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  • Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 419, 467, 468, 471 of the I.P.C, apart from Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the I.P.C, apart from Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
  • Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, especially Section 6(1),
  • Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code
  • Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
  • Section 19(1)(C) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
  • SECTION 6 A PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • Section 197 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471
  • Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • SECTION 197 A CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Sub-section (3)(c) of Section 19
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT
  • sub-clauses of Section 6(1)
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 419, 467, 468, 471 of the I.P.C, apart from Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the I.P.C, apart from Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
  • Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, especially Section 6(1),
  • Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code
  • Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
  • Section 19(1)(C) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
  • SECTION 6 A PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • Section 197 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471
  • Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • SECTION 197 A CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Sub-section (3)(c) of Section 19
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT
  • sub-clauses of Section 6(1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Writ Appeal concerning sanction under Prevention of Corruption Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

The present appeal arises from a Single Judge's order dated 06.01.2010 in W.P. No. 22472 of 2009 by Her Lordship Ms. Justice K. Suguna. The appellant (a long-serving employee of the Indian Overseas Bank) challenged an order of the Bank dated 16.09.2009 granting sanction to prosecute him under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Earlier the same competent authority had twice declined to grant sanction (on 30.12.2008 and 18.05.2009). The appellant had earlier faced departmental proceedings resulting in a penalty (reduction in basic pay for one year) which became final. A CBI investigation and related complaint led to a charge-sheet in which initially the appellant's name was excluded because the Employer declined sanction; subsequently the Employer granted sanction in the impugned order, and that grant was challenged by the appellant by way of writ petition. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, holding that the sanction order reflected an independent application of mind and that a charge-sheet had been filed. The present appeal was filed against that dismissal.

A related writ petition (W.P. No. 10569 of 2010) concerning another bank employee (the petitioner) followed a similar factual pattern: departmental enquiry and punishment, earlier refusal to grant sanction to prosecute, then a later sanction dated 19.03.2005 challenged as having been granted under pressure and without independent application of mind.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a sanctioning authority that has earlier refused to grant sanction to prosecute can subsequently grant sanction on the same materials, absent fresh materials, or whether such a change of view is impermissible.
  2. Whether the impugned sanction orders were the result of an independent application of mind by the sanctioning authority or were motivated by extraneous pressure from agencies such as the CBI and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC).
  3. Whether the grant of sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is a statutory order requiring independent consideration (and, if so, whether the courts can examine whether materials were considered), and to what extent principles like natural justice or opportunity to be heard arise in that context.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioners' Arguments

  • The sanctioning authority had no power to review earlier refusals to grant sanction in the absence of any new materials; thus the later grant of sanction (on the same materials) was unlawful.
  • The impugned sanctions were not the product of an independent application of mind; instead they were motivated by the CBI and the Central Vigilance Commission, and therefore tainted by extraneous considerations.
  • The impugned orders did not refer to or deal with prior orders declining sanction, which indicated non-application of mind.
  • The sanctioning authority did not place any new materials before itself which were not available at the time of the earlier refusals.
  • The reliance by the Single Judge on an internal letter (dated 03.09.2009) — which had not been shown to the appellant before the Single Judge — amounted to denial of natural justice and was unfair.
  • Counsel relied on multiple Supreme Court authorities (e.g., R.S. Nayak; Mansukhlal; Gopikant Choudhary; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen) to argue that sanction must be independent and review is permissible only on fresh materials.

Respondents' (Bank and CBI) Arguments

  • The writ petitions were not maintainable because sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act is an administrative/statutory step which does not require "application of judicial mind" in the same sense, and the authority may change its view when new materials come to light.
  • The disciplinary authority had accepted the Enquiry Officer's report and punishment was imposed; the sanctioning authority was prima facie satisfied that sufficient materials existed to grant sanction.
  • Even if earlier refusal to grant sanction was an oversight, that does not preclude the authority from taking a different, bona fide decision later, provided reasons are given and sufficient material exists.
  • Counsel for respondents relied on decisions (for example, Superintendent of Police (C.B.I.) v. Deepak Chowdhary and Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala) to submit that the sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is preliminary/administrative and distinct from Section 197 CrPC, and therefore does not go to the root of jurisdiction nor require prior hearing.
  • The CBI argued that the matter was at a preliminary stage and the accused could defend themselves during trial or seek discharge if no prima facie case is made out by the criminal court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Of Karnataka v. Ameerjan (2007) 11 SCC 273 Independent application of mind is imperative for granting sanction. The Single Judge relied on this case to find the impugned sanction order was a speaking order reflecting independent application of mind. The appellate court described this principle as part of the legal background.
R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984) 2 SCC 183 Granting sanction to prosecute is a sacrosanct act; the competent authority must apply its mind and not act under pressure. The appellate court relied on this authority to confirm that sanction is solemn and the authority entitled to remove the public servant must judge whether prima facie misuse/abuse occurred; applied to underscore that the sanction must be independent.
Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State Of Gujarat (1997) 7 SCC 622 Grant of sanction is a solemn act; High Court can look at whether materials were considered by the sanctioning authority; sanction must disclose consideration of evidence/materials. Used to support that the High Court can examine whether the sanctioning authority applied its mind and that sanction is not an idle formality. The court reiterated that availability of materials considered by sanctioning authority is reviewable.
Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar (2000) 9 SCC 53 Independent application of mind is sine qua non; sanction cannot be granted without fresh materials where earlier refusal occurred. The appellate court cited this to support the proposition that a later grant of sanction on the same materials (without new evidence) is impermissible and applied it to conclude that the impugned sanction was given on the same material.
State Of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen (AIR 2011 SC 404) Statutory power to grant/refuse sanction cannot ordinarily be exercised again on the same materials; review/reconsideration is permissible only when fresh materials are placed before the authority. The appellate court relied on this judgment as controlling law to state that review by a sanctioning authority is possible only if fresh materials have been collected and placed before it; it used the authority to test the validity of the impugned sanction.
Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad v. State of A.P (1979) 4 SCC 172 Grant of sanction is a solemn, sacrosanct act that removes protection against frivolous prosecutions and requires strict compliance. Cited in passages reproduced in the opinion to support the view that sanction must be based on application of mind and the nature of the authority granting sanction.
Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 124) Referenced (with others) for the principle that extrinsic evidence/files can show whether materials were considered by the sanctioning authority. Quoted in the context that the availability and consideration of materials may be established by placing relevant files before the Court; used to explain the scope of judicial scrutiny.
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 Referenced regarding the ability to show consideration of materials by extrinsic evidence. Referred to as part of the judicial hierarchy supporting scrutiny of whether materials were considered by the sanctioning authority.
Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. King (AIR 1948 PC 82) Government has wide discretion to grant or withhold sanction; not limited to demonstration of prima facie case. Quoted in Mansukhlal discussion reproduced in the opinion to underline the discretionary character of the grant of sanction.
Basdeo Agarwalla v. Emperor (AIR 1945 FC 16) Sanction under the Act is not an automatic formality and must be strictly observed. Referred to in the jurisprudential discussion supporting strict compliance in sanction matters.
State through Anti-Corruption Bureau v. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani (1996) 4 SCC 472 Public interest is a guiding principle for the sanctioning authority; protection under sanction is not absolute. Referred to in the Mansukhlal excerpt to show public interest as a consideration for sanction.
Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1 Mere irregularity/error/omission in sanction does not vitiate it unless it results in failure of justice; Section 19(1) is procedural and does not go to root of jurisdiction. Cited by respondents and discussed by the court; the appellate court observed that Parkash Singh Badal does not answer the central question whether the same authority may change its view on the same materials.
Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala (2007) 14 SCC 783 Section 197 CrPC is conceptually different from Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act; Section 19(1) does not go into root of jurisdiction. Relied on by respondents to argue the preliminary/administrative nature of Section 19(1) sanction; the court noted the distinction but held it not decisive on the central issue in the present cases.
Superintendent of Police (C.B.I.) v. Deepak Chowdhary (1995) 6 SCC 225 Held in the context of the 1947 Act that grant of sanction is an administrative function and opportunity of hearing to accused before sanction does not arise. Respondents relied upon this decision; the appellate court held it was not applicable on facts because appellants did not claim lack of opportunity in the present cases.
Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar (2000) 9 SCC 53 (Reproduced earlier) Emphasizes independent application of mind and the impermissibility of changing earlier refusal without fresh materials. Used by the court to show legal precedent that a later change of view by the sanctioning authority on the same materials is impermissible.
Ramanad Chaudhary v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 153 Authority has no jurisdiction to review and grant sanction on same materials (reiterated principle). The opinion notes that the Single Judge referred to this judgment, but the appellate court found no new materials on the facts and disagreed with the Single Judge's conclusion that fresh material existed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate bench conducted a step-by-step analysis combining factual review and legal authorities:

  1. Review of Single Judge's findings: The Single Judge had concluded that the impugned sanction order dated 16.09.2009 (and the 2005 sanction in the related petition) showed independent application of mind and were supported by reasons; the Single Judge relied on an internal office note (letter dated 03.09.2009) and a CVC memorandum (04.09.2009) indicating aspects of criminal conspiracy and fresh evidence. The Single Judge also accepted that fresh materials had come to light through the intervention of the CVC and CBI.
  2. Legal principles recited: The appellate court reviewed settled law: (a) sanction to prosecute is a statutory and solemn act (R.S. Nayak; Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad); (b) the sanctioning authority must apply its independent mind and must not be influenced by extraneous pressures (Mansukhlal; Gopikant Choudhary); (c) the power to review an earlier refusal to grant sanction is available only if fresh materials have been collected and placed before the sanctioning authority (State Of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen).
  3. Examination of the material placed before the court: The appellate bench examined the file produced by respondents and specifically the office note dated 03.09.2009 from the Bank's GM (Vig & CVO) to the Disciplinary Authority and the CVC office memorandum dated 04.09.2009. Those documents recorded a joint meeting of Bank, CBI and CVC and recorded reasons urged by CVC/CBI (losses, outstanding amounts, KYC failures, inflated valuation) and recommended reconsideration.
  4. Application of law to facts: The court observed that the same sanctioning authority had earlier declined sanction on two occasions on the same materials and that the materials urged in the 03.09.2009 / 04.09.2009 communications were not shown by respondents to be newly discovered materials that were not available at the time of earlier refusals. Instead, the change of mind appeared to have resulted from a joint meeting where CBI and CVC persuaded the Bank (sanctioning authority) to reconsider. The appellate court said the change of mind “occurred only at the instance and instigation of the CBI and CVC.”
  5. Conclusion of law on this factual matrix: Applying the principle that a sanctioning authority cannot reopen a refusal on the same materials, the court held that the later grant of sanction was not an independent decision based on new material, but a revisiting of the same materials under extraneous influence. The court also noted the absence in the impugned orders of any reference to earlier refusals or any explanation that new materials were placed before the authority.
  6. On precedential arguments relied upon by respondents (e.g., Deepak Chowdhary; Paul Varghese), the court examined scope and applicability and found them not decisive in the present factual context: Deepak Chowdhary concerned whether opportunity of hearing is required before sanction under an older statute and was not applicable here because lack of opportunity was not the appellant's complaint; Paul Varghese distinguished Section 197 CrPC from Section 19 of the Act but did not resolve the central question about review on same materials.
  7. Additional factual point: With respect to the writ petitioner whose impugned sanction dated 19.03.2005 related to events in 2001–2002, there was a three-year delay between events and the sanction order; the court noted the delay but did not penalize the petitioner for belatedly approaching the High Court in 2010.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED; the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The impugned sanction orders passed by the Sanctioning Authority are quashed.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The impugned sanction orders challenged in the writ petition and writ appeal have been quashed on the ground that the sanctioning authority changed its earlier refusal without being shown to have been placed with fresh materials and that the change of mind was induced by extraneous influence (CBI/CVC) rather than by independent application of mind.
  • Consequently, the writ petition and the writ appeal stand allowed. The connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. The court ordered no costs.
  • The opinion does not assert that it establishes any broader new legal principle beyond applying and reconciling existing Supreme Court authorities; the court applied established precedents on the conditions under which a sanctioning authority may reconsider an earlier refusal (specifically, only when fresh materials have been placed before it) and on the requirement of independent application of mind when sanctioning prosecution.

This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those stated in the opinion.

    M.S. Vijayakumar v. Indian Overseas Bank

    Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters of Patent against the order dated 06.01.2010 made in W.P No. 22472 of 2009 passed by Her Lordship Ms. Justice K. Suguna on the file of this Hon'ble Court.

    Writ Petition filed for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the Second respondent in sanction order dated 19.03.2005 and to quash the decision taken thereon sanctioning prosecution under Section 19(1)(C) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner.

