H.R Khanna, C.J:— This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent by the Management of Hamdard (Waqf) Laboratories, Delhi, is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant against Raunaq Hussain respondent No. 1, Hamdard Dawakhana Employees Union respondent No. 2 and the Presiding Officer, Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, respondent No. 3 (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), for quashing the award of the Tribunal was dismissed.

Raunaq Hussain respondent joined the service of Hamdard (Waqf) Laboratories, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Dawakhana) at Delhi in 1953. By an order of the Divisional Manager Administration of the Dawakhana dated June 30, 1966 Raunaq Hussain was transferred with effect from July 5, 1966 to Hamdard Dawakhana, Hyderabad, and was directed to join the new post by July 11, 1966. Raunaq Hussain made representation against the proposed transfer but the representation was rejected. Raunaq Hussain who did not go to Hyderabad was charged-sheeted on July 21, 1966 for having disobeyed reasonable orders. As such, he was stated to be guilty of misconduct as defined in Para 15 of the Standing Orders. The explanation furnished by Raunaq Hussain was found to be unsatisfactory and the matter was referred to the Enquiry Officer who made a report on September 26, 1966 that Raunaq Hussain had disobeyed a lawful and reasonable order of the management and as such his disobedience amounted to misconduct. On August 30, 1966 Raunaq Hussain was served with two more charge-sheets. Under charge No. 1 Raunaq Hussain was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service of the Dawakhana because of his absence since July 24, 1966. The second charge related to the refusal of Raunaq Hussain to receive a letter from the Establishment Officer charging him of the misconduct of remaining absent without leave with effect from July 24, 1966. The above charges were described by Raunaq Hussain to be wrong and baseless in his explanation. These charges were also referred to the Enquiry Officer who, as per report dated September 30, 1966, held Raunaq Hussain guilty of both the charges. The management of the Dawakhana, on the basis of the two reports of the Enquiry Officer, dismissed Raunaq Hussain by its order dated November 10/14, 1966.

Meanwhile, before the passing of the order of dismissal, the management passed an order on October 28, 1966 transferring Raunaq Hussain to Ghaziabad. It was stated in that order that during enquiry proceedings Raunaq Hussain had agreed to be transferred to Ghaziabad. This order of transfer to Ghaziabad was not carried out by Raunaq Hussain and he questioned the validity of the same.

Two references relating to industrial dispute between the appellant and Raunaq Hussain were made by the Lieutenant Governor, Delhi as per orders dated November 23, 1966 and March 29, 1967. Raunaq Hussain was represented by the Hamdard Dawakhana Employees Union, respondent No. 2. The question referred to the Tribunal in one of the cases was:

“Whether the transfer orders of Shri Raunaq Hussain from Delhi to Hyderabad were unjustified, mala fide or illegal, and should be set aside and what directions are necessary in this respect ?”

The following two questions were referred to the Tribunal in the other cases: —

“ (a) Whether the order of management transferring Shri Raunaq Hussain to Ghaziabad is illegal or invalid, and

(b) Whether his ultimate dismissal was unjustified and to what relief is he entitled ?”

In his statement of claim before the Tribunal, Raunaq Hussain stated that he had joined the service of the Dawakhana at Delhi in 1953 when it had no branch or depot outside Delhi, on the clear understanding that his service was not transferable. It was also stated that the transfer to Hyderabad or to Ghaziabad would deprive him of the benefits under the Employees State Insurance Act and that the transfer orders had been passed to force him to resign. In reply the management of the Dawakhana stated that it had every right to order transfer of workmen from one place to the other without adversely affecting their emoluments. The right of transfer was said to be not only implicit in the authority of the management but was also expressely conferred on the management by agreement dated February 28, 1966 to which the Union sponsoring the dispute was also a party. The management, accordingly, justified its action in punishing Raunak Hussain for non-compliance with the transfer order and his subsequent absence from duty without leave. The assertion of Raunaq Hussain that the Hamdard Dawakhana had no branch or depot out-side Delhi was denied. Clauses 16 and 22 of the agreement of settlement dated February 28, 1966, referred to above, read as under: —

“16-a: All employees except Madadgars drawing a salary exceeding Rs. 200.00 P.M comprising basic wage plus dearness allowance, will be liable to transfer from one post/branch/department/section to another anywhere in the country.”

“16-b: Employees in respect of salary amounting to less than Rs. 200.00 P.M shall be liable to be transferred from one post/branch/section/deptt. to another situated at the same station only.”

“22: The Unions assure the management that they will co-operate fully in maintaining discipline, raising production and certification and application of the revised Standing Orders as per copy attached which bears their signatures in token of their having studied ad accepted the same.”

The preamble of the document incorporating the Settlement shows that it had been arrived at as a result of discussion between the management and the employees of the Dawakhana with a view to promote industrial peace and harmony. The document was signed by a representative of the management as well as by representatives of the two Unions of the employees. Another memorandum of Settlement was also signed by the above-mentioned parties on the same day, i.e, February 28, 1966. The preamble of that document showed that the existing Standing Orders of the Dawakhana were in force from 1951. The parties felt the need to amend and amplify those Standing Orders so that they might suit the working conditions of the establishment and be in conformity with service conditions in other similar establishments. Clause 2 of the above memorandum of Settlement was as under: —

“The revised Standing Orders, as per copy enclosed, shall take effect from such date as may be notified by the management on their being certified by the authority competent under the law to do so.”

