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Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking certiorari to call for and quash the records in O.A. No. 87 of 2004 dated 24.9.2004 on the file of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Madras Bench).

The dispute concerned Respondent No.1 (the applicant before the Tribunal), who joined as an Upper Division Clerk on 19.7.1954 and retired on superannuation as Audit Officer on 31.5.1990. Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity (DCRG) and Surrender Leave Salary (SLS) had been calculated on the basis of the last pay drawn and were paid without taking into account an annual increment that would fall due on 1.6.1990.

The respondent/applicant made a representation dated 22.2.2002 requesting recalculation of DCRG and other benefits by taking the increment due on 1.6.1990 into account. That representation was rejected by order dated 6/7-3-2003. Thereafter O.A. No. 87 of 2004 was filed seeking:

  • set aside of the impugned orders dated 6th/7th March 2003;
  • allow the increment due on 1.6.1990 and revise the DCRG;
  • revise the SLS by taking into account the increment due on 1.6.1990; and
  • consequential increase in pension due to increase in salary.

The Tribunal quashed the order dated 7.3.2003 and directed the Union of India to allow the date of increment on 1.6.1990 and to revise the DCRG and SLS accordingly. The present writ petition challenges that Tribunal order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Government servant who retires on the last working day of the preceding month and whose annual increment falls due on the first of the succeeding month is entitled to sanction of the annual increment for the purpose of pension and gratuity? (This question was expressly framed by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and is central to this petition.)
  2. Whether the Tribunal's order dated 24.9.2004 (quashing the departmental rejection and directing recalculation of DCRG and SLS by taking the increment due on 1.6.1990 into account) was legally sustainable.
  3. Whether the Original Application filed before the Tribunal was barred by limitation insofar as DCRG and SLS were concerned, given that those amounts had been paid soon after retirement (well before 2004) and the representation was made only on 22.2.2002.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Union of India) Arguments

  • DCRG and other retirement benefits must be calculated on the basis of emoluments the concerned person was receiving immediately before retirement; since Respondent No.1 retired on 31.5.1990, he was not entitled to the increment that fell due on 1.6.1990.
  • Reliance upon Fundamental Rules (FRs) governing pay, increments and retirement (FR 17(1), FR 56(a), FR 33, FR 9(21)(a)(i), FR 22, FR 24, FR 26) to support the position that increments falling due after cessation of duty are not payable.
  • The Tribunal relied on decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (Division Bench) and CAT Hyderabad which have since been overruled by a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (Principal Accountant General, Andhra Pradesh v. C. Subba Rao), and that Full Bench decision was placed before this Court.

