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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner sought a declaration that Board Proceedings Permanent B.P.Ms(FB) No.46 (Admn.Branch) dated 13.10.1995 insofar as it prescribes that an application for compassionate appointment should be made within three years of the death of a Government servant is not to be applied so as to defeat the petitioner's claim, and prayed for a direction to the respondents to grant relief.

The petitioner's father, V.A. Radhakrishnan, was employed in Rajaji Nagar Division Electricity Distribution North Division and died on 11.2.1997. The petitioner was born on 20.4.1982 and was 15 years old at the time of his father's death. The petitioner is the only son; two sisters are married; the mother gave a No Objection for appointment; petitioner studied up to 10th Standard.

The petitioner submitted an application for compassionate appointment after attaining majority. The respondents rejected his application by order dated 6.1.2002 on the stated ground that the petitioner had not completed 18 years of age, and again rejected an application by order dated 31.10.2003 stating that the petitioner had not completed 18 years of age within three years of his father's death (noting that the petitioner completed 18 years on 19.4.2000). The petitioner then filed this writ petition contending that the three-year time limit cannot be insisted upon where the claimant was a minor at the time of the death.

The Court heard learned counsel for the petitioner and for the respondents and considered several precedents, internal Board memos (including B.P.Ms. No.46 dated 13.10.1995, memo dated 14.6.1997 and a subsequent memo dated 6.4.2002), and prior High Court and Supreme Court decisions dealing with compassionate appointment claims by minors who attain majority after the death of the employee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the three-year limitation prescribed in Board Proceedings B.P.Ms(FB) No.46 dated 13.10.1995 (that an application for compassionate appointment must be made within three years of the death of the employee) can be insisted upon so as to defeat the claim of a dependant who was a minor at the time of the employee's death and who applied after attaining majority.
  2. Whether an application that was made within three years of the employee's death by a legal heir who was a minor, and thereafter renewed or re-filed immediately after the claimant attained majority, can be rejected solely on the ground that the claimant did not attain 18 years within three years of the death.
  3. Whether the subsequent cancellation (by memo dated 6.4.2002) of provisions that had asked minors to re-apply after attaining majority affects the entitlement to have a post-majority application considered where an initial application was filed within three years but the claimant was a minor at the time.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner (through counsel) contended that the time limit of three years prescribed in the Board Proceedings is unreasonable as applied to a claimant who was a minor at the time of the death of the employee, and that the rule cannot be insisted upon to deny consideration where the claimant was a minor when the employee died.
  • The petitioner alleged that he had applied within the three-year period (through his family/legal heir) but was directed to re-apply after attaining majority; upon attaining majority he filed an application immediately (13.01.2003) and therefore his claim should be considered on merits.
  • The petitioner emphasised his indigent circumstances, that he is the only son, and that his mother had no other means of livelihood; the family circumstances pointed to the need for compassionate consideration rather than a hyper-technical rejection.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents relied on Board Proceedings B.P.Ms. No.46 dated 13.10.1995 requiring applications to be filed within three years from the date of death and argued that the petitioner's application was therefore time-barred because the petitioner did not complete 18 years within three years of the date of death.
  • The respondents referred to a subsequent Board memo dated 6.4.2002 which deleted provisions (in an earlier memo dated 14.6.1997) that had permitted minors who applied within three years to re-apply after attaining majority; relying on the deletion, the Board contended that the petitioner's post-majority application dated 13.01.2003 could not be entertained under BP.46 dated 13.10.1995.
  • Learned counsel for the respondents referred to several Supreme Court decisions (listed in the opinion) argued to justify rejection of the application on legal and limitation grounds; the respondents advanced that the rules and established principles disallow courts/tribunals from compelling relaxation of compassionate appointment ceilings and that compassionate appointment is not a right but an exception.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Syed Khadim Hussain vs. State of Bihar and Others, 2006 (9) S.C.C. 195 The opinion quotes paragraph 5 addressing whether a minor claimant who applies can be considered after attaining majority and notes that rules may not specify relaxation for minors. The Court relied on this decision as addressing the same issue (minor claimant applying after attaining majority) and used it in examining whether the petitioner's post-majority application could be considered.
P. Rajamani vs. Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2006 LAB.I.C. 4163 (Division Bench) Principle that compassionate appointment should not be defeated on hyper-technical grounds; authorities should adopt sympathy and practicality in considering claims where the family is destitute. The Court relied on the Division Bench's reasoning and outcome to support the direction that the petitioner's application should be entertained and not rejected on technical limitation grounds where initial steps were taken within time and subsequent re-application was immediate on attaining majority.
