had agreed not to sow any fresh crop other than fodder after March 31, 1960. Clauses 3 and 4 of the compromise, which provided for paying a sum of Rs. 4500/- by the owners to the tenant by depositing the amount in court two months prior to July 15, 1960, were as under:—

    “3. That the plaintiff have agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 4500/-(Rupees four thousand five hundred only), being payable by the plaintiffs in equal, amount ratio Rs. 1500/- by each class of persons and have also agreed to give up their claim for rent for the period in suit and for the subsequent period till 15th July, 1960, in lieu of the defendant's claim for improvements and payment of land revenue as mentioned in the written statement and also his claim for cempensation for disturbance as contanied in his application under section 70 read with sect on 69 of the Punjab Tenancy Act.

    4. That the plaintiffs will deposit the aforesaid amount of Rs. 4500/- (Rupees four thousand five hundred only) in court two months prior to 15th July, 1960. The said amount will be payable to the defendant only, after he delivers v.icant possession of the property in suit to the. plaintiffs and the plaintiff's also would not be entitled to take possession of the property in execution of the deeree even after 15th July, 1960, till they pay the aforesaid amount of Rs. 4500/- to the defendant.”

    11. After the payment of Rs. 4500/- in terms of the compromise Daryodh Singh was not to have any claim for improving, levelling or developing the land or any other claim in respect of the property in suit or compensation for disturbance from the said property.

    12. The compromise as well provided that in the event of che suit properly being acquired by the Government the owners shall be entitled to all compensation which may become payable at Daryodh Singh in respect of levelling, improving and developing or in respect of tenancy rights. In that event Daryodh Singh was only to get compensation which may become payable in respect of the standing crops but he was to have no right to cut down or remove trees or to damage or remove the superstructure on the land. In this respect clauses 6 and 7 of the compromise were as follows:—

    “6. That if the Government acquires the property in suit, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to all compensation which may become payable to the defendant in respect of levelling, improving and developing or in respect of tenancy rights relating to the property in suit. The Plaintiffs shall be entitled to receive the said amount by virtue of this agreement and in consideration of the payment of Rs. 4,500/- and for relinquishing rent upto 15th July, 1960.

    7. The defendant shall be entitled to the crop standing on the property in suit or any compensation which may become payable in respect of the said standing crop, but he shall not be entitled to cut down or remove trees standing at present on the property as per schedule “A” attached and will not damage or removed super-structure on the property.”

    13. Shri Tyagi learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the Additional District Judge fell in error in holding that Daryodh Singh had relinquished his right to compensation. It was submitted/that as required by the decree for ejectment the payment of Rs. 4500/- was not made by the owners of the land two months prior to July 15, 1960 and consequently there had been non-compliance with the terms of the decree. The clauses of the compromise, relating to matters other than the subject matter of the ejectment suit, including clause 6, were stated to be inadmissible in evidence as the deed of compromise was not got registered. It was further urged that in any event the terms of the compromise relating to the owners alone being entitled to all the compensation except for the standing crops were without consideration, illegal and void. Another contention which was raised was that the appellant had acquired new rights in the land as a result of coming into force, with effect from December, 4 1961 of the Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenants' Relief Act, 196.1 (No. 30 of 1961) and even of clause 6 in the compromise could some how be read as part of the evidence still that elapse only affected the tenancy rights which the appellant had on the day the compromise was executed and not the additional rights which came to be vested in him under Act 30 of 1961.

    14. As required by the ejectment decree against Daryodh Singh an amount of Rs. 4500/- was to be paid by the owners of the-land two months prior to July 15, 1960. Msy 15, 1960 happened to be a Sunday at on the next day the amount of Rs. 4500/- was deposited on behalf of ti ownes of the land in the State Bank of India under the head “Revenu Deposit as the amount” of the decree passed by the Court of Shri S. Vajpayee, Revenue Officer, Delhi in case Seth Ram Gopal etc. Plaintiffs v. Daryodh Singh, suit No. 26/1956 decided on JOth Jul 1959.

    15. Shri Tyagi contended that the payment was made one day lal and no advantage could be taken of the fact that May 15, 1960 happei ed to be a Sunday. His other submissions were that the record of tl Court of the Assistant Collector did not show the receipt of the counte part of the challan by which the amount had been deposited and th; in the Register of the Bank- the entry relating to the deposit di not contain the name of the person to whom the amount was payable.

    16. The deposit of the amount of Rs. 4500/- was actualy made o May 16, 1960. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the deposi was made “two months prior to 15th July, 1960.” Tn its ordinary accef ted sense the expression “month” means a “calender month” and a “lunar month.” As to how a calender month is to be counted fror a date which is not the first of the month has been described in paragn ph 143 of Halsbury's Laws of Enghnd Volume 37 (third Edition) in the following words:—

    “When the period prescribed is a calender month running- from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeedin month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if the period startsat the end of a calender month which contains more days than the next succeed ing month, the period expires at the end of the latter month.”

