The civil revision petition arises out of an order passed by the Trial Court allowing an application permitting the sub agents appointed by the power agent of the plaintiff to conduct the proceedings on behalf of the plaintiff.
2. Heard Mr. G.R Swaminathan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Kadarkarai, learned counsel for the respondents.
3. A suit in OS. No. 48 of 2005 was filed on the file of the Principal District Court, Dindigul on behalf of one Mrs. Kavitha represented by her power of attorney agents Mr. P. Chinniah and Mr. C. Duraisamy. The petitioner in the civil revision petition is the sole defendant in the suit. The suit is for recovery of a sum of Rs. 7,68,800/- together with interest at 2% per month on the principal amount of Rs. 4 lakhs, said to have been borrowed by the petitioner herein (defendant) and also for a decree for sale of the mortgaged properties, if there was a failure, to pay the decree debt.
4. Since the suit was filed by persons claiming to be power agents, an application was taken out in I.A No. 177 of 2004 under Order III Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. That application was allowed by the Trial Court by an order dated 20.10.2005 Challenging the said order, the petitioner herein/defendant filed a revision in CRP(PD)(MD) No. 101 of 2007 on the file of this Court, contending that under Section 190 of the Indian Contract Act, an agent cannot appoint another person to perform the acts that he was directed by the principal to perform and also on the ground that appointment of agents was not in accordance with Order III Rule 2 of the CPC.
5. By an order dated 14.8.2007, this Court allowed the said revision petition holding that under Order III Rule 2 (wrongly typed as Order V Rule 2 in the order in CRP(PD)(MD) No. 101 of 2007), an agent can be appointed only by means of an instrument signed by the principal and that the principal Mrs. Kavitha (plaintiff in the suit) had not executed any instrument appointing Mr. P. Chinniah as power agent.
6. Thereafter, a fresh application was taken but in I.A No. 226 of 2007 under Order III, Rule 2, CPC, by P. Chinniah and C. Duraisamy seeking permission to prosecute the suit on behalf of the plaintiff, on the basis of the rectified deed of power of attorney executed by Mrs. Kavitha on 20.11.2007 That application was allowed by the Principal District Court, Dindigul by an order dated 17.12.2009 Challenging the said order, the defendant in the suit has come up with the above civil revision petition.
7. Assailing the order of the trial court, Mr. G.R Swaminathan, learned counsel for the petitioner raised two contentions, namely
(a) that once the order passed in the earliest application in I.A No. 177 of 2004 (filed under Order III Rule 2) was set aside by this Court in the previous civil revision petition, the Trial Court ought to have rejected or returned the plaint, as there was no plaint in the eye of law; and
(b) that the rectified deed of power of attorney executed on 20.11.2007 will not cure the improper presentation of the plaint in the year 2004 by persons, who had no authority to institute the proceedings.
8. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced in view of the decision of the Apex court in Uday Shanker Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, 2006 (1) SCC 75 : 2006-1-L.W. 769. One of the questions that arose for consideration in that case was whether the presentation of a Memorandum of Appeal by a Vakil without any authority in the shape of a vakalatnama is a valid presentation or not. Incidentally, the Court was also concerned with the question whether such defect could be permitted to be rectified or not. After comparing the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 1, CPC, Order III, Rule 4, CPC and Order VI, Rule 14, CPC, the Supreme Court held in paragraph-16 of its decision as follows:—
“16. An analogous provision is to be found in Order VI, Rule 14, CPC, which requires that every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader, if any. Here again, it has always been recognised that if a plaint is not signed by the plaintiff or his duly authorised agent due to any bona fide error, the defect can be permitted to be rectified either by the Trial Court at any time before judgment, or even by the Appellate Court by permitting appropriate amendment, when such defect comes to its notice during hearing.”
9. Paragraph-17 of the said decision laid down the general principles regarding the consequences of non-compliance with the procedural requirements. Paragraph-17 reads as follows:—
“17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well recognised exceptions to this principle are:
(i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non-compliance;
(ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
(iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
(iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the Court;
(v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.”