Respondent No.1's Arguments

  • The preceding annual increment had fallen due on 1.6.1989 and, having completed the last year of service on 31.5.1990, the employee had "earned" the increment due on 1.6.1990; mere fact of retirement on 31.5.1990 should not deprive him of that increment for calculation of retiral benefits.
  • Denying the increment in such close cases would cause hardship to government servants whose increment date falls immediately after scheduled retirement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench — O.A. No. 797 of 2002 (12.11.2002) Applied principles/reasoning of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Division Bench and ultimately relied upon Supreme Court authority in S. Banerjee. The Madras Bench Tribunal relied upon this CAT Hyderabad decision in granting relief to Respondent No.1; this reliance was examined and effectively displaced by higher court analysis in the present matter.
Division Bench, Andhra Pradesh High Court — W.P. Nos. 1219 & 1409 of 1998 Held, following S. Banerjee, that the increment could be taken into account in certain factual contexts. The Tribunal's order drew inspiration from this Division Bench decision; the present Court noted that this Division Bench view was later overruled by the Full Bench of the same High Court.
Supreme Court — S. Banerjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 285 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 486 Dealt with the date of retirement where voluntary retirement was permitted "with effect from the forenoon" of a specified date and applied a Pay Commission recommendation to that date; ruled the petitioner had retired on 1.1.1986 (forenoon) and thus fell within the benefit period. The Tribunal's reasoning had inspiration from observations in S. Banerjee, but the present Court and the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court distinguished that decision on its facts and held it inapplicable to cases where a person retires on the last working day of the month and the increment falls on the next day.
Full Bench, Andhra Pradesh High Court — W.P. Nos. 22042, 24191, 24308, 24324 & 24325 of 2003 (Principal Accountant General, Andhra Pradesh v. C. Subba Rao) Considered whether a person retiring on the last working day of the preceding month is entitled to an increment falling on the first of the succeeding month; held such person would not be entitled to that increment. The present Court placed respectful reliance on the Full Bench's detailed analysis and aligned with its conclusion, observing that the Full Bench had correctly distinguished S. Banerjee and quashed the Tribunal's order relied upon in the present case.
Division Bench, Karnataka High Court — W.P. No. 18186 of 2003 (Union of India v. Y.N.R. Rao) Analysed FR 56 and Pension Rules (Rule 5) and observed that the date of retirement is the last date of the month and retirement gratuity/pension entitlement is governed by rules in force on that date. The present Court stated concurrence with the Karnataka High Court's analysis and observed that it is in accord with the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh and relevant Fundamental Rules.
Supreme Court — Achhaibar Maurya v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 2 SCC 639 Examined cut-off dates and rule wording; distinguished S. Banerjee on facts and held benefit depended on rule wording and factual position (teacher retiring on 30.6.2003 was not within the extension applicable to those retiring on or after 1.7). The present Court considered Achhaibar Maurya as supportive of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh's analysis and regarded it as squarely applicable to the facts in the present proceeding.
Supreme Court — C. Jacob v. Director of Geology & Mining (2008 AIR SCW 7233) Addressed limitation principles and the effect of long delays in pursuing claims (as applied in the present opinion). The Court referred to C. Jacob to support the conclusion that the Original Application before the Tribunal was also liable to be dismissed on limitation grounds because DCRG & SLS had been paid long before and the representation was filed belatedly in 2002.
K.P. Vargese v. I.T. Officer, Ernakulam (referenced) Cited for the principle that statutory provisions must be interpreted consistent with Article 14 (equality) — used in Full Bench analysis. The Full Bench used this authority to support a non-discriminatory interpretation of Fundamental Rules; the present Court noted and accepted that reasoning.
Full Bench, CAT (Mumbai) — (referenced in Karnataka High Court discussion) Earlier Full Bench view that a government servant retiring on the afternoon of the last day of the month is to be treated as retiring with effect from the first day of the next month (criticised). The Karnataka Division Bench disapproved that Full Bench (Mumbai) view; the present Court recorded concurrence with the Karnataka view rejecting that approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by reference to the applicable Fundamental Rules and relevant authorities and by examining factual distinctions in the cited precedents.

Key aspects of the Court's step-by-step reasoning as reflected in the opinion:

  • Statutory/regulatory framework: The Court extracted the following provisions from the Fundamental Rules:
    • F.R.17(1): an officer is entitled to draw pay and allowances from the date he assumes duties and shall cease to draw them as soon as he ceases to discharge the duties of that post.
    • F.R.56(a): provides for retirement on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which a government servant attains age of superannuation; if date of birth is the first of a month, retirement is on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month.
    • F.R.33 and F.R.9(21)(a)(i): definition of "emoluments" and "pay" — pay includes increment allowed at an anterior date, and "emoluments" means basic pay as defined which the government servant was receiving immediately before retirement.
    • F.Rs.22, 24 and 26: govern initial pay, time-scale and sanction of increment to a government servant who is on duty.
  • Legal consequence drawn from rules: The Court concluded that, read together, these rules imply that annual increment is given to enable the government servant to discharge duty and draw pay — a government servant who ceases to discharge duties (i.e., on retirement) is not entitled to draw pay and allowances after that date, and therefore would not be entitled to any increment falling due after retirement.
  • Reliance on Full Bench and other High Court decisions: The Court expressly agreed with the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (Principal Accountant General v. C. Subba Rao) which held that a person who retires on the last working day of a month would not be entitled to an increment falling due on the next day. The Court also recorded concurrence with the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court (Union of India v. Y.N.R. Rao), which reached similar conclusions about the date of retirement and calculation of gratuity/pension.
  • Distinguishing S. Banerjee (Supreme Court): The Court observed that the Tribunal's reliance upon Banerjee was misplaced because Banerjee involved voluntary retirement expressly effective "from the forenoon" of the succeeding date (1.1.1986) and thus the factual matrix in Banerjee placed the petitioner within the Pay Commission recommendation. The Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh had distinguished Banerjee on similar grounds, and the present Court adopted that distinction.
  • Application of Achhaibar Maurya: The Court found the reasoning in Achhaibar Maurya (2008) supportive, noting that the Supreme Court in that case emphasized that entitlement to certain benefits depends on rule wording and factual position; this further supported the conclusion that entitlement to an increment falling after cessation of duty cannot be presumed.
  • Limitation and cause of action: The Court observed that DCRG and SLS were calculated on last pay actually drawn and paid soon after retirement (long before 2004). The respondent's representation dated 22.2.2002 came much later, and the cause of action in relation to DCRG and SLS had arisen long before. The Court therefore considered the Original Application to be time-barred insofar as DCRG and SLS were concerned, relying on C. Jacob to support dismissal on limitation grounds.
  • Conclusion of analysis: For the foregoing reasons — statutory interpretation of Fundamental Rules, persuasive weight of Full Bench and Division Bench precedents, distinguishing of S. Banerjee, and limitation considerations — the Court concluded that the Tribunal's order directing recalculation of DCRG and SLS by taking into account the increment due on 1.6.1990 was unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court's final decision was to quash the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, dated 24.9.2004 (in O.A. No. 87 of 2004). The writ petition under Article 226 was allowed.

