Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — I.D. Dua, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act directed against an order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 23 July 1968 which dismissed the appellant's appeal and maintained an order of the Rent Controller dated 15 December 1967. The Rent Controller's order allowed an amendment to the respondent's written statement by introducing a plea of want of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The eviction proceedings were initiated in May 1964; by the time the amendment was sought (sometime in November 1967) about six witnesses for the landlord had already been examined. The Rent Controller's brief order allowed the amendment on payment of costs of Rs. 25/-. The appellant challenged that allowance on the ground that the Controller's order did not disclose reasons and that the amendment had been permitted at an advanced stage of the proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Rent Controller properly exercised his judicial discretion in allowing the respondent to amend the written statement to introduce a plea of want of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act at the late stage of proceedings.
  2. Whether an order granting such an amendment must disclose the reasons or the working of the judicial mind so as to permit appellate scrutiny (i.e., whether the discretion was exercised in a non-arbitrary, judicial manner).
  3. Whether a plea of want of notice under section 106 goes to the inherent jurisdiction of the Rent Controller or is otherwise excluded from amendment at a late stage (including whether such a plea can be waived by a tenant).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Rent Controller's order allowing amendment was arbitrary because it contained no reasons and did not disclose the judicial mind that led to the exercise of discretion.
  • The amendment was allowed after substantial progress in the case (six landlord witnesses examined and proceedings pending since 1964), making it inappropriate at such a late stage.
  • Relied on prior decisions (including Pritam Singh v. Suraj Pershad and others) to submit that although amendment powers are wide, they are discretionary and must be exercised on judicial principles; and that want of notice under section 106 does not oust the Rent Controller's jurisdiction.
  • Relied on authorities (including Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh) to argue that appellate interference is warranted where a discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or on a misunderstanding of governing principles, producing a failure of justice.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Court should look into the facts to determine whether the Rent Controller rightly allowed the amendment even if the Controller's brief order does not disclose detailed reasoning.
  • The Rent Control Tribunal's order on appeal (which upheld the Controller) could be used to supplement the Rent Controller's order and to indicate that the discretion was rightly exercised.
  • Implicit in submissions was a contention that superior courts should not substitute their own discretion for that of the Controller; rather they should respect the Controller's exercise of judicial discretion where properly applied.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pritam Singh v. Suraj Pershad — 1967 3 D.L.T. 704 That the court may allow alterations or amendments at any stage on terms just and in the larger interests of justice; power to permit amendments is recognised under the Delhi Rent Control Act but is discretionary and must be exercised on judicial principles. Used by appellant to show amendment power is wide but discretionary; Court considered this authority when evaluating whether the Controller exercised judicial discretion properly.
Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh — A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 321 Principle that appellate interference is warranted where a discretion is exercised arbitrarily or based on a misunderstanding of governing principles, resulting in a failure of justice. The Court relied on this principle to explain when intervention is appropriate if discretion has been misapplied or exercised arbitrarily.
Naresh Chander Mittal v. Bishamber Nath Chopra — 1966 D.L.T. 352 This decision was cited but no specific rule or principle from it is detailed in the opinion. The Court observed that this decision was of little assistance on the issues before it.
Bansi Dhar v. R. D. Bansal — R.S.A. 323-D of 1966 (decided 24 Oct 1968) Sets out an interpretation of section 106, Transfer of Property Act: it is a rule of construction applicable where no period is agreed; it determines duration by reference to the object of the tenancy; the section raises a presumption at the commencement of the lease and may not readily be applied to leases existing before the section's enforcement. Quoted by appellant to challenge straightforward application of section 106 to varied factual contexts; Court noted and reproduced the passage in considering how section 106 has been interpreted.
Bhaiya Ram v. Mahavir Parshad — 1968 70 P.L.R. 1011 (Full Bench) Held that a plea of want of notice under section 106 is not incapable of waiver by a tenant; waiver is a deliberate and conscious act (distinct from estoppel) and whether waiver occurred is a question of evidence. Appellant relied on this Full Bench decision to argue that the Controller should have considered whether the tenant had waived the objection to non-issue of notice before allowing amendment.
Mst. Sardar Begum v. Jagdish Chand Bhandari — A.I.R. 1967 Delhi 61 This decision is listed by the Court; no specific rule or principle extracted in the opinion beyond its citation. The Court noted it among several authorities relied on by the respondent but observed such decisions proceed on their own facts.
L.J. Leach & Co. v. Jardine Skinner & Co. — 1957 S.C.R. 438 Specific rule or principle from this case is not stated in the provided opinion. The Court listed this case among authorities considered but did not describe its precise application in the present judgment.
Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalagonda Sidgonda Patil — 1957 S.C.R. 595 This case is cited but the opinion does not specify the rule or principle relied upon from it. No specific application is described in the opinion beyond its inclusion in the catalogue of decisions.
Raj Kumar v. Harish Kumar — 1968 70 P.L.R. (Delhi) Section 67 The opinion does not set out a specific principle from this citation. Listed among other decisions; the Court did not elaborate a direct application in the text supplied.
Narasingk Prasad Paul v. Steel Products Ltd — A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 15 No specific rule or principle from this case is described in the opinion. The case was mentioned but the opinion does not record a particular application to the facts before the Court.
Amolakchand Mohanlal v. Firm of Sadhuram Tularam — A.I.R. 1954 Nag. 200 The opinion does not state a specific rule or principle cited from this authority. The decision was listed; the Court did not elaborate its application in the provided text.
Masireddi Suryananayana v. Akula Anasuyamma — A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 298 No particular principle from this case is extracted in the opinion. Included among cited authorities; no detailed application is provided in the opinion excerpt.
Roop Narain God v. Smt. Krishan Devi Bagadia — 1969 5 D.L.T. 127 Recent Bench decision of this Court that considered whether dicta in Manujendra Dutt v. Roy Chaudhury applied to proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act; the question was left open. The Court noted that this decision left open whether the Supreme Court's dicta in Manujendra Dutt covered proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, implying the point still required judicial determination.
Manujendra Dutt v. Pumedu Prasad Roy Chaudhury — A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1419 The opinion references dicta from this Supreme Court decision but does not set out the dicta in full or the exact principle relied upon. The Roop Narain Bench had left open whether Manujendra Dutt's dicta applied to Delhi Rent Control Act proceedings; the present Court noted that the question needs judicial determination.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the appellant's contention that the Rent Controller's brief order — permitting the amendment on payment of Rs. 25 — did not disclose reasons or the judicial process by which the discretion was exercised. The Court accepted the premise that when a judicial or quasi-judicial authority is called upon to exercise discretion it must do so according to rules of reason and justice, and the order should disclose the working of the judicial mind so that superior courts can scrutinise it on appeal or revision.

