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Case Number

R.S.A No. 7-D of 1961

Attorney(S)

M.N.Madan
M.M.Rao

Judges

Mr. P.S Safeer, J.

Acts

sub-Section (1) of section 13 of Act 38 of 1952,
sub-section (1) of section 14,

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — P.S. Safeer, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns the interpretation of clause (h) of the proviso to sub‑section (1) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958. The appeal arises from an ejectment (eviction) application and proceedings before the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal.

Key procedural and factual points stated in the opinion:

The judgment is delivered by P.S. Safeer, J., and turns on the interpretation of clause (h) of the proviso to s.14(1) of Act 59 of 1958.
An application for ejectment of the tenant appellant was filed on 17 September 1959 by respondent Chuni Lal (para. 13).
The Rent Control Tribunal (referred to as the Kent Control Tribunal) found (para. 13) that the respondent was not the owner of the disputed premises but was himself a tenant; the present appellant was an alleged subtenant.
The parties agreed that premises allotted to the tenant remained in his possession from 21 January 1956 to 5 February 1959 (para. 14).
The Act (referring to Act 59 of 1958) came into force in February 1959 (para. 14).
The ejectment application included a ground of non‑payment of rent and water charges “due from 1st of April, 1957” (para. 14–15).
The ejectment application alleged (para. 22) that the respondent “has acquired vacant possession of Government quarter at Vinay Nagar, New Delhi.” The opinion records that as a matter of fact the person referred to (Ved Parkash, the respondent to the ejectment application) did not have acquired vacant possession of that Government quarter on 15 September 1959 (paras. 16, 23).
The Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal allowed ejectment based on clause (h), but the High Court judge found that the Tribunal and Controller failed to record a factual finding that the respondent had the acquired vacant possession on the relevant date and therefore allowed the appeal (paras. 23–24). The appeal was allowed and costs were awarded to the appellant (para. 24–25).

Legal Issues Presented

How is clause (h) of the proviso to sub‑section (1) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958 to be interpreted—specifically, does the word “has” (in the phrase “has built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence”) require the tenant to have a present, subsisting legal right to another residence on the date the eviction application is filed?
Whether a landlord can rely on past breaches or past events (such as an acquisition/allotment/building that no longer gives the tenant a present right to reside elsewhere) to sustain an eviction application under the proviso to s.14(1), or whether the requisite circumstances must persist on the date of the application.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
McConnel v. Wright, 1903 1 Ch. 546	Support for the interpretation that the word “acquired” (in “acquired vacant possession”) implies a present right to move into the premises whose vacant possession is said to have been acquired (para. 13).	The court records that it is “supported in this view” by this authority and relies on it to reinforce the view that “acquired” denotes a present right to occupy.
Naurang Lal v. Suresh Kumar	The opinion lists the case among several authorities considered by the court (para. 11).	The judge states he has read the case but purposefully avoids detailed discussion, remaining firm in his own interpretation (para. 12).
Shyam Sunder v. Khan Chand, 1963 2 D.L.T. 223	Listed as an authority considered by the court (para. 11).	Read by the court; the judge declines to discuss it in detail, maintaining his own interpretation of clause (h) (para. 12).
Siri Chand v. Topi Ram, 1961 63 P.L.R. 915	Listed among cases before the court (para. 11).	The court notes the case was read but avoids detailed engagement, sticking to the statutory interpretation reached (para. 12).
Gian Singh v. Surinder Lal	Listed among the cases referred to the court (para. 11).	The opinion records it was considered but the judge does not enter into its discussion, preferring his chosen interpretation (para. 12).
Jai Kumar v. Sardar Begum, 1968 D.H.C.N. 7	Listed among authorities examined by the court (para. 11).	Read by the judge; no detailed discussion is undertaken, as the judge anchors his decision on his interpretation (para. 12).
New Garage, Limited v. Khitshwant Singh (Division Bench)	Cited for the principle (as described by the judge) that a landlord who has accepted rent after the occurrence of an event relied on as ground for eviction may have waived that breach (para. 15).	The opinion says the law laid down by this Division Bench “cannot be ignored” when considering waiver arising from acceptance of rent after allotment; the point is used to question a landlord's right to invoke eviction after accepting rent (para. 15).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court’s reasoning proceeds from basic principles of statutory interpretation and the protective purpose of the Act. The analysis, in the order presented by the opinion, is as follows:

