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Factual and Procedural Background

These two Civil Miscellaneous Petitions (Nos. 795 & 796 of 1969) were filed in Regular First Appeal No. 189 of 1969. The appeal had been filed by the Union of India against the decree dated 10 December 1968 of the Additional District Judge, Delhi, made upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appeal was filed on 9 April 1969 and admitted on 20 May 1969.

The respondents in the appeal were Rameshwar Nath and Hira Lal, who held an undivided 1/4th share (in equal shares) in several khasra numbers in village Ali. Hira Lal (respondent No. 2) died on 5 June 1969.

Civil Miscellaneous No. 795 (of 1969) sought to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondent (Hira Lal) and to set aside the abatement of the appeal. Civil Miscellaneous No. 796 (of 1969) sought condonation of delay in filing C.M. No. 795.

A chronology relevant to the condonation and abatement applications is set out in the opinion, including: appeal admission (20-5-1969); death of Hira Lal (5-6-1969); expiry of time under Article 120 Limitation Act to bring legal representatives on record (3-9-1969); appellants' alleged knowledge of death (10-9-1969); communications and transmission of particulars from the Land Acquisition Collector (18-10-1969; received by appellants' counsel 22-10-1969); alleged misplacing of papers and their tracing on 21-11-1969; applications filed 25-11-1969.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the abatement of the appeal.
  2. Whether the abatement of the appeal should be set aside (i.e., whether the appellants proved they were prevented by sufficient cause from bringing the legal representatives on record within the time prescribed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963).
  3. Whether the abatement of the appeal, caused by the death of one respondent, affects the entire appeal or only the deceased respondent (i.e., whether the appeal can proceed against the surviving co-respondent).
  4. Whether the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to appeals filed in the High Court against the decree of the Additional District Judge upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and whether limitation provisions apply to such appeals.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants contended that Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to appeals against decrees passed by the Court upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  • They relied on an unreported Division Bench decision dated 31 January 1969 (R.F.A. No. 178 of 1962) and on the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Abdul Karim v. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1964 M.P. 171) to support the view that the provisions of Order 22 (and related limitation articles) do not apply to these reference proceedings or appeals arising therefrom.
  • They also argued (by implication through reference to section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act) that an appeal under section 54 is not an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore Order 22 should not apply.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The legal representatives of the deceased respondent and respondent No. 1 opposed the applications, contending that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay either for setting aside the abatement or for bringing the legal representatives on record.
  • Respondents asserted that the appellants had not adequately explained each day's delay or provided particulars of the efforts alleged to have been made to ascertain legal representatives.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Ram Charan and others, 1964 (3) S.C.R. 467 The expression "sufficient cause" is not to be liberally construed; the court should not readily accept unsupported averments explaining default; each day's delay must be explained; bare statements that "efforts were made" are insufficient. The court relied on this principle to reject the appellants' bare averment (supported by the Land Acquisition Collector's affidavit) that "efforts were made" to ascertain legal representatives; finding absence of particulars, the court held appellants failed to prove sufficient cause to bring legal representatives on record.
State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, 1962 (2) S.C.R. 636 Sets out the tests to determine whether an appeal abates as to surviving co-respondents: (a) whether allowing the appeal would produce a decree contradicting a final decree between appellant and deceased; (b) whether appellant could have obtained necessary relief against surviving respondents alone; (c) whether any decree against surviving respondents would be ineffective (not capable of execution). The court applied the first test (conflict with final decree between appellant and deceased) and held that because the respondents were joint undivided owners, allowing the appeal would produce a contradictory decree; therefore the appeal abated entirely.
Pandit Sri Chand and others v. M/s Jagdish Parshad Kishan Chand and others, 1966 (3) S.C.R. 451 Clarifies that the three tests regarding abatement are not cumulative; satisfaction of even one test may justify holding that appeal has abated in its entirety. The court invoked this authority to note that it need only apply one of the tests (the first test) and, having found that test satisfied, concluded the appeal abated entirely.
