1. Animadverting upon the judgement and decree dated 20.3.12 passed by the VII Small Causes Court, Chennai, in RCA No. 643 of 2010 confirming the order dated 15.9.2010 passed by the XIII Small Causes Court, Chennai, in RCOP No. 1272 of 2009, this revision petition has been filed.

2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the Rent Controller.

3. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts in a broad stroke could succinctly and precisely be set out thus:

(i) The respondent herein filed the RCOP for evicting the revision petitioner herein/tenant, invoking Section 10(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short), on the ground of ‘wilful default’. Counter was filed and the O.P was resisted by the tenant.

(ii) During enquiry, the landlord examined himself as P.W 1 and marked Exs. P1 to P4. The tenant examined himself as R.W 1 and marked Exs. R1 to R5.

(iii) After hearing both sides, the Rent Controller ordered eviction, as against which, the appeal was filed for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate authority, confirming the order of the Rent Controller.

4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement and order of the respective authorities concerned, this revision has been focussed on various grounds.

5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant, by placing reliance on the grounds of revision would put forth and set forth his arguments thus:

(i) The appellate authority under the Rent Control Act, namely, VI Judge, Court of Small Causes, had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the Rent Control Appeals, as the matter was pertaining to VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai. Since VI Judge, Court of Small Causes was in-charge of the VII Court, he disposed of the appeal and as such, the judgement passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority is one without jurisdiction.

(ii) In fact, this is the second round of litigation initiated by the landlord, after meeting with his Waterloo in getting evicted the tenant, by initiating, at the first instance, the rent control proceedings on the same ground of ‘wilful default’.

(iii) It so happened that the tenant, by way of abundant caution, paid 10% more than the agreed rent, but it was refused by the landlord, whereupon, the tenant was in quandary and eight months elapsed thereafter; taking undue advantage of the piquant situation, the landlord simply initiated the second round of litigation by filing RCOP on the same ground of ‘wilful default’.

(iv) Both the Courts below failed to understand that there is no wilful element in not paying the rent and it was because of the conduct of the landlord, apparently it appears as though the tenant had not paid the rent for eight months, as on the date of filing of the RCOP.

(v) Pendente lite, the tenant paid the arrears without any default, however, without considering the genuine intention of the tenant in paying the rent, both the Courts below simply ordered eviction on the ground of ‘wilful default’ in paying the rents, warranting interference in revision.

6. In a bid to torpedo and pulverise the arguements as put forth and set forth on the side of the revision petitioner/tenant, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord would pyramid his arguements, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus:

(a) As on the date of filing of the RCOP, there was eight months arrears of rent; without adhering to Section 8(5) of the Act, the tenant cannot be heard to put forth his rebarbative averments in the counter as though the landlord was at fault in receiving the rent.

(b) The law is well settled that the tenant cannot be heard to comend that because the landlord refused to receive the rent, he was justified in not paying the rent and that too, for eight months.

(c) The appellate authority, namely, the VI Judge, Court of Small Causes, was in full additional charge of the post of VII Judge and hence, he had the competence to dispose of the appeal.

Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord would pray for dismissal of the revision.

7. The points for consideration are as under:

(i) Whether the VI Judge, Court of Small Causes, had the jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal, while he was in-charge of the VII Judge, Court of Small Causes?

(ii) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the findings of both the Courts below relating to the finding given in respect of the ‘wilful default’ committed by the tenant in paying the rents?

8. Point No. (i) Trite the proposition of law is that a Judge in full additional charge of a post of another Judge, can exercise full powers, including the statutorily conferred special powers. Here, it is clear that the VII Judge, before whom the RCA was pending, was not available and during that period, the VI Judge was in-charge of that Court, and it is quite obvious that VI Judge and VII Judge of the Court of Small Causes are having equal status as per the Judicial Service Rules. In such a case, there is no inherent deficiency in power on the part of the VI Judge to dispose of the RCA. Hence, I could see no inherent defect in the competence of the VI Judge in disposing of the RCA.

9. Point No. (ii): I would like to fumigate my mind with the following judgements of the Honourable Apex Court.

(i) (2003) 1 SCC 123, [E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (D) by LRs.], certain excerpts from it would run thus:

“4. It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by the landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specifies the name of the bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a bank in spite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act.

5. Mr Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in court, it should be taken as compliance with Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance with Section 8 inasmuch as the arrears of rent stand deposited in court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a precondition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance with the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e to deposit rent in court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been taken by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal - and M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu2.

