| Tata Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Abdul Husain Hakim Ji, A.I.R. 1924 Bombay 144, 147 |
Cited in the context of authorities addressing whether a Court is "closed" for purposes of section 4 of the Limitation Act when its offices remain open during vacation. |
Referred to as one of several decisions taking a view relevant to the interpretation of closure under section 4; the Court noted conflicting precedents and did not adopt all of them but relied on the language of the local notification in this case. |
| Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Occhavlal Hagovindas Shah, A.I.R. 1927 Bombay 480 |
Cited regarding the same closure/section 4 issue. |
Noted as part of the body of conflicting authority; the Court declined to follow these precedents as determinative, preferring to interpret the local notification directly. |
| Bachivappa Modali v. Ayyasami Ayyar, I.L.R. 5 Madras 189 |
Cited on the “Court closed vs offices open” question under section 4 of the Limitation Act. |
Listed among decisions with differing views; the Court held that the particular language of the High Court notification governed the result in the present case. |
| British India Steam Navigation Co. v. H.M. Sharafally Marchand, A.I.R. 1923 Madras 435 |
Cited on the same point (closure under section 4). |
Included in the compilation of authorities; the Court emphasized resolving the issue by interpreting the notification text rather than resolving the inter-authority conflict exhaustively. |
| Ramani Raji Mohli v. Todapouri Maniah, A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 103 |
Cited in the discussion of section 4 of the Limitation Act and the effect of court vacation notices. |
Referred to as an authority in the wider debate; the Court’s decision did not turn on reconciling all such authorities but on the specific wording of the notification before it. |
| Petloh Muhammad v. Chothu Ram, A.I.R. 1921 Lahore 237 |
Cited regarding closure/section 4 analysis. |
Referred to as part of a group of cases reflecting divergent approaches; used to show there is precedent on both sides of the question. |
| Hira Lal v. Sojan Chand, A.I.R. 1933 Lahore 239 |
Cited in the same context (closure for limitation purposes). |
Placed among earlier decisions; the Court focused on the notification's language rather than resolving the line of authorities. |
| Babu Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Babu Girdhari Lal, A.I.R. 1939 Patna 667 |
Cited on the question whether a Court is 'closed' when offices are open. |
Noted as part of conflicting authorities; the Court relied on its own notification's words to decide the preliminary point. |
| Kishan Lal v. Tansukh Rai, A.I.R. 1941 Nagpur 261 |
Cited in discussion of closure under section 4. |
Referenced as one of the authorities with relevant views; the Court affirmed that the answer depends on the language used in the particular notification. |
| Akhtari Bibi v. Raj Laxmi Debi, 59 C.W.N. 684 |
Cited among cases on the closure/limitation question. |
Included in the list illustrating differing judicial approaches; the Court followed an interpretation of its notification that allowed section 4 to apply here. |
| Rambir Narhargir Gosai v. Prabhakar Bhaskar Gadhaway & Ors., A.I.R. 1955 Nagpur 300 |
Cited in the closure/limitation discussion. |
Mentioned as part of the authorities; the Court observed that decisions differ and resolved the matter by construing its own notification. |
| Municipal Corporation Delhi v. Chaman Dass (Unreported Division Bench, Criminal Appeal No.125 of 1967, pronounced 16 Aug 1969) |
Referred to in the debate about whether offices being open prevents the court from being 'closed' for limitation purposes. |
Referred to; the Court treated it as one among authorities and proceeded to interpret the notification specifically before it. |
| Kamla Soni v. Roop Lal, Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1966 (pronounced 26 Sep 1969) |
Stated for the proposition that the question whether a landlady requires premises bona fide is a mixed question of law and fact. |
The Court relied on this proposition to frame the standard of review: the bona fide requirement is a mixed issue and must be decided on the facts of each case. |
| Vasdev Dhawan v. Triloki Nath, LXIX (1967) P.L.R. 261 (Delhi Section) |
Cited for the test of 'bona fide' requirement — whether the landlord genuinely desires possession, intends to occupy, and lacks collateral motive. |
Adopted as a guiding test; the Court applied the test to the facts and accepted the Tribunal's finding of bona fide requirement. |
| Om Parkash Singal v. Roshan Lal Khanna, 1969 D.L.T. 366 |
Quoted for the interpretation of “bona fide” in proviso (e): meaning genuine good faith and absence of intent to deceive; landlord's assessment to be considered in context. |
Used to support the conclusion that bona fide requirement should be tested against the landlord's status and circumstances and that such findings are ordinarily to be upheld. |
| Panju Mal v. Smt. S.L. Keshwari, 1969 D.L.T. 264 |
Cited for the proposition that the phrase “bona fide requires” must be assessed by reference to relevant facts, status and circumstances; bona fides is crucial and broadly a question of fact. |
Applied to emphasize the Court's deferential approach to factual findings about bona fide requirement and to uphold the Tribunal's conclusion. |