Abdul Karim v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1964 M.P. 171 Held (in Madhya Pradesh decision) that provisions of Order 22 of the CPC cannot be applied to proceedings under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act because such proceedings are not suits instituted by plaint and certain features (like mandatory award) make the Code provisions incompatible. The appellants relied on this decision; the court observed that a local Division Bench observation in R.F.A. No.178/62 had cited this decision but made clear that those observations cannot be treated as accepting the Madhya Pradesh decision. The court did not treat Abdul Karim as controlling and distinguished the unreported local decision from it.
Alihusain Abbasbhai and others v. Collector, Punch Mahals, A.I.R. 1967 Gujarat 118 Holds that Order 22 of the CPC applies to reference proceedings under section 18 (by virtue of section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act); but held Article 176 of Limitation Act, 1908 (equivalent to Article 120 Limitation Act, 1963) not applicable to reference proceedings because such proceedings are not "suits" within that Article. The opinion discussed this decision at length, noting the Gujarat court's reasoning and that it took a different view on the applicability of Article 176. The present court considered the Gujarat view but preferred the Punjab Division Bench view (on the point of limitation) where relevant; it did not adopt the Gujarat court's conclusion that Article 176 is inapplicable to reference proceedings.
Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel and others, 1964 (6) S.C.R. 129 Held that an appeal conferred by a special statute can nonetheless be an appeal "under the Code of Civil Procedure" if the procedure for filing and the powers of the Court in dealing with the appeal are governed by the Code; Article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act applies. The court relied on this Supreme Court decision to conclude that an appeal to the High Court from a decree upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act must be treated as an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure; accordingly, Order 22 and the Limitation Act apply to such appeals.
Phuman and others v. The State of Punjab and others, I.L.R. 1963 (2) Punjab 442 Division Bench held Order 22 applies to proceedings before the Court hearing a reference under section 18 by virtue of section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act; further, legal representatives must be brought on record within the time limited by law and references are treated as suits for limitation purposes. The court regarded the Punjab view (on applicability of limitation provisions and treatment of reference as suit for limitation) as preferable to the Gujarat view on that particular point, but expressly stated it did not express a final opinion on the broader question since that issue was not fully argued.
Unreported Division Bench decision, R.F.A. No. 178 of 1962 (dated 31-1-1969) Referenced by appellants and noted in the opinion; it considered similar issues and made observations (including reference to Abdul Karim and the use of section 5 Limitation Act) in a factual context. The court noted this unreported decision but stated the observations cannot be taken as acceptance of the Madhya Pradesh decision and did not treat that unreported ruling as resolving the applicability question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps addressing condonation, abatement, and the applicability of procedural rules and limitation.

  1. Condonation of delay to apply for setting aside abatement:
    • The application to set aside abatement (which should have been made on or before 2 November 1969) was actually filed on 25 November 1969 — a delay of 23 days.
    • The appellants alleged (by affidavit) that particulars of legal representatives had been received by their counsel on 22 October 1969 but the papers were mixed with other papers and only traced on 21 November 1969; applications were filed promptly thereafter.
    • The court was satisfied that the delay in applying to set aside the abatement (the 23-day delay) was sufficiently explained on the basis that the applications were filed promptly after the papers were traced. Accordingly, the court found sufficient cause to condone that delay.
  2. Whether sufficient cause was shown for failure to bring legal representatives on record within Article 120 time (i.e., whether to set aside abatement):
    • The court emphasized that Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of Order 22 CPC requires proof that the plaintiff/appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit/appeal; mere filing of an application within Article 121 time is not an automatic entitlement. The appellants must show why they were prevented from bringing legal representatives on record within the Article 120 period.
    • The court observed that time runs from the date of death (5 June 1969), not from knowledge of death; but it accepted for the purposes of this case that appellants had no reason to know of the death before 10 September 1969 (their asserted date of knowledge).
    • The critical inquiry was whether, after knowledge on 10 September 1969, appellants acted diligently so as to justify excluding the period up to 22 October 1969 when particulars were allegedly supplied to counsel.
    • Relying on Union of India v. Ram Charan, the court stressed that "sufficient cause" is not to be liberally construed and mere, general averments that "efforts were made" are insufficient. Each day's delay must be explained with particulars.