Statutory interpretation principle: The words of the statute are to be given their plain, contextual meaning. The statute should be construed to be “judiciously meaningful” in its own context (para. 3).
Structure of s.14(1): Section 14(1) generally prohibits eviction orders in favour of landlords, but the proviso to sub‑section (1) enumerates specific grounds on which the Controller may make an order for recovery of premises (paras. 3–4).
Present‑tense effect of “has”: The court focuses on the word “has” in clause (h), treating it as a present‑tense requirement. The opening part of the proviso (permitting the Controller to make an order “on an application made to him in the prescribed manner”) means that the circumstances listed must exist on the date of the application (para. 3).
Meaning of clause (h): Clause (h) requires that, as on the date of the eviction application, the tenant must be presently in a position to occupy some other residence—either because he has built it, has acquired vacant possession of it, or has been allotted it. In short, one of these three situations must be present on the date of application (paras. 3–4, 8–9).
Protective purpose of the Act: The Act is a special protective statute (captioned “Protection of tenant against eviction”), and the proviso identifies limited circumstances that remove that protection. The intent of clause (h) is that a tenant should not be entitled to protection if, at the date of the application, he has a clear subsisting legal right to occupy other residential premises (para. 4).
Past breach insufficient: The court rejects the notion that past events or breaches (or past acquisitions/allotments no longer giving a present right) can sustain an eviction application. The ground must be subsisting at the date of the application; otherwise clause (h) does not apply. The court emphasizes that this is not a punitive provision and that past breaches do not amount to ongoing causes of action for eviction (paras. 5–6).
Practical consequence and waiver: The opinion reasons that if a landlord intends to rely on a ground under the proviso he must act promptly: refuse to continue treating the person as tenant, stop accepting rent and initiate eviction proceedings at the earliest. Accepting rent after knowledge of the relevant event may amount to waiver (para. 6; para. 15 cites New Garage, Limited v. Khitshwant Singh).
Application to the facts: Applying the interpretation to the present case, the court examines the ejectment application allegation that the respondent “has acquired vacant possession of Government quarter at Vinay Nagar.” The court finds the proved facts contradict that allegation for the relevant date (15 September 1959): the respondent (Ved Parkash, the respondent to the ejectment application) did not have acquired vacant possession then (paras. 16, 23).
Failure of Tribunal/Controller to find the factual prerequisite: Because neither the Controller nor the Rent Control Tribunal recorded a finding that the respondent had acquired vacant possession on the date of application, they should not have allowed ejectment on that basis. The eviction was sustained only on clause (h), and the judge disagreed with that approach (paras. 23–24).
Reliance on authorities: The court refers to McConnel v. Wright as supporting the view that “acquired” conveys a present right to occupy; other local cases were read but not discussed because the judge adhered to his statutory interpretation (paras. 13, 11–12).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED.

The court concluded that clause (h) of the proviso to sub‑section (1) of section 14 requires that, on the date the eviction application is made, the tenant must presently possess a subsisting legal right to another residence (whether because he has built it, has acquired vacant possession of it, or has been allotted it). If that present right is absent on the date of application, eviction under clause (h) cannot be sought.

Direct consequences and implications identified in the opinion:

The eviction order under appeal was unsustainable because the Controller and Rent Control Tribunal did not find that the factual prerequisite (acquired vacant possession on the date of application) existed; on that basis the High Court allowed the appeal and awarded costs to the appellant (paras. 23–25).
The opinion emphasizes practical consequences for landlords: they must act promptly if relying on grounds in the proviso—refuse to treat the person as tenant, stop accepting rent, and institute proceedings without undue delay—otherwise the landlord may be taken to have waived the right to seek eviction on that ground (paras. 6, 15).

