Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Letters Patent Appeal No. 94-D of 1966, D/- 17-2-1967, against the judgment of H.R Khanna, J., reported in AIR 1967 Punj 152.

Attorney(S)

P. Narain and A.B. Saharya
A.K. Sen with Dr. Anand Parkash and Miss Usha Mehra

Judges

K.S Hegde, C.J
Jagjit Singh, J.

Acts

Sec. 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act)
Section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act,

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent filed an application under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking a decree declaring her marriage to the appellant a nullity on the ground that the appellant was impotent at the time of the marriage and continued to be impotent until institution of the proceeding. The trial Court (Additional District Judge of Delhi) accepted the respondent's case and declared the marriage a nullity. That decision was affirmed by Khanna, J., sitting singly in the High Court. The appellant appealed to the Court which delivered the opinion summarized here.

Material factual points established in the record and relied upon by the Courts below include:

The parties were married in 1948 and lived together until 1956, during which they travelled extensively.
They ceased living together after 1956; the respondent began to live separately after July 30, 1956 (Exhibit P-2 is the letter of that date).
The respondent alleged and adduced evidence that the appellant was impotent at the time of the marriage and remained so through the institution of proceedings; the trial Court accepted this evidence and the High Court affirmed.
The respondent presented the petition for nullity on March 19, 1962.
There were financial transfers/gifts from the appellant to the respondent during 1948–1956; the respondent explained some transfers (including a withdrawal of Rs. 2 lakhs) as reclaiming a sum given as Tilak by her father and the Courts below accepted that explanation.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the appellant was prejudiced in his defence because the respondent allegedly failed to give necessary particulars regarding the impotence allegation.
Whether the Courts below were correct in finding that the appellant was impotent at the time of marriage and continued to be so up to the institution of proceedings (i.e., whether the respondent discharged the burden of proof).
Whether the respondent should be denied relief on the ground of lack of sincerity (the "doctrine of want of sincerity" as laid down in G. v. M. (1885) 10 AC 171) or on the ground that she had approbated the marriage.
Whether the petition should be dismissed for laches or undue delay in presenting the petition (i.e., whether the delay between separation and filing in 1962 was fatal to the claim).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant contended he was prejudiced because the respondent did not give necessary particulars about the impotence allegation either in the petition or in particulars supplied later.
He argued that the evidence did not sustain a finding of continuing impotence after 1956 or at the time the petition was instituted.
He relied on the House of Lords decision in G. v. M. (1885) 10 AC 171 to urge application of the "doctrine of want of sincerity" (approbate and reprobate) and argued the respondent had approbated the marriage and taken benefit such that she should be estopped from relief.
He urged that the petition was filed after an inordinate delay (filed in 1962 though separation was in 1956 and marriage in 1948), and that such delay (laches) should bar relief under Section 23(1)(d) of the Act.

