I.D Dua., C.J and T.V.R Tatachari J.:— In a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell the property in controversy and for damages instituted by Shri Charanjit Lal Malhotra against Dr. Prithi Singb, the learned Commercial Subordinate Judge, Delhi, on 27th February, 1965 made a decree in favour of the plaintiff for specific performance of the agreement to sell in the following terms:—

“I, therefore, pass a decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant of the property in dispute The plaintiff will deposit Rs. 7,550/- with in one month from today. If he failed to do so, the suit of the plaintiff will be deemed to have been dismissed. The defendant will give an application for permission to transfer the property in question to the plaintiff to the appropriate authority within one month of the notice of the deposit of the money served on the defendant. Within one month of the date of the grant of the permission, the defendant would execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. In case the permission is refused the decree for specific performance would be-come in fructuous and in that case the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for Rs. 5,000/- only with proportionate costs. In case the permission is granted to the defendant for transfer of the property, the plaintiff will’ be entitled to full costs of the suit. The plaintiff would also be entitled to the possession of the flat in question in case a decree for specific performance stands. If the defendant fails to perform any of the acts mentioned above, the same will be done by the Stenographer of this out on behalf of the defendant”

2. The plaintiff presented in it is Court Regular First Appeal No. 120 D of 1965 on 12th July, 1965. The Office returned this appeal with the remark that certified copy of the decree-sheet duly stamped should be filed. The appeal was refiled on 17th July, 1965 with the certified copy of the decree and it was noted by the counsel for the appellant that the copy was ready on 15th July, 1965 and was taken delivery of on 17th July, 1965. An application for condonation of the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was pointed out, had already been filed. An application dated 10th July, 1965, but tiled in Court on 13th July 1965 under rection 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151 Civil P.C contains reasons for condoning the delay in paragraphs 3 to 6. It is averred therein that the appellant had been misled by the operative portion of the Judgment and thought that the decree for specific performance was conditional on the permission being available from the appropriate authority and if the permission was refused, then the appellant was only entitled to Rs. 5.000/- with proportionate costs. On this view, the appellant remained under the impression that the decree sheet would be drawn up only when the permission of the appropriate authority was granted or refused. As a result of this impression, the appellant only applied for a certified copy of the judgment on 16th April, ls65, without applying for a copy of the decree. The appellant deposited the requisite amount in Court in accordance with its directions In the meantime, however, Dr. Prithi Singh judgment debtor died and the appellant became uncertain as to who was to specifically perform the agreement Faced with this situation the appellant filed an application under Order XXII, Rule 4, Civil P. C., for impeding the heirs of the judgment-debtor, which application is still pending in the trial Court, though it is conceded in the application that after the conclusion of the suit, it is unnecessary to file an application for imploding the bears and successors of the judgment debtor. On Dr. Prithi Singh's death, it drawled upon the appellant that in case the decree for specific performance be not capable of being implemented, he would still be entitled to damages which had not been awarded by the trial Court. He, therefore, considered it necessary to appeal from the decree In the meantime, however, the civil Courts were closed and the petitioner was prevented from applying for the certified copy of the decree. The petitioner approached the acting District judge, Delhi, during the vacation for being supplied with the necessary certified copy, but the Clerk of the Court of the Commercial Subordinate Judge, in whose custody the file of the case was, was also on leave due to the summer vacation. The petitioner then averred that on the re-opening of the civil Courts on 14th July, 1965, he would be able to obtain a certified copy and file the same in this Court. The appeal, it may be pointed out, was accordingly presented only with a certified copy of the judgment and without that of the decree. Dulat, J. of the Punjab High Court, sitting on Circuit, on 9th August 1965, issued notice to the opposite party of the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act (C. Misc. 2344-D of 1965). From the record, I find that a certified copy of the decree dated 27th February, 1965 was applied for on 8th July, 1965 and was ready on 15th July, 1965. C. Misc. 2344-D of 1965 was set down for hearing before S.B Kapoor and Khanna JJ. on 27th July, 1966, but was adjourned on request by. Miss C.M Kohli, Advocate, to the effect that Shri G.R Chopra, counsel for the appellant, had gone not of India. Shri G R. Chopra appeared before the same Bench on 9th August, 1986 and offered to file certified copies of the amended judgment and decree vide order of Miss S. Mehta, Commercial Subordinate Judge, dated 25th May, 1966 and prayed that the disposal of the miscellaneous application under section 5, Limitation Act, be in the circumstances held over. In October, 1965; the appellant filed an application under Order V Rule 20, Civil P. C, for serving the unserved respondents by substituted service (C. Misc. 3759-D of 1965). It appears that this petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab High Court. Thereafter it seems that by means of an application under Order J, Rale 10, and section 151, Civil P.C.C Misc 105-D/65 the appellant prayed that Smt. Santosh Devi-and-Miss Shanta Sud be also impeded as respondents and served through substituted service in the manner directed by Bedi, J. in C. Misc. 3759-D of 1965. According to the appellant, S.K Kapur, J allowed this application and the notice was published in the Daily Tej in April, 1966. On 16th January, 1968, the three miscellaneous petitions were set down for hearing before one of us when the records were sent for and notice of C. Misc. No. 2344-D of 1965 was also directed to go to the respondents. After several adjournments, the matter has finally been argued before us and now we are required to pronounce on the question whether the regular first appeal is within limitation, and if not, whether there is sufficient ground for condoning the delay.