    COMMON ORDER

    (Order of the Court was made by P. JYOTHIMANI, J.,)

    The appeal arises from the order of the learned Single Judge dated 06.01.2010 made in W.P No. 22472 of 2009 filed by the appellant herein, in and by which the learned Judge, while dismissing the writ petition, has held that the order of sanction to prosecute the appellant has been made with independent application of mind supported by reasons and charge sheet has already been filed.

    2. The appellant has served the respondent/Bank for a period of 33 years under various positions. While he was working as Chief Manager of Indira Nagar Branch, Chennai, in the year 2005, an explanation was called for in respect of some of the commissions and omissions stated to have been committed by him during 2003-2005. At that time, he was working in New Delhi. The appellant has submitted his explanation. Rejecting the said explanation, charges were framed against him and enquiry was conducted and based on the report of the Enquiry Officer, the Employer/Bank, by an order dated 13.11.2008, has imposed a punishment of reduction in basic pay by one stage in the time scale of pay for a period of one year with further direction that he will not earn increment of pay during the period of such reduction and on the expiry of such period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay. That order of punishment imposed in the departmental proceeding has become final.

    3. It appears that after he was transferred from New Delhi Branch, certain complaint has been lodged with the Central Bureau of Investigation, Economic Offence Wing, New Delhi and the same was registered on 24.12.2007 and in the said complaint, the appellant was cited as one of the accused. After the investigation was completed, the charge sheet was filed against five persons, but the appellant's name was excluded from the charge sheet. The reason was that the Competent Authority namely, the Employer, has declined sanction of prosecution of the appellant. That refusal was made on 30.12.2008 Again for the second time, sanction was sought to prosecute the appellant and that was also declined on 18.05.2009

    4. Thereafter, it is seen that under the impugned order dated 16.09.2009, the same Authority namely, the Employer, has granted sanction for prosecution against the appellant under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was that sanction order given by the Competent Authority, which was challenged by the appellant in the writ petition filed by him in W.P No. 22472 of 2009. The challenge was on various grounds including that the Competent Authority having declined the grant of sanction based on the materials available, cannot now grant sanction on the same materials. In other words, it has been the case of the appellant that the Sanctioning Authority has no power of review, unless new materials come to limelight, which were not brought to the notice of the Sanctioning Authority at the time of granting sanction.

    5. Further, the point on which the writ petition was filed was that, when once the first order of declining sanction has been passed by the Authority, there is no question of reopening the case once again, especially in the absence of such power available in law. It is the further case of the appellant that even otherwise in passing of the impugned sanction order, there has been no independent application of mind. According to the appellant, the sanction order has been motivated at the instance of the Central Bureau of Investigation, as directed by the Central Vigilance Commission, and therefore, it has to be treated as not an independent decision, as it has been judicially established that the sanction order has to be granted by the Authority by applying its mind independently and the Authority should not succumb to any pressure from any quarters.

    6. It was contended by the respondent/Bank that the writ petition is not maintainable on the ground that for sanction of prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act there is no need to apply judicial mind and therefore, as and when new materials come to light, the Authority is entitled to change its view and on that basis, it was the case of the respondent/Bank before the learned Single Judge that the writ petition is not maintainable. It is further stated that the Disciplinary Authority has given a finding accepting the report of the Enquiry Officer about the guilt of the appellant and it has prima facie satisfied itself to come to a conclusion that there are sufficient materials available for the purpose of granting sanction and therefore, it is not open to the appellant to say that there were no prima facie materials available.

    7. It is also the case of the Bank that simply because on an earlier occasion certain mistakes have been committed by the Authority Competent in declining the grant of sanction, that does not prevent the Authority to take a different decision as long as sufficient materials are available and the action has been taken bona fide giving independent reasons.

    8. It is also the case of the respondent/Bank that the decision to grant sanction, even if it is by the same Authority, when compared to earlier two occasions, the same was on independent application of mind.

    9. The learned Single Judge found that:

    (i) the earlier order declining to grant sanction dated 18.05.2009 was issued on the assumption that the petitioner did not have any mala fide or criminal intention of defrauding the Bank;

    (ii) the said decline was by oversight and on the ground that the lapses committed by the appellant were only procedural irregularities, in respect of which the departmental proceedings have been conducted and punishment has been imposed;

    (iii) however, in the impugned sanction order, the Authority has now made up its mind and come to a conclusion that there has been a criminal conspiracy entered into between the appellant and G.D Bansal by sanctioning Packing Credit Limit, because of which the Bank has to sustain loss, and to arrive at such finding, the learned Judge, before whom the records were produced by the Authority, has relied upon a letter of the Chief Manager and Chief Vigilance Officer, Indian Overseas Bank dated 03.09.2009 Admittedly, that letter was neither shown to the appellant nor to the appellant's counsel. The letter dated 03.09.2009 of the respondent/bank has been received subsequently by the appellant under the Right to Information Act, which is extracted hereunder:

    “Office Note:

    Date:03.09.209

    From

    GM(VK & CVO)

    To

    CM(MVN) - DA

    RC 4(E)/2007.EOW-II against Shri G.D Bansal,

    R/O 115, Engineer Enclave, Pitampura, New Delhi 34 and Other Indian Overseas Bank.

    Mr. V.K Gupta, Addl. Secretary, Central Vigilance Commission had called for a meeting on 21st August 2009 at 12.00 hours in his chambers to resolve the difference of opinion for sanction of prosecution by CBI against Mr. M.S Vijayakumar, the, then Chief Manager, IOB, Model Town branch. During the meeting CBI presented their version of the case and the undersigned on behalf of the Bank explained the reasons why DA had not given sanction for prosecution. After hearing both sides, Addl. Secretary, CVC came to the conclusion and advised that the DA reconsider his decision of not giving sanction for prosecution for the following reasons.

    1) The Bank has lost substantial money by entering into One Time Settlement with the party.

    2) In one of the accounts, there is still an outstanding of Rs. 77.46 lakhs which is likely to result in loss to the Bank.

    3) The member has chosen to sanction packing credit limits of Rs. 95 lakhs each to four borrowers without proper verification of KYC of the borrowers concerned and CBI has been able to establish the link between these four parties and Mr. G.D Bansal.

    4) The member has accepted the valuation of nearly Rs. 1.31 crores for a property which was registered with Sub-Registrar for a sum of Rs. 2.55 lacs nine months prior to the date of valuation. In this case, Bank was able to actually realise only Rs. 19.00 lacs after liquidation of their property.”