10. In the light of the above principles, the first contention that the plaint ought to have been rejected/returned by the trial court after the order passed in the first civil revision, cannot be accepted. After the disposal of the earlier civil revision petition, the plaintiff has a right to rectify the defect in the presentation of the plaint. This right cannot be defeated by rejecting the plaint.
11. In so far as the second contention is concerned, a detailed enquiry into the question as to whether there was proper presentation or not and whether the defect was curable or not, is necessary. Therefore, let me now undertake a journey into the relevant provisions of the CPC.
12. Section 26(1) of the CPC, as amended by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002, prescribes that ‘every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed’. While Order I, CPC deals with the ‘parties to suits’, Order II, deals with the ‘frame of suit’. Order III, CPC, deals with ‘recognised agents and pleaders’. Rule 1 of Order III, enables a party to a suit, to appear, apply and act, either as party in person or by his recognised agent or by a pleader. The recognised agents, who are so entitled to appear, apply and act, are listed out under Rule 2 of Order III, which reads as follows:
“2. Recognised agents:— The recognised agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are—
(a) persons holding powers of attorney, authorising them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties;
(b) persons carrying on trade or business for and in the names of parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court within which limits the appearance, application or act is made or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only, where no other agent is expressly authorised to make or do such appearances, applications and acts.”
The High Court Amendment (Madras) to Order III Rule 2, reads as follows:
“2. The recognised agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are the persons holding powers of attorney, authorising them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of parties. (Amendment dated 27.6.1973).”
13. Order IV which deals with ‘institution of suits’ mandates that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint, which shall comply with the Rules contained in Order VI and Order VII, so far as they are applicable.
14. Order VI, Rule 14 requires every pleading to be signed by the party and his pleader, if any. The proviso to Order VI, Rule 14, which stands independently on its own footing, apart from Order III, Rule 2, enables any person duly authorised by a party to sign the pleading. The Rule and the proviso read as follows:
“14. Pleading to be signed: Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any):
Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf.”
15. Order VI, Rule 15, which deals with ‘verification of pleadings’, enables any person acquainted with the facts of the case to verify the pleadings. Order VI, Rule 15(1), reads as follows:—
“15. Verification of pleadings:— (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.”
16. Thus, it is seen that while Order III, enables ‘the holder of a power of attorney’ to appear, apply and act on behalf of a party to a suit, as his ‘recognised agent’, Order VI, Rule 14, enables ‘any person duly authorised by a party to sign the pleading’ if the party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading. Thus, it appears from Order VI, Rule 14, that even in the absence of a power of attorney, a party to a suit is entitled to have the pleading signed on his behalf, by any person duly authorised by him to sign. This inference is inevitable on account of the difference in the expressions used in Order III, Rule 2, vis-a-vis Order VI, Rule 14. While Order III, Rule 2, uses the expressions “recognised agents” and “persons holding powers of attorney”, Order VI, Rule 14, uses the phrase ‘any person duly authorised by him’. Rule 15(1) of the Order VI, goes one step further and empowers “some other person” to verify the pleadings, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that he is acquainted with the facts of the case.
17. It is well settled that a defective presentation of a plaint, cannot result in the rejection of the plaint. The grounds on which a plaint can be rejected are listed under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC. A defect which is curable in nature, does not fall within the ambit of Order VII, Rule 11. This is why even in cases where the relief claimed is under valued or where the relief is properly valued but the plaint is insufficiently stamped, the Court is required to call upon the plaintiff to correct the valuation and supply the requisite stamp papers.