3. It has been argued before us that the judgment and decree dated 27th February, 1965 were latter amended by Miss Santosh Mehta, Commercial Subordinate Judge and it is the date of the amendment which should be considered to be the. terminus a quo for the purpose of the appeal and merely because the present appeal was presented prior to the amendment and as such may be premature, it can, without pre-judice, to the opposite party, be treated as an appeal from the amended decree and judgment.

4. On the present record of the appeal, however, we find only a copy of the order dated 28th May, 1968 made by Miss Santosh Mehta, Commercial Subordinate Judge, when the case was adjourned to 31st July, 1965 for report on the steps to be taken by the Stenographer in what appears to us to be more in the nature of execution than a 6nal judgment in the suit. This copy appears to have been produced in this Court in August, 1966. On 27th March, 1967, the appellant also appears to have produced in this Court a certified copy of the decree dated 27th February, 1966 as amended as per order of the Commercial Subordinate Judge dated 3rd March, 1962. This copy had apparently been applied for on 4th March, 1S67 and secured on 21st March, 1967 No copy of the order dated 3rd March, 1967 seems to have been produced in this Court. From the original record of the lower Court, however, we find that in the order dated 23rd August, 1967, the Commercial Subordinate Judge, in proceedings following her order dated 28th May, 1966, observed as follows:—

“The applicant has also moved for amendment of the decree in pursuance of the order dated 28th May, 1966. I have perused that order necessitates the amendment of the decree as all the matters including the death of the judgment debtor, have taken place after the passing of the decree and these matters would be allowed in execution application, if any taken by the applicant, The application be filed.”

5. It clearly shows that on 28th May, 1966, some mistakes, which had apparently cropped in the judgment due to inadvertence, were rectified but obviously no amendment of the decree as directed by Miss Santosh Mehta, Commercial Subordinate Judge. On 7th September, 1966, it is noteworthy that the same learned Commercial Subordinate Judge, after receiving the report observed that the sale-deed had been executed and with this observation, consigned the file to the record room, though no party was present.

6. From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that there is no question of any amendment of the decree, which would have the effect of superseding the earlier decree dated 27th February, 1965 and conferring a fresh right of appeal from the amended decree. Indeed no appeal from the amended decree even purports to have been filed in this Court.