The opinion sets out the court's interpretation of clause (h) and applies that interpretation to overturn the eviction allowed by the Controller and Rent Control Tribunal in the present case.

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Ved Parkash v. Sh. Chuni Lal .

P.S Safeer, J.:— This appeal turns on an interpretation of clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958 (hereinafter called “the Act”).

2. Sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act with the proviso and the relevant clause is:—

“14. Protection of tenant against eviction:—

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:—

(h) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of the Act built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allot-ed, a residence”

3. The elementary principle of statutory interpretation is that the words employed should be given their plain meaning. The statute is to be construed as to be judiciously meaningful in its own context. subsection (1) of section 14 starts with the prohibition that no order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises is to be made by any court or Controller in favour of a landlord against the tenant and then by enumerating under the proviso separate grounds the provision contains in itself, the pre-conditions which when satisfied may lead to an order for recovery of premises by the Controller. The word “has”, the fourth in clause (h), carries in itself the force of the present tense. It has to be interpreted in terms of the words employed in the opening part of the proviso which are to the effect that the Controller may on an application made to him in the prescribed manner make an order for the recovery of the premises and those words mean that on the date of the application the tenant must be having a residence either because he may have built the same or may have acquired vacant possesion thereof or it may have been allotted to him. Either of the three situations must be there on the date of the application. If that is not so, then clause (h) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act will have no application. Yet in another way, it may be said that as on the date of the application the tenant should be presently having firm legal rights of residence either in respect of a residence built by him or of which he may have acquired vacant possession or of which he may be having the allotment. This clause has been the subject of some controversial interpretations. It is, therefore, that I have repeated myself and propose to dwell further on a thorough probe into its true meaning.

4. The Act is a special protective statute. Section 14 begins under the caption Protection of tenant against eviction”. In term of the grounds contained in the proviso that protection becomes unavailable to the tenant and he becomes liable to eviction only in case certain specified circumstances are proved. The legislative intent contained in clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act is that no tenant should remain entitled to the protection against eviction any longer if he has. as on the date of the application for his eviction, a clear subsisting legal right to occupy and live in any other residential premises which may be available to him either because he may have built the same or may have acquired vacant possession thereof or may have been allotted such residential premises. If as a matter of fact, on the date of an application for eviction the tenant does not have any subsisting legal right to go and reside in a residence either built by him or of which he may have acquired vacant possession or which may have been allotted to him then it cannot be said that the landlord has a subsisting cause of action to move the Controller for passing an order for eviction against him. The “building”, “acquisition” or “allotment” may be either before or after the commencement of the Act, but the “residence” mentioned in clause (h) must be actually available to the tenant on the date when the action for eviction is initiated against him

5. The controversy which has arisen around this clause and around clauses (b) (c) and (d) of the proviso to subsection (l) of section 14 of the Act is based upon a significant, but, in my respectful view, erroneous Concept. Section 14 seen in its entirety is not a punitive provision. The grounds contained in the proviso are not criminal offences and the tenant mentioned therein is not an accused person ever more liable to be punished Take a case where A is the landlord and B is the tenant. B sub-lets the premises without obtaining consent in writing of the landlord, after the 9th of June, 1952, in January, 195j. He incurs the liability to ejectment In terms of clause (b) under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. After about six months be recovers the premises from the sub-tenant. From that month in 1953 onwards the tenant continues to remain in possession of the entire premises as a tenant and the landlord continues accepting rent. In 1960, the premises are sold out to another person who then becomes the landlord entitled to receive the rent and invoke the law against the tenant. Can it be said that the landlord in 1960 can file an application and successfully obtain eviction of the tenant on the ground of his having Bub-let the premises once in 1958 without obtaining the consent in writing of the then landlord? There are some cases in which the view taken is that he can do so. That view however, militates against the intention of the statute. The intention can be best gathered by keeping in view the words used in the opening part of the proviso which are:—

“Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:—”

6. An application has to be made in the prescribed manner invoking one or more of the grounds enumerated under the proviso. There should be a subsisting cause of action as on the date of the application so as to be affirmed ultimately through evidence that the breach by the tenant of the obligations cast upon him was persisting on the date, of the application itself. A, past breach cannot furnish circumstances for punishing this tenant. He is not a person accused of a crime These provisions as, I have said are not punitive provisions. This aspect of section 14 becomes clear when the provisions contained in sub-sections (2) to (11) of the Act are considered in their total effect. After having enumerated the grounds as from (a to (1) further restrictions have been imposed against eviction in terms of several subseqient subsections contained in section 14 The pre-conditions for allowing eviction are sought to be egislatively fixed with absolute certainty. If a landlord wants, to derive aid from the breach of any of the obligation created by the grounds enumerated under the provison to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act than he must make a grievance of it, at once refuse treating the tenant as such and stop accepting the rent and because rent is his only earning out of the tenancy he is expected tc initiate an action lor the tenants’ eviction at the earliest.

7. The clauses containing the grounds under the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act lay down the circumstances which alone, if proved, would entitle a landlord to an order of eviction Howsoever may be the protection as given to the tenant in terms of clause (h) to the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, he is not to be allowed to enjoy his residence in the tenancy premises in a situation in which be may be having a present persisting right to go and live just at his own choice in a residence which he may have built or of which he may have acquired vacant possession or which may have been allotted to him. An order of eviction can be passed against him if premises for his residence other thin the tenancy-premises are as a matter of right available to him If such a tenant is not moving into such premises presently available to him, the land lord can come forward with an application in the prescribed manner and the Controller can then on coming to the conclusion that the demands of clause (h) to the proviso to section 14(1) stand satisfied, pass an order of eviction. If the tenant has no such present right as on the date of the applica-tion, then his eviction under that clause cannot be sougnt.

8. Turning once again to the exact provisions of clause (h), mentioned above, the word “has” applies with the same force and velocity 10 the words “built”, “acquired vacant possession of” and “been allotted. The last words “a residence” again relate to all the three contingencies. The word “has” contains in itself the meaning of presently possessing something the ordinary English dictionaries while giving the meaning of word “has” refer to the word “have”, which in turn means “to hold”, “to possess”.

9. The words “has built” or “has acquired” or “has been allotted” clearly mean that the tenant has already built acquired or been alloted the residence to which he can move and that on the date of the application for his eviction his right to reside therein exists I am supported in this view by the views expressed in Mc Connel v. Wright . 1903 1 Ch. 546. It is imperative that the word “acquired” in the phrase acquired vapant poses-sion of is given the deserved consideration As for as its true import is concerned the word “acquired” carries within itself sense of present right to move into the premises of which vacant possession stands acquired.

10. The meaning of clause (h) may be looked into in another way. It occurs in a provision which provries protection to the tenant against eviction If a tenant has no present right of moving into a residential accommodation either built by him or of which may have been allotted to him then the landlord cannot be held to be having any present right of moving an application against the tenant for his eviction. Any ofher meaning would defeat the statue in as much as it would cease to be a protective statute. The words (as they stand associated with each other m clause (h) lead to the only conclusion that as on the date of the appli-cation the tenant must be possessing a clear right to reside in some other penses than the tenancy premises as a matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or the same may have been allotted to him. To me it appears that if any other interpretation is sought to be placed then that would be making an effort beyond the statute and that would not be permissible in law. The casts referred to before me are:—

11. Naurang Lal v. Suresh Kumar,2 Shyam Sunder v. Khan Chand . 1963 2 D.L.T 223. Siri Chand v. Topi Ram . 1961 63 P.L.R 915. Gian Singh v. Surinder Lal.5 and Jai Kumar v. Sardar Begum . 1968 D.H.C.N 7

12. I have read the cases and pondered over the views expressed therein. I am purposefully avoiding discussion because I am firmly of the view that clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act bears out to me only the interpretation to which I have resorted.