    Hence, we request you to re-examine the matter and advise your decision.”

    And the letter dated 04.09.2009 of the Central Vigilance Commission is as follows:

    “Dated: 04.09.2009

    OFFICE MEMORANDUM

    SUB:RC4(E)/2007.EOW-II/DLI against Shri G.D Bansal,

    R/o 115, Enineer Enclave, Pitampura, New Delhi-34 and Others - Case of Shri M.S Vijay Kumar, SMGS-IV, Indian Overseas Bank.

    The undersigned is directed to refer to the IOB's letter No. C.208.VIG:GM(V)/305/2009-10 dated 20.05.2009 and subsequent joint meeting held with the SP, CBI and CVO on 21.08.2009 on the subject cited above.

    2. The case had been examined and the Commission is of the view that aspects of criminal conspiracy have been brought out by following points-

    (i) Shri M.S Vijay Kumar has accepted the valuation of a property purchased only 7 months back for Rs. 2.55 lac, at an exaggerated value of Rs. 1.3 crore as collateral security, even after he had himself visited the site.

    (ii) Shri M.S Vijay Kumar accepted projected sale of Rs. 18 crore and Rs. 20 crores in the next two years, with projected profit of Rs. 16.5 lacs, in sharp contrast to the loss of Rs. 44,985/- reflected in the balance sheet dated 30.11.2004 This over projection was to create an impression that the company was doing a roaring business and showing a massive upward swing.

    (iii) He permitted diversion of huge money on the very next day of the disbursement of funds into the accounts of sisters/associate and dummy companies without any corresponding business deals and this is a clear-cut evidence of criminal intent.

    3. Further, all irregularities/omissions committed in this case clearly indicate that there was a design to get the advance sanctioned and allow the money disbursed diverted to other accounts without little control over its end use. The evidence collected during the investigation conducted by the CBI has brought out criminal intent and prosecution of the accused officer is called for. The plea taken by the Bank that irregularities were mere procedural; and that formalities and KYC norms were complied with, cannot be accepted as good defence. The Commission would therefore in agreement with the CBI, advise sanction for prosecution of Shri M.S Vijay Kumar, Chief Manager.

    4. Receipt of the OM may be acknowledged and action taken intimated.”

    10. It is apparent that it is on going through the records which were produced before the learned Judge, after arguments were heard and reserved for orders, the learned Judge has referred to the said letter. The learned Judge has also referred to some of the passages in the impugned order of sanction which relate to the grant of Packing Credit Limit Facility to M/s. Padmakar Iron and Steel Company and has come to a conclusion that the reference of the incident shows the independent application of mind by the Authority for granting prosecution. Therefore, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Of Karnataka v. Ameerjan., (2007) 11 SCC 273, which contemplates independent application of mind as an imperative character for granting sanction, the learned Judge has concluded that the impugned sanction order is a speaking order. The learned Judge has also held that it can never be contended that for granting the sanction, the Authority has no power of review. What is required is an independent application of mind and materials. The learned Judge has also held that there is no delay on the part of the Authority in granting sanction order, since it was only after the Central Vigilance Commission has brought to the notice of the Sanctioning Authority new materials, which expose the alleged conspiracy between the appellant and G.D Bansal, the sanction order had to be issued, which cannot be held to be invalid. According to the learned Judge, fresh materials were placed and they gave a new slant and therefore, simply because there is some delay, it cannot be held that the Sanctioning Authority cannot review its earlier order. With that reasoning, the learned Judge has dismissed the writ petition, because of which the writ petitioner has filed the appeal.

    11. The main grounds on which the appeal has been filed are that:

    (i) There is no power of review to the Sanctioning Authority, especially, when the same Sanctioning Authority, on earlier two occasions namely, on 30.12.2008 and 18.05.2009 on the basis of the same materials, has come to a conclusion that there was no ground for granting sanction and in the impugned order nothing new has been stated in respect of the materials, which are relied upon.

    (ii) The impugned sanction order has been passed at the instance of the Central Bureau Investigation and Central Vigilance Commission, who have furnished their views to the Sanctioning Authority and due to that extraneous considerations, the Bank being the Sanctioning Authority had to change its earlier stand and therefore, it cannot be said to be an independent view based on fresh materials.

    (iii) Even in the impugned order, the Sanctioning Authority has not chosen to state anything about the previous orders declining sanction of prosecution dated 30.12.2008 and 18.05.2009 and that shows the non application of mind on the part of the Sanctioning Authority.

    (iv) There is nothing about the new materials stated to have been brought to the notice of the Sanctioning Authority, which were not available earlier on 30.12.2008 and 18.05.2009

    (v) The reliance placed by the learned Judge on the letter dated 03.09.2009 and the decision arrived at by the learned Judge based on such letter, which is inter-departmental in nature and has not been revealed to the appellant, is a denial of the principles of natural justice to the appellant and the same is unfair.

    12. Likewise, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 10569 of 2010 was working as a Clerk cum Typist having joined in the year 1975 in the Indian Overseas Bank and was subsequently promoted as Senior Manager in the year 1996 and was posted in New Delhi and was transferred to Chennai in that capacity on 01.11.2007 It was in respect of some commissions and omissions, while he was working in Chennai, there was certain disciplinary proceeding initiated against him, in which, after conducting enquiry and based on the report of the Enquiry Officer, punishment of reduction in basic pay in two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of one year to the effect that the reduction will not have the effect of postponing his future increment of pay was imposed. That order of punishment imposed in the departmental proceeding has become final.

    13. In this case also, like that of the Appellant, wherein the fact was explained about the complaint that was registered, making the petitioner as one of the accused and the Central Bureau of Investigation forwarded a letter on 28.07.2004 to the Authority Competent to grant sanction to prosecute the petitioner for alleged offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the I.P.C and under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The General Manager, Central Office, who is the Competent Authority, has rejected the proposal of the Central Bureau of Investigation on 31.08.2004 It appears that there has been some letter on 04.11.2009 from the Central Vigilance Commission requesting the General Manager to grant sanction, stating the necessity of granting sanction for prosecution because of the gravity of the alleged offences, which was once again rejected by the Chairman cum Managing Director on 23.12.2004 reiterating the earlier stand taken by the General Manager on 31.08.2004 It appears that subsequently, based on certain advice of the Central Vigilance Committee dated 21.02.2005, the same authority has granted the sanction order on 19.03.2005, which is challenged in the writ petition by the petitioner on the same grounds which are stated above in respect of the appellant.