18. That an error of procedure is merely an irregularity, which can be cured, is well settled by the decisions of various High Courts. One of the earliest cases on the issue is that of the Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Wall Mohammed Khan v. Ishak ali Khan (AIR 1931 All 307), where it was held as follows:
“If the legislature had intended that the absence of the presentation of the plaint by the plaintiff or by some person duly authorised by him would altogether oust the jurisdiction of the Court the language used would have been definite and specific. Instead of that, Section 26 merely provides that every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed, without saying in express terms that the presentation should be by the plaintiff or his duly authorised agent. As there is no specific rule either requiring or expressly authorising the plaintiff to present the plaint it is doubtful whether Order III, Rule 1 of the Code would apply to such a case. If it does not apply, the presentation by a person orally authorised to do so would be valid. But even if it does we are clearly of opinion that the omission to comply with this provision would be a mere irregularity and not an absence of jurisdiction. The Court receiving a plaint which has not been properly presented would have jurisdiction to dismiss it and pass orders on it. It would not be acting without jurisdiction if it did so. We do not mean to imply that a plaintiff has the right to get his plaint presented by a man in the street. If the person presenting it was not properly authorised, the presentation would be irregular. The Court would then have the discretion to allow the irregularity to be cured or not. If the plaintiff has acted in good faith and without gross negligence and it is fair and just to allow the defect to be cured, the Court would undoubtedly do so. It is not absolutely helpless in the matter.”
19. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had an occasion to consider the same issue, with particular reference to a suit instituted by a company incorporated under the Companies Act. In paragraph 13 of its judgment in All India Reporter Ltd. v. Ramchandra (AIR 1961 Bombay 292), the Bombay High Court held as follows:
“13. The question is whether the provisions contained in Order VI relating to signing, verification and presentation of the plaint relate merely to procedure or whether a plaint which does not strictly comply with the requirements of Order VI would cease to be a valid plaint and would be a nullity because of such defects or irregularities. It is true that when a plaint is presented to the Court or to such Officer as the Court appoints, it is open to the Court or to the Officer to point out the defects or irregularities to the person presenting the suit and to require him to rectify the defects or irregularities. But can it be said that the defects or irregularities would make the presentation of the suit itself invalid although the plaint is admitted and particulars of the plaint are entered in a register of suits as provided by Order IV, Rule 2? In this connection, it is necessary to note that Order VII, Rule 11, which refers to the rejection of a plaint, enumerates only four cases in which a plaint has to be rejected, but it does not enumerate any of the defects or irregularities referred to in Order VI, Rule 14, Order VI, Rule 15, or Order VI, Rule 2. It is clear from the provision contained in Order VI that these rules relate only to procedure, and the better view would be to regard them as mere matters of procedure and to hold that if a plaint is not properly signed or verified but is admitted and entered in the register of suits it does not cease to be a plaint and the suit cannot be said not to have been instituted merely because of the existence of some defects or irregularities in the matter of signing and verification of the plaint.”
In paragraph 20 of the same judgment, the Bombay High Court held as follows:
“20…………………..In the case of companies the plaint can be signed by either a Secretary or a Director or other Principal Officer under Order XXIX, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, or any person duly authorised by the company under Order VI, Rule 14. The words ‘duly authorised’ in Order VI, Rule 14, need not be restricted to mean authorised by proper written authority or by power of attorney. There is authority for this view in Re: Arbn. The Bengal Jute Mills, v. Jewraj Heeralal.* AIR 1943 Cal 13, AIR 1948 Mad. 369, ILR 1939 Nag 515: (AIR 1939 Nag 242) and AIR 1941 Nag 159. In these cases it was held that a plaintiff can orally authorise another person to sign a plaint for him. The Managing Director of the plaintiff company in the instant case, who has authority to file suits on behalf of the company (vide Article 156 of the Company's Articles of Association), can orally authorise another person to sign the plaint for him on behalf of the company. Plaintiff No. 2, who is the Managing Director of the company (plaintiff No. 1), has in his deposition deposed that Ghushey signed the plaint under his instructions. The evidence of Ghushey is to be same effect.”