Group of Supreme Court authorities relied upon by respondents (listed in the opinion): 1994 (2) S.C.C. 718; 2000 (7) Supreme 83; 2000 (7) S.C.C. 192; 2004 (7) Supreme 691; 2004 (7) S.C.C. 265 The opinion states that from these decisions the following principles emerged collectively: (i) Courts/Tribunals cannot grant relief purely on sympathetic consideration; (ii) High Courts cannot compel the Department to relax compassionate appointment ceilings; (iii) Vacancies cannot be reserved pending the claimant attaining majority unless provided; (iv) Compassionate appointments must follow rules/regulations and consider the family's financial condition; (v) Compassionate appointment is not a matter of right. The Court acknowledged these principles but distinguished them on the facts before it — noting the existence of specific Board Proceedings and intermediate communications (e.g., instructions to reapply after attaining majority) and a demonstrable history of pursuing the claim; the Court therefore declined to sustain the respondents' reliance on these authorities to bar reconsideration.
Union of India vs. Bhagwan Singh, 1995 (6) S.C.C. 476 The opinion mentions this case as relied upon by the learned single Judge below. The Court observed that Bhagwan Singh (and other cases relied upon by the single Judge) were not directly applicable to the facts of the present case for reasons explained in the opinion (primarily because of the specific Board Proceedings and the sequence of applications and directions to reapply).
State of U.P. vs. Parasnath, 1998 (2) S.C.C. 412 Mentioned as one of the authorities relied upon by the single Judge below. The Court held that Parasnath was not directly applicable to the present facts for reasons noted in the opinion (distinguishing factual and regulatory context).
G. Vijayaraghavan vs. General Manager (P) Indian Bank, 2000 (3) L.L.N. 625 Stated (in the opinion) to hold that an eligible person can claim compassionate appointment irrespective of settlement of gratuity and benefits and that a claim may be considered when made on attaining majority. The Court cited this decision as supportive of considering post-majority applications where circumstances justified consideration.
D. Ramadoss vs. The Chief Engineer, T.N.E.B., 2001 W.L.R. 601 Used as an example where the Court (single Judge) directed the TNEB to consider a claim for appointment on compassionate grounds when an application had initially been made within three years and later re-submitted after the claimant attained majority. The Court relied on this earlier decision to justify entertaining the petitioner's post-majority application given the comparable factual matrix.
W.P. No.24225 of 2001 (order dated 01.02.2002) before K.P. Sivasubramaniam, J. The opinion records the single Judge's conclusion that Clause (3) of B.P.46 dated 13.10.1995 could not apply where the Department itself had permitted re-application after attaining majority and the initial application was made within time. The Court used the reasoning and factual parallels from this writ to support its conclusion that a second application made immediately on attaining majority should not be rejected on the sole ground of delay under BP.46.
T. Meer Ismail Ali v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, (2004) 3 CTC 120 Earlier High Court decision directing the Board to consider a claimant's request for compassionate appointment under similar circumstances. The Court noted that other writs relied upon followed similar reasoning and treated such authorities as supportive of entertaining reconsideration of a post-majority application where initial application steps had been taken within the prescribed period.
Indiraniammal v. The Chief Engineer (Personnel), Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, W.A. No.3050 of 2003 (Division Bench) Division Bench set aside a subsequent circular dated 6.4.2002 which sought to delete provisions permitting minors who applied within three years to re-apply after attaining majority; the Division Bench ordered reconsideration in comparable circumstances. The Court followed the Division Bench's reasoning and treated the Indiraniammal decision as a controlling Division Bench view applicable to the facts, observing that the subsequent memo (6.4.2002) had been set aside by the Division Bench and that the matter had been the subject of proceedings in the Supreme Court (with no stayed order preventing application of the Division Bench judgment in the interim).
Civil Appeal No.2039 of 2006 (Supreme Court order dated 30.3.2010) (reproduced in the opinion) The reproduced Supreme Court order (as set out in the opinion) states that where the mother applied within time for compassionate appointment and the claimant was a minor at the time of the father's death, the claimant after becoming major should have been granted compassionate appointment; the Supreme Court allowed certain appeals, set aside the Division Bench and restored the Single Judge's order in that matter. The Court in the present opinion cited and relied upon the Supreme Court order as authoritative support for the view that a minor claimant whose family took steps within time should be entitled to consideration after attaining majority.
E. Ramasamy v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, (2006) 4 MLJ 1080 One Division Bench decision that followed the Board memo dated 6.4.2002 (deletion) and therefore took a different approach from Indiraniammal; cited in the opinion as a conflicting authority. The Court explained why Ramasamy could not be applied in preference to Indiraniammal given that Indiraniammal's decision setting aside the deletion had not been stayed by the Supreme Court; accordingly Ramasamy was not followed for the present facts.
Balbir Kaur vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., 2000 (6) S.C.C. 493 The Supreme Court held that in appointment matters, considerations of social and economic justice may require denial of deserving cases to be set aside and that authorities should adopt a humane outlook when considering compassionate appointments. The Court invoked Balbir Kaur to emphasise that compassionate appointment schemes exist to render assistance to indigent families and that authorities are expected to adopt a humane outlook; this supported the Court's conclusion that the petitioner's claim merited consideration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the factual chronology, the relevant Board Proceedings and memos, and the line of authorities addressing compassionate appointment claims for minors who attain majority after the death of the employee.