    14. The case of the petitioner is that the draft sanction order furnished by the Central Bureau of Investigation to the Bank based on which the impugned order came to be passed by the Sanctioning Authority on 19.03.2005, shows that it is out of pressure from the Central Vigilance Commission, the sanction came to be granted and therefore, the sanction cannot be said to be independent and based on any fresh materials available.

    15. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, the facts have been reiterated and in addition to that, it has also been stated that the sanction order of the year 2005 has been challenged in the year 2010 and therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.

    16. Mr. V.T Gopalan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant as well as the petitioner, contended that even though the sanction order may not be a decision, it is sacrosanct in nature, since it is based on such order of sanction which has been prima facie arrived at by the Sanctioning Authority, the prosecution has commenced and therefore, the order of sanction must be not only independent, but also based on the materials. He would also rely on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.S Nayak v. A.R Antulay., (1984) 2 SCC 183 to substantiate his contention that the sanction order should not be out of pressure from any source and the same should be by independent application of mind. While referring to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, especially Section 6(1), which is in pari materia with Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, he would also rely upon the judgment in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State Of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622, apart from Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (2000) 9 SCC 53, to submit that in the absence of any fresh materials, there is no question of reviewing an earlier sanction by the Sanctioning Authority, he would also rely upon the judgment in State of Punjab v. Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti, (2009) 17 SCC 92.

    17. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that even though the appellant as well as the petitioner have taken a stand that the Sanctioning Authority has no power to review, such power of review is possible when there are new materials. Therefore, there cannot be any review of earlier decision based on the same materials, which were the basis for earlier rejection. To substantiate the same, he would rely upon the latest judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen., AIR 2011 SC 404.

    18. On the other hand, it is the contention of Mr. N.G.R Prasad, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 that the sanction order is not a decision, but it is only a statutory requirement. Against the sanction order, no writ petition can be filed. To substantiate that a sanction order is only an administrative act and therefore, it does not require any opportunity to a person against whom the sanction order was to be given or there is no question of principles of natural justice to be followed, he would rely on decision in Superintendent of Police (C.B.I) v. Deepak Chowdhary, (1995) 6 SCC 225.

    19. Again, to insist on his point that the sanction is only procedural in nature and it does not go to the root of jurisdiction, he would rely upon the decision Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 783. He also contends that the sanction as stated under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code is totally different from the sanction that is required under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. According to Mr. N.G.R Prasad, sanction under Section 19(1) is only preliminary in nature, whereas under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code it is substantial. Therefore, by granting sanction to prosecute the appellant as well as petitioner, their right to defend themselves in the criminal case is not taken away.

    20. Mr. N. Chandrasekaran, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent/CBI, while reiterating the above said contentions of Mr. N.G.R Prasad, would submit that the appellant as well as the petitioner have approached the Court in the preliminary stage and the criminal case is yet to commence. It is not as if the appellant as well as the petitioner cannot defend themselves. If there is no prima facie case which has been taken cognisance of by the Competent Criminal Court, it is always open to the accused to file petition for discharge.

    21. We have heard both the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant as well as the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents and have given our anxious thought to the issue involved in these cases.

    22. It is also relevant to note at this point in time that in respect of the writ petition, the petitioner has filed a petition for discharge, which came to be dismissed.

    23. Insofar as the factual aspect in the writ appeal as well as in the writ petition is concerned, it is not in dispute that the Authority, which has granted sanction, is the same on earlier two occasions, when the order declining sanction of prosecution was passed. On a reference to the impugned order of sanction, it is seen that in respect of the appellant, while he was working in New Delhi, he has abused his official position by fraudulently sanctioning Packing Credit Limit of Rs. 95 lakhs to M/s. Padmakar Iron and Steel Company on the basis of fabricated balance sheets. It is also stated that in furtherance of the same, there has been a conspiracy in allowing M/s. Padmakar Iron and Steel Company, a Proprietary concern floated by Shri Om Prakash Malik, to open the Current Account No. 3948 and thereafter it is alleged that the appellant has visited the premises of M/s. Padmakar Iron and Steel Company on 10.02.2005 and he has filed a report, in which he states that the value of the collateral security is Rs. 1.31 crores as per the valuer of the Indian Overseas Bank, S.S.K Bhagat. Further, the stock statements submitted by M/s. Padmakar Iron and Steel Company from time to time, signed by Shri Om Prakash Malik showing a godown address in Narela, New Delhi, has been accepted by the appellant, while such godown does not exist in the said premises. Therefore, by sanctioning such loan facilities to the said party, loss has been caused to the Bank and therefore, the appellant has committed offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the I.P.C, apart from Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and it is on that basis, the sanction order came to be passed.

    24. Likewise, in respect of the writ petition in W.P No. 10569 of 2010, the impugned sanction order states that the petitioner while working as Senior Manager, IOB, T. Nagar Branch from 2001-2002 has entered into agreement with Shri. T.S.R Vasudevan, Proprietor of M/s. Lalitha Oils, S/Shri. C. Manohar Naidu, R. Muthaiyan, P. Thanigaivelan, Sundaram Balraj, Smt. P. Hema, T. Palanivel and T. Vetrivel and A. Ramesh during the months of August 2001 to October 2002 towards certain illegal acts to cheat the Indian Overseas Bank by fabricating the documents and using the same as genuine and committed criminal misconduct and in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy, various acts have been committed causing loss to the extent of Rs. 1,22,89,785/- to the Indian Overseas Bank. It is also alleged that in respect of the credit worthiness of the persons, the Advance Officer anticipated that the project would not become fruitful due to the reasons namely,

    “1. The CC limit of Rs. 70 lacs was always in excess of limit from 09.07.2002 onwards.