Enclosed with the memorandum was the draft of the revised Standing Orders. The draft of revised Standing Orders dealt with a very large number of matters. One of those matters related to transfer of employees. The clause in this respect read as under: —

“All employees, except Madadgars drawing salary not exceeding Rs. 200 per mensem shall be liable to transfer from one post/branch/department/or section to another, anywhere in the country. However, employees in receipt of salary amounting to less than Rs. 200 shall be liable to be transferred from one post/branch/section or department to another situated at the same station.”

The Tribunal held that the Dawakhana had no branch outside Delhi in 1953 and that the opening of such branch outside Delhi was not in contemplation. The Tribunal referred to the fact that there had been a number of transfers of the employees of the Dawakhana from one branch in India to the other during the period from 1955 to 1967. In the opinion of the Tribunal it would not be legitimate to deduce from those transfers that transfer was an implied service condition of Raunaq Hussain because those transfers took place after 1953. Dealing with clause 16 of the Settlement dated February 28, 1966 the Tribunal observed that the salary of Raunaq Hussain was more than Rs. 200 per mensem when his transfer was ordered. According to the Tribunal operation of the transfer clause 16 stood postponed till after the revised Standing Orders were certified by the competent authority, and the date of their coming into force was notified by the management of the Dawakhana by putting up a notice on the Notice Board. As the revised Standing Orders were not certified, the management was held to be not entitled to invoke clause 16 of the Settlement. The Tribunal accordingly held that the transfer of Raunaq Hussain in the first instance to Hyderabad and then to. Ghaziabad was not justified and that Raunaq Hussain could not be punished for having disobeyed the transfer orders. The absence of Raunaq Hussain from duty, after he was relieved from the Delhi Office, was further held to be not culpable. The charge that Raunaq Hussain refused to take delivery of the charge-sheet was held by the Tribunal to be misconceived. In the result the Tribunal directed the reinstatement of Raunaq Hussain with continuity of service and the right to receive back wages.

The above award of the Tribunal, which is dated July 20, 1968, was assailed by the management of the Dawakhana by filing writ petition. The learned Single Judge, after giving the facts, referred to clauses 16 and 22 of Settlement of February 28, 1966 and held that the view taken by the learned Tribunal that the term relating to the transfer of employees drawing over Rs. 200 would come into operation after certification was accorded by the certifying authority was not unreasonable. It was further observed.

“It could not be stated that the view of the Additional Industrial Tribunal was not reasonably possible; even though the clause containing the right to transfer employees drawing more than Rs. 200 per mensem outside Delhi was the only clause common to both the agreements, we still find that clause 22 was incorporated in Ex. M.1 (Annexure X) making a reference to the union's offer to co-operate in respect of securing such certification. The other agreement, which contained only the Standing Orders, had admittedly to be certified by the Certifying Authority. In view of clause 22 of Ex. M. 1 making a reference to such certification, it seems to me, that it is not reasonable to hold that the clause containing the transfer was to be given effect to regardless of the certification of the Standing Orders. If that was the intention of the parties, clause 22 would not have found a place in Ex. M.1”

In the result the petition was dismissed.

We have heard Mr. Tarkunde on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Madan Mohan on behalf of the contesting respondents, and are of the view that the award of the Tribunal and the judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. It would appear from the resume of facts given above that the Tribunal declined to uphold the transfer order of Raunaq Hussain on the basis of clause 16 (a) of the Settlement because the revised Standing Orders, which also contained a transfer clause similar to clause 16, had not been certified by the management of the Dawakhana. Certification of the Standing Orders takes place under Section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946). Standing Orders have been denned in Section 2 (g) of that Act to mean rules relating to matters set out in the Schedule. The Schedule to that Act mentions a number of matters which might be provided in Standing Orders under the Act. Transfer of employees is not one of the matters mentioned in the Schedule and as such it is manifest that transfer of employees of an industrial establishment cannot be the subject matter of the Standing Orders of that establishment. In the case of Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1966) 2 SCR 863 (1), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that Standing Orders could not deal with the subject of the transfer of employees from one branch to another and from one job to another. It was observed as under:

“Then in regard to the matters which may be covered by the Standing Orders, it is not possible to accept the argument that the draft Standing Orders can relate to matters outside the Schedule. Take, for instance, the case of some of the draft Standing Orders which the appellant wanted to introduce; these had reference to the liability of the employees for transfer from one branch to another and from one job to another at the discretion of the management. These two Standing Orders were included in the draft of the appellant as Nos. 10 and 11. These two provisions do not appear to fall under any of the items in the Schedule; and so, the certifying authorities were quite justified in not including them in the certified Standing Orders.”