20. Even in a case where a sale deed was executed on the strength of a power of attorney, which was not authenticated, the Supreme Court held in Jugraj v. Jaswantsingh (AIR 1971 SC 761) that though the first deed of power of attorney was not authenticated, the second deed of power of attorney which was duly authenticated, ratified and validated the transaction entered into by the agent in pursuance of the unauthenticated first deed of power of attorney. Thus, law is well settled that it was always open to the Principal to ratify the act of the agent by producing an authenticated power of attorney.
21. Rules 16 and 17 of the Civil Rules of Practice prescribe a procedure to be followed for signing and verifying the pleading in any proceeding. Rules and 16 and 17 read as follows:
“16. Party appearing by agent:— (1) When a party appears by an agent other than a pleader or advocate, the agent shall before making or doing any appearance, application, or act, in or to the Court, file in Court the power of attorney, or written authority, thereunto authorising him, or a properly authenticated copy thereof/or, in the case of an agent carrying on a trade or business on behalf of a party, without a written authority, an affidavit stating the residence of his principal, the trade or business carried on by the agent on his behalf and the connection of the same with the subject matter of the suit and that no other agent is expressly authorised to make or do such appearance, application or act.
(2) The Judge may thereupon record in writing that the agent, is permitted to appear and act on behalf of the party, and unless and until the said permission is granted no appearance, application or act, of the agent shall be recognised by the Court.”
17. Signing or verification by agent: If any proceeding, which, under any provision of law or these rules is required to be signed or verified by a party, is signed or verified by any person on his behalf a written authority in this behalf signed by the party shall be filed in Court, together with an affidavit verifying the signature of the party, and stating the reason of his inability to sign or verify the proceedings and proving the means of knowledge of the facts set out in the proceeding of the person signing or verifying the same.”
22. A question arose before the Kerala High Court in Narayanan Nair v. John Kurien (1988 (1) K.L.T 673) about the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 23 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice, which was identically worded as Rule 24 of Travancore Cochin Civil Rules of Practice that was in force at the time of institution of the proceedings. It was considered by Mr. Justice Thomas (as he then was), with reference to the provisions of Order VI, Rule 14, CPC. In paragraph 3, the learned Judge held as follows:
“What is meant by the expression ‘duly authorised’ in the aforesaid Rule? Learned counsel for the appellants contended that any authorisation without compliance with Rule 24 of the Travancore Cochin Civil Rules of Practice (which was in force when the suit was instituted) cannot be recognised in law as the special rule under the Civil Rules of Practice prescribed a particular mode to make the authorisation. (Rule 23 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice is identically worded and hence reference to one of them would be sufficient). The said rule in the Civil Rules of Practice reads as follows:
‘Signing or verification by agent:— If any proceeding, which, under any provision of law or these rules, is required to be signed or verified by a party is signed or verified by any other person on his behalf, a written authority in this behalf signed by the party except in the case of persons under disability, shall be filed in Court, with an affidavit by such person verifying the signature of the party, and stating the reason of his inability to sign or verify the proceeding.’