Key points in the Court's analysis:

  • The petitioner (or his family) had initiated an application within three years of the father's death; however, the claimant was a minor at the time and was advised (in departmental communications) to re-apply after attaining majority. The petitioner re-applied promptly after attaining majority (application dated 13.01.2003 filed within two days of majority, as pleaded in the opinion).
  • The Court considered Board Proceedings B.P.46 dated 13.10.1995 (which prescribes a three-year time limit) together with the subsequent memo dated 14.6.1997 (which instructed that minors who applied within three years should re-apply after attaining majority and that such re-applications would be considered under Board rules in force at that time) and noted that paragraphs (3) & (4) of the 14.6.1997 memo were subsequently sought to be withdrawn by memo dated 6.4.2002.
  • The Court examined relevant case law. It acknowledged Supreme Court and High Court decisions indicating that compassionate appointments are not an automatic right and that courts cannot compel relaxation of rules solely on sympathetic grounds. However, the Court distinguished those authorities on facts where departmental directions had been given to re-apply after majority or where the initial application was not made within the prescribed time.
  • The Court relied on Division Bench and single-judge precedents (including P. Rajamani, D. Ramadoss, W.P. No.24225/2001, T. Meer Ismail Ali and others) which had allowed reconsideration of post-majority applications where an initial application had been made within the three-year period by the family and a re-application was promptly made on attainment of majority.
  • The Court rejected the respondents' contention based on the memo dated 6.4.2002 (which deleted the earlier provision allowing re-application after majority) stating that on the facts of the present case that deletion did not preclude consideration because of the prior communications and the existence of Board Proceedings and Division Bench authority that set aside the deletion in a closely analogous matter.
  • The Court also referenced Balbir Kaur to underline the social and economic justice rationale behind compassionate appointments and the expectation that authorities adopt a humane outlook when considering such claims where the family is indigent.

On the above collective analysis, the Court found that the petitioner's facts were covered by the precedential approach favouring reconsideration (initial application within three years, direction to re-apply after majority, prompt re-application on majority) and therefore the petitioner's application should be considered on merits notwithstanding the respondents' objection regarding the three-year cut-off.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court directed the respondents to consider the petitioner's application dated 13.01.2003 on merits and to pass a necessary revised order within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. No costs were awarded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The respondents are to revisit and decide the petitioner's application for compassionate appointment (filed on 13.01.2003) on its merits within the prescribed three-month period. The impugned order(s) rejecting the application on the ground of delay/age were set aside to the extent necessary to permit this reconsideration.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion relies on a line of Division Bench and Supreme Court reasoning but does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying existent authorities to the facts; the decision's principal practical effect is to require the respondents to reconsider the petitioner's claim rather than to create a new rule. The opinion expressly distinguishes several Supreme Court authorities relied upon by the respondents and follows Division Bench authorities which favoured reconsideration in comparable circumstances.