13. Turning to the facts of this case an application for ejectment of the tenant appellant was filed on 17th September 1959 by respondent Chuni Lal It is significant that it has been found by the Kent Control Tribunal in paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment that the respondent was not the owner of the premises in dispute, but was himself a tenant thereof; the present appellant being an alleged subtenant.

14. The agreed case between the parties is that the premises allotted to the tenant remained in his possession as from 21st of January, 1956, to 5th of February, 1959. The facts proved show that in spite of the provisions contained in clause (h) of the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 13 of Act 38 of 1952, which were applicable, the present respondent-landlord never moved an application for the ejectment of the tenant during the aforementioned period. The act came into force in February, 1959. The application for ejectment was not filed till 17th September, 1959. I have seen the original application for ejectment, Non-payment of rent was one of the grounds. That ground as in the eviction application is:—

“18(a): Non-payment of rent and water charges due from 1st of April, 1957.”

15. The aspect raised by the plea that rent was due only as from 1st of April, 1957, is indeed “intriguing. The tenant had been allotted premises as from 21st January, 1956 From that date to the 1st of April, 1957 (for about a yeary and three months the landlord received the rent. How can such a landlord turn back ani invoke the aid of the Controller for riving him an eviction order against the tenant from whom he has been receiving rent inspite of his having been allotted other residential premises and his not having moved to the same? The landlord waived the breach which was there The law laid down by a Division Bench in New Garage, Limited v. Khitshwant Singh,7 cannot be ignored.

16. I must, however say that the interpretation of clause (h) as recorded above has not been influenced by this aspect and I hive actually checked up the ejectment application after recording the interpretation. The plea with which this appeal is concerned is contained in the following Words used in ground of paragraph 18 of the ejectment application:—

18(2): Respondent has acquired Vacant possession of Govern ment quarter at Vinav Nagar, New Delhi.”

17. The foregoing was an allegation of fact. Its clear meaning was that as on 15th September, 1959, which is the date on which the application for ejectment seems to have been thumb-marked by Chuni Lal applicant (although the filing stamp on the ejectment application bears the date 17th September, 1959) the respondent was alleged to have acquired uacant possession of Government quarter at Vinay Nagar, New Delhi It was not alleged that he had been allotted any residential premises The allegation was that he had acquired vacant possession of Government quarter The words “has acquired” could not convey that as on the date of the application the respondent had with him the acquired vacant possession of the Government quarter at Vinay Nagar The facts proved disclose that on the 15th September, 1959, Ved Parkash, respondent to the ejectment application, did not have any acquired vacant possession of Government quarter at Vinay Nagar. That being an admitted fact, I wounder why the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal did not look through this factual aspect and decide the dispute between the parties on that basis. It has been noticed by both the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal that after 5th February, 1959, Ved Parkash did not have in his possession any allotted premises That being so, the fact of his not having with him any acquired vacant possession of any Government quarter at Vinay Nagar on 15th September, 1959, should have been determined as disentitling the respondent to any relief on that ground because of the very scope of the factual plea raised by him through his ejectment application.

18. I may also say that the allegation to the effect that the “respondent has acquired vacant possession of Government quarter at Vinay Nagar, New Delhi” clearly meant that the respondent as on 15th September 1959, was having that accommodation. The Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal having not recorded any finding that on 15th September, 1959, the respondent was having any such tenure 1 vacant possession of Government quarter at Vinay Nagar, New Delhi, should not have allowed ejectment on that score. Looking at the case before me from all aspects and finding that the judgment under appeal sustains eviction only on the basis of the provisions of clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act and finding myself in clear disagreement with the view taken by the Rent Control Tribunal I hereby accept the appeal and allow the same. The appelant will have his costs incurred before this Court and the Rent Control tribunal.

19. Appeal allowed.

Ved Parkash v. Sh. Chuni Lal .

Structured Summary of the Opinion — P.S. Safeer, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ved Parkash v. Sh. Chuni Lal .

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