No written authority has been produced either by the plaintiff or by the Kurian in support of the case that Kurian has been duly authorised to institute the suit. Nor has Kurian filed an affidavit verifying the signature of the plaintiff stating the reasons of plaintiff's inability to sign in the plaint. The particular rule in the Civil Rules of Practice (quoted above) applies only to cases where proceedings are required to be signed or verified by parties concerned. The said rule need not be imported to a case where plaint or written statement can be signed, as sanctioned by the substantive law, by any other person duly authorised by the party concerned. Order VI Rule 14 permits such a course to be adopted in making the pleadings. The scope of Order VI Rule 14 is not to be curtailed or restricted by unduly reading of Civil Rules of Practice into it. Nor could the sanction offered by the substantive law be stultified by resort to the rules framed under such law. The proviso in Rule 14 (of Order VI) does not insist on production or even creation of a power of attorney or written authorisation. There is nothing in the said provision suggesting that a written authorisation is indispensable for the proper compliance thereof. Case law seems to be very much in support of the view that even oral authorisation would be sufficient to constitute due authorisation. (Vide Re: Arbn. The Bengal Jute Mills, v. Jewraj Heeralal.*, AIR 1943 Calcutta 13; Subbiah Pillai v. Sankarapandiam Pillai, AIR 1948 Madras (Vol. 35) 369; Sarju Prasad v. Badri Prasad, AIR 1939 Nag. 242; and Netram v. Bhagwan, AIR 1941 Nag. 159). Those decisions were referred to and discussed in detail by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in All India Reporter Ltd. v. Ramachandra (AIR 1961 Bombay 292). The Bombay High Court, in concurrence with the preponderant view held that oral authorisation is good enough to constitute a valid authorisation under Order VI Rule 14 of the Code. In Iyakku Mathoo…Defendant- v. Julius Elias Metropolitan…Plaintiff-. (AIR 1962 Kerala 19) absence of a written authority was considered to be a defect in constituting due authorisation, but the said decision can be distinguished on facts since the suit was instituted on behalf of a plaintiff residing abroad permanently. Raman Nayar, J. (as he then was) has observed in the said decision that in such cases the proviso to Order VI Rule 14 does not apply. The upshot of the discussion is that there is compliance with the requirements in Order VI Rule 14 of the Code if there is satisfactory material to show that the signatory in the plaint had the authority of the plaintiff to sign the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff and such authority need not necessarily be in writing.”
23. It may be seen from Rule 23 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice extracted in the aforesaid judgment of the Kerala High Court that it is in pari materia with Rule 17 of the Madras Civil Rules of Practice. It may also be seen that the Kerala High Court referred to the judgment of the Bombay High Court in All India Reporter Ltd. v. Ramachandra, while coming to the conclusion that it did.
24. In Subbiah Pillai v. Sankarapandiam Pillai, 1948 (I) MLJ 227 : (1948) 61 L.W 220, a suit was instituted by three brothers, one of whom held a power of attorney from the other two. The defendant questioned the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the power of attorney did not authorise the third plaintiff to institute suits on behalf of the other two. Referring to Order VI, Rule 14, CPC, and to the decisions of the Judicial Committee and the Allahabad High Court, a Division Bench of this Court held as follows:
“At the highest there was a failure to follow the strict provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order VI, Rule 14 provides that every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader if any, provided that, where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. That provision corresponds to the provisions of Section 578 of the Code of 1882.
In Mohinimohan Das v. Bungsi Budhah Saha Das, (1889) ILR 17 Cal. 580, one of the three plaintiffs had not signed the plaint. In reference to that omission their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed at page 582 of the report as follows:
‘In the first place it was said that the plaints were signed and verified by Mohini Mohan alone. But that is immaterial. There is no rule providing that a person named as a co-plaintiff is not to be treated as a plaintiff unless he signs and verifies the plaint.’
Later at page 583 it is observed, further, that, ‘Their Lordships think that Khatter Mohun, as well as Gobind Rani became a party, as plaintiff, on the 2nd November, 1883, and that the suits therefore are not barred by lapse of time.’
Basdeo v. John Smidt, (1899) ILR 22 All. 55, is a decision to a like effect where it was held that a defect in the signature of the plaint or the absence of signature, where it appears that the suit was in fact filed with the knowledge and by the authority of the plaintiff named therein, may be cured by amendment at any stage of the suit and is not a ground for interference, in appeal. Those two decisions were given at the time when the Code of 1882 was in force. In Basdeo's case, reference is made to Section 578 of the old Code which corresponds to Section 99 of the Code of 1908. That section enacts that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. The result of the above decisions by the Judicial Committee and the High Court of Allahabad is that where a plaintiff has not signed a plaint, filed with his knowledge and consent, it is an omission which can be cured, and, indeed, should be corrected in the interests of justice. Regarding Order VI, Rule 14 of the Code, the commentary in the late Sir Dinshah Fardunji Mulla's work on the Code of Civil Procedure refers to the two cases cited above and then adds this:
‘If the defect is not discovered until the case comes on for hearing before an Appellate Court, the Appellate Court may order the amendment to be made in that Court. The Appellate Court ought not to dismiss the suit or interfere with the decree of the Lower Court merely because the plaint has not been signed. The omission to sign or verify plaint is not such a defect as could affect the merits of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court.’