    • The affidavit of the Land Acquisition Collector merely averred that "efforts were made" but did not disclose the nature or details of those efforts. The court found this insufficient and held there was a "complete absence of particulars" to prove sufficient cause for failing to bring legal representatives on record within Article 120 time.
    • Therefore, the appellants failed to prove sufficient cause entitling them to set aside the abatement of the appeal.
  3. Effect of abatement on surviving co-respondent and the appeal as a whole:
    • The court considered the law on whether abatement as to one of several respondents requires dismissal of the appeal as against surviving respondents. It cited State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram and Pandit Sri Chand to extract and apply relevant tests.
    • The court applied the first test from Nathu Ram — whether allowing the appeal would produce a decision contradictory to a decree final between the appellant and the deceased respondent — and found it satisfied because the two respondents were joint and undivided owners. If the appeal were allowed as to the surviving respondent, the Court's decision would conflict with the decree final as against the deceased respondent.
    • Accordingly, the court concluded the appeal abated completely and cannot proceed even against the surviving respondent.
  4. Applicability of Order 22 CPC and Limitation to appeals from decrees on references under section 18 Land Acquisition Act:
    • The appellants argued Order 22 does not apply to appeals under section 18, relying on certain High Court decisions. The court distinguished authorities that dealt with reference proceedings (under section 18) and not appeals to the High Court from decrees entered on such references.
    • The court relied on the Supreme Court authority Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel to hold that even where a special statute confers the right of appeal, the appeal may nonetheless be an appeal "under the Code of Civil Procedure" if the procedure and powers of the Court are governed by the Code. It held that this appeal must be treated as an appeal under the CPC.
    • Accordingly, the court concluded the provisions of Order 22 CPC apply to appeals to the High Court from decrees passed upon references under section 18, and that the Limitation Act applies to such appeals.
    • The court also discussed conflicting High Court views (Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Punjab) on the applicability of Order 22 and limitation provisions to reference proceedings themselves, stating a preference for the Punjab view on the point of limitation but noting it would not express a final opinion because the issue did not arise for full argument in this case.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Civil Miscellaneous applications (Nos. 795 & 796 of 1969) are dismissed, and the appeal is dismissed as having abated in its entirety.

Implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The court's direct effect on the parties: because appellants failed to prove sufficient cause for not bringing the legal representatives on record within the prescribed time, the abatement is not set aside and the appeal abates completely and is dismissed.
  • The court held that an appeal to the High Court from a decree passed upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure; therefore the provisions of Order 22 of the CPC and the Limitation Act apply to such appeals (the court explicitly stated: "We further hold that the Limitation applies to such an appeal").
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.

    The Union Of India v. Rameshwar Nath And Another S

    S.N Andley, J.:— These two Civil Miscellaneous petitions (Nos. 795 & 796 of 1969) have been filed in Regular First Appeal No. 189 of 1969. The appeal has been filed by the Union of India against the decree dated December 10, 1968, of the Additional District Judge, Delhi, upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

    The appeal was filed on April 9, 1969, and was admitted on May 20, 1969. The respondents to the appeal are Rameshwar Nath and Hira Lal who hold an undivided ¼th share in equal shares in Khasra Nos. 1 to 6, 7/1 and 7/3 situate in village Ali.
    Civil Miscellaneous No. 795 of 1969 has been filed to bring on record the legal representatives of Hira Lal (respondent No. 2) who died on June 5, 1969, and to set aside the abatement of the appeal. Civil Miscellaneous No. 796 of 1969 has been filed for condonation of delay in filing C.M No. 795 of 1969.
