| M/s. Tilokchand Motichand and others v. H. B. Munshi (AIR 1970 SC 898) |
Authority relied on by respondents to argue that long delay may be fatal to maintainability of writs challenging acquisition. |
The court noted respondents relied on this decision for the preliminary objection of delay, but did not decide that point because the appeals failed on merits. |
| Rabindra Bose and others v. Union of India and others (AIR 1970 SC 470) |
Another Supreme Court decision invoked to support the contention that delay was fatal to maintainability. |
The court acknowledged reliance on this decision by respondents but did not address the point further because it resolved the appeals on merits. |
| Valjibhaiji Muljibhaij Soneji and another v. The State of Bombay (AIR 1963 SC 1890) |
Acquisition held invalid where the entire compensation was to be paid out of funds of a corporation (no part from public revenues) and Part VII requirements were not complied with. |
The court distinguished this case: in the present matter compensation was stated to be paid from public revenues and therefore Valjibhaiji did not apply. |
| Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan & others v. The State of Gujarat (AIR 1966 SC 1408) |
Declaration under Section 6 valid only if compensation is to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or a fund controlled/managed by a local authority; invalid where compensation paid entirely by a company. |
The court observed that unlike that case, the present notifications did not state acquisition was to be at the expense of societies; counter-affidavit asserted acquisition was not specifically for societies, so the precedent was inapposite. |
| Bhagwat Dayal & others v. Union of India (AIR 1959 Punjab 544) |
Principle that construction of houses is not necessarily per se a public purpose; whether it is depends on circumstances (e.g., shortage of dwelling accommodation). |
The court referred to this authority to show that whether housing is a public purpose depends on facts; it noted the present circumstances (shortage etc.) supported planned development as public purpose. |
| P. Thambiran Padayachi & others v. The State of Madras (AIR 1952 Madras 756) |
Scheme for houses for slum clearance, relieving congestion and housing poor people are public purpose as they promote social welfare. |
The court cited this to support the view that housing schemes can be public purpose; it nonetheless considered factual record regarding the socioeconomic composition of the societies. |
| Ratilal Shankarbhai & others v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1970 SC 984) |
Where there is a declaration under Section 6, courts ordinarily will not probe genuineness of need or whether purpose is public unless fraud is shown; the conclusiveness of Section 6(3) extends to the question of public purpose. |
The court applied this principle to support deference to government assessment that the acquisition was for planned development and a public purpose absent allegations of fraud. |
| Smt. Somawanti & others v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 151) |
Earlier authority relied upon regarding deference to government declarations of public purpose under Section 6. |
The court cited Somawanti as supporting authority for Ratilal and to justify limited judicial interference with the government’s declaration of public purpose. |
| V. K. Krishna Iyer v. The State of Madras (1967-2 MLJ 422) |
Observation that undue prolongation of acquisition proceedings can operate oppressively on owners and may afford a remedy even though statute prescribes no timetable. |
The court noted this authority but distinguished the present case because appellants had not shown laches by the authorities; it also considered the statutory remedy introduced by Parliament (interest). |
| Saragadam Apparao & others v. Special LAO (1969-1 AWR 282) |
A bench observed that delay ordinarily would justify striking down awards, but delay by petitioners themselves may preclude relief. |
The court drew on this to emphasize the need to identify which party's laches caused delay; appellants had not pleaded laches by authorities specifically. |
| State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma (AIR 1966 SC 1593) |
Observation that compensation is determined with reference to the date of the Section 4 notification and delay between S.4 and S.6 may cause loss to owners if prices rise. |
The court used this authority to acknowledge the problem of loss from delay but then turned to the 1967 amendment which addressed delay by providing interest as additional compensation. |
| Udai Ram Sharma & others v. The Union of India (AIR 1968 SC 188) |
Analysis of the 1967 Amendment: validating multiple declarations, prescribing time-limits for future acquisitions, and providing additional compensation by way of interest where Section 6 follows Section 4 by more than three years. |
The court relied on this decision to explain that Parliament's scheme provided interest as additional compensation for delay and that this addressed the inequity argued by appellants. |
| Corporation of Calcutta v. Omeda Khatun Bawa (AIR 1956 Calcutta 122) |
Discusses when more than one award may be made; suggests only limited circumstances justify multiple awards (different owners or unavoidable legal impediments). |
The court examined the two awards here against that test and found the circumstances (stay orders, different owners/holdings) justified separate awards. |
| R.C. Sen v. Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta (AIR 1921 Calcutta 340) |
Statement that a declaration may cover several holdings of different owners and separate proceedings may be taken in respect of separate holdings; but where there is one holding, piecemeal acquisition is improper. |
The court applied this distinction, concluding the lands in the two awards did not form a single holding belonging to the same owner and that piecemeal acquisition was not established. |