    2. Regarding LC limit, the LC commitment was not honoured on the due dates on various earlier occasions.

    3. With regard to the bills limit, the bills were found mostly drawn on two parties i.e M/s. Hari Oil and M/s. Vetri Oils, Villupuram. Many of the UBD bills were not paid on the due dates and an over due amount of Rs. 32.26 lacs was adjusted only during the last week of September 2002. The said account was also classified as Quick Mortality Account (QMA) by the inspection team of IOB, Central Office, Chennai on 22.02.2002”

    In spite of the said reasons given, the writ petitioner and one P. Sethuseshan, Assistant General Manager have overruled the above said opinion without any reasons and recommended enhancement of LC limit from Rs. 25 lacs to Rs. 40 lacs and CC limit from Rs. 70 lacs to Rs. 75 lacs on permanent basis and based on the said criminal conspiracy, the transactions have taken place and the account was classified as QMR (Quick Mortality Report) and the same was revised thrice and certain deficiencies were subsequently noted in respect of the mortgage which was created as security for the repayment, and that on 31.10.2001, the writ petitioner went along with the Proprietor of M/s. Lalitha Oils and T. Ramaswamy, Approved Panel Lawyer to inspect the agricultural land at Gummidipoondi for valuation and the valuation report has been submitted by him by increasing the value, resulting in the grant of facilities to the said account holder. It is also alleged under the sanction order that by granting the said loan facilities, RBI instructions have been breached and therefore, the sanction order shows that the writ petitioner is alleged to have committed offences punishable under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 419, 467, 468, 471 of the I.P.C, apart from Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. As stated above, in respect of the writ petitioner, earlier, the General Manager, on the said materials has declined to grant sanction and subsequently, on the CBI approaching the Chairman cum Managing Director, the said stand was reiterated and it was thereafter, the General Manager has granted the impugned sanction order based on the same reasons.

    25. Insofar as it relates to the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant as well as the petitioner that the Sanctioning Authority cannot change its opinion and, in fact, there is no power of review available, now the law is well settled that the power of review to the Sanctioning Authority is available, provided that new materials have come to the lime light. While dealing with Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code contemplating sanction to prosecute, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State Of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen., AIR 2011 Supreme Court 404 has held that the power of the Government in granting sanction is a statutory power and when once it is exercised, it cannot be exercised again in the absence of express power of review. But in cases where new materials have been brought to the notice of the Authority namely, the Government, for granting sanction that can be a ground for reconsidering the earlier decision of refusal to grant sanction. The Supreme Court while reiterating that unless the power of review is granted under a statute, based on the earlier materials by which the sanction was refused there cannot be a reopening for the purpose of granting fresh sanction, has held that based on fresh materials certainly there are powers to review the earlier stand, as it is seen in the following paragraph:

    “12. It is true that the Government in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory power and that would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence of express power of review in no circumstance whatsoever. The power of review, however, is not unbridled or unrestricted. It seems to us sound principle to follow that once the statutory power under Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code has been exercised by the Government or the competent authority, as the case may be, it is not permissible for the sanctioning authority to review or reconsider the matter on the same materials again. It is so because unrestricted power of review may not bring finality to such exercise and on change of the Government or change of the person authorised to exercise power of sanction, the matter concerning sanction may be reopened by such authority for the reasons best known to it and a different order may be passed. The opinion on the same materials, thus, may keep on changing and there may not be any end to such statutory exercise. In our opinion, a change of opinion per se on the same materials cannot be a ground for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. However, in a case where fresh materials have been collected by the investigating agency subsequent to the earlier order and placed before the sanctioning authority and on that basis, the matter is reconsidered by the sanctioning authority and in light of the fresh materials an opinion is formed that sanction to prosecute the public servant may be granted, there may not be any impediment to adopt such course.”

    26. Therefore, legally it is settled that the power of review is possible only when there is an express provision enabling the Authority to review the earlier stand. It is equally settled that in respect of the grant of sanction to prosecute, when once on certain materials the Sanctioning Authority decides not to grant sanction, certainly on the same materials, the Sanctioning Authority cannot change its opinion.

    27. It cannot be said that the sanction order is not an order, as stated by the Hon'ble Apex Court. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the sanctioning order is a statutory order. A statutory order has got a legal force and that is the basis for starting the prosecution against the delinquent officer and therefore, it cannot be lightly taken up. It was held as early as in the year 1984 in R.S Nayak v. A.R Antulay., (1984) 2 SCC 183 that granting sanction to prosecute is a sacrosanct act. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is in pari materia with Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in categorical terms held that granting sanction is not expected to be misused or abused by the Sanctioning Authority and it cannot be for the purpose of frivolous prosecution. While holding that the grant of sanction is a sacrosanct act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

    “The expression “office” in the three sub-clauses of Section 6(1) would clearly denote that office which the public servant misused or abused for corrupt motives for which he is to be prosecuted and in respect of which a sanction to prosecute him is necessary by the competent authority entitled to remove him from that office which he has abused. This interrelation between the office and its abuse if severed would render Section 6 devoid of any meaning. And this interrelation clearly provides a clue to the understanding of the provision in Section 6 providing for sanction by a competent authority who would be able to judge the action of the public servant before removing the bar, by granting sanction, to the taking of the cognizance of offences by the court against the public servant. Therefore, it unquestionably follows that the sanction to prosecute can be given by an authority competent to remove the public servant from the office which he has misused or abused because that authority alone would be able to know whether there has been a misuse or abuse of the office by the public servant and not some rank outsider. By a catena of decisions, it has been held that the authority entitled to grant sanction must apply its mind to the facts of the case, evidence collected and other incidental facts before according sanction. A grant of sanction is not an idle formality but a solemn and sacrosanct act which removes the umbrella of protection of Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and the aforesaid requirements must therefore, be strictly complied with before any prosecution could be launched against public servants. (See Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad v. State of A.P, (1979) 4 SCC 172) The Legislature advisedly conferred power on the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office to grant sanction for the obvious reason that that authority alone would be able, when facts and evidence are placed before him to judge whether a serious offence is committed or the prosecution is either frivolous or speculative. That authority alone would be competent to judge whether on the facts alleged, there has been an abuse or misuse of office held by the public servant. That authority would be in a position to know what was the power conferred on the office which the public servant holds, how that power could be abused for corrupt motive and whether prima facie it has been so done. That competent authority alone would know the nature and functions discharged by the public servant holding the office and whether the same has been abused or misused. It is the vertical hierarchy between the authority competent to remove the public servant from that office and the nature of the office held by the public servant against whom sanction is sought which would indicate a hierarchy and which would therefore, permit inference of knowledge about the functions and duties of the office and its misuse or abuse by the public servant. That is why the Legislature clearly provided that that authority alone would be competent to grant sanction which is entitled to remove the public servant against whom sanction is sought from the office.”

    Therefore, the contention of Mr. N.G.R Prasad and Mr. N. Chandrasekar, learned counsel for the respondents that sanctioning order is not a decision, has no meaning.