    The facts pertaining to the application for condonation of delay are set out below in chronological order:—
    20-5-69 Appeal was admitted. 5-6-1969 Hira Lal, respondent No. 2, died. 3-9-1969 Time for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondent as prescribed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963, expired. 10-9-1969 The appellants allege that their counsel in the appeal came to know of the death of respondent No. 2. 11-9-1969 The appellants' counsel in the appeal intimated the appellants about the death of respondent No. 2 whereafter the appellants allege that efforts were made “to find out the names, addresses and relationship of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent and this could be known on 18-10-69 when the Land Acquisition Collector communicated the particulars of the legal representatives to the Deputy Adviser, Govt. of India, Ministry of Law, New Delhi”. 22-10-1969 The particulars were received by the counsel of the appellants in this appeal but these papers are alleged to have got mixed up with other papers in the office of the counsel for the appellants. 2-11-1969 Time for setting aside abatement prescribed under Article 121 of the Limitation Act, 1963, expired. 21-11-1969 The papers are alleged to have been treated. 24-11-1969 The applications and affidavits were received by the appellants' counsel in the appeal. 25-11-1969 The applications and affidavits were filed in this Court.
    The applications are strongly opposed on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent and by respondent No. 1 who contend that there is no sufficient cause either for condoning the delay in making the application for setting aside the abatement of the appeal or for condoning the delay in making the application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent on the record.
    The first question that arises is whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the abatement. A prayer for condonation for setting aside the abatement which should have been made on or before November 2, 1969, was actually made when the above applications were filed on November 25, 1969. There is therefore, a delay of 23 days in applying for setting aside the abatement. The allegation supported by an affidavit is that although the particulars of the legal representatives had been received by the counsel for the appellants in this appeal on October 22, 1969, the papers got mixed up with the other papers in the office of the counsel and were traced only on November 21, 1969, whereafter the applications and affidavits were received on November 24, 1969, and were filed in this Court on the day following. We are satisfied that there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay in making the application for setting aside the abatement.
    We have then to consider whether the abatement of the appeal should be set aside. Sub-rule (2) of rule 9 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that abatement can be set aside if it is proved that the plaintiff (which must include the appellant) was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit (which must include appeal). In other words, the mere filing of an application for setting aside the abatement within the time prescribed by Article 121 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not entitle the plaintiff to an automatic order of setting aside the abatement. He must further prove that he was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit (or appeal) or, in other words, he must prove sufficient cause as to why he was prevented from applying for bringing the legal representatives on the record within the time-prescribed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
    We have, therefore, to examine whether the appellants in this case have proved that there was sufficient cause which prevented them from applying for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent on the record on or before September 3, 1969. It cannot be doubted that time begins to run from the date of death of the respondent and not from the date of knowledge of such death. At the same time it is not to be expected of a plaintiff or appellant to sit, as it were, on the door-step of the respondent after instituting his action. We will, therefore, take it that the appellants have proved in this case that they had no reason to know about the death of the deceased respondent prior to September 10, 1969 as alleged by them. The question is whether after having this knowledge they took steps diligently and expeditiously so as to entitle them to say that there is sufficient cause for them to exclude the period up to October 22, 1969, when they furnished the particulars to their counsel in this appeal. All that is alleged by the appellants is that “efforts were made to find out the names, addresses and relationship of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent and this could be known on 18-10-69 when the Land Acquisition Collector communicated the particulars of the legal representatives to the Deputy Adviser, Govt. of India, Ministry of Law. New Delhi.”
    It has been observed in 1964 (3) S.C.R 467 in re: Union of India v. Ram Charan and others (1) that, —
    “the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not to be liberally construed either because the party in default was the Government or because the question arose in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The Court should not readily accept whatever is alleged to explain away the default. The delay in making the application should not be for reasons which indicate the negligence of the party making the application in not taking certain steps which he could have and should have taken. The court has to be satisfied that there were certain valid reasons for the applicant not knowing the death within a reasonable time. The bare statement of the applicant is not enough.”
    It is also well established that each days' delay has to be explained by giving reasons therefor. The averment made in the application for condonation of delay which is supported by the affidavit of Bishan Singh, Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi, is merely this that efforts were made after acquiring knowledge of the death of respondent No. 2 on 10-9-1969 or thereabout. The nature of the efforts is not disclosed nor the details of the steps taken for the ascertainment of the particulars of the legal representatives have been stated in the petition. A bare averment that efforts were made is not enough. It seems to us that the Land Acquisition Collector who swore the affidavit took it for granted that he has only to state that efforts were made to entitle him to the condonation of delay and this seems to be the normal pattern of affidavits which have come up before us in other cases also which are filed on behalf of the Union of India. Such averment cannot be taken any note of and we are of the view that there is complete absence of particulars to enable us to say that there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in making the application for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellants have completely failed in proving to this Court that there was any sufficient cause entitling them to the setting aside of the abatement of the appeal.
