Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 227 of the Constitution of India, to call for the records relating to the order & decretal order, dated 28.01.2010 passed by the Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Madurai, in I.A No. 897 of 2009 in O.S No. 548 of 2009.
JUDGMENT
1. The defendants/respondents in O.S No. 548 of 2009.I.A. No. 897 of 2009, on the file of the II Additional Subordinate Judge, Madurai, are the revision petitioners herein.
2. The respondent herein filed the above Suit stating that he was validly appointed by the Governing Council of American College as Bursar and he has not been terminated from that post and therefore, he is entitled to hold that post till another person is validly appointed by the Governing Council of the College and for consequential injunction restraining the revision petitioners herein from interfering with his functions as Bursar of the American College.
3. The case of the respondent herein, as seen from the Plaint is that he was appointed as Bursar of the American College on 3.6.2006 by the Governing Council and his appointment has not been terminated and as per the order passed by this Court in W.A No. 790, 796 & 797 of 2008, dated 24.08.2009, his appointment was also confirmed by the Division Bench of this Honourable Court and in his place, no other person has been validly appointed and the Principal/Secretary of the American College with a view to usurp the office of Bursar, is preventing the respondent herein from acting as Bursar and also claim to have appointed the 2nd petitioner herein as Bursar and on that pretext, the revision petitioners are trying to interfere with his functioning as the Bursar and prayed for the reliefs aforesaid mentioned.
4. Along with the Suit, the respondent herein also filed I.A No. 897 of 2009 under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 of C.P.C, for the relief of temporary injunction restraining the revision petitioners herein from interfering with his functioning as the Bursar of the American College, pending the Suit. The revision petitioners, who were the respondents, before the lower Court filed separate counter taking the same plea that the term of appointment of the respondent herein, came to an end on 31.05.2008 and the Governing Council in its regular meeting held on 28.05.2008 appointed the 2nd petitioner herein as Bursar of the American College and his tenure was extended for a further period of one year from 26.05.2009 and after 31.05.2008, the respondent never functioned or acted as a Bursar of the College and the 2nd petitioner only is acting as Bursar and therefore, the respondent is not entitled to any order of temporary injunction.
5. Before the lower Court, the revision petitioners filed 25 documents and the respondent filed 12 documents and the learned Subordinate Judge, on the basis of the pleadings and documents, allowed the Application I.A No. 897 of 2009 in O.S No. 548 of 2009 and granted temporary injunction. This order is challenged in this Civil Revision.
6. Mr. Issac Mohan Lal, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners, submitted that though an Appeal remedy is available under Order 43, Rule 1(r), C.P.C, having regard to the fact that the lower Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the order of temporary injunction and has decided the main issue under the guise of granting temporary injunction and proceeded on the basis that the materials were placed before the Court to substantiate the case of the respondent that he is acting as Bursar of the American College when no materials were placed and hence, the revision petitioners have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction available under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
7. He further submitted that the order of the lower Court is perverse as the findings are not based on any evidence and the lower Court has also given a finding that the 2nd petitioner is acting as Bursar and despite such finding, the lower Court has granted injunction in favour of the respondents and also held that the 2nd petitioner herein has not proved that he has been validly appointed as Bursar, which amounts to granting the main relief and therefore, the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court has been invoked to set aside the order passed by the lower Court.
8. Mr. M.V Venkateseshan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that the order of lower Court was on merits and therefore, if the revision petitioners are aggrieved, they will have to file Appeal, as per Order 43, Rule 1(r), C.P.C and invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India, cannot be permitted in such cases.
9. In this case, it is admitted by both parties that the respondent was appointed as Bursar of the American College on 03.06.2006 and his term of office was upto 31.05.2008 This fact is admitted by both the parties. According to the respondent, even after the expiry of his period, he is entitled to continue as Bursar of the College and he is acting as Bursar and he can be replaced only by a person, who has been validly appointed by the Governing Council and till date, no person has been validly appointed by the Governing Counsel and as such, the respondent is entitled to function as Bursar.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners contended that the term of office of the respondent came to an end on 31.05.2008 and even on 28.05.2008, the 2nd petitioner was appointed as Bursar and his term of office was extended for a period of one more year from 26.05.2009 and the 2nd petitioner is acting as a Bursar of the College, operating the Bank accounts and even, the respondent is drawing salary from the 2nd petitioner and after the expiry of his term, the respondent is not authorised by the Governing Counsel to act as a Bursar of the College.