Respondent's Arguments

The respondent alleged that the appellant was impotent at the time of the marriage and remained impotent until institution of proceedings; the Courts below accepted her oral evidence on that point.
She explained the financial transfers/gifts (including a withdrawal of Rs. 2 lakhs) as either gifts made for wealth-tax reasons or, in the specific drawing of Rs. 2 lakhs, as reclaiming the Tilak given by her father; this explanation was accepted by the Courts below.
On the question of delay, the respondent explained that prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act (1955) she had no legal remedy, and that social conservatism and her parents' opposition prevented her from approaching the Court sooner; this explanation was believed by the Courts below.
As to the application of the "doctrine of sincerity" under G. v. M., Shri A.K. Sen (counsel for the respondent) argued, and the Court agreed, that Sections 11–28 of the Hindu Marriage Act form a complete code and that the English doctrine was inapplicable to the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
G. v. M., (1885) 10 AC 171	Doctrine of "want of sincerity" (approbate and reprobate) — that certain conduct by a complainant (e.g., taking benefits of marriage) may estop relief; an equitable restraint on granting relief where complainant has behaved inconsistently.	The Court held that this rule is a peculiar English rule and is wholly inapplicable to cases arising under the Hindu Marriage Act. Even if it were applicable, the Court found on the facts that the doctrine would not disentitle the respondent to relief. The Court also explained that the doctrine must be applied with great caution where relevant.
H. v. H., AIR 1928 Bom 279	Application of the English doctrine (G. v. M.) to cases under the Indian Divorce Act because Section 7 of that Act requires similarity to English practice.	The opinion cites this case to show that the English rule had been applied in the context of the Indian Divorce Act, but distinguishes it from the present case because the Hindu Marriage Act is a separate, self-contained code (Sections 11–28) and must be interpreted by its own provisions.
Clifford v. Clifford, 1948 P. 187	Illustration of the scope of the doctrine of sincerity (and issues around long delay) — the case involved declaration of nullity many years after marriage and discussion of sincerity/approbation aspects.	The Court referred to this decision when discussing the doctrine of sincerity and the role of delay. It cited Clifford v. Clifford for the proposition that the rule of sincerity must be applied cautiously and in context, and also in connection with assessing delay.
Smt. Leela v. Dr. Rao Anand Singh, AIR 1968 Raj 178	Considerations concerning delay in instituting proceedings under the Act and how social circumstances/facts should be weighed.	The Court cited this Rajasthan High Court decision in support of the principle that delay must be judged on the facts of each case and that social pressures and conservative family conditions can be relevant in deciding whether there was unreasonable delay under Section 23(1)(d).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning follows a structured factual-and-legal analysis:

Deference to findings below: The Court emphasized respect for the trial Judge's findings of fact, especially where the trial Judge had the opportunity to observe witness demeanour, and affirmed that the single Judge of the High Court had carefully analysed the evidence and agreed. The Court stated that findings of fact so reached would not be disturbed except for very good reasons.
Particulars and prejudice: The Court rejected the appellant's contention that particulars given by the respondent about impotency were inadequate. It observed that the plea as to inadequate particulars had not been taken at trial or before the single Judge and that, on the pleadings and merits, there was no substance in that contention.
Burden of proof and evaluation of evidence: The Court noted that the burden of proof that the appellant was impotent at the time of marriage and continued to be so was on the respondent. The Courts below had accepted the respondent's oral evidence; the impugned findings were factual conclusions supported by satisfactory evidence. The Court expressly stated it found satisfactory evidence to support the conclusion of impotence through 1956.
Continuing impotence after separation: The appellant argued there was no evidence of impotence after 1956. The Court observed the appellant did not assert that he became potent after 1956, that he had not sought treatment for impotence, and that it was reasonable on the established facts to presume continuing impotence as the appellant aged.
Applicability of the English "doctrine of sincerity": Addressing the appellant's reliance on G. v. M., the Court analysed the source and scope of the doctrine and concluded it was a peculiar English rule. The Court held that Sections 11–28 of the Hindu Marriage Act form a complete code and that the scope of annulment rights must be determined by the Act's provisions (not English common law). Consequently, the rule in G. v. M. was held wholly inapplicable to cases arising under the Act.
Clause (a) of Section 23(1): The Court examined the contention that clause (a) incorporates the equitable rule of G. v. M. It noted the appellant neither pleaded nor proved that the respondent was taking advantage of her own wrong or disability for the purpose of obtaining relief. The Court found that the financial transfers were explained and accepted by the Courts below (e.g., transfers made for wealth-tax reasons or reclaiming Tilak), and that even if gifts had conferred some rights they would not bring the case within clause (a).
Approbate/reprobate doctrine: The Court held that the doctrine of approbate and reprobate referred to in G. v. M. has no place under the Act.
Factual appraisal of transfers and correspondence: The Court reviewed the evidence about gifts, bank authority, allowances, correspondence, and the timing of transfers. It accepted the trial Court's conclusion that transfers were voluntary, not procured by misrepresentation by the respondent, and that correspondence after separation was formal and not indicative of an agreement to continue the marital relationship.
Delay and laches: The Court acknowledged that unnecessary or improper delay is a recognised ground for refusing relief under Section 23(1)(d). However, it held that the period prior to the Act (pre-1955) could not be counted against the respondent. The Court accepted the respondent's explanation that conservative parental opposition and social consequences explained the delay after 1955. The Courts below believed this evidence, and the appellate Court found the explanation credible and adequate; there was no unreasonable or improper delay that would bar relief. The Court also noted that the Act prescribes no specific limitation period for applications under Section 12 and that delay must be judged on facts of each case (citing Clifford v. Clifford and Smt. Leela).
Conclusion of analysis: Considering deference to factual findings, the sufficiency of the respondent's evidence on impotence, the inapplicability (or limited applicability) of the English doctrine of sincerity to the Act, the accepted explanations for financial transfers, and the acceptable explanation for delay, the Court concluded there was no ground to disturb the findings below.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The decrees of the Courts below are affirmed — the trial Court's declaration of nullity of the marriage (under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act) stands as upheld by the High Court and the appellate Court. The respondent retains the relief granted below (the marriage declared null).
On legal principles: The Court expressly held that the English "doctrine of want of sincerity" (as in G. v. M.) is not applicable to proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act because Sections 11–28 constitute a complete statutory code governing nullity and divorce. The Court also stated that the doctrine of approbate and reprobate has no place under the Act. These statements indicate that courts should look primarily to the statutory framework of the Act when considering annulment claims, rather than importing the English equitable doctrine wholesale.
Delay and laches: The Court confirmed that delay can bar relief under Section 23(1)(d), but whether delay is unreasonable depends on the facts of each case; social context and constraints (for example, lack of remedy before the Act and parental/societal pressure) can be relevant in excusing delay. The Act prescribes no fixed limitation period for Section 12 petitions.
Precedential effect: The opinion explains interpretive positions about the inapplicability of certain English equitable doctrines to the Act and the need to apply Section 11–28 as a complete code. The Court applied these principles to the facts before it and affirmed the nullity decree. The opinion does not purport to create rules beyond that interpretive statement and the factual holding in this appeal.