With respect i subscribe fully to the observations in Sir Dinshah Fardunji Mulla's book.”
25. The above decision in Subbiah Pillai was quoted with approval by another Division Bench of this Court in M.C.S Rajan v. National Nail Industries, 1975 II MLJ 490. While doing so, the Division Bench pointed out that “under Sections 196 and 199 of the Indian Contract Act, an act done by one person on behalf of another but without his knowledge or authority, may be ratified by that other and if that other so elects to ratify, the same effect will follow as if the act was performed by the other”. The Bench also referred to Section 199 of the Contract Act, which says that ‘a person ratifying any authorised act done on his behalf ratifies the whole of the transaction of which such act formed a part’.
26. The Division Bench decision in M.C.S Rajan, arose out of a suit, in which, the plaint was signed and verified and presented by the Manager of a sole proprietary concern, without an express authorisation in that behalf. The Trial Court held the suit as not maintainable since the Manager had not produced the power of attorney on the day when he signed the pleading. The Trial Judge did not even accept the power of attorney later produced, on the ground that it was produced belatedly, despite the fact that it contained a ratification. Though the Division Bench referred to Order XXX, Rule 10 and pointed out that there is no provision in the CPC, for suits filed by persons carrying on business in a name other than his own, the Bench took the view that the regularity of such suits had to be context that the Bench referred to Order VI, Rule 14 as well as to the Division Bench decision in Subbiah Pillai and ultimately held the suit as maintainable.
27. In Union Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, the suit filed by the Union Bank of India was dismissed on the ground that the plaint was not duly signed and verified by a competent person. Though other issues were found in favour of the bank, the suit was dismissed by 3 courts namely, the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court and the High Court on this short ground and the bank filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. The decisions of all the three Courts were reversed by the Supreme Court and the suit filed by the bank was decreed. Though the decision of the Court primarily revolved around public interest and Order XXIX, Rule 1, CPC, the Supreme Court went to the extent of holding, in paragraph 10 of its decision, that “by virtue of Order VI, Rule 14, together with Order XXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the signing and verification of the plaint, by a person holding an office, could be accepted, even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney”.
28. In Sugesan and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Pachayappa's Trust, 1998 (2) CTC 572, another Division Bench of this Court expressed the same view, following the decision of the Division Bench in M.C.S Rajan and the decision of the Apex Court in Union Bank of India.
29. Keeping in mind the consistent views expressed by this Court and various other Courts as well as the Supreme Court, let me now turn to the facts of this case. It is no doubt true that the Deed of Power of Attorney with which the suit was originally instituted, was executed by one Mr. A.K Seerappan, the father and power agent of the plaintiff, in favour of his sub agents Chinniah and Duraiswamy. Since the order of the Trial Court, allowing I.A No. 177 of 2004, permitting Chinniah and Duraiswamy to prosecute the suit on behalf of the plaintiff was reversed by this Court in the previous civil revision petition, the plaintiff Kavitha executed a fresh Deed of Power of Attorney dated 20.11.2007, not only appointing P. Chinniah and C. Duraiswamy, but also ratifying all acts done by them, including the filing of the suits by them. In fact, the plaintiff had also sworn to an affidavit before the Trial Court about the appointment of P. Chinniah and C. Duraiswamy. Therefore, the Trial Court was justified in allowing the application I.A No. 226 of 2007 filed under Order III, Rule 2, CPC, since the principal has specifically ratified the acts done by P. Chinniah and C. Duraiswamy.
30. In view of the above, I find no merits in the Civil Revision Petition and hence it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.
VCJ/VCS