6. The counsel for the appellant did not dispute that the tenant had not fulfilled the conditions prescribed in Section 8 of the Act before making deposit of rent in court. Hence similar circumstances and while dealing with almost similar provisions contained in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal1 held: (SCC p. 249, para 8)

“8. In the present case, the appellant is seeking to avail of the benefit of the legal fiction under Section 19-A(4) of the Act. It is settled law that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. [See Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (SCR at p. 646).] The appellant can avail of the benefit of Section 19-A(4) if the deposit of Rs. 3600 made by him in the Court of Munsif (South), Udaipur, on 29-10-1982, by way of rent for the months of May 1982 to October 1982, can be treated as a payment under Section 19-A(3)(c) so as to enable the appellant to say that he was not in default in payment of rent. Under Section 19-A(3)(c) the tenant can deposit the rent in the court only if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied. It is the admitted case of the appellant that these conditions are not satisfied in the present case. The deposit which was made by the respondent in court on 29-10-1982 cannot, therefore, be regarded as a deposit made in accordance with clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19-A and the appellant cannot avail of the protection of sub-section (4) of Section 19-A and he must be held to have committed default in payment of rent for the months of May 1982 to October 1982. This means that the decree for eviction has been rightly passed against the appellant on account of default in payment of rent for the period of six months.”

7. Again in M. Bhaskar v. Venkatarama Naidu with reference to similar provisions contained in the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, this Court observed that when the landlord is evading payment of rent, the tenant has to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 8 of the Act i.e to issue notice to the landlord to name the bank and if he does not name the bank, the tenant has to file application before the Rent Controller for permission to deposit rent. The tenant did not follow that procedure. Omission to avail of the prescribed procedure disentitles the tenant to plead that there was no wilful default on his part. The landlord was, therefore, entitled to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent on the part of the tenant.

8. Admittedly the tenant did not follow the procedure prescribed under Section 8. The only submission that was advanced on behalf of the appellant was that since the deposit of rent had been made, a lenient view ought to be taken. We are unable to agree with this. The appellant failed to satisfy the conditions contained in Section 8. Mere refusal of the landlord to receive rent cannot justify the action of the tenant in straight away invoking Section 8(5) of the Act without following the procedure contained in the earlier sub-sections i.e sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 8. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the eviction order passed against the appellant with respect to the suit premises on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent needs no interference. The impugned judgment of the High Court, therefore, does not call for interference. These appeals are dismissed. We are informed that the landlords have already taken possession of the suit premises, in pursuance of the High Court judgment.”

(ii) 1997-2-L.W. 571-S. Sundararajan v. S.A Viswanathan Chetty, CERTAIN EXCERPTS FROM IT WOULD RUN THUS:

“11……It is thus seen that Sec. 8(5) of the Act, which had been resorted to by the petitioner in this case in H.R.C No. 569 of 1981, is intended to protect the tenant from the consequences of non-payment of rent amounting even to wilful default owing to the refusal by the landlord to receive the rent when tendered. Under Sec. 9(2) of the Act, the amount deposited under Sec. 8(5) of the Act may be permitted to be withdrawn by the person held by the ent Controller to be entitled to the amount on an application made by such person, to the Rent Controller on that behalf. It is thus seen that the obligation of the tenant to pay or tender the rent within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy or in its absence, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable is intended to be fulfilled by resort to Sec. 8() of the Act and the deposit of the rents, refused to be received by the landlord when remitted by money order as well as that which may subsequently become due under Sec. 8(5) of the Act, when paid out to the landlord under Sec. 9(2) of the Act, would ensure the payment of the rent regularly by the tenant as well as the receipt thereof by the landlord on being paid out to him by an order of the Controller under Sec. 9(2) of the Act. It is therefore, obvious that it is not merely for the sake of a deposit in to Court Sec. 8(5) of the Act is intended, but it also serves to very vital and important purpose in that by resorting to a deposit of rents under Sec. 8(5) of the Act after obtaining the orders of the Controller in that regard, the rents refused to be received in the usal course by the landlord are not only paid by the tenant, but also made available to the landlord, so that a ground for eviction under Sec. 10(2)(i) of the Act does not arise, in the event of the deposit of rents being made without default…..”

10. A mere poring over and perusal of the above precedents would clearly highlight that it is the bounden duty of the tenant, by adhering to Section 8(5) of the Act to deposit the rent. But in this case, admittedly, the tenant did not do so.

11. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would try to explain and expound away by pointing out that the tenant was an auto-driver and he was not so well informed of the law and hence, he could not deposit the rent.

12. However, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord would submit that for eight months the rent was not paid and the tenant also admittedly had not taken steps to deposit the rent. Both the Courts below, adverting to the said fact and the law governing the same, correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in revision.

13. In view of my discussion supra, I could see no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by both the Courts below. Accordingly, the revision is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed.

14. On hearing this order, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would pray for a years' time to vacate the premises. Whereas, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord would submit that six months' time may be granted, subject to payment of arrears and future rents.

15. Striking a balance between the two and taking into consideration the fact that now-a-days it will take some time for the tenant to find an alternate accommodation, in the interest of justice, I would like to grant nine months' time from this date for vacating the premises, subject to payment of arrears of rent as well as future rent till the date of vacating the premises, regularly, to the landlord and accordingly it is ordered; to that effect an affidavit shall be filed by the revision petitioner within 15 days from this date.

VCJ/VCS