End of summary. This summary is limited strictly to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    R. Prasath v. The Secretary

    The prayer in the writ petition is to declare the Board Proceedings permanent B.P.Ms(FB)No.46, (Admn.Branch), dated 13.10.1995 issued by the respondent insofar as the application for appointment on compassionate grounds should be made within three years of the death of Government servant and direct the respondents to grant the relief and pass further orders.

    2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respective counsel for the respondents.

    3. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner's father V.A.Radhakrishnan was working in Rajaji Nagar Division Electricity Distribution North Division. The petitioner's father, while working in the said place, died on 11.2.1997. At the time of death of the petitioner's father, the petitioner was aged 15 years as his date of birth is 20.4.1982. The petitioner is the only son and two of his sisters are married. Based on the scheme for providing compassionate appointment to a member of the family of the deceased Electricity Board employee, the petitioner, after completion of 18 years of age, submitted an application to the respondents to appoint him on compassionate grounds within 3 years and the same was rejected on 6.1.2002 stating that the petitioner has not completed 18 years of age. The petitioner studied upto 10th Standard. The other legal heirs, namely, two sisters are married and the petitioner's mother has given No Objection to the petitioner's appointment. In the application, it was stated by the petitioner that no one from his family is employed and his family is in indigenous circumstances. Again the petitioner applied, which was rejected by the respondents by order dated 31.10.2003 stating that the petitioner has not completed 18 years of age within three years of the date of death of the petitioner's father on 11.2.1997 and the petitioner completed the 18 years of age on 19.4.2000. The petitioner having attained the majority, has filed this writ petition contending that the time limit prescribed for submitting application on compassionate grounds as three years to the minors of the deceased Electricity Board employee, is unreasonable and the same cannot be insisted upon to consider the claim where the claimant is a minor at the time of death of the person.

    4. The Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in 2006 (9) SUPREME COURT CASES 195 (Syed Khadim Hussain vs. State of Bihar and Others) also considered the similar issue as to whether a minor claimant seeking compassionate appointment can apply after attaining majority. In paragraph-5 of the judgment, it is held as follows:-

    " 5. .... When the appellant submitted the application he was 13 years' old and the application was rejected after a period of six years and that too without giving any reason and the reason given by the authorities was incorrect as at the time of rejection of the application he must have crossed 18 years and he could have been very well considered for appointment. Of course, in the rules framed by the State there is no specific provision as to what should be done in case the dependants are minors and there would be any relaxation of age in case they did not attain majority within the prescribed period for submitting application."

    5. The very same issue was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in P. RAJAMANI VS. CHAIRMAN, TAMIL NADU ELECTRICITY BOARD, CHENNAI reported in 2006 LAB.I.C. 4163. In paragraph-6 of the judgment, it is held as follows:-

    " 6. Having heard the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents, we are not able to appreciate and accept the stand of the respondents. We hasten to state that the very purport of extending a helping hand to a destitute on the death of her husband by way of compassionate appointment would get defeated if such claims are turned down on such hyper-technical ground. In the case on hand, as noted earlier, after the death of the appellant's husband on 15.11.1996, an application was made on 7.4.1997 for compassionate appointment for her elder son. Therefore, there was an application for compassionate appointment within five months from the date of the death of her husband. It was unfortunate that the said application came to be rejected on the ground that her elder son was over aged. Such rejection was made only on 5.12.1998. Therefore, the appellant had to necessarily wait for some more time in order to renew her claim for appointment of her younger son who was running 18 years as on 11.11.1999. The said younger son completed his 18 years on 15.3.2000. Nevertheless, the appellant wanted to ensure that an application was made on 11.11.1999 itself for that son in order to confirm that an application for compassionate appointment was made well within time i.e., before 14.11.1999 by which time the three years period from the date of death of her husband would come to an end. Subsequently, on 1.4.2000, her younger son himself renewed the application preferred by the appellant on 11.11.1999 by making another application along with the no objection letters of his other brothers. Therefore, all the above steps taken by the appellant go to show that she was diligently pursuing her claim for compassionate appointment over the death of her husband right from the year 1997 till 1.4.2000. In such circumstances, when the appellant being a widow and since she had no other source of livelihood, the respondents should have been much more sympathetic and practical in considering the claim of the appellant for compassionate appointment to her younger son based on the application dated 11.11.1999 and 1.4.2000. In this context, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant reported in 2004 (4) MLJ 238 and 2002(4)LLN 1132 as well as the decision of the Division Bench reported in 2005 W.L.R.256, cited supra, fully supports the claim of the appellant."