DISPOSITION: The Tribunal's order is quashed; the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, WPMP No. 30978 of 2005 is closed.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The direction of the Tribunal to the Union of India to allow the increment dated 1.6.1990 and to revise DCRG and SLS accordingly is set aside.
  • Respondent No.1 will not receive recalculation of DCRG/SLS on the basis of the increment falling due on 1.6.1990 pursuant to the impugned Tribunal order.
  • The Court also indicated that the Original Application before the Tribunal would have been liable to dismissal on limitation grounds in any event, insofar as DCRG and SLS were concerned.

Broader implications: The Court accepted and applied the reasoning of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court and distinguished S. Banerjee on its facts. The decision aligns the present case with those authorities and clarifies that, under the Fundamental Rules considered, increments falling due after cessation of duty are not to be taken into account for payment of retirement gratuity and surrender leave salary when retirement precedes the increment date.

    Union Of India, Rep. By The Principal Accountant And General Tamil Nadu & Pondicherry, Teynampet, Chennai 600 018 Petitioner v. R. Sundara Rajan

    Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of Writ of Certiorari to call for the records in O.A No. 87 of 2004, dated 24.9.2004, on the file of the 2nd respondent, and quash the same.

    JUDGMENT

    P.K MISRA, J

    The Union of India has filed this writ petition against the order, dated 24.9.2004, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) in O.A No. 87 of 2004, whereunder the Tribunal, while quashing the order dated 7.3.2003, has directed the present petitioner to revise the Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity (DCRG) and the Surrender Leave Salary (SLS) by taking into account the increment due on 1.6.1990

    2. The basic facts, which were projected before the Tribunal, are as follows:-

    The present contesting Respondent No. 1, who was the applicant before the Tribunal, joined service as Upper Division Clerk on 19.7.1954 and retired on superannuation as Audit Officer on 31.5.1990 The DCRG and SLS had been calculated on the basis of the last pay drawn which had been paid without taking into account the annual increment which was to fall due on 1.6.1990 The respondent/applicant filed a representation dated 22.2.2002 to the present petitioner stating that he had completed the last year of service from 1.6.1989 to 31.5.1990 and, therefore, the increment, which was due on 1.6.1990 Forenoon, was payable and on that basis the DCRG and other benefits should be recalculated. Such representation was apparently rejected by order dated 6/7-3-2003. Thereafter, O.A No. 87 of 2004 was filed with the following reliefs:-

    “(i) To set aside the impugned orders dated 6th/7 March 2003 of the respondent.

    (ii) To allow the increment due on 1-6-90 and revise the death-cum-retirement gratuity.

    (iii) To revise the surrender leave salary by taking into account the increment due on 01-06-90.

    (iv) To give consequential increase in pension due to increase in salary.”

    3. The present petitioner, relying upon various rules relating to superannuation, took the stand that DCRG and other retirement benefits are to be calculated on the basis of the emoluments, which the concerned person was receiving immediately before retirement, and since the person had retired on 31.5.1990, there was no question of calculating even on notional basis the increment due on 1.6.1990 as by then the person had already retired.