    17. Thus one month counted from July 15, 1960 would be on June 16 any the second month counted from June 16 would be on May 17, 1960. Evidenlly; therefore, thedeposit made on May 16, 1960 was two month prior to July 15, 1960.

    18. Even if it is somehow considered that in order to fulfil th requirement of “two months prior to 15th July, 1960″ the deposit should have been-made on May 15, 1960, as contended by the learned counse for the appellant, still by applying the equitable principle of section of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the deposit can be considered to have been made in due time. In Sankaran Unni (minor) v. Kum makattil Ezhuvan Kandan's son Raman . AIR 1926 Mad. 748 it was pointed out:—

    “There is a generally recognized principle of Law, under which parties, who are prevented from doing a thing not by any default of their own, but by the Court itself, are entitled to do it, at the first subsequent opportunity. That is the general principle of equity quite apart from the terms of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. In fact Section 10 is based upon that principle. In this case, the defendant had the option to pay either to the plaintiff directly or into Court. He was entitled to choose between the two. He was prevented from paying into Court; because the Court was closed on the due date. His payment therefore onthe re-opening day must, I think be held to-be a sufficient compliance with the terms of the decree.

    19. This-decision was relied upon in Puran Chand v. Mohd. Din . AIR 1935 Lah. 291 for applying the equitable principles of section 9 of the General Clauses Act for the construction of a decree.

    20. As provided in the compromise the payment was to be made by depositing the amount and this is what was done by the respondents. The fact that a copy of a challan was some how not sent by the treasury officer either to the Court of the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Delhi, or was not traceable in the record of that court is of no consequence in det-e???ining the question whether payment in terms of the decree based on the compromise of the parties had been made or not. Similarly the short entry made in a register in the bank is of no relevance in that connection.

    21. The respondents having made the payment two months prior to July 15, 1960 they could get the decree for eviction executed on July 16, 1960. They, however, applied for execution of the decree on July 28, 1962. Before that date the Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenant's Relief Act, 1961 had already come into force. Section 3 of that Act, inter alia, provided that after its commencement no person was liable to be evicted from any land held by him as a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely:—

    “(a) that a decree for arrear of rent due in respect of the land remains unsatisfied after the expiry of the period allowed therefore;

    (b) where rent is payable in kind, that he has without sufficient cause failed to cultivate the land;

    (c) that he has sub-let or otherwise transferred the whole or any part of the tenancy in contravention of any law for the time being in force or of any contract;

    (d) that he has used the land in a manner which renders it unfit for the purpose for which it was let.”

    22. Further section 4 made a provision that except as provided in section 3 no tenant of land was to be ejected from the land whether in execution of a decree or order of a court or otherwise, and if there was any proceeding for ejectment of such tenant pending immediately before the commencement of the said Act and the proceedings could not have been instituted had the Act been in force at the time of the institution of such proceeding, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, such proceeding was on the such commencement to abate. As the decree for the appellant's ejectment was not covered by section 3 the execution application was dismissed by the Additional Revenue Assistant on Vovem-ber 6, 1962. From this order dated November 6, 1962 the only inference sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the appellant continued to be in possession of the land as a tenant, including the land regarding which acquisition proceedings were then pending.

    23. The record of the case does not show on which date possession of the acquired land was taken by the Collector, but it must have been after December 4, 1961 as a suit filed by the appellant to obtain an injunction that possession of the land should not be taken from him was dismissed on December 6, 1961.

    24. The Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenants' Relief Act, 1961 having come into force with effect from December 4, 1961 the appellant could not be ejected from the land which was held by him as a tenant on the basis of the decree which the owners of the land had obtained from the Court of Assistant Collector, First Grade Delhi, on July 30, 1959. His future liability to be ejected from the land at the instance of the landlord also came to be restricted to the grounds mentioned in section 3 of the said Act.

    25. There, however, seems to be no force in the contention the the compromise dated July 30, 1959, (Exhibit A/2) was not admissble in evidence in so far as it related to relinquishment by the appe lant of his right to receive compensation in respect of “levelling in proving and developing or in respect of tenancy rights.” Section V. (l)(b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 on which reliance wa placed, provides that non-testmantary instruments which purport o operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in pre sent or in future, the right, title or interest, whether vested or contin gent, of the value of Rs. 100/- or onwards, to or in immovable pro perty, require registration. If such a document is not registered then as provided by section 49 of that act, it is not to be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such immovable property though it ma be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performanc or evidence of part-performance of a contract for the purposes of section 53-A of the Transfer or Property Act or as evidence of a collatera transaction not to be affected by registered instrument.