11. Therefore, the point for consideration that arose before the lower Court is whether the respondent continues to act as Bursar, even after the expiry of his term or whether the 2nd petitioner is acting as a Bursar by virtue of the resolution of the Governing Council, dated 28.05.2008
12. The lower Court has held that as per Exs.P7 and 8, the respondent has proved that he is acting as a Bursar and the revision petitioners also accepted the same under Ex.R7 and therefore, on the basis of the documents filed before the lower Court, the respondent has proved that even after 31.05.2008, he continues to function as Bursar and on that basis, granted temporary injunction. This order is challenged by the revision petitioners on the following grounds:
1. The lower Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by giving a finding that the appointment of the 2nd petitioner is not valid while granting temporary injunction and that amounts to virtually decreeing the Suit as prayed for.
2. The lower Court having held that the 2nd petitioner is acting as Bursar, committed an error in granting temporary injunction in favour of the respondent and the object of the temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo and having held that the 2nd petitioner is acting as Bursar, the lower Court should not have granted temporary injunction.
3. The order of the lower Court is also perverse as the lower Court has not taken into consideration the documents filed by the revision petitioners, viz., Ex.R6 and 8, the appointment of the 2nd petitioner as Bursar and the letters written by the 2nd petitioners to various Banks as disclosed in Exs.R-16 to R-24 and the assessment order, Ex.R25, wherein it was stated that the 2nd petitioner represented the American College and hence, there is an error apparent on the face of the record and it can be rectified, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
13. Before going into the merits of the case, I want to emphasis the power of this Court, while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The circumstances under which, the Honourable High Court can exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has been elaborately discussed in the judgement reported in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2003 (4) CTC 176 (SC) : 2003 (6) SCC 675 and in that case it has been held as follows:
“Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of Appeal or Revision is available to the person aggrieved. The High Court may have regard to legislative policy formulated on experience and expressed by enactments where the legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain orders and proceedings to be kept away from exercise of appellate and revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating the conclusion of the proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is occasioned by subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of Appeal or Revision.
The power to issue a Writ of Certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion.”
14. The Honourable Supreme Court in that judgment also sum up their conclusions and held that—
“Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
Be it a Writ of Certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
The power to issue a Writ of Certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any Suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an Appeal or Revision preferred there-against and entertaining a Petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the Suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result prolonging of the lis.
The High Court in exercise of Certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.”
15. In the judgment reported in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, 1983 (4) SCC 566: AIR 1984 SC 38, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows:
“A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority” and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision.”
16. It has been held in the judgment reported in the case of B. Shyamkumar v. Francies George, 2009 (4) CTC 750, that—
“There is no second opinion that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not for the purpose of correcting a mere question of fact. The jurisdiction cannot be exercised as an appellate jurisdiction to set right all kinds of errors committed by the Subordinate Courts. However when the Trial Court misconstrued a document and arrived at a perverse conclusion, it would be open to this Court to correct such errors, as it would amount to jurisdictional error.”
Therefore, from the principles laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, we will have to see whether invoking of extraordinary jurisdiction against the order passed under Order 39, Rule 1 is justified or not in this case.
17. As stated supra, the main contention of Mr. Issac Mohan Lal, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners is that the lower Court has given a finding that the 2nd petitioner was not validly appointed and has placed the burden on the petitioners, who are defendants in the lower Court that they have not proved that the 2nd petitioner was validly appointed. Therefore, the finding that the 2nd petitioner was not validly appointed for the post of Bursar amounts to granting the main relief in the Suit, which is prohibited. For that proposition, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners relied upon the Division Bench judgement of this Honourable Court reported in the case of Dr. M. Thirunavukarasu (Dr) v. Indian Psychiatric Society Tribunal, rep. by its Chairman, Prof. Shridhar Sharma, 2008 (2) CTC 51, wherein this Court has held that
“when the prayer for interim injunction and prayer for permanent injunction are one and the same and any interim injunction having the effect of granting a final relief should not be granted.”
Therefore, Mr. Issac Mohan Lal, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners, submitted that the lower Court having given a finding that the petitioners have not proved that the 2nd petitioner was validly appointed as Bursar, has virtually granted the main relief prayed for in the Suit.
18. To appreciate the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners, we will have to see the facts and the contention raised by the parties.
19. It is the case of the respondent that though his term of office expired on 31.05.2008, he is continuing to hold that post until another Bursar is appointed validly by the Governing Council and as no person was appointed for that post, he is continuing as Bursar. The stand of the revision petitioners is that the on 28.05.2008, the 2nd petitioner was appointed as Bursar and he is acting as a Bursar of the college. Therefore, rival claims were made for the post of Bursar and in that context only, the lower Court has stated that in the meeting held on 28.05.2008, some members participated, who were not entitled to participate and Dr. V. Swaminathan, Rathinam, Sathiyamoorthy were not in the Governing Council at that time and Bishop did not participate and no reason was stated for the absence of the Bishop in that meeting and therefore, held that the 2nd petitioner could not have been appointed as Bursar in that meeting. He further held that in the meeting, there could not have any valid quorum and therefore, the contention of the 2nd petitioner that he was appointed as Bursar in the meeting cannot be accepted. In this context, I want to make it clear that I am not giving any finding about the appointment of the 2nd petitioner as claimed by him, but I have only reproduced the findings of the lower Court while granting the injunction.
