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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sub-section (1) of section 133 of the Code,
  • section 188 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sub-section (2) of section 140
  • sub-section (1) of section 133
  • section 135. Section 137
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sub-section (1) of section 133 of the Code,
  • section 188 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sub-section (2) of section 140
  • sub-section (1) of section 133
  • section 135. Section 137
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.N. Andley, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

On June 5, 1969 Gurdita Mal, manager of Mandir Laxmi Narayanji (the temple), filed an application before the District Magistrate, Chamba, alleging that portions of temple premises had been let out to the petitioner, Balwant Singh, who had installed wool and cotton ginning machines and a rice husking machine driven by a 20 HP electric motor. The complaint alleged that vibrations from these machines caused cracks in temple buildings and that noise disturbed the temple's peaceful atmosphere, amounting to a public nuisance; the complainant sought an order that the petitioner desist from carrying on these activities. The District Magistrate forwarded the application for trial to Mr. Shamsher Singh, Magistrate first class, Chamba.

Procedural chronology as reflected in the record:

  • June 6, 1969: The Magistrate examined the complainant, Gurdita Mal, and issued a notice to the petitioner to appear and show cause. The record indicates no conditional order under section 133 CrPC was made on that date.
  • June 17, 1969: The petitioner appeared and showed cause, admitting installation of the machines, claiming they had existed for 15 years, denying that they caused cracks or affected the public, and asserting the surrounding area was not inhabited.
  • July 14–15, 1969: The Magistrate recorded and concluded the complainant's evidence; the matter was adjourned to July 24, 1969 for "proper proceedings."
  • July 19, 1969: At the oral request of the complainant the Magistrate took up the case and passed an order directing the petitioner to cease carrying on the trade at the premises; a formal order of the same date recites premises were declared ancient monuments and directs cessation forthwith. The file was ordered "duly completed" and consigned to the General Record Room.
  • Subsequently the petitioner filed Criminal Revision No.16 of 1970 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra Division, challenging the Magistrate's July 19, 1969 order; the Sessions Judge recommended that the Magistrate's order be quashed and the Magistrate directed to proceed in accordance with law. The matter came before this Court on that recommendation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Magistrate complied with the procedure prescribed by Chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in particular section 133 and its sub-sections) before making an order affecting alleged public nuisance.
  2. Whether the Magistrate's actions in taking up the matter on July 19, 1969 (a date on which the petitioner did not have notice) and treating the file as "duly completed" violated principles of natural justice and rendered the order illegal.
  3. Whether the impugned order dated July 19, 1969 should be quashed and the matter remitted for proceedings in accordance with Chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

Complainant's (Applicant's) Allegations and Requests

  • The complainant, Gurdita Mal (on behalf of the temple), alleged that machines installed by the petitioner caused vibrations that produced cracks in temple buildings and made noise that disturbed the public and the temple's peaceful atmosphere.
  • He characterized the petitioner's activities as a public nuisance and requested that the petitioner be ordered to desist from carrying on the trade in the temple premises.
  • On July 19, 1969, the complainant made an oral request in court prompting the Magistrate to take up the matter and seek a prohibitory order under section 133 CrPC.

Petitioner's Responses

  • The petitioner admitted installation of the machines but stated they had existed for the last 15 years.
  • The petitioner asserted that the area around the machines was not inhabited and that the machines were not run so as to cause discomfort or inconvenience to the general public.
  • The petitioner denied that cracks in temple buildings resulted from the machines and denied that the running of the machines was injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community.
  • The petitioner had also applied to the Sessions Judge for transfer of the proceedings to another Magistrate (an application mentioned in the record, with the Sessions Judge calling for the Magistrate's comments for a later date).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by closely examining the statutory scheme in Chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure (public nuisance provisions) and the factual sequence of actions taken by the learned Magistrate, and then comparing the two.