    6. In the above said judgment, the rejection order was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court and the respondents were directed to entertain the application of the appellant in the writ appeal and pass appropriate orders for granting compassionate appointment to the claimant within a period of three months. In W.A.No.3050 of 2003, the Division Bench of this Court (Honourable P.Sathasivam, J., and S.K.Krishnan, J.) considered a similar issue and granted relief to a person, who was a minor when his father died while on duty and the application was submitted after 3 years of the death of his father due to the rejection of earlier application. In paragraphs-8 to 16, the Division Bench held as follows:-

    " 8. ...... ..... No doubt, as per that proceedings, an application for appointment on compassionate ground should be made within three years from the date of death of an employee. The second application being 13.01.2003 and the date of death of her husband being 15.07.1996, the second respondent by applying the said B.P., rejected her request.

    9. We have already referred to the letter of the second respondent dated 14.07.1999, which finds a place at page 11 of the typed set, wherein the second respondent, who is the competent officer while considering her application dated 10.07.1999 for appointment on compassionate ground has requested her to apply afresh after her son attaining majority (18 years). As said earlier, immediately on attaining majority, i.e., on 11.01.2003, the petitioner has made another application on 13.01.2003. In such a circumstance, particularly in the light of the statement made by the second respondent in his letter dated 14.07.1999 and of the fact that the petitioner has made a further representation on 13.01.2003, i.e., within a period of two days on her son attaining majority, as directed by the second respondent, we are of the view that the rejection of her representation based on BP.No.46 dated 13.10.1995 on the ground that her application is beyond the period of three years from the date of death of her husband cannot be sustained.

    10. Mr. V. Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has very much relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions justifying the rejection of the petitioner's application.

    (i) 1994 (2) S.C.C. 718;

    (ii) 2000 (7) Supreme 83;

    (iii) 2000 (7) S.C.C. 192;

    (iv) 2004 (7) Supreme 691 and

    (v) 2004 (7) S.C.C. 265.

    We find that the following principles emerged from the above decisions.

    (i) The Courts and Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration;

    (ii) The Tribunal or the High court cannot compel the Department concerned to relax the ceiling of compassionate appointment and appoint a person;

    (iii) There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the petitioner becomes major after number of years, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief;

    (iv) Appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the Rules, Regulations or administrative instructions, taking into consideration the financial conditions of the family of the deceased; and

    (v) Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Died-in-harness Scheme cannot be made applicable to all types of posts irrespective of the nature of service rendered by the deceased employee.

    11. If we apply the above principles, no doubt the claim of the petitioner has to be rejected. However, in our case, the Electricity Board has framed a Scheme and formulated certain guidelines, as seen from B.P.46 dated 13.10.1995. As per the said proceedings, particularly Clause 3 (i), one of the main condition is that application for appointment on compassionate ground should be made within three years from the date of death of an employee. In our case, we have already observed that the petitioner made an application within three years period and one more factor in favour of the petitioner is that the second respondent himself has informed in his letter dated 14.07.1999 that her son being a minor, after attaining the age of 18 years, she would make another application. Pursuant to the same, she has made an application on 13.01.2003, i.e., within two days on her son attaining majority.

    12. The learned counsel for the Board has brought to our notice that by proceedings dated 06.04.2002, the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board has deleted two conditions imposed in Boards Circular dated 14.06.1997, viz., (a) if the applicant is a minor, he has to make an application after attaining majority; and (b) fresh application after attaining majority will be considered based on the Rules of the Board applicable on that date. It is contended that since the above said Clauses have been deleted by the above referred proceedings dated 06.04.2002, which has come into force from 06.04.2002 itself, the second application of the petitioner dated 13.01.2003 cannot be considered as per BP.46, dated 13.10.1995, as her application is beyond the period of three years from the date of death of her husband. For the reasons stated in para 11 we are unable to sustain the said objection.