    28. While dealing with the same Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State Of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while referring to the hierarchy of the judgments on granting of sanction, has held that grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to the government servants against frivolous prosecutions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in that case has held that the grant of sanction is based on the application of mind and the materials and evidence collected during investigation and it was also further held that the High Court by exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is entitled to take a decision if the Sanctioning Authority has not made its decision on the materials. Of course, it is not the sufficiency of materials which has to be considered by the High Court, but the availability of the materials that have been considered to the satisfaction of the Sanctioning Authority. It is not the decision making process, which can be the subject matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The categoric pronouncement of the judgment by the Hon'ble Apex Court is reflected in the following paragraphs:

    “14. From a perusal of Section 6, it would appear that the Central or the State Government or any other authority (depending upon the category of the public servant) has the right to consider the facts of each case and to decide whether that “public servant” is to be prosecuted or not. Since the section clearly prohibits the courts from taking cognizance of the offences specified therein, it envisages that the Central or the State Government or the “other authority” has not only the right to consider the question of grant of sanction, it has also the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction.

    15. In Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. King, AIR 1948 PC 82 it was pointed out that:

    “… The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. They are not, as the High Court seem to have thought, concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. They can refuse sanction on any ground which commends itself to them, for example, that on political or economic grounds they regard a prosecution as inexpedient. Looked at as a matter of substance it is plain that the Government cannot adequately discharge the obligation of deciding whether to give or withhold a sanction without a knowledge of the facts of the case.” (emphasis supplied)

    16. In Basdeo Agarwalla v. Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 16, it was pointed out that sanction under the Act is not intended to be, nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that the provisions in regard to sanction should be observed with complete strictness. This Court in State through Anti-Corruption Bureau, Govt. of Maharashtra v. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani, (1996) 4 SCC 472 while considering the provisions of Section 6 of the Act held that one of the guiding principles for sanctioning authority would be the public interest and, therefore, the protection available under Section 6 cannot be said to be absolute.

    17. Sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecutions. (See Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P, (1979) 4 SCC 172) Sanction is a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty.

    18. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority. (See also Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 124 and State of Bihar v. P.P Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222)

    19. Since the validity of “sanction” depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority “not to sanction” was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution.

    20. The narration of facts, set out in the beginning of the judgment, would show that while the matter of grant of sanction was under the consideration of the State Government, Harshadrai had filed a petition on behalf of his firm in the Gujarat High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State Government to grant sanction. In this petition, the Secretary of the Department who, originally was not impleaded, was, subsequently, arrayed as Respondent 7 and a direction was issued to him to grant sanction and the Secretary, acting in pursuance of the order of the High Court, granted the sanction.

    21. The question is whether the High Court could issue a mandamus of this nature and whether the order of sanction, in these circumstances, is valid.

    22. Mandamus which is a discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is requested to be issued, inter alia, to compel performance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. Statutory duty may be either directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they are intended to be mandatory in character, are indicated by the use of the words “shall” or “must”. But this is not conclusive as “shall” and “must” have, sometimes, been interpreted as “may”. What is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the statute in which the “duty” has been set out. Even if the “duty” is not set out clearly and specifically in the statute, it may be implied as correlative to a “right”.

    23. In the performance of this duty, if the authority in whom the discretion is vested under the statute, does not act independently and passes an order under the instructions and orders of another authority, the Court would intervene in the matter, quash the order and issue a mandamus to that authority to exercise its own discretion.”

    29. The reliance placed by Mr. N.G.R Prasad on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Superintendent of Police (C.B.I) v. Deepak Chowdhary, (1995) 6 SCC 225 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. There the contention was as to whether before granting sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the delinquent must be given an opportunity and it was in those circumstances held that granting of sanction is only an administrative act and therefore, the question of giving opportunity of hearing does not arise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

    “5. We find force in the contention. The grant of sanction is only an administrative function, though it is true that the accused may be saddled with the liability to be prosecuted in a court of law. What is material at that time is that the necessary facts collected during investigation constituting the offence have to be placed before the sanctioning authority and it has to consider the material. Prima facie, the authority is required to reach the satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction. The grant of sanction, therefore, being administrative act the need to provide an opportunity of hearing to the accused before according sanction does not arise. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the order of sanction is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice.”

    It is not the case of the appellant as well as the petitioner in this case that no opportunity was given before the impugned sanction order came to be passed and therefore, the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case.

    30. Further reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala in (2007) 14 SCC 783, which again relates to the sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was held that the sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 does not go into the root of jurisdiction, while it is altogether different under Section 197 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has differentiated the two statutes holding that they are absolutely different. Ultimately, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

    “10. It may be noted that Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the Act operate in conceptually different fields. In cases covered under the Act, in respect of public servants the sanction is of automatic nature and thus factual aspects are of little or no consequence. Conversely, in a case relatable to Section 197 of the Code, the substratum and basic features of the case have to be considered to find out whether the alleged act has any nexus to the discharge of duties. Position is not so in case of Section 19 of the Act.”

    In fact, in the said judgment by referring to the earlier decision in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that mere irregularity or error or omission in granting the sanction does not vitiate the sanction order, unless it is shown that such irregularity or error has resulted in substantial failure of justice. It is relevant to extract paragraph-8, which is as follows:

    “8. The effect of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19 of the Act is of considerable significance as noted in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 1. In sub-section (3) the stress is on “failure of justice” and that too “in the opinion of the court”. In sub-section (4), the stress is on raising the plea at the appropriate time. Significantly, the “failure of justice” is relatable to error, omission or irregularity in the sanction. Therefore, mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is (sic not) considered fatal unless it has resulted in failure of justice or (sic failure of justice) has been occasioned thereby. Section 19(1) is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of jurisdiction. Sub-section (3)(c) of Section 19 reduces the rigour of prohibition. In Section 6(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “old Act”) corresponding to Section 19(2) of the Act, question relates to doubt about authority to grant sanction and not whether sanction is necessary.”

    31. But that is not the issue before this Court. The issue before this Court is that the Authority on the same materials having taken earlier decision twice in not granting sanction, has chosen to grant sanction based on the same materials and it is not the question of mere irregularity or omission to show that it is not substantive in nature.