Key statutory points recited by the Court (as applied in the analysis):

  • Section 133 CrPC authorizes a Magistrate, on information and after taking such evidence as he may think fit, to pass a conditional order for removal of a public nuisance—requiring the person creating it to desist.
  • Section 135 allows the person against whom a conditional order is made to either perform the act directed or, after appearing, apply for a jury to try whether the order is reasonable and proper. If the person fails to comply with the conditional order and also fails to appear or apply for a jury, the order may be made absolute and penalties under section 188 IPC become applicable, as provided by section 136.
  • Section 137 requires the Magistrate, upon cause being shown against a conditional order, to take evidence as in a summons case and, if satisfied the order is not reasonable and proper, to take no further proceedings; otherwise the conditional order shall be made absolute.
  • Sections 138–139 regulate constitution and procedure before a jury where one is appointed. Section 140 prescribes notice after a conditional order is made absolute and warns of liability under section 188 IPC for disobedience; sub-section (2) of section 140 sets out consequences of disobedience.

Applying the statute to the facts, the Court identified multiple legal and procedural defects in the Magistrate's conduct:

  1. The Magistrate did not make the conditional order on June 6, 1969 after examining the complainant; instead a mere notice to show cause was issued. The Court held that issuing only a notice to show cause without a conditional order is not contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 133 CrPC.
  2. Because no conditional order was made initially, the Court observed it was unclear what, under Chapter X, the petitioner was being called upon to show cause against when he appeared on June 17.
  3. Assuming the Magistrate intended his July 19, 1969 order to operate as the conditional order under section 133(1), the Magistrate nevertheless treated the file as "duly completed" and consigned it to the General Record Room without calling upon the petitioner to show cause against that order. The Court found this to be an illegality: issuing a conditional order requires an opportunity for the person affected to respond and invoke the procedural safeguards (appearance, application for jury, evidence, etc.) provided in Chapter X.
  4. The Magistrate took up the case on July 19, 1969—five days earlier than the scheduled date of July 24, 1969—apparently on an oral request by the complainant. The petitioner had no notice of proceedings on July 19. The Court held that proceeding in the absence of notice and then purporting to pass a final order violated the principles of natural justice.
  5. For these reasons—non-compliance with the procedural requirements of Chapter X and the breach of natural justice—the Magistrate's action in treating the file as completed and consigning it to records, and the formal final order of July 19, 1969, were unlawful.
  6. The Court accepted the Sessions Judge's recommendation that the impugned orders be quashed, but directed that the learned Magistrate should treat the July 19, 1969 order as a conditional order under section 133(1) and proceed further in accordance with Chapter X of the Code (including giving the petitioner an opportunity to avail himself of the remedies and procedures provided therein).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The recommendation of the Sessions Judge to quash the impugned orders dated July 19, 1969 is accepted; the impugned orders are quashed and the matter is remitted for further proceedings in accordance with law.

Specific disposition and immediate consequences:

  • The formal order dated July 19, 1969 (directing the petitioner to cease carrying on the trade and consigning the file as duly completed) and the Magistrate's action treating the file as completed have been quashed.
  • The learned Magistrate is directed to treat his July 19, 1969 order as a conditional order under sub-section (1) of section 133 CrPC and, in pursuance of that order, to take further proceedings as required by Chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure (including giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to appear, show cause, and apply for a jury where appropriate).
  • The file is to be returned to the learned Sessions Judge for remand to the learned Magistrate for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Broader implications: The opinion does not announce or apply any new principle beyond enforcing the statutory procedure in Chapter X of the CrPC and the requirement of natural justice in contempt/ public nuisance proceedings; it limits itself to quashing the impugned order and directing compliance with the statutory procedure.

Order signed by K.L.B.; judgment pronounced orally by S.N. Andley, J.

    Balwant Singh Petitioner v. Mandir Lakshmi Narain

    S.N Andley, J. (Oral):— The records of Criminal Revision No. 16 of 1970 filed by Balwant Singh, petitioner, in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra Division, against the order dated July 19, 1969, of Mr. Shamsher Singh, Magistrate first class, Chamba, purporting to have been passed under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been submitted to this Court with the recommendation that the aforesaid order of the learned Magistrate be quashed and the learned Magistrate be directed to proceed in accordance with law. The said revision came to be filed in the circumstances set out hereinafter.