    The next question is whether the appeal has abated only so far as the deceased respondent is concerned. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1962 (2) S.C.R 636 in re: State Of Punjab v. Nathu Ram (2) where it has been observed that it is not a correct statement to say that the appeal abates against the surviving co-respondent but the effect of the abatement of the appeal against one of several respondents is that the appeal against the co-respondent cannot proceed in certain circumstances and has, therefore, to be dismissed. It has been further observed that ordinarily the considerations which weigh with the Court in deciding upon the question whether the appeal can proceed against the surviving co-respondents are whether the appeal between the appellants and respondents other than the deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the Court. The Supreme Court has observed that
    “The test to determine this has been described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the Court and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be successfully executed.”
    The Supreme Court has observed in 1966 (3) S.C.R 451 in re: Pandit Sri Chand and others v. M/s Jagdish Parshad Kishan Chand and others. (3) that the above three tests are not cumulative tests and even if one of them is satisfied, the Court may, having regard to all the circumstances, hold that the appeal has abated in its entirety. We are here concerned with the first test, namely, whether the decree against the surviving respondent, if the appeal succeeds, will be contradictory to the decree which has become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellants and the deceased respondent.
    In the present case, the two respondents were joint and undivided owners of the same piece of land and it follows that if the appeal is allowed, it will result in the decree of this Court being contradictory to the decree appealed against with respect to the same subject matter. The appeal cannot therefore, proceed even against the surviving respondent and abates completely.
    Faced with this difficulty, the appellants contend that Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to appeals against decrees passed by the Court upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Reliance is first placed on an unreported Division Bench decision dated January 31, 1969 of this Court in R.F.A No. 178 of 1962. In this case reference is made to A.I.R 1964 M.P 171 in re: Abdul Karim v. State of Madhya Pradesh (4) which was cited and it is stated that the attention of the learned Judges (I.D Dua, C.J and S. Rangarajan J.) was not invited to any contrary decision. The learned Judges then go on to say that independently of this decision, they were inclined on the facts and circumstances of that case to give to the appellants benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act. These observations cannot by any means be taken to be an acceptance of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to above and to be a decision on the question regarding the applicability of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure to an appeal like the present.
    Reference is then made by the appellants to the aforesaid Madhya Pradesh decision where the learned Chief Justice has observed that for the purpose of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure a suit must be taken as one meaning a suit instituted by the presentation of a plaint and that the provisions of Order 22 cannot be applied to proceedings under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It has further been observed that section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act has applied, the Code of Civil Procedure to proceedings under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act subject to the limitation that the provisions of the Code intended to be applied must not be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. The learned Chief Justice has observed that it is not necessary to show inconsistency that there should be an express provision to the contrary in the Act itself and it would be enough if the applicability of a provision of the Code to any proceedings before the Court under the Act would be incompatible with the nature of the proceedings. One of the reasons advanced is that the Court to whom a reference is made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act has to make an award under section 26 of this act, no matter whether the person at whose instance the reference has been made appears or fails to appear before the Court or fails to produce evidence in support of his objection and that there is no question of any dismissal or abatement of the reference proceedings.