    13. Though the learned single Judge while rejecting the request of the petitioner relied on Judgment of one of us (P. Sathasivam,J.) made in W.P.No.14134 of 1991 dated 25.01.1999 and the case of Union of India vs. Bhagwan Singh reported in 1995 (6) S.C.C. 476 as well as the case of State of U.P. vs. Parasnath reported in 1998 (2) S.C.C. 412, for the same reasons as stated in para 11 above, those judgments are not directly applicable to the case on hand. In the case of G. Vijayaraghavan vs. General Manager (P) Indian Bank reported in 2000 (3) L.L.N. 625, learned single Judge of this Court (P. Sathasivam,J.) in similar circumstance directed the Indian Bank to consider the claim of the petitioner therein, who made an application on attaining majority for employment on compassionate ground. In that decision, it is held that, irrespective of settlement of full term service gratuity and other benefits, eligible person can claim appointment on compassionate grounds.

    14. In the case of D. Ramadoss vs. The Chief Engineer, T.N.E.B., reported in 2001 W.L.R. 601, the learned single Judge (D. Murugesan,J.) in an identical circumstance, relying on a very same Board Proceedings No.46 dated 13.10.1995, after noting the fact that the petitioner has made a request within the period of three years, as per the Circular, though there was enormous delay, directed the Electricity Board to consider the request of the petitioner therein for appointment on compassionate ground.

    15. In W.P.No.24225 of 2001 dated 01.02.2002, the learned single Judge (K.P. Sivasubramaniam), had an occasion to consider similar claim against Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. Before the learned Judge, the father of the petitioner, who was employed in the Electricity Board died on 19.10.1996. On behalf of his legal heirs, an application dated 01.12.1997 was forwarded by the mother of the petitioner for seeking appointment on compassionate ground. The said application was also endorsed by the Superintending Engineer by his letter dated 07.01.1998 and the mother of the petitioner was directed to apply for appointment in due course after filing a formal application. Thereafter, the mother of the petitioner complied with the direction. However, the said application was returned by the respondents with an observation that the petitioners son was a minor as on that date and to submit an application after he attains majority. The petitioner, after attainment of majority of his son, by letter dated 08.06.2001, applied for appointment on compassionate grounds. However, by order dated 17.08.2001, the request of the petitioner was rejected on two grounds, namely, that the application has not been submitted within three years after the death of his father and the petitioner did not complete 18 years within three years. Rejecting both the grounds, the learned Judge has concluded that the limitation of three years from the date of the Boards Proceedings dated 13.10.1995 was contemplated only as a result of the said Circular having been issued afresh in the context of regulating appointments on compassionate ground. It is further held that the mention of the period of limitation cannot have any relevance to the case of the petitioner, who has been specifically directed to apply after completion of 18 years of his son. According to the learned Judge, Clause (3) of B.P.46 dated 13.10.1995 cannot apply to the facts of the present case. The learned Judge has also observed that the Department itself permitted the mother of the petitioner to renew her application after her son attains majority, which has been complied with. In such a circumstance, the learned Judge concluded that there is no justifiable reason to reject the application for appointment on compassionate ground and directed the Department to consider the application on merits. It is stated that the Department has accepted the said direction. Inasmuch as in the case before the learned Judge as well as before us, the initial application was made within time, because of the fact that the son of the deceased was a minor, mother was asked to apply after her son attains majority and in both the cases the application was made immediately after attaining majority, in such a circumstance, as rightly said, the second application cannot be rejected on the ground of delay. We are also satisfied that similar scheme in the form of Board Proceedings and conditions are not available in the cases of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned counsel for respondents. It is also brought to our notice that almost in similar circumstance, another learned single Judge of this Court (F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla,J.) in the case of T. Meer Ismail Ali vs. T.N.E.B., reported in 2004 (3) C.T.C. 120 directed the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board to consider the claim of the petitioner therein.