7. Turning now to the question of limitation, it is in contestable that the appeal in the case in hand lay only from a decree and there is no question of dispensing with the production, along with the memorandum of appeal, of a copy of the decree appealed from. The decree was made on 27th February, 1965 and the application for its copy was presented on 8th July, 1965. The copy was ready on 15th July, 1965, taken delivery of on 16th July, 1965 and filed in this Court on 17th July, 1965. Prima facie, the appeal would be barred by time, and in fact the appellant's learned counsel does not dispute it. The only question to be decided is if sufficient cause is made out for attracting section 5, Limitation Act. The principal ground on which this section is invoked is that the appellant had been misled by the operative portion of the judgment, he being under the impressior, that the decreesheet would be drawn up only when the permission of the appropriate authority is either granted or refused. On this impression, the appellant had initially applied only for a certified copy of the judgment send not of the decree. Inability to apply for a copy during the summer vacation in the subordinate civil Courts has also been pleaded as an additional ground for condoning the delay, it being added that when the appellant approached the acting District Judge for a copy during the vacation, the Clerk of Court of the Commercial Subordinate Judge, having the custody of the record, was on leave with the result that the copy could not be prepared during the vacation Limitation is stated by the appellant to have expired on 1st July, 1965.

8. At this stage we consider it proper to draw the attention of the officer of this Court, whose duty it is to examine the memorandum of appeal, to the provisions contained in Chapter 11-D, Vol of the High Court Rules & orders particularly to paragraph 2 of that Part which roads as under:—

“2. (i) If the memorandum of appeal appears to be presented after r time, or there appears to be ground for doubting whether it is within time, such officer shall record upon or annex to the memorandum of appeal a note of bits calculation, showing:—

(1) the date when the period expired without any allowances;

(2) the allowances to which appellant seems entitled;

(3) the date when the period expired, alter all the allowances, to be made under head (2) have been made.

(ii) In making such calculations the following points must be borne in mind:—

(a) The date when the time expired under head (1) is to be calculated irrespective “of such date failing upon a day when the Court is closed for a holiday (including Sunday) or for vacation, any allowance on this account being noted under head (2) of the calculation

(b) The entries endorsed on copies of judgments and the like will be assumed to be correct.

(c) The date on which the application for copy is made and also the day on which the copy is given will each be reckoned separately as one day unless both events occur on the same day.

(d) The date on which a copy is ready for delivery will be deemed, for the purpose of such calculation, to be the day on which it is given.

9. We have considered it necessary to lay emphasis on these directions because due compliance with them would facilitate proper determination of the question of limitation by the Courts of appeal and these directions are not always fully complied with. At least the case in hand is one such instance. the attention of such officers in the lower Appellate Courts is also drawn to these directions. In the present case, we have to check up from the certified copy of the judgment attached with the memorandum of appeal, the time spent in securing it. The application for the copy was apparently made on 16th April, 1965 and the copy was attested on 20th May, 1965. Taking into account these days, the limitation apparently seems to have expired on 1st July, It 65 when the High Court was closed due to summer vacation. In these circumstances, the appeal, if validly presented, complete air all particulars on the reopening of the High Court, would have been within limitation. Bat the appeal admittedly was not so presented on the re-opening of the Court. A copy of the decree-sheet was applied for on 8th July, 1985 when the period of limitation had expired even after excluding the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the judgment. The appeals could be held within time only by virtue of the provisions of section 4, Limitation Act. The question would thus arise if the time spent in obtaining the copy of decree after the re-opening of the High Court after the vacation can be considered as time requisite so as to justify its exclusion in computing the period of limitation in accordance with section 12, Limitation Act. No arguments on this precise aspects have been addressed at the bar and we express no considered opinion on the question whether the appellant is entitled as of right to exclude this period under section 12. Indeed the appellant's counsel has all along proceeded on the assumption that the appeal would be barred by time unless section 5, Limitation Act, is app led.

10. There is another aspect to which we may advert at this stage. According to paragraph 1 of Chapter 14-B(a) of Vol. I of the High Court Rules and Orders whenever an application is made for a copy of a civil judgment for the purpose of appeal the applicant is to be informed that a copy of the decree would also be required and he should be supplied with such copy, unless he declines to pay the necessary fees, in which a case certificate under the signatures of the officer-in-charge of the Copying Department, should be endorsed on the copy of the judgment supplied to the applicant to the effect that he was duly informed that a copy of the decree was requisite, and, after being so informed declined to pay fees for the same. Now, the appellant has not cared to make any point founded on the failure of the Copying Department to attempt to supply him a copy of the decree, and indeed we do not even know if the appellant had made an application for a copy of the judgment for the purpose of appeal. Had be done so, it could reasonably have been taken into account for applying section 5, Limitation Act.