This summary is strictly confined to the materials and determinations contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings not explicitly stated therein.

Show full summary ...

S v. R .

1. The marriage of the appellant with the respondent has been declared a nullity by the Additional District Judge of Delhi in pursuance of an application under Sec. 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) made by the respondent. The complaint of the respondent was that the appellant was impotent at the time of marriage and continued to be so until the institution of the proceeding. That case has been accepted by the trial Judge. The decision of the trial Court was affirmed by Khanna, J., sitting singly. Hence this appeal.

2. Shri Parkash Narain, the learned counsel for the appellant questioned the correctness and legality of the decision in this case on four grounds, namely,—

“(1) The appellant was prejudiced in his defence because of the fact that the necessary particulars were not given by the respondent either in her petition or in the particulars supplied later;

(2) the Courts below erred in opining that the respondent has satisfactorily established that the appellant was impotent at the time of the marriage and continued to be so until the institution of the proceedings;

(3) the Courts below should have dismissed the petition of the respondent on the ground of lack of sincerity on her part or at any rate on the ground that she had approbated the marriage; and

(4) the same should have been at least dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was guilty of laches.”

3. While examining the appellant's contentions we cannot lose sight of the fact that the two Courts below, after a careful examination of the material on record were pleased to accept the version of the respondent. In the matter of appreciation of oral evidence, the appellate Court attaches a great deal of weight to the opinion of the trial Judge who had the benefit of observing the demeanour of the witnesses in the box. In this case, the conclusions reached by the trial Court have been affirmed by a learned Judge of the High Court and that after carefully analysing the evidence on record and weighing the probabilities. It is true that in a Letters Patent Appeal, the powers of the High Court are very wide. But as a matter of practice, the learned single Judge's findings on questions of fact more particularly when it accords with the findings of the trial Court are treated with great deal of respect. They are not interfered with except for very good reasons.

4. Bearing in mind the above principles, we shall now proceed to examine the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant married the respondent in 1948. …. They lived together from 1948 to 1956. During that time, they extensively travelled in various parts of the world. After 1956 the respondent and the appellant did not live together. …. The respondent filed the petition for declaring her marriage with the appellant a nullity on March 19, 1962. These are undisputed facts.