The Court reviewed authorities relied upon by both sides. It acknowledged that the power to permit amendments is wide and recognised under the Delhi Rent Control Act (as in Pritam Singh), but emphasised that such power is discretionary and must be exercised on judicial principles. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Santosh Kumar that appellate interference is appropriate where discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or on a misunderstanding of governing principles, producing a failure of justice.

The respondent's submission that the Rent Control Tribunal's order could supplement the Rent Controller's order and that this Court should examine the facts was considered and rejected to the extent that it amounted to permitting an appellate court or Tribunal to substitute its reasons for those of the authority that purported to exercise the discretion. The Court reiterated that neither the Tribunal nor this Court is ordinarily entitled to substitute its own discretion for that of the Rent Controller and that a discretionary order must itself show the reasons or the judicial mind if the exercise is to be meaningfully amenable to scrutiny.

Applying these principles to the instant facts, the Court concluded that the impugned order suffered from a substantial error: the Rent Controller's order did not permit a fair assessment that he had applied his judicial mind to all relevant considerations and recognised principles applicable to amendments of this kind. Accordingly, the Court found it necessary to quash both the Rent Controller's order and the Appellate Tribunal's order and to remit the matter to the Controller for fresh exercise of discretion in accordance with law and in light of the observations recorded in the opinion.

The Court also observed that several decisions have addressed the question of allowing fresh pleas of want of notice under section 106 in eviction proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, and noted that a recent Bench decision left open whether certain Supreme Court dicta applied to proceedings under that Act — indicating that some questions remain for judicial determination.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct consequences and instructions:

  • The Court quashed both the Rent Controller's order dated 15 December 1967 (which allowed the amendment) and the Rent Control Tribunal's order dated 23 July 1968 (which had dismissed the appellant's appeal).
  • The case is remitted to the Rent Controller to exercise his judicial discretion afresh and in accordance with law, taking into account the principles articulated in this opinion.
  • The parties were directed to appear before the Controller on 2 December 1968 for a short listing and further proceedings in accordance with law.
  • The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs.
  • The Court directed that the proceedings (which had been pending since 1964) be given priority and disposed of without undue delay.