11. Considering now the question of sufficient cause under section 5, on the facts established, it may be pointed out that the appellant's failure to account for his non-diligence during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal does not necessarily by itself disqualify him from praying for relief under this section. The appellant claiming relief has to show sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period and when he has successfully done so. the Court is then required to consider, in its discretion, the question of condoning the qelay It is at this stage that the Court has to take into account all the relevant factors. It is proper in this connection to bear in mind that after the expiry of limitation, a valuable right accrues to the successful respondent and also that the right of appeal on the merits should not be too readily denied to the aggrieved party. Section b has, therefore, to be construed and applied in a practical way, judiciously striking a poper balance between these two conflicting claims The applicability of section has accordingly to be reasonably liberal so as not to unduly penalise the appellants who have taken reasonable steps necessary for prosecuting their appeals, nor should it unduly deprive the successful party of the benefit of the expiry of limitation. In the case in hand, the appeal as filed was incomplete because the copy of the decree applied for had not been supplied to him by that time. As observed earlier, the copy of the decree was applied for on 13th July 1965 when the High Court was closed. Now, according to Rule 24 of the Rules framed by the Punjab High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, as published in Chapter 17 of the High Court Rules & orders Vol, IV, a copy has ordinarily to be ready, by the third working day of the receipt of application and the applicant for a copy is entitled to have his copy furnished to him as far as possible on the day appointed for its delivery. If for any reason, it is not possible to prepare the copy asked for by the appointed day, the officer in charge, is required to send an intimation by post ‘to the applicant fixing another day for its delivery so that he does not unnecessarily visit the agency. It is true that these rules were framed by the Punjab High Court with the previous approval of the State Government for regulating the preparation and supply of copies of records of Civil and Criminal Courts by the Copying Agencies under the control of the District & Sessions Judges and the judge, Small Cause Court, Amritsar, and it may not in terms be applicable to Delhi. But these rules' do illustrate the importance attached to the speedy supply of copies to the litigants. Turning now to the directions contained in Chapter 5-B of the High Court Rules & orders Vol. V, according to paragraph 9 thereof, urgent copies have ordinarily to be delivered to the applicant not later than ‘three days of the receipt of the records in the Copy Branch and ordinary copies, as far as practicable, in the order in which the fees required under the rules are deposited. If the Copy Branch experiences difficulty in securing the records, the Deputy Commissioner is required, on the matter being reported to him, to take stepsto secure them for the Copy Branch. Now these, sets of rules and directions in unambiguous terms bring but the importance of supply of copies to the applicants with the reasonable due dispatch and the anxiety of their authors to see that copies are supplied with the requisite promptitude In the case in hand, we do not know if the application for the decree was made urgent, but even otherwise, the delay in supplying the copy of the decree cannot be considered as a wholly irrelevant factor, and if the delay beyond the period within which the copies are expected to be supplied is unexplained, than it may legimately be taken into account, within proper limits, in considering the question of sufficient cause under section Limitation Act We regret to observe in this connection that the unsatisfactory working of the Copy Branch in Delhi is notorious and it is a matter of common knowledge that the supply of copies here is, as a general rule, inordinately delayed. This delay not infrequently pre-justics the litigants and tends to some extent to cause avoidable multiplicity of proceedings. It further tends to create alluring conditions for corruption in the Copy Agency which, in our view, is a highly distrubing factor. Bat be that as it may, we are inclined in these circumstances to exercise our discretion in favour of the appellant and hold that the delay in producing a certified copy of the decree deserves to be condoned. We should like to make it clear that in so far as the impression stated to have been formed by the appellant about the effect of the impugned judgment is concerned, we are far from satisfied that such an impression was reasonable or could have been formed by any person, inspired by normal anxiety to diligently prosecute his appeal, taking, to that end, legal advice from some professional lawyer of reasonable status and standing. This plea, on the circumstances of this case, gives to us an impression as if it is an afterthought: it is certainly difficult to accept.

12. As a result of the foregoing discussion, we allow the application under section 5, Limitation Act, and hold that the appeal is within time, but in the circumstances of the case, the appellant must pay costs o f these proceedings which we fix at Rs. 50.

13. Appeal allowed.