    16. Though we are conscious of the directions of the Supreme Court which we have already referred to in the earlier part of our order, in view of the Boards Proceedings referred to above and of the fact that the petitioner has made an application within three years from the date of death of her husband i.e., within the prescribed period and also made subsequent application as directed by the second respondent and also taking note of the assertion of the petitioner that after her husbands death, in the absence of any income, she is living in poverty, her claim has to be considered. In this regard it is worthwhile to refer the case of the Supreme Court in the case of Balbir Kaur vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., reported in 2000 (6) S.C.C. 493, wherein their Lordships have held that in the case of appointment considering the social and economic justice as enshrined in the Constitution, denial of deserving cases are liable to be set aside. Further, the purpose of providing compassionate ground to a son or daughter or a near relative of the deceased government servant is to render assistance to the family, which is found in indigent circumstances. Hence in considering the case for compassionate appointments, the authorities are supposed to adopt a humane outlook. We do not find any delay or laches on the part of the petitioner, we are unable to accept the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge in our case and we are satisfied that the petitioner has made out a case for consideration of her claim. Accordingly, the order of the learned single Judge as well as the order impugned in the writ petition, viz., W.P.No.21512 of 2003 are set aside and the respondents are directed to consider the petitioners application dated 13.01.2003 on merits and provide necessary relief. Consequently, the writ appeal is allowed. "

    7. The said judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.2039 of 2006, dated 30.3.2010. The said order reads as follows:-

    The Division Bench of the High Court has reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge only on the ground of delay who directed compassionate appointment to the appellant. The appellant was a minor at the time of the death of his father and since the mother of the appellant applied within time, we are of the opinion that the appellant after becoming major should have been granted compassionate appointment.

    Accordingly, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and restore the judgment of the learned Single Judge. No costs.

    .....................J.

    (MARKANDEY KATJU) NEW DELHI; .....................J.

    MARCH, 30, 2010 (A.K. PATNAIK)"

    8. During the pendency of the Civil Appeal in Indiraniammal case, a Division Bench of this Court considered a similar claim of another candidate in W.A.No.42 of 2007 and by order dated 2.7.2009, the Division Bench held as follows:-

    " 3. The respondent by name P.Venkatesan is the son of Thiru Ponnusamy, who was employed as a Wireman in Vellore division of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. The father of the respondent died in harness on 20.3.99 leaving his wife, three daughters and the respondent as his legal heirs. At the time of the death of the father of the respondent, the respondent was aged about 12 years. After attaining the age of 18 years on 22.7.2005, on the same day, he made an application for appointment on compassionate ground. That application came to be rejected by the proceedings of the Superintending Engineer, Vellore Electricity Distribution Circle on the ground that he is not eligible as per the Board's proceedings, as he submitted the application after the cut-off period viz., the application should have been submitted within three years from the date of death of the board employee. The writ petition filed by the respondent came to be allowed following the judgment of this Court in T.Meer Ismail Ali v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board through its Chairman and another, (2004) 3 CTC 120. Hence this appeal by the electricity board.

    4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondent.

    5. The appellant-Board, admittedly, has evolved a scheme for providing appointment on compassionate ground. It appears that initially the scheme provided for the compassionate appointment to the dependants of the employees of the Board who died while in service without prescribing any time limit for the submission of application and that the sons/unmarried daughters, widowed or deserted daughters, divorced daughters should not be more than 30 years of age and in the case of widow 40 years on the date of death of the Board employee. Thereafter, the appellant-Board thought it fit to modify the scheme relating to compassionate appointment and issued the proceedings in Permanent B.P.Ms.(FB) No.46 (Adm.Branch) dated 13.10.95 by directing that (i) the application for appointment on compassionate grounds should be made within three years from the date of death of employees of the Board, (ii) the maximum age limit for such appointment be raised to 50 in the case of widows of the deceased employees of the Board and (iii) in case of already expired staff while in service the dependant should apply for employment assistance within three years from the date of issue of this order.

    6. Nevertheless, the appellant-Board issued the proceedings in Memo No.147941/921/R.6(2)/96 dated 14.6.97, which reads as follows:-

    "(1) As per the B.P.(F.B.) No.46 dated 13.10.1995, the legal heirs of the deceased employees shall give application within 3 years from the date of death of Board employee as mentioned in the letter under reference cited.

    (2) Board employees who died prior to implementation of B.P.No.46 dated 13.10.1995, the legal heirs of the deceased employees shall apply for employment assistance within 3 years from the date of issue of the said B.P.

    (3) If the applicants who applied for employment assistance within 3 years from the date of death and not completed 18 years of age, such cases will be requested to apply again after completion of 18 years of age.

    (4) If the applicants applied again after completion of 18 years of age, the applicants will be intimated that such applications will be examined as per the Board's Rules in force at that time."