The above observations were relied upon in a recent case of Workmen of Lakheri Cement Works Limited and Associated Cement Companies Limited, 1970 (2) (2) Factories and Labour Report 243, and it was held that the extension of the Standing Order inter alia to the topic of the transfer was without jurisdiction and the Standing Order could not be framed in respect of that.

As the revised Standing Orders of the Dawakhana in the present case could not legally cover the subject of the transfer of employee the non-certification of those Standing Orders could not, in our opinion, prevent the operation and enforcement of clause 16 (a) of the Settlement. The award of the Tribunal was based upon the mistaken view of law that the Standing Orders could and did affect the enforceability of the clause of the Settlement relating to transfer of employees, and that if such Standing Orders were not certified the clause relating to transfer of employees could also not be enforced. The approach of the Tribunal in this respect was not in confirmity with law, because, as observed earlier, the Standing Orders cannot deal with the subject of transfer of employees. The present is not a case where two views in the matter were possible and the Tribunal has taken one view. On the contrary, the present is a case where the Tribunal has proceeded on a mistaken view of the law and has founded its decisions upon reasons which are wrong in law. The distinction between “an error of law apparent on the face of the record” and “a possible view of the matter” cannot be lost sight of. The error of law in the present case is apparent on the face of the record. Such an error can be corrected by the issuance of a writ certiorari. As held in the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhakrishnan and other, (1964) 5 SCR 64 (3); a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challanged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy of sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was), speaking for the majority in the above case, further observed:

“It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define of to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.”

There is an evident error of law in the order of the Tribunal in the present case, and as such the appellant, in our opinion, is entitled to a writ of certiorari.

There was nothing in the terms of the Settlement of February 28, 1966 to prevent the coining into force of clause 16 of the Settlement from the date of signing of the memorandum of the Settlement. According to section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and a workman other than one in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Sub-section (1) of section 19 of that Act provides that a settlement shall come into operation on such date as is agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, and if no date is agreed upon the date on which the memorandum of the Settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute. As Raunaq Hussain was admittedly a member of the Union which entered into the Settlement of February 28, 1966, he would be bound by clause 16 of that Settlement. Further, as no date was agreed upon for the coming into force of the Settlement of February 28, 1966 the said Settlement should be taken to have come into operation from the date it was signed by the parties to the dispute.

An application was filed during the pendency of the appeal on behalf of the contesting respondents that according to clause 2 (p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, where a written agreement between the employer and the workman is arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding a copy of the agreement should be sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the Conciliation Officer. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that copies of the said settlements were forwarded to the Conciliation Officer (Central), the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) and the Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi. According to the contesting respondents the appropriate Government in respect of industrial disputes arising between the appellant-company and its workmen was the Delhi Administration and the appropriate authorities prescribed were the Labour Commissioner, Delhi Administration, Conciliation Officer, Delhi Administration and the Secretary (Labour) Delhi Administration, and not the authorities to whom the copies were sent. As such the contesting respondents stated that the requirements of section 2 (p) of the Act read with rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules had not been complied with. The above application was contested by the appellant and it was stated in the affidavit of S.M.A Hashimi, Establishment Officer of the appellant, that copies of the Settlement were inter alia sent to the Conciliation Officer, Delhi Administration and the Labour Commissioner, Delhi Administration. It was further stated by Hashimi that a contention had been raised on behalf of respondent No. 1 before the Tribunal that copy of the Settlement had not been sent to the appropriate Government and the Conciliation Officer. The appellant according to Hashimi then summoned the relevant records to show that copies were actually sent and summons were duly taken out for this purpose. When the records were produced before the Tribunal and the statement of the witnesses, who had brought the relevant records before the Tribunal, were to be recorded, a statement was made on behalf of respondent No. 1 by his counsel, Shri Asghar Ali, conceding that copies of the Settlement dated February 28, 1966 had been sent by the appellant to the Conciliation Officer and the Delhi Administration. It was, accordingly, stated by Shri Hashimi that the contention that requirements of clause 2 (p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, read with rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, had not been complied with, were baseless. The appellant also filed alongwith that affidavit a copy of the statement of Shri Asghar Ali. Shri Asghar Ali admitted in that statement that copies of the Settlement dated February 28, 1966 had been sent by the Hamdard Dawakhana management to the Conciliation Officer and Delhi Administration. At the hearing of the appeal, the application filed by the contesting respondents was not pressed by their learned counsel. The same was, accordingly, dismissed.

It may be observed that an objection was raised at the time of arguments by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents that no ground had been taken and no contention had been advanced on behalf of the appellant before the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge that the Standing Orders could not relate to the subject of transfer of employees. It was urged that the appellant should not be permitted to raise that ground in appeal. The above ground raised on behalf of the appellant is purely one of law on the admitted facts of the case, and we are of the opinion that the appellant should be allowed to raise it. The fact that the appellant did not raise it before the Tribunal or the learned Single Judge, would however, be a good ground for disallowing the costs to the appellant.

We, accordingly, accept the appeal and the writ petition and quash the impugned award of the Tribunal. The parties shall bear their own costs throughout.

Appeal allowed.