    This case was noticed by the Gujarat High Court in the decision reported in A.I.R 1967 Gujarat 118 in re: Alihusain Abbasbhai and others v. Collector, Punch Mahals. (5) The learned Chief Justice has not followed the Madhya Pradesh decision. He has observed that there is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act which is directly inconsistent with Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, this Order would apply to reference proceedings by virtue of section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act which makes the provisions of the Code applicable to all proceedings before the Court under the Act unless such provision in the Code is inconsistent with anything contained in the Land Acquisition Act. It has further been observed:—
    “The nature of proceeding under S. 18 need not necessarily terminate with an award or determination of compensation. The reference is not different from an ordinary civil proceeding whence the private party in the position of a plaintiff claims extra compensation and the Collector defends it. If the private party fails to appear at the hearing of the proceeding the reference must by force of O. 9, R. 8 be dismissed for want of appearance and evidence in support of the claim. Since the right to claim additional compensation devolves on the heirs of the private party on his death the provisions of O. 22, R. 3 are applicable. A reference to the earlier Land Acquisition Act of 1870, S. 36 which provides for application of the Code of Civil Procedure on topics like ‘death of parties’ also indicate that the provisions of Order 22, R. 3 are applicable to a reference proceeding under S. 18 of the Act.”
    However, the learned Chief Justice has held that Article 176 of the Limitation Act, 1908, (equivalent to Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963) is not applicable to a reference proceeding under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act because the applicant in such a proceeding is not a plaintiff and the proceeding is not a suit within the meaning of this Article and, therefore, there is no period of limitation prescribed for bringing on record the legal representatives of an applicant in so far as reference proceedings are concerned.
    Both these decisions relate to the applicability of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure to reference proceedings under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and not to appeals which are filed in the High Court against the decree of the Additional District Judge in such proceeding. We are concerned with the latter question.
    The right to appeal to the High Court from the decree passed by the Additional District Judge upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is conferred by section 54 of this act which, inter alia, provides that subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals from original decrees and not-withstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award of the Court. It is, therefore, contended on behalf of the appellants that this appeal is not an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the provisions of Order 22 of the Code will not apply. This contention has no force. A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in re: Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel and others reported in 1964 (6) S.C.R 129 (6). In this case an appeal was filed in the High Court under, section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the question was whether such an appeal is an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. The majority of the learned Judges (Sinha, C.J; K. Subba Rao and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) held that though the right of appeal is conferred by section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and it is by virtue thereof that the appeal was filed in the High Court, it is still an appeal “under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the High Court.” It was observed that to attract Article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, it was not necessary for an appeal to be an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, that the right to prefer the appeal should be conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure and that it was sufficient if the procedure for the filing of the appeal and the powers of the Court for dealing with the appeal when filed are governed by the Code. In view of this decision this appeal has to be treated to be an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and if it is so treated, there can be no doubt that the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply.
    A question similar to the one which was dealt with by the Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat High Courts came up before the Punjab High Court and the decision is reported in I.L.R 1963 (2) Punjab 442 in re: Phuman and others v. The State of Punjab and others (7). The Division Bench held:—
    (1) that the provisions of Order 22 of the Code would apply to all proceedings before the Court hearing a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act by virtue of section 53 of this Act as there was no specific provision in this Act says which that the principles of abatement would not apply to proceedings before the Court under the Act:
    (2) that there was no force in the argument that the Court hearing the reference was bound to give an award;
    (3) that legal representatives of the deceased claimant must be brought on record within the time limited by law; and
    (4) that for the purpose of the Indian Limitation Act a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is treated as a suit and the applicant is to be regarded as a plaintiff and the Government as a defendant.
    To the extent that the Punjab Division Bench has held that the application for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased claimant must be made within the time prescribed by Indian Limitation Act, it is in conflict with the Gujarat view referred to above. In our view, the Punjab view that the provisions of Article 176 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, are applicable to a reference proceeding under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, is preferable to the view taken in the aforesaid Gujarat decision but we do not express any final opinion on this question as it does not arise before us and we have not had the benefit of a full argument on this question.
    In view of the Supreme Court decision in Vidyacharan Shukla's case we cannot but hold that an appeal against the decree of the Court upon a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of Order 22 of the Code apply to such an appeal. We further hold that the Limitation applies to such an appeal.
    For these reasons, we dismiss both the Civil Miscellaneous applications and hold that the appeal has abated in its entirety. Accordingly, the appeal is also dismissed as having abated. There will be no order as to costs.
    Appeal dismissed
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    The Union Of India v. Rameshwar Nath And Another S
    (Aug 17, 1971)