Broader implications:

  • The decision emphasises that discretionary orders permitting amendments must disclose the reasoning or the working of the judicial mind to enable appellate scrutiny; an absence of such disclosure may render the exercise of discretion susceptible to interference as arbitrary.
  • The Court did not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying established principles on the proper exercise of judicial discretion and the need for reasoned orders. The opinion notes unresolved questions (for example, the precise application of certain Supreme Court dicta to proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act) remain open for further judicial determination.

This summary is derived exclusively from the provided opinion text and does not add or infer facts not contained therein.

    Om Parkash Singal v. Roshan Lal Khanna .

    I.D Dua, C.J:— This is a second appeal from order under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act directed against the order of the learned Rent Control Tribunal dated 23rd July, 1968 dismissing the present appellant's appeal and maintaining the order of the learned Rent Controller dated 15th December, 1967, by means of which amendment of the written statement filed by the respondent in this Court was allowed by introducing a plea of want of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    2. The order which is described by the appellant to be arbitrary so far as relevant reads thus:—

    “I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. In my opinion, it would be quite just and expedient to allow the amendment in question on payment of costs amounting to Rs. 25/-”

    3. The appellant's learned counsel submits that this order does not show any reasons for exercising the discretion in favour of the respondent in the proceeding which started as far back as May, 1964. It is common case of the parties that about six witnesses for the landlord were examined before the Controller when the application for amendment of the written statement was presented sometime in November, 1967. Shri Vijay Kishan has relied on to begin with a decision of this Court in Pritam Singh… v. Suraj Pershad…Defendant. . 1967 3 D.L.T 704. It was observed in that decision that the Court may at any stage of the proceeding allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and in the larger interests of justice, the Court should, as a general rule, permit amendments which may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties. Such power of amendment is recognised during proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act. It was emphasised in that decision that this power however wide, is discretionary and the discretion is to be exercised on judicial principles. While dealing with sect on 106. Transfer of Property Act, it was observed that this section merely lays down a deeming provision in regard to duration of certain leases in the absence of contract or local usage and provides for their termination by notice specified to be observed in the manner provided. This section. however, does not exclude or prohibit other means of terminating such leases nor does it concern itself with the inherent jurisdiction of the Court empowered to deal with eviction proceedings. Want of notice under this section was accordingly held not to go to the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts of the Rent Controllers under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Reference has next been made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh . A.I.R 1953S.C 321.. Specific reliance has been placed on following observations at P. 324:—

    We do not wish to throw doubt on those decisions which decide that ordinarily an appeal will not be entertained against an exercise of discretion that has been exercised along sound judicial lines. But if the discretion is exercised arbitrarily, or is based on a misunderstanding of the principles that govern its exercise, then interference is called for if there has been a resultant failure of justice. As we have said the only ground given for corcluding that the defence is not bona fide is that the defendant did not prove his assertions before he was allowed to put in his defence; and there is an obvious failure of justice if judgment is entered against a man who, if he is allowed to prove his case, cannot but succeed. According interference is called for here.”

    4. The next decision cited is Naresh Chander Mittal v. Bishamber Nath Chopra . 1966 D.L.T 352., but this decision seems to be of little assistance and need not detain me. He has also relied on some unreported decisions of this Court. In Bansi Dhar v. R D. Bansal . R.S.A 323-D of 1966 decided on 24th October, 1968., R. S. A. 323 D of 1966 decided on 24th October. 1968 after reprrducing section 106, Transfer of Property Act, it was observed as under:—

    “This section lays down a rule of construction which is to be applied when there is no period agreed upon between the parties, and in such cases, the duration his to be determined by a reference to the object or purpose for which the tenancy is created. The rule of construction embodied in this section applies not only the express leases of uncertain duration but also to leases implied by law which may be inferred from possession and accceptance of rent and other circumstances It would thus appear that this section would raise the requisite presumption at the time when the lease starts in other words, this section must be in force at the time of the commencement of the lease in order to incorporate the implied terms in the bilateral agreement giving rise thereto. It would, therefore, be somewhat doubtful to apply this section to this section to those leases which were in existence before its enforcement for variation of the terms of those leases after their enforcement, is not easy to uphold on the plain reading of this section. Once a contractual lease is created, its terms, as intended by the parties, whether express or implied, must govern the relationship from the very inception of the agreement and in the absence of a clear statutory provision, a modification of those terms cannot be implied by a provision like section 106, Transfer of property Act.”