20. As stated supra, in a case where there were rival claims to a particular post, in order to decide the issue, the Court has to necessarily give a finding prima facie that one party has proved his case and another party has not proved his case and that does not mean that the Court has rejected the case of the other side, even though as per the law, the revision petitioners are not expected to prove their case. The finding of the lower Court that the meeting held on 25.04.2008 cannot be a valid meeting and the 2nd petitioner could not have been validly appointed in that meeting, may be correct or wrong. While exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, I do not want to go into the question whether the finding is correct or not.
21. Suffice, it to say, there is a finding based on certain materials. In such cases, the question that arose for consideration is whether the revision petitioners are entitled to invoke Article 227 of Constitution of India, without filing the Appeal as provided under Order 43, Rule 1 of C.P.C
22. In the judgment reported in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2003 (4) CTC 176 (SC) : 2003 (6) SCC 675, referred to above, it has been held that—
“the power to issue a Writ of Certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion.”
23. Further, the Honourable Supreme Court has held in the reported judgment in the case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, 2000 (4) CTC 358: AIR 2000 SC 3032, that—
“Now what remains is the question whether the High Court should have entertained the Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of when the party had two other alternative remedies. Though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the Constitutional powers of the High Court it is a well recognised principle which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies one or the other before he resorts to a Constitutional remedy. Learned Single judge need not have entertained the Revision Petition at all and the party affected by the interim ex parte order should have been directed to resort to one of the other remedies. Be that as it may, now it is idle to embark on that aspect as the High Court had chosen to entertain the Revision Petition.”
24. In the judgement reported in the case of Ajay Bansal v. Anup Mehta and others, 2007 (3) CTC 604, it has been held as follows:
“Ordinarily, an Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable where an Appeal lies. An Appeal lay from the decree under Section 96 of the Code. When an Appeal could be filed, ordinarily, an Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not be entertained.”
25. In a similar circumstances, this Court has held in the judgment reported in the case of Alexander v. M. Balu and others, 2008 (1) CTC 225, held that—
“Suit laid for permanent injunction to restrain Defendants from interfering with plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment. Second Defendant/Revision petitioner contending that the First Defendant is the lawful owner and that as a promoter the Second Defendant has been in possession. Trial Court granted an ex parte interim order and also made it absolute on enquiry. Revision preferred by the Second Defendant under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Law is well settled that the power of superintendence of the High Court can be invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or even suo motu. Power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is wider than power under Article 226 as the power of superintendence is not subject to technicalities or traditional fetters which are found in Certiorari Jurisdiction. Power to High Court is also not affected by Amendment Act 46 of 1999.”
26. In another judgement reported in the case of Ganapathy Subramanian v. S. Ramalingam, 2007 (3) LW 515, it has been held that—
“Article 227 of the Constitution of India confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals through out the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any Court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. Without prejudice to the generality of such power, the High Court has been conferred with certain specific powers under clauses (2) and (3) of Article 227 of the Constitution. It could be seen that the power of the superintendence so conferred on the High Court is administrative as well as judicial and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is to clear that path of justice. Such a power of superintendence is not subject to technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters. That power so conferred cannot also be regarded as Appeal or revisional jurisdiction and should not be exercised in the garb or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and hence, the Court has devised a self-imposed rule and discipline on this power. The supervisory jurisdiction can be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of defending the Suit or filing an Appeal or Revision is available to the person aggrieved. The Court shall have regard to the legislative policy formulated on experience and expressed by enactments where the legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain orders and proceedings to be kept away from the Appellate or Revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating conclusion of the proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is occasioned by subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of Appeal or Revision.
It is not denied that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are extraordinary and discretionary power as distinguished from ordinary statutory power. No doubt, Article 227 of the Constitution conferred a right of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercised jurisdiction, but no corresponding right is conferred upon the litigant to invoke the jurisdiction as a matter of right. In fact, the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India casts a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior Courts and Tribunals within the limits of its authority and that they do not cross the limit ensuring the performance of their duties in accordance with law conferring power within the ambit of the enactment treating such Court and Tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the Subordinate Courts and Tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party.”
Therefore, it is seen from the afore-said judgments, when an effective and efficacious Appeal remedy is available to the parties, invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 is not maintainable. Therefore, when a finding has been given by the Trial Court on the basis of the evidence that finding can be challenged only by invoking Appeal remedy and the same cannot be challenged under Article 227 of Constitution of India.