5. We shall now take up the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant for examination.

6. There is no substance in the contention that the particulars given by the respondent as regards the impotency of the appellant are inadequate. There is no issue on that point. That contention does not appear to have been taken either during the trial of the case or before the learned single Judge. Such a plea cannot be entertained at this stage. We nave gone through the pleadings. Even on merits we see no substance in that contention.

7. The burden of establishing that the appellant was impotent at the time of the marriage and continued to be so until the institution of the proceeding is no doubt on the respondent. As mentioned earlier, the two Courts below have accepted the evidence adduced by the respondent in that regard. The findings of the Courts below that the appellant was impotent at the time of the marriage and that he continued to be so until the institution of the proceedings are essentially findings of fact. Those findings are primarily based on oral evidence.

(After discussing the evidence in Para the judgment proceeded:—) We think that there is satisfactory evidence to support the conclusion of the Courts below that the appellant was impotent at the time of the marriage and that he continued to be so till 1956 when the respondent chose to leave him.

8. Shri Prakash Narain contended that even if we accept the evidence of the respondent that the appellant was impotent at the time of the marriage and that he continued to be so till 1956, there is no evidence to show that he continued to be impotent after 1956 or that he was impotent at about the time of the institution of the proceeding. It is not the case of the appellant that he ceased to be impotent after 1956. On the facts established, the Courts below were right in presuming that the appellant continued to be impotent even after 1956. It is not the appellant's case that he got himself treated for his impotence after 1956. As he grew older he is not likely to have acquired potency.

9. Next it was urged that the respondent's application should have been dismissed on the basis of the rule laid down by the House of Lords in G. v. M., (1885) 10 AC 171. The rule in question is known as the “doctrine of want of sincerity”. The said rule was also applied to cases arising under the Indian Divorce Act. See H. v. H., AIR 1928 Bom 279. This was done evidently because of Section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act, which requires the Courts in India to act and give relief on principles and rules which, in the opinion of the said Courts, are as nearly as may be conformable to the principles and rules on which the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being acts and gives relief. It is clear from the decision of Selborne, L.C, who rendered the principal judgment in (1885) 10 AC 171 that the rule in question was not recognised in Scotland. It is a peculiar English rule. Hence the first thing that we have to see is whether that doctrine can be applied to oases arising under the Act. The Hindu Law did not contemplate dissolution of marriages. Under that law marriages are sacrosanct. The Act made a serious inroad into that law when it provided for the dissolution or nullification of marriages. It is an entirely new right created by the Act. For finding out the scope of that right we must look only to the provisions of the Act. Section 12 of the Act lays down under what circumstances a marriage solemnized shall be voidable and under what circumstances a marriage can be annulled by a decree of nullity. Therefore, in a given case, the Court has first to see whether the requirements of Section 12 are satisfied. Then the Court has next to see whether even if any ground for granting the relief exists, the petitioner is not entitled for the same for any of the reasons mentioned in Section 23(1) of the Act. Sections 11 to 28 of the Act form a complete code by themselves as regards the law relating to nullity of marriage and divorce. In considering the scope of those provisions we cannot fall back on the English common law. We are in agreement with Shri A.K Sen, the learned counsel for the respondent, that the rule laid down by the House of Lords in (1885) 10 AC 171 is wholly inapplicable to cases arising under the Act.

10. It was said on behalf of the applicant that clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act merely incorporates the equitable rule laid down in (1885) 10 AC 171. That clause reads thus:

“In proceedings under this Act, whether defended or not if the Court is satisfied that any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief…… then, and in such a case, but not otherwise, the Court shall decree such relief accordingly.” The appellant neither pleaded nor proved that the respondent was in any way taking advantage of her own wrong or disability for the purpose of getting the relief she is seeking. The respondent did no! put forward any disability of her own tor the purpose of getting the relief she is seeking; nor is it proved that she, in any manner, is taking advantage of her own wrong for getting the said relief. All that is proved is that after the marriage the appellant had made certain gifts in favour of the respondent. It is the case of the respondent that those gifts were made with a view to avoid wealth tax and that plea has been accepted by the Courts below. Even if we accept the plea of the appellant that he made those gifts with a view to confer some right on his wife in his affairs that would not bring the case within clause (a) of section 23(1) of the Act.