    7. However, paragraphs (3) & (4) of the above memo dated 14.6.97 were sought to be withdrawn by the Board by a subsequent memo dated 6.4.2002 with effect from the said date. The respondent, after attaining the age of 18 years, has immediately made an application in terms of the memo dated 14.6.97. However, the said application was not entertained by the Board in view of the Board's proceedings dated 13.10.95. The application of the said circular dated 13.10.95 came up for consideration before this Court in the judgment in D.Ramadoss v. The Chief Engineer (Personnel), Tamilnadu Electricity Board, Chennai and another, 2001 Writ L.R. 601.

    8. In fact, a similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.3050 of 2003 dated 8.3.2005 (Indiraniammal v. The Chief Engineer (Personnel), Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai and another). The issue that fell for consideration before the Division Bench was not only the applicability of the circular dated 14.6.97, but also the subsequent cancellation of the provision for making an application even after a person attaining majority i.e., on 6.4.2002. The Division Bench in paragraph-16 set aside the subsequent circular dated 6.4.2002. Our attention was also drawn that though the said order was taken on appeal, the Supreme Court by judgment dated 11.8.2005 in S.L.P.(C) No.16518 of 2005, while directing the notice on the application for condonation of delay, further directed that the petitioner's case shall be considered in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court and subject to the result of the Special Leave Petition. In the absence of any stay order by the Supreme Court, the Division Bench judgment in Indiraniammal's case should alone be applied to the facts of this case.

    9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board has brought to our notice the judgment of another Division Bench in E.Ramasamy v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board rep.by its Chairman, Chennai and others, (2006) 4 MLJ 1080. The said judgment was rendered by following the circular dated 6.4.2002, whereby the provision for an application to be made even after a person attaining majority was deleted. Inasmuch as the validity of the very circular was put in issue before the earlier Division Bench in Indiraniammal's case and the same was set aside, in our considered opinion, with great respect to the Division Bench which rendered the judgment in Ramasamy's case, the judgment in Ramasamy's case cannot be applied, particularly when the challenge to the order of the Division Bench in Indiraniammal's case was not stayed by the Supreme Court. We have rendered the above finding by simply following the earlier Division Bench judgment in Indiraniammal's case and we are not embarking into the validity of the circular dated 14.6.97 or the subsequent circular dated 6.4.2002, as the matter is pending before the Supreme Court.

    10. As we have already pointed out that the matter concerns only about the eligibility to make an application and not for an automatic appointment on compassionate ground, even in case if this Court directs the application to be entertained, it is open to the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, the appellants herein to consider the application on its own merit and decide whether the applicant could be granted compassionate appointment or not. The consideration of the application for compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule, where any vacant post in Government or public sector undertaking etc., should be filled up only by the usual method of recruitment as per the rules. Having regard to the fact that the Board themselves have come forward with a decision to entertain the applications from the candidates even after they attained majority, though there is a considerable lapse of time in making such application, it cannot now reject the application of the respondent on the ground that it was filed with considerable lapse of time.

    11. For all the above reasons, we are of the considered view that the application made by the respondent cannot be rejected on the ground that it was filed after a lapse of time and the said application should be considered by the Board on its own merits and be disposed of within a period of two months. We once again make it clear that by the above direction, we do not mean that the respondent would be automatically entitled for compassionate appointment merely because we have directed the consideration of his application. With the above observation, the writ appeal is dismissed. Consequently, M.P.No.1 of 2007 is also dismissed. "

    9. In the light of the above judgments of the Supreme Court as well as the Division Bench judgments of this Court and having regard to the fact that the petitioner has applied within 3 years from the date of his father which was rejected on the ground that he has not completed 18 years of age by order dated 6.1.2002. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said order of Division Bench has not been challenged by the Board by filing SLP or civil appeal.

    10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of a firm view that the petitioner has made out a case to issue a direction directing the respondents to consider the claim of the petitioner seeking compassionate appointment without reference to the objection raised i.e., the petitioner has not applied within three years from the date of the death of the petitioner's father. Necessary revised order is directed to be passed by the respondents within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.

    kb To

    1. The Secretary Labour and Employment Department Fort St. George Town Chennai 9.

    2. The Chairman Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Chennai 2.

    3. The Chief Engineer (Employment) 800, Anna Salai, Chennai 2

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