27. In this case, it is contended by the Mr. Issac Mohan Lal, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners that the order of the lower Court is perverse, there is apparent error on the face of the record and the lower Court has given a finding that the 2nd petitioner is functioning as Bursar of the American College and therefore, the grant of injunction is erroneous and abuse of process of law. He further relied upon the judgement reported in the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer and others v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai and others, 2006 (5) SCC 282 and submitted that for granting a temporary injunction, the following requirements are to be made out by the plaintiffs and they are “(i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of the plaintiff's rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of the defendant's rights or likely infringement of the defendant's right, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands.”
28. He, therefore, submitted that having given a finding that the 2nd petitioner is acting as Bursar, the Court should not have granted the relief of injunction when there is no material to show that the respondent is acting as Bursar after the expiry of his period. In the aforesaid judgments, the Honourable Supreme Court has stated the requirement for granting temporary injunction and in this case, the lower Court has relied upon Ex.P7, the affidavit filed by the revision petitioner in M.P No. 5 of 2008 in W.P No. 844 of 2008 wherein it has been stated that the respondent is acting as a Bursar and attended the meeting and in the assessment order of Income-tax, dated 31.12.2008, marked as Ex.P8, it was stated that the respondent appeared on behalf of the American College. On the basis of the aforesaid two documents, the lower Court has held that the respondent is continuing in the post of Bursar even after 31.05.2008 The lower Court also discussed the minutes of the Governing Council viz., Exs.R5 & R7 regarding the appointment of the 2nd petitioner as Bursar and came to the conclusion that the meeting held on 28.05.2008 was not validly constituted and the 2nd petitioner cannot be claimed to have been appointed validly. At the risk of the repetition, it is stated that this Court is not endorsing the finding of the lower Court. The aforesaid finding of the lower Court may be right or wrong, but it is seen from the order of the lower Court it has relied upon certain evidence to grant the injunction and hence, it cannot be stated that the order is perverse. Further, it cannot also be stated that there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Further, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2003 (4) CTC 176 (SC), that the broad working rule for determining what is a patent error or an error apparent on the face of the record was well set out in Satyanarayana Laxminarayanan Hegde v. Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137: 1960 (1) SCR 890, wherein it was held that—
“The alleged error should be self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or an error in a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions cannot be called a patent error. In a Writ of Certiorari the High Court may quash the proceedings of the Tribunal, authority or Court but may not substitute its own findings or directions in lieu of the one given in the proceedings forming the subject-matter of certiorari.”
Therefore, if the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners is to be accepted, it requires lengthy and complicated arguments and in such case as held by this Honourable Court, it cannot be stated that there is an apparent error on the face of the record and hence, on that ground also, the Revision Petition is not maintainable. Of course, it has been held in the order that the 2nd petitioner is acting as Bursar and as rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, Mr. M.V Venkateseshan that sentence cannot be read in isolation and having regard to the earlier finding of the lower Court that the respondent is acting as a Bursar and appointment of the 2nd petitioner was not proved, the casual observations that the 2nd petitioner herein is acting as Bursar will not help the petitioners to contend that the lower Court has given a finding that the 2nd petitioner is acting as Bursar as per the appointment order of the Governing Counsel of the American College.
29. Further, as held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the judgment reported in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2003 (4) CTC 176 (SC) : 2003 (6) SCC 675, that the jurisdiction under Article 227 can be invoked when the Subordinate Court assumed the jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or exercising the jurisdiction in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby.
30. In this case, it cannot be stated that the lower Court has no jurisdiction or the jurisdiction was improperly exercised in a manner not known to law. Further, the supervisory jurisdiction will not confer the High Court to go into the merits and demerits of the case and finding of the lower Court cannot be re-appreciated and this Court cannot evaluate the evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences.
31. Further, as held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the judgment reported in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, 1983 (4) SCC 566: AIR 1984 SC 38, that “a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227”. I have dealt in detail that the lower Court on the basis of the documents filed has come to the prima facie conclusion and that conclusion cannot be analysed or re-appreciated, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227. Further, an effective and alternative remedy is available under Civil Procedure Code, by filing an Appeal and therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the lower Court.
32. According to me, the petitioners have not proved any exceptional circumstances for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and that there is no apparent error on the face of the record and the order of the lower Court is not perverse. However, I make it clear that I am not giving any opinion on the finding of the lower Court and it is always open to the petitioners to challenge the same in the Appellate forum as provided under Civil Procedure Code. Hence, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed and the office is directed to return the certified copies of the fair and decretal order passed in I.A No. 897 of 2009 in O.S No. 548 of 2009 to enable the petitioners to file Appeal and the Lower Appellate Court is directed to exclude the period, during which the proceedings were pending before this Court for computing the period of limitation. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs.
RSN