    32. It was in Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (2000) 9 SCC 53, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that independent application of mind is sine qua non for granting sanction to prosecute. In that case, originally, the matter was placed before the Minister of Law to revise the grant of sanction and after retirement of the delinquent, the Chief Minister has granted sanction and it was in those circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court having found that the investigating agency has not collected any fresh materials and therefore, the Chief Minister has no authority to change the earlier decision of the Minister of Law, has held as follows:

    “5. In the case in hand, the matter was initially placed before the Minister of Law who refused to accord sanction after applying his mind to the entire materials and an order to that effect was passed. Subsequent to the same, the appellant retired in the year 1994 and it is only in 1997, the Chief Minister appears to have passed the impugned order. The appellant assailed the legality of the aforesaid order in the High Court, but the High Court having not interfered, he has approached this Court. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that no fresh materials were collected subsequent to the earlier order refusing to sanction prosecution and the appropriate authority having applied its mind and having passed the said order, the subsequent order was wholly uncalled for and unjustified. In the counter-affidavit filed by the State, it has been indicated that before passing the earlier order, the matter had not been referred to the Chief Minister who was the competent authority and, therefore, when the matter was referred to the Chief Minister, the Chief Minister having passed the order there is no infirmity with the order of sanction in question. He also produced the relevant file before us to indicate as to how the file has been processed after the earlier order refusing to sanction prosecution.

    6. We find from the file that was produced that there has been no application of mind when the subsequent order was passed in the year 1997. It further appears that between the order refusing to sanction and the order that was passed in 1997, the investigating agency had not collected any fresh materials requiring a fresh look at the earlier order. It is also apparent that the alleged excess amount said to have been paid on account of non-performance of the duty by the appellant is to the tune of Rs. 2750 and, therefore, under the Rules of Business, the file pertaining to sanction would have been finally dealt with by the Law Minister and, in fact, he had done so. In this view of the matter, neither was there any necessity for the authorities concerned to place the file before the Chief Minister nor had the Chief Minister any occasion to reconsider the matter and pass fresh order sanctioning prosecution particularly when taking into account the loss sustained to the exchequer to the tune of Rs. 2750. That apart, the person concerned has already retired in the year 1994 and it is unthinkable that for a loss of Rs. 2750 the State would pursue the proceedings against such person. In this view of the matter, we set aside the impugned order of sanction dated 10-12-1997 passed by the Chief Minister for prosecuting the appellant.”

    While the law is thus well settled, on the facts of the present case, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned sanction has been given by the authority on the same material, which was available before the Authority on the earlier two occasions when the refusal was made.

    33. We have also perused the file handed over by the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2. On a reference to the letter relied upon by the learned Judge dated 03.09.2009, extracted above, it is seen that the Central Vigilance Commission has called for a meeting in the Chamber of the Central Vigilance Commission to resolve the difference of opinion for sanctioning of prosecution by the CBI against the appellant. The letter shows that during the said joint meeting of the Bank, CBI and CVC, the Additional Secretary, CVC has advised the Bank, being the Sanctioning Authority, to the effect that the bank has lost substantial amount by One Time Settlement and the Packing Credit Limit has been given by the appellant without proper verification of the borrower's status and that the appellant blindly accepted the valuation of nearly Rs. 1.31 Crores, while the property was registered with the Sub-Registrar for a sum of Rs. 2.55 lacs, nine months prior to the date of valuation. The following points which have been insisted by the CVC to the Bank as seen in the letter dated 03.09.2009 are once again extracted hereunder with the risk of repetition:

    “1. The Bank has lost substantial money by entering into One Time Settlement with the party.

    2. In one of the accounts, there is still an outstanding of Rs. 77.46 lakhs which is likely to result in loss to the Bank.

    3. The member has chosen to sanction packing credit limits of Rs. 95 lakhs each to four borrowers without proper verification of KYC of the borrowers concerned and CBI has been able to establish the link between these four parties and Mr. G.D Bansal.

    4. The member has accepted the valuation of nearly Rs. 1.31 crores for a property which was registered with Sub-Registrar for a sum of Rs. 2.55 lacs nine months prior to the date of valuation. In this case, Bank was able to actually realise only Rs. 19.00 lacs after liquidation of their property.”

    34. It is seen that it is because of the joint sitting of the CBI, CVC along with the Indian Overseas Bank (Sanctioning Authority), the Sanctioning Authority has changed its view. It is not the case of the bank that these materials which are insisted by either the CBI or CVC were not available on earlier two occasions when the order declining sanction of prosecution was passed. Therefore, it is manifestly clear that the change in mind on the part of the Sanctioning Authority has occurred only at the instance and instigation of the CBI and CVC. In the light of the well settled legal principle that the Sanctioning Authority has to independently decide before granting sanction on the materials available, we have no hesitation to hold on the facts and circumstances of the present case that the change of mind on the part of the Sanctioning Authority is certainly not independent. Moreover, it is astonishing to note that in the impugned sanction orders passed by the competent authority there is not even a reference about the earlier order declining to grant sanction and there is absolutely nothing to show that the impugned order has been passed based on any new materials, which were brought to the notice of the authority competent.

    35. It is unfortunate that in spite of the alleged grave nature of the offences stated to have been committed by the appellant as well as the petitioner, the employer, being the Sanctioning Authority, having taken a lenient view earlier of declining to grant sanction has changed its opinion due to the pressure from the extraneous sources, which is certainly not expected of the Sanctioning Authority in the light of the well settled principles of law. Unfortunately, the learned Judge has not taken note of the said relevant fact, which in our view vitiates the impugned sanction order. It cannot be said that the impugned sanction order has been passed based on the new materials. Even though the learned Judge has referred to the judgment in Ramanad Chaudhary v. State of Bihar in (2002) 1 SCC 153 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that the Sanctioning Authority has no jurisdiction to review the order and grant sanction on the same materials, she has chosen to come to a conclusion that there are new materials available. On fact, we do not see any new materials which were either placed by the CBI or CVC before the Sanctioning Authority for the purpose of enabling the Sanctioning Authority to come to a different conclusion.

    36. In respect of the alleged conduct during the year 2001-2002, the impugned sanction order came to be passed in the year 2005 and there has been a substantial delay of three years and in such circumstance, we do not want to fasten the responsibility on the petitioner for belatedly approaching this Court by filing the writ petition in the year 2010.

    37. For all these reasons, the order of the learned single Judge stands set aside. Consequently, the orders of the Sanctioning Authority, which are impugned in the writ petitions, are quashed and resultantly, the writ petition as well as the writ appeal stand allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

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    M.S. Vijayakumar v. Indian Overseas Bank
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