11. We also do not think that the doctrine of “approbate” and “reprobate” referred to in (1885) 10 AC 171 is relevant for our present purpose. That doctrine has no place under the Act.

12. Even if we had come to the conclusion that “doctrine of sincerity” or to put it more correctly, the “doctrine of insincerity” is applicable to cases under the Act, on the facts of this case, that doctrine would not have been attracted. It is true that the appellant transferred in the name of the respondent substantial sums of money during the years 1948 to 1956. The Courts below have come to the conclusion that he did so voluntarily. That conclusion is justified by the evidence on record. Those gifts were not procured by the respondent by holding out to the appellant that she would continue to remain as his wife even though he was unable to discharge his marital obligation. Most of the presents were made at a time when it was not possible for the respondent to break her marital ties with the appellant, Till the Act came into force, the respondent had to remain as the wife of the appellant whether she liked it or not It is true that even after the respondent began to live separate from the appellant, the appellant was paying her a monthly allowance of Rs. 1,000 That again is not on the seeking of the respondent. It is also true that the appellant permitted the respondent to operate on his bank accounts. The appellant admits that he did so because he did not want the respondent to have any financial difficulty during his absence from India. Even before the appellant and the respondent left for England in 1955 the appellant had thought of transferring two of his houses to the name of his wife, evidently with a view to reduce the burden of wealth tax. After the appellant left for L., the respondent on the advice of Sri T., the topmost official in the service of the appellant, forwarded to the appellant a draft for the purpose of effectuating the transfer previously thought of. But the appellant did not execute the necessary document evidently because of the fact that the respondent had ceased to live with him. The respondent admits that she had transferred a sum of rupees two lakhs from the account of the appellant to her own account during the time she had the authority to operate on his account. Her explanation for so doing is that at the time of the marriage, her father had given the appellant a sum of rupees two lakhs as Tilak and as she wanted to put an end to her marital ties with the appellant, she wanted to take back that money. This explanation has been accepted by the Courts below. According to the findings reached by the Courts below, when the respondent transferred the sum of rupees two lakhs from the account of the appellant to her own account, there were still about nine lakhs of rupees standing to the appellant's credit in his account. That circumstance lends weight to the respondent's explanation for drawing the amount in question. It is true that during the time the appellant was at L., there was continuous correspondence between the appellant and the respondent. From that correspondence it is not possible to spell out that the two agreed to remain as husband and wife after their separation in July, 1956. The correspondence that passed between them thereafter though of very polite nature, does by no means show any warmth between the two. It was formal and business-like.

13. Dealing with the “doctrine of sincerity” this is what Selborne, L.C, observed in (1885) 10 AC 171: “the real basis of reasoning which underlies that phraseology is this, and nothing more than this, that there may be conduct on the part of the person seeking this remedy which ought to estop that person from having it; as, for instance, any act from which the inference ought to be drawn that during the antecedent time the party has, with the knowledge of the facts and of the law, approbated the marriage which he or she afterwards seeks to get rid of, or has taken advantages and derived benefits from the matrimonial relation which it would be unfair and inequitable to permit him or her, after having received them, to treat as if no such relation had ever existed. Well now, that explanation can be referred to known principles of equitable, and, I may say, of general Jurisprudence. The circumstances which may Justify it are various, and in cases of this kind, many sorts of conduct might exist, taking pecuniary benefits for example, living for a long time together in the same house or family with the status and character of husband and wife, after knowledge of everything which it is material to know……” In that very case. Lord Bramwell had something different to say. This is what he observes: “Now one word as to this question of “sincerity”. It is a most remarkable Oppression, a very curious word, and I am not at all sure that it has not resulted from this, that sincerity is a very important matter in ascertaining whether the spouse complained of is impotent or not, and sincerity has been dwelt upon for that purpose till at last it has been taken to be a separate head of objection to the complaining party's proceedings. It seems to me very strange. What the complainant does in a suit of this sort is to come to the appropriate Court for a declaration of the truth: “I say that this man is impotent and was so at the time of the marriage, and I ask you to declare that fact”. The very words of the summons are, “Declare the truth, that this man was impotent when he married me”. The Court say, “No, we will not,” or the argument is that the Court ought to say, “No, we will not—we know that it is true, but we will not say so”— why? In my opinion a man who has inflicted this cruel wrong upon a woman ought not to be heard to object to her complaining, when she comes forward with her complaint of this wrong that he has done her, unless in some way or another; he can show that he sustains some injury from the double matter of her not having complained earlier, and of her complaining now. In such a case, I should indeed think that a law might be made (perhaps it exists, for aught I know), that in some way or another the declaration of the truth should be accompanied by some compensation to him for the sort of injury which, as I have indicated, might have been done to him.” The scope of the doctrine of sincerity was further explained in Clifford v. Clifford, 1948 P. 187. Therein a marriage was declared a nullity twenty-seven years after the marriage. In this case, the respondent wants the Court to declare her marriage with the appellant a nullity because he was impotent at the time of the marriage and he continued to be so until the institution of the proceedings. The fact that the appellant is impotent is well established. We fail to see how lack of sincerity on her part or the fact that she had earlier approbated the marriage, assuming that those things are established, can disentitle her to the relief to which he is entitled under the law. Lack of sincerity on her part or her approbation of the marriage cannot make the appellant potent. The want of insincerity on the part of a spouse or his or her approbation of the marriage may be elements which can be taken into consideration in deciding whether the complaint of impotency is true. We think that the rule of ‘sincerity’ laid down by the House of Lords will have to be applied even in cases to which that rule applies, with great deal of caution.

