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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • section 114 and Order XLVII. Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • section 480 and section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 37(2)
  • section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure.Support
  • Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules 1959,
  • section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • SECTION 3 CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT
  • section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 202, Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 151, Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 193, Indian Penal Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • section 114 and Order XLVII. Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • section 480 and section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 37(2)
  • section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure.Support
  • Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules 1959,
  • section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • SECTION 3 CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT
  • section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 202, Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 151, Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 193, Indian Penal Code
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Om Parkash, J.: Controller under Delhi Rent Control Act vis-à-vis Section 195(1)(b) CrPC

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a complaint under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code alleging that the respondent, a tenant of part of premises No. 4024, Chawri Bazar, Delhi, had deliberately given false evidence during proceedings before the Additional Controller appointed under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The factual core: the petitioner and his brother purchased the premises on 12 May 1961; the respondent continued as tenant; on 9 May 1962 the petitioners applied under section 14(1) of the Act for eviction, alleging among other grounds that the respondent had acquired alternate accommodation after the Act commenced. During the Controller's proceedings the respondent answered interrogatories and filed an affidavit denying that he had been allotted or acquired accommodation, but the petitioner alleged that the respondent had in fact acquired accommodation at House No. 24/9, Tilak Road, Shakti Nagar, Delhi.

The petitioner lodged a criminal complaint under section 193 IPC. The Additional District Magistrate (ADM) sent the complaint to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for enquiry under section 202 CrPC. On receipt of the SDM's report, the ADM declined to take cognizance, holding that the alleged offence was committed in proceedings before the Additional Controller (a "Controller" within the Act) and, since the complaint was not filed by the Controller, section 195(1)(b) CrPC barred cognizance. A revision against the ADM's order was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, leading to the present revision petition to the High Court. Notice was served on the respondent but he did not appear.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Controller appointed under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is a "Court" within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  2. Whether section 195(1)(b) CrPC barred taking cognizance of the petitioner's complaint under section 193 IPC because the alleged false evidence was given in proceedings before the Additional Controller?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The two courts below erred in treating the Controller as a "Court" for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) CrPC and in holding that section 195(1)(b) barred taking cognizance of the complaint.
  • The scheme and provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act show that the legislature intended the Controller to be regarded as a Court only for certain specified purposes and not universally for all statutory contexts.
  • Specific provisions of the Act (referred to before the court as sections 14, 35, 36, 37 and 41) demonstrate that the Controller is invested with limited, specified powers rather than the full attributes of a court; notably, the Act does not deem the Controller to be a Court for the purposes of section 195 CrPC.
  • Therefore the Controller cannot be treated as a "Court" within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) CrPC and the bar in that section does not apply to the petitioner's complaint.

No detailed arguments from the respondent are recorded in the opinion; the respondent failed to appear despite service.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thakar Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. (also cited as Thakur Jugal Kishore) Authorities on the significance and definition of the word "Court"; included an approved definition from Halsbury's Laws of England describing "Court" as tribunals exercising judicial functions under legal sanction. The Court relied on the definitions and observations in this decision to frame the test whether an authority possesses the attributes of a "Court" and to compare attributes of the Controller with those of recognized courts (including noting that an Assistant Registrar performing certain functions was held to be a Court in that case).
Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab Explains distinction between a Court and a quasi-judicial tribunal: a Court decides disputes in a judicial manner, gives definitive judgments, guarantees parties a right to be heard and to adduce evidence, and decides on evidence in accordance with law. The High Court adopted this test from the cited decision to assess whether the Controller under the Rent Control Act possessed all attributes of a Court.
Ram Parshad Rastogi v. Jagdish Narain Held that a Controller is not a Court within the meaning of section 476 CrPC. The court treated the ratio as supportive authority: if a Controller is not a Court for s.476 CrPC, the reasoning lends support to holding the Controller is not a Court for purposes of section 195(1)(b) CrPC.
Ved Parkash v. Harish Chander Rastogi Decision holding that a Controller is not a Court (as stated in the opinion). The decision was cited as additional judicial support for the proposition that a Controller does not qualify as a Court for the statutory purpose in question.
State v. Ram Dass T. Chugani (Criminal Original No. 14 of 1967, Division Bench) Held that the Tribunal under the Delhi Rent Control Act is a Court within the meaning of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The decision was distinguished: the Tribunal (on appeal) is vested with all powers of a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure by section 38(3) of the Act, whereas the Controller is given only specified procedural powers; thus the Division Bench's holding about the Tribunal does not govern the Controller's status.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied a statutory-structure and attribute-based analysis, anchored in precedents that articulate what constitutes a "Court" as opposed to a quasi-judicial body. The reasoning proceeded in these principal steps:

  1. Identification of the legal test: The court relied on authoritative statements (as recorded in the cited Supreme Court authorities) that to be a "Court" an authority must possess the attributes of a forum that decides disputes judicially, issues definitive judgments, ensures parties a right to be heard and to produce evidence, and decides matters on consideration of evidence and law.
  2. Examination of the Rent Control Act's scheme: The court reviewed the Act's specific provisions to see which powers are conferred on the Controller. Key statutory provisions considered included:
    • Section 14 — indicates the Controller is to be treated differently from a court with respect to orders for recovery of possession and sets out grounds for eviction; the language suggests intentional distinction between Controller and "court".
    • Section 36(2) — confers only certain powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) on the Controller (summoning witnesses, etc.) and expressly deems the Controller to be a Court only for limited purposes (sections 480 and 482 CrPC are specified); the Act does not expressly deem the Controller a Court for section 195 CrPC.
    • Section 37(2) and Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 — direct the Controller to follow practice and procedure of a court of small causes and to be guided by CPC on procedure, indicating a procedural alignment but not full equivalence with a civil court.
    • Section 42 — empowers the Controller to make orders executable as a civil court decree and grants the Controller "all the powers of a civil Court" for execution purposes, again indicating purpose-limited conferral of powers.
  3. Attribute comparison and limitation: The court observed that the Controller has been vested with specified procedural and execution powers, but not with the full suite of judicial attributes of a court (for example, the Controller lacks review powers and inherent jurisdiction under the CPC, which were present in authorities held to be Courts in other cases).
  4. Use of precedents: The court drew on earlier decisions holding a Controller not to be a Court (Ram Parshad Rastogi; Ved Parkash) and on the tests and distinctions in Supreme Court authorities (e.g., Virindar Kumar Satyawadi and Thakar Jugal Kishore Sinha). It also distinguished a Division Bench decision that treated the Tribunal (appeal body under the Act) as a Court because the Tribunal is expressly vested with all powers of a civil court on appeal by section 38(3), which materially differs from the Controller's limited statutory powers.
  5. Conclusion from statutory scheme and authorities: Because the Act confers only specified, limited powers on the Controller and does not deem the Controller a Court for purposes of section 195 CrPC, the Controller does not possess all attributes of a "Court" within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) CrPC. Accordingly, section 195(1)(b) did not operate as a bar to the taking of cognizance of the petitioner's complaint under section 193 IPC.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition was allowed. The Court held that the Controller appointed under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is not a "Court" within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; therefore section 195(1)(b) did not bar taking cognizance of the complaint alleging an offence under section 193 IPC committed in proceedings before the Additional Controller.

Consequential orders and immediate effect:

  • The orders of the two Courts below (the Additional District Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge) were set aside.
  • The complaint filed by the petitioner was remitted to the Additional District Magistrate for disposal in accordance with law.

Broader implications: The opinion confines itself to statutory construction and application of existing authorities to the particular statutory scheme. The judgment emphasizes that the Controller is to be regarded as a Court only for certain specified purposes enumerated in the Act and not universally for all statutory contexts; the opinion relies on precedent and statutory distinction rather than announcing a novel rule. The opinion does not assert that it establishes a new broader precedent beyond its application to the Controller's status under section 195(1)(b) CrPC.

Revision allowed.

    Sumer Chand Petitioner v. Shri Daya Sarup Saxena

    Om Parkash, J.:— The question, which requires decision in this revision petition, against an order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, is whether the Controller, appointed under the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is a Court, within the meaning of section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure. The question arose in a complaint, filed under section 193, Indian Penal Code, by the petitioner, against the respondent. The allegations in the complaint were as under :—

    The respondent was a tenant of a portion of premises No. 4024, Chawri Bazar, Delhi. The petitioner and his brother had purchased the premises on the 12th May 1961. The respondent had continued to be a tenant in the portion occupied by him. On the 9th May 1962, the petitioner and his brother had made an application, under section 14(1) of the Act, before the Controller, for eviction of the respondent from the portion of the premises occupied by him. The eviction had been sought on various grounds. One of the grounds was that the respondent had acquired or had been allotted a residence after the commencement of the Act. The Controller entrusted the application to the Additional Controller for disposal. The respondent contested the application. During the course of trial of the application the respondent had, in answer to the interrogatories delivered, stated that he had not been allotted any accomodation by the office nor he had arranged for any other accomodation. An affidavit was filed in support of the above reply. The statement and the affidavit were false as the respondent had already acquired accomodation in House No. 24/9, Tilak Road, Shakti Nagar, Delhi. The respondent had thus intentionally given or fabricated false evidence during and for the purpose of being used in a judicial proceeding before the Additional Controller.

    The Additional District Magistrate, before whom the complaint, under section 193 Indian Penal Code, was filed by the petitioner, had sent it to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for enquiry under section 202, Code of Criminal Procedure. On the receipt of the report from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Additional District Magistrate refused to take cognizance of the complaint on the ground that the offence under section 193, Indian Penal Code, was alleged to have been committed in proceedings before the Additional Controller, who was a Court as the complaint was not filed by the Additional Controller, but by the petitioner only, section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure, was a bar to taking cognizance of the complaint.