    On June 5, 1969, Gurdita Mal, Manager of Mandir Laxmi Narayanji, filed an application on behalf of the said temple before the District Magistrate, Chamba, alleging that in the premises appertaining to the said temple some portions have been let out to the petitioner wherein the petitioner had set up wool and cotton ginning machines; and a rice husking machine which were being run by a 20 horse power electric motor with the result that vibrations caused by the running of the said machines resulted in the appearance of cracks in the buildings belonging to the temple. It was further complained that these machines create such a noise that the physical comfort of the community and the peaceful atmosphere of the temple are disturbed and inconvenience is caused to the public. It was alleged that the conduct of the aforesaid trade by the petitioner amounted to a public nuisance. Prayer was made that the petitioner be ordered to desist from carrying on these activities. The District Magistrate forwarded this application for trial to Mr. Shamsher Singh, Magistrate first class, Chamba.
    The learned Magistrate examined Gurdita Mal, the aforesaid manager, on June 6, 1969, and issued a notice to the petitioner to appear and show cause against the complaint. It does not appear that any conditional order as is contemplated by section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was made by the learned Magistrate on June 6, 1969, when the notice was issued.
    In response to the notice, the petitioner appeared before the learned Magistrate on June 17, 1969 and showed cause. The petitioner admitted that the machines had been installed in the premises belonging to the temple but averred that they had been in existence for the last 15 years and that the area around the machines was not inhabited nor were the machines run in such a manner as to cause discomfort or inconvenience to the general public. The petitioner denied that cracks had appeared in the temple buildings as a result of the working of the machines. The petitioner further denied that the running of the machines was injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community.
    The learned Magistrate directed Gurdita Mal, the complainant, to produce his evidence on July 14, 1969. On this date and on July 15, 1969, the evidence of the complainant was recorded & concluded. The matter was then adjourned to July 24, 1969 for “proper proceedings.” However, it appears that on July 19, 1969, the learned Magistrate took up the case at the oral request of the complainant and passed the impugned order in these terms :—
    “Case came up today on the oral request of the applicant who says that the respondent be directed to stop carrying on the trade in the said premises because irreparable damage is being caused to the protected monument. Sufficient evidence about the temple being a protected monument has come on record and it is the duty of every law abiding citizen to help in the preservation of our ancient culture which would otherwise be lost to the nation. As such a prohibitory order u/s 133 Cr. P.C be issued to the respondent.
    File duly completed be consigned to the General Record Room. Announced in the open Court.”
    It seems to me that the learned Magistrate did not apply his mind at all to the provisions contained in Chapter X of the Criminal Procedure Code. I have looked into the file which contains a formal order dated July 19, 1969, which appears to be final in its terms, directing the petitioner to cease carrying on the said trade in the premises in question. The provision of law under which this formal order has been passed does not appear on the face of the order. It may, however, be useful to quote this formal order. It says :—
    “Whereas it has been made to appear to me that you are carrying on as owner the trade of wool and cotton ginning and rice thrashing in a portion of the premises of Temple Shri Damodar Lakshmi Narayan and the same is injurious to the public health by reason of being noisy and is also causing damage to the temple and Sanatan Dharam Hall which have been declared as ancient monument by the Archaeological Department, Government of India, and should be suppressed or removed to a different place;
    I do hereby direct and require you forthwith to cease carrying on the said trade at the said place and not again to carrying on the same.
    Given under my hand and seal of the Court this the 19th day of July, 1969.”
    It appears from the reference made to this Court that on July 19, 1969, the petitioner had filed an application before the Sessions Judge for transfer of the proceedings to some other Magistrate and on this date the Sessions Judge called for the comments of the learned Magistrate for September 19, 1969. It is stated in the reference that the contention of the petitioner was that the learned Magistrate had come to know of the order of the Sessions Judge and therefore it was that he took up this case on July 19, 1969, although it was fixed for hearing only on July 24, 1969. With this contention this Court is not concerned because the relevant material is not ascertainable from the files.
    Chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains provisions in relation to public nuisances. Section 133 authorizes the Magistrate concerned to pass a conditional order for removal of nuisance upon information being laid in that behalf and on taking such evidence as the Magistrate may think fit. By this conditional order the Magistrate may require the person who is creating the public nuisance to desist from doing so. But if the person objects so to do or, in other words, fails to comply with such conditional order he is to appear before the said Magistrate or some other Magistrate as provided and move to have the order set aside or modified in the manner provided in the subsequent sections in this Chapter. Section 135 provides that the person against whom a conditional order is made may either perform the act directed by such order or, after appearing before the Magistrate concerned, apply to him to appoint a jury to try whether the order made is reasonable and proper. It is only if the person against whom such order is made does not perform such act or appear and show cause or apply for the appointment of a jury that he is made liable to the penalty prescribed in that behalf in section 188 of the Indian Penal Code and such order shall be made absolute as provided in section 136. It is, therefore, clear that no penalty is provided for the disobedience of a conditional order unless it is made absolute for failure to appear or to make an application as provided by section 135. Section 137 enjoins upon the Magistrate upon cause being shown against the conditional order to take evidence in the matter as in a summons case and if he is satisfied that the order is not reasonable and proper, no further proceedings shall be taken in the case but if the Magistrate is not so satisfied, the conditional order shall be made absolute. Sections 138 and 139 provide for the constitution of and procedure before a jury if a jury is appointed on the application of a person against whom the conditional order has been made. Section 140 provides that after a conditional order has been made absolute, the Magistrate shall give notice of the same to the person against whom it is made and this notice shall further require such person to perform the act directed by the order within the time fixed and also notifying such person that he will be liable to the penalty provided by section 188 of the Indian Penal Code in case of disobedience. Sub-section (2) of section 140 lays down the consequences of the disobedience of the order.
    It seems to me that upon an application being made to the Magistrate under section 133 and upon his taking such evidence as he may think fit, a conditional order will be made if a prima facie case is established but if no prima facie case is established the application has to be dismissed. The first irregularity which the learned Magistrate committed was in not passing a conditional order if he was prima facie satisfied that the petitioner was guilty of committing the nuisance alleged. A mere notice to show cause without a conditional order is not contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 133 of the Code.
    As stated, the learned Magistrate did not make any conditional order on June 6, 1969, after examining Gurdita Mal. Since there was no conditional order, it is difficult to see what the respondent was called upon to show cause against in so far as Chapter X of the Code is concerned. Assuming that the learned Magistrate intended to record more evidence on behalf of the complainant which he did on 14th and 15th July, 1969 and that his order dated July 19, 1969 was intended to be the conditional order contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 133 of the Code, it is not understood why he considered the file duly completed and ordered it to be consigned to the General Record Room without calling upon the petitioner to show cause against this order. However the matter is looked at, there can be no doubt that treating the file as having been duly completed and ordering it to be consigned to the General Record Room on July 19, 1969 is an illegality which the learned Magistrate has committed. If he passed the conditional order on July 19, 1969 he should have issued a show cause notice to the petitioner so that the petitioner could avail of the procedure and the other provisions contained in Chapter X of the Code.
    It is also clear that July 19, 1969 was not fixed for proceedings in the case which had been adjourned from July 15, 1969 to July 24, 1969. The petitioner did not have any notice for July 19, 1969 and yet the learned Magistrate purported to pass what according to him was a final order in so far as the commission of the alleged nuisance by the petitioner is concerned. Without saying anything about the motive of the learned Magistrate in taking the matter on July 19, 1969 when the date of hearing was July 24, 1969 it is enough to say that the impugned order is clearly in violation of the principles of natural justice.
    Therefore, both because of the non-compliance with the provisions of Chapter X of the Code and the violation of the principles of natural justice, the order dated July 19, 1969 treating the file as duly completed and ordering it to be consigned to the General Record Room as also the formal order of the same date containing the final order have been rightly recommended by the learned Sessions Judge for quashing. The recommendation of the learned Sessions Judge is accepted. The learned Magistrate should treat the order dated July 19, 1969 as a conditional order as contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 133 of the Code and should in pursuance of that order take further proceedings as contemplated by Chapter X of the Code. Let the file be returned to the learned Sessions Judge for being remanded to the learned Magistrate for further proceedings.
    K.L.B Order accordingly.
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    Comments

    Balwant Singh Petitioner v. Mandir Lakshmi Narain
    (Aug 25, 1970)