    5. In this connection Shri Vijay Kishan has also drawn my attention to a recent Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported as Bhaiya Ram v. Mahavir Parshad . 1968 70 P. L. R. 1011. The conclusion of the Full Pench is recorded at pages 1041 and 1042 of the report. It is observed at page 1042 that plea of want of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not such that cannot be waived by a tenant and a tenant is entitled to waive the objection regarding non-issue of such a notice if he likes. Waiver is, however, a deliberate and conscious act as elistinguished from estoppel which may be cremated by law. Whehter the objection has in fact been waived or not in a particular case is a question on the direct and circumstantial evidence avilable in a given case. It is submitted that all these various aspects should have been weighed by the learned Controller while deciding whether cannot it was a fit case in which discretion should have been exercised at such late stage of the proceedings when six witnesses had been actually examined in Court by the landlord and more than three years had elapsed after the initiation of eviction proceedings.

    6. On behalf of the respondent, great stress has been laid on the submission that even though the order of the Controller does not purport to show on the face of it, its reasoning or the considerations which actually weighed with it, in allowing amendment, neverthless this Court should and is entitled to go into the facts to see whether or not the Rent Controller should have rightly allowed the amendment. As a matter of fact, the order of the Rent Control Tribunal on appeal has also been pressed into service for the purpose of supplementing the order of the Rent Controller and saying that the Rent Control Tribunal has held that the discretion was rightly exercised by the Controller and, therefore, this Court should assume that the discretion has been rightly exercised. The submission is somewhat difficult to uphold. Discretion has to be exercised by the authority which is invested with the power and which purports to do so. Neither the Rent Control Tribunal nor this Court is entitled to substitute its own discretion, in regard to the matter requiring discretionary decision for the discretion of the Rent Controller, nor would it ordinarily be permissible for the Rent Control Tribunal or for this Court to give its own reasons in support of the conclusion of the Rent Controller which has to be based on the latter's judicial discretion. It is axiomatic that the order by means of which a discretionary matter is decided, must disclose the working of the judicial mind so as to enable the superior Courts to scrutinise those orders on appeal or revision, if necessity to do so arises. If such an order merely records the conclusion without disclosing reasons, it may well be suggestive of arbitrariness. When something is to be done within the discretion of a Court or a judicial Tribunal then it has to be done according to the rules of reason and justice and not according to private opinion: in other words, it has to be done according to law and not humour: it must not be arbitrary, seemingly fanciful or devoid of reason, but legal and regular. The idea of discretion which is to be exercised in a disciplined and responsible manner, postulates that the possessor of discretion must put his mind in the case and really use judgment in coming to a decision and not approach the matter suggesting that his mind is already made up. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent do not run counter to the view I have just expressed. They all proceed on their own facts. I would however, like just to note those decisions in deference to the exhaustive arguments addressed:

    Mst. Sardar Begum v. Jagdish Chand Bhandari . A.I.R 1967 Delhi 61., L.J Leach & Co. v. Jardine Siknner & Co. . 1957 S.C.R 438., Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalagonda Sidgonda Patil . 1957 S.C.R 595., Raj Kumar… v. Harish Kumar… . 1968 70 P.L.R Delhi Section 67., Narisingk Prasad Paul v. Steel Products Ltd . A.I.R 1953 Cal. 15., Amolakchand Mohanlal v. Firm of Sadhuram Tularam . A.I.R 1954 Nag. 200, and Masireddi Suryananayana v. Akula Anasuyamma . A.I.R 1963 A. P. 298..

    7. Now the question arises as to what order should be made on the facts and circumstances of this case. The impugned order suffers from a substantial error in as much it is not possible on the facts and circumstances of this case to hold that the RentController has applied his judicial mind to all the relevant considerations and to the recognised principle applicable to a case of amendment like the present. The correct procedure to adopt in this case would, in my opinion be to quash both the orders of the Rent Controller and of the Appellate Tribunal and send the case back to the Controller to exercise his judicial discretion in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Quite a number of decisions of this Court have since been given dealing with the question of amendment in the matter of introducing a fresh plea of want of notice under section 106. Transfer of Property Act in proceedings for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act. In a recent Bench decision of this Court in Roop Narain God v. Smt. Krishan Devi Bagadia . 1969 5 D.L.T 127. the question whether the dicta of the Supreme Court decision in Manujendra Dutt v. Pumedu Prasad Roy Chaudhury . A.I.R 1967 S. C. 1419 covered the proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act. was left open which would suggest that the question needs judicial determination.

    8. For the foregoing reasons. I allow this appeal but without any order as to costs and direct the parties to appear before the Controller on 2nd December, 1968 when a short date would be given for further proceeding in accordance with law.

    9. I need hardly point out that these proceedings which have been pending since 1964 should be given priority and should be disposed of without undue delay.

    10. Appeal allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Om Parkash Singal v. Roshan Lal Khanna .
    (Nov 13, 1968)