    A revision petition against the order of the Additional District Magistrate was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. Hence the present revision petition.

    Notice of the revision petition was given to the respondent. He was served; but he did not appear, despite service.

    The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the correctness of the view of the two Courts below that the Controller was a Court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure, and that that section barred taking cognizance of the complaint of the petitioner. The learned counsel contended that the scheme of the Act clearly indicated that the intention of the legislature was that the Controller should be regarded as a Court for certain specified purposes and not for other purposes. The learned counsel referred to sections 14, 35, 36, 37 and 41 of the Act in support of his contention. The learned counsel submitted that the Act does not say that the Controller will be deemed to be a Court for purposes of section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Controller was not, therefore, a Court within the meaning of that section.

    The contentions raised by the learned counsel have got validity. The word “Court” has been used both in the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the Act. But neither of the two defines the word “Court”. The significance of the word “Court” has been considered by the Supreme Court in various decisions. In Thakar Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. and another,(1), previous decisions were noted by the Supreme Court. The following definition of the word “Court” given in Halsburys' Laws of England (Third Edition—Vol. 9) at page 342 was also noted :—

    “Originally the term ‘Court’ meant among other meanings, the Sovereign's palace; it has acquired the meaning of the place where justice is administered and, further, has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived either immediately or mediately from the Sovereign. All tribunals, however, are not Courts, in the sense in which the term is here employed, namely, to denote such tribunals as exercise jurisdiction over persons by reason of the sanction of the law, and not merely by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction.”

    The Supreme Court, also approved the observations made in the earlier case, Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State Of Punjab ,(2) which were:—

    “It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question, therefore, arises as to whether an authority created by “an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court.”

    The question to be considered is whether having regard to the provisions and scheme of the Act, the Controller possesses all the attributes of a Court. Section 14 of the Act lays down that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant. Then follow grounds on which a Controller can order eviction of a tenant. The language of section 14 indicates that the legislature intended to maintain distinction between a Controller and a Court and that the intention was that the Controller should not be regarded as a Court. Section 36(2) of the Act confers only certain powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for summoning of witnesses etc., on a Controller but not all the powers under that Code. This section also lays down that a Controller shall be deemed to be a Court for purposes of section 480 and section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no provision in the Act that the Controller shall be deemed to be a Court within the meaning of Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 37(2) provides that the Controller shall follow the practice and procedure of a court of small causes. Under Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules 1959, the Controller is to be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, while deciding any question relating to procedure. It is clear that the Controller has been invested with the powers of a civil Court relating to practice and procedure only and not with all the powers of a civil Court. Section 42 of the Act provides that an order made by the Controller shall be executable by the Controller as a decree of the civil Court and for this purpose, the Controller shall have all the powers of a civil Court. This section also indicates that the Controller can exercise the powers of a civil Court for certain purposes only.

    It is clear from the provisions set forth above that the intention of the legislature was that the Controller should be regarded as a Court for certain specified purposes only and not for all purposes and that the Controller does not possess all the attributes of a Court. The Controller, therefore, cannot be held to be a Court for purposes of section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure.

    Support for the above view is forthcoming from the decision in Ram Parshad Rastogi v. Jagdish Narain, (3), wherein it was held that a controller is not a Court within the meaning of section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure. The ratio of the decision will apply for holding that Controller is not a Court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure. In Ved Parkash v. Harish Chander Rastogi, (4), it was held that a Controller is not a Court.

    In Thakur Jugal Kishore v. The Sitamarhi Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. (1), supra, the Assistant Registrar discharging the functions of a Registrar, was held to be a Court within the meaning section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Assistant Registrar, besides having powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling the production of documents etc. in the same manner as provided in the case of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, had also powers of review vested under section 114 and Order XLVII. Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, and inherent jurisdiction specified in section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. The Controller, under the Act, is not invested with the powers of review or with inherent jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, but is invested with the powers of summoning witnesses, compelling production of documents etc. only.

    A Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Original No. 14 of 1967 (The State v. Ram Dass T. Chugani) decided on the 17th December, 1968, has held that the Tribunal under the Act is a Court within the meaning of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It is to be noted that while only certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure have been conferred on the Controller, all the powers of a Court under that Code have been conferred on the Tribunal when hearing an appeal vide section 38(3). This is an important distinction between the powers of a Controller and the Tribunal. The decision of the Division Bench will not govern the case of the Controller.

    It follows, from the above discussion, that the Controller, appointed under the Act, is not a Court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure. That section did not, therefore bar the taking of cognizance of the complaint, filed by the petitioner, which alleged the commission of an offence under section 193, Indian Penal Code in proceedings before the Additional Controller which term is included in the word “Controller”.

    The revision petition is allowed. The orders of the Courts below are set aside. The complaint is remitted to the Additional District Magistrate for disposal in accordance with law.

    ANK Revision allowed.
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    Comments

    Sumer Chand Petitioner v. Shri Daya Sarup Saxena
    (Apr 25, 1969)