    26. The compensation to be paid in respect of any land which in acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, cat by no stretch of imagination, be regarded as immovable property. The clause 6 of the compromise, therefore, section 17(l)(b) of the Registration Act was not applicable, even though it was not the subject matter of the suit by the owners of the land against the appellant any the decree passed also made no reference to it.

    27. In Mrinalini Dasi v. Abinash Chandra Dutt . 11 Cal. LJ.533., a case cited by the appellants learned counsel, a Hindu widow had sold without lega necessity a portion of the lands inherited by her from her husband That portion of the lands was later on acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and the compensation money was withdrawn by the person to whom the land had been sold. The reversionary heirs brought £ suit for a declaration that the transfer was not operative against then: and to compel the transferee to bring the money into court for in vestment. It was held that the court had inherent power to comp the transferee to bring the money into court and to direct its investment in Government or other approved securities terms of section 32 of the Land Acquisition Act. Evidently the facts of that case were entirely different and it can be of no help for supporting the contention sought to be raised that compensation paid by Government on acquiring land under the Land Acquisition Act can be regards as immovable property. The compensation amount is obviously movable property and a contract relating to it cannot be said to be regarding a right, title or interest in immovable property.

    28. Clause 6 of the compromise between the parties by which it was agreed that the owners shall be entitled to all compensation which may become payable to the tenant in respect of levelling, improving and developing or in respect of tenancy rights was not hit by section 17(1) (b) of the Indian Registration Act. The contract so embodied in clause 6 was not without consideration and was in no way illegal or void. The consideration for the appellant giving up his right to receive compensation was mentioned in the clause itself. The consideration so mentioned was payment of Rs. 4500/- by the owners and their relinquishing their claim for rent against the appellant up to July 15, 1960. The contract as well did not contravene any of the provisions of Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenants ‘Relief Act, 1961 or any other law. In Gadadhar Bhatta v. Laht Kumar Chatterji . 1909 4 IC 434., a condition in a permanent lease that if the tenancy is terminated by reason of the acquisition of the land for public purposes, the whole amount of the acquisition money will be payable to the landlord was considered to be valid.

    29. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that under clause 6 of the compromise, the appellant had only relinquished his rights to receive compensation in respect of the tenancy rights as they existed under the Punjab Tenancy Act on the date of execution of the compromise and that there was no relinquishment of the compensation that may become payable m respect of the rights of tenancy as safeguarded by the Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenant's Relief Act, 1961. It was urged that the nature of the appellant's tenancy changed and clause 6 had, therefore, no application to this changed tenancy.

    30. What was intended by clause 6 of the compromise was that if the Government acquired the property which was the subject matter of the ejectment suit the owners (i.e the plaintiffs in that suit) shall be entitled to all compensation which may become payable to the tenant in respect of levelling, improving and developing or in respect of tenancy rights relating to the property. The tenancy rights referred to in the clause were those for which compensation was payable if the Government acquired the land. The appellant had thus relinquished his rights to receive compensation for such tenancy rights as he may possess when compensation became payable to him on the land being acquired by the Government. The contract between the parties was not made with reference to the nature of the tenancy rights as these existed on July 30, 1959 but took into its purview whatever tenancy rights the appellant may happen to possess when compensation may become payable by the Government in the event of the land being acquired. No advantage can, therefore, be taken by the appellant from the fact that in consequence of the Delhi (Urban Areas) Tenant's Relief Act, 1961 certain additionalsafeguards came to be provided to persons holdirg any land as a tenant in the areas to which that Act extended. The learned Additional District Judge was, in our opinion, right in holding that the appellant had given up his rights to compensation in respect of levelling, improving and developing the land or his tenancy rights. The appellant was also not entitled to compensation allowed for the trees standing on the land, even though the trees may have been planted by him. Clause, 7 of the compromise specifically provided that on the land being acquired he was not to be entitled to cut down or remove the trees. If he did not have the right'to cut down or remove the trees he could not get the compensation assessed as the price of the trees. The claim of the appellant forcompensation for items other than those relating to tenancy rights and tress was not even pressed before us.

    31. The appellant not being entitled'to any share in the compensation amount of Rs. 1,15,565/- his appeal fails and is. a.ccordingly;dis-missed. In view of the fact that the appellant had to pay ad valorem court fee on the portion claimed by him in the amount of compensation and but for his giving up his rights to receive compensation he may have been entitled to a substantial amount, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of the appeal.

    32. Appeal dismissed.

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    Daryodh Singh v. Union Of India
    (Apr 5, 1972)