14. Lastly, it was said that the relief prayed for by the respondent should be refused as her application was a highly belated one. Unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding is undoubtedly a good ground for refusing to grant any relief under Section 12 of the Act. That much is provided in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. Therefore, the question for decision is whether there was any unnecessary or improper delay on the part of the respondent in approaching the Court. It is not denied that till the Act came into force in the year 1955, she was tied down to the appellant. There was no escape from her marriage with the appellant. The evidence in this case satisfactorily establishes that the respondent began to live separately from the appellant after July 30, 1956. On July 30, 1956, she wrote to the appellant, Exhibit P-2. Therein she had made it clear that she had reached the end of her patience. That letter read along with the evidence of the respondent clearly establishes that on July 30, 1956, the respondent made it clear to the appellant that she is not prepared to live with him as his wife thereafter.

15. The period preceding the coming into force of the Act cannot be taken into consideration in dealing with the question of delay in presenting the petition under Section 12. It is true that there was considerable delay even thereafter. The petition for declaration of the nullity of the marriage was presented only it 1962. The respondent's explanation for the same is that her parents who are very conservative stood in her way from seeking relief under the Act. In considering whether there was unnecessary or unreasonable delay in seeking the relief, we cannot ignore the conditions of the society in which the parties lived and traditions of the families to which they belong. The Hindu society looked with disfavour dissolution of marriages. It was considered as something sinful. It requires courage to face the public odium. We can take judicial notice of the fact that even today considerable sections of the Hindu society look with disfavour the idea of dissolving a marriage. Further, as seen earlier, the respondent belongs to a highly aristocratic family.

16. We can very well believe when the respondent swears that her parents are highly conservative. They must have shuddered at the idea of their daughter approaching the Court for declaring her marriage with the appellant a nullity. The respondent further says that her parents told her that if her marriage with the appellant is dissolved, the society in which they lived would shun them and it would be difficult for them to get alliances for the daughters of her sisters and brothers. Therefore, she hesitated for long before approaching the Court. The evidence of the respondent on this point has been believed by both the Courts below.

17. Her explanation for the delay in approaching the Court is believable They accord with the facts of life. Therefore, we are unable to hold that there was any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding under S. 12 of the Art. The question whether in a given case, there had been unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding has to be decided on its own facts. No hard and fast rule can be applied in deciding that question. It is worth remembering that the Act has not prescribed any period of limitation for presenting an application under Section 12 of the Act. In this connection it would he appropriate to again refer to the decision in 1948 P. 187. Reference may also be usefully made to the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Smt. Leela v. Dr. Rao Anand Singh, AIR 1968 Raj 178.

18. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.

19. AGT/D.V.CAppeal dismissed.

S v. R .

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

S v. R .

Comments