    4. The Tribunal, by relying upon the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench in O.A No. 797 of 2002 dated 12.11.2002, which had been passed on the basis of the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P Nos. 1219 & 1409 of 1998, which in its turn had relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1990 SC 285: 1989 Supp (2) SCC 486 (S. BANERJEE v. UNION OF INDIA), quashed the impugned order dated 7.3.2003 and directed the present petitioner to allow the date of increment on 1.6.1990 and to revise the DCRG and the Surrender Leave Salary accordingly. The said order is in question in the present writ petition.

    5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, as a matter of fact, the Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which was relied upon by the Tribunal for granting the relief to the present Respondent No. 1, has been subsequently overruled in a decision of the Full Bench of the very same Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P NOs. 22042, 24191, 24308, 24324 and 24325 of 2003 (The Principal Accountant General, Andhra Pradesh v. C. Subba Rao).

    6. A copy of the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has been enclosed by the petitioner as a part of the typed set filed along with the writ petition. On a perusal of the said judgment, it is apparent that the Full Bench had framed two points for consideration. In the present case, we are concerned with the first point, which is to the following effect:-

    “I. Whether a Government servant who retires on the last working day of the preceding month and whose annual increment falls due on the first of the succeeding month is entitled for sanction of annual increment for the purpose of pension and gratuity?”

    7. In the said case, ultimately, the Full Bench, while distinguishing the decision of the Supreme Court in Banerjee's case, held that the Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had not been correctly decided and it was specifically observed that “A person retired on the last working day would not be entitled for any increment falling due on the next day and payable next day thereafter”. As a matter of fact, the order of the Tribunal of the Andhra Pradesh, which was also one of the orders, relied upon in the present impugned order, was specifically quashed in the said case. It is thus apparent that the basis on which the present impugned order had been passed by the Tribunal was found to be erroneous by the Full Bench of the very same Andhra Pradesh High Court. However, since the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is only of persuasive value, we are required to consider the matter independently.

    8. As per F.R 17(1), an officer is entitled to draw the pay and allowances with effect from the date when he assumes the duties of that post and shall cease to draw them as soon as he ceases to discharge the duties of that post.

    As per F.R 56(a), every Government servant shall retire from retire on the afternoon of the last preceding month in which he attains the age of sixty years. Where, however, the date of birth of a Government servant is the first of a month, he shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month on attaining the age of sixty years.

    As per F.R 33, the expression ‘Emoluments’ means basic pay as defined in Rule 9(21)(a)(i) of the Fundamental Rules which a Government servant was receiving immediately before his retirement.

    ‘Pay’ as defined in F.R.9(21)(a)(i) means the amount drawn monthly by a Government servant which also includes the increment allowed at an anterior date. (Emphasis added)

    F.R 22 governs the initial pay of a Government servant who is appointed to a post in time-scale and F.Rs 24 and 26 govern the sanction of increment to a Government servant, who is on duty. It is thus obvious that as per F.R.17 read with FRs. 24 and 26, no employee would be entitled to any increment if it falls due after the date of retirement.

    9. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 has submitted that the previous increment had fallen due on 1.6.1989 and since the concerned employee can be said to have completed one year on 31.5.1990, it can be taken that he had earned the increment and merely because he had retired on 31.5.1990, it cannot be said that the next increment was not due to him. It is further submitted by him that any other interpretation would cause great hardship in all cases, where the date of increment fallen due immediately after the scheduled date of retirement.

    10. Even though such a submission may prima facie appear to be attractive, we do not think it can be accepted in view of the clear provisions contained in F.Rs 9(21)(a)(i), 17, 24 and 26 and F.R 56. As a matter of fact, we may say so with respect that in the unreported decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the entire matter has been considered in a great detail and it may not be necessary for us to retrace the entire path, save and except by making reference to appropriate observations made in such Full Bench decision as we are in respectful agreement with the views expressed therein.

    11. In course of the above judgment, after referring to the definition of ‘pay’ as contained in F.R.9(21)(a)(i), ‘time scale of pay’ as referred to in F.R 9(31) and F.Rs 17,24 and 26 and F.R 56(a), it was observed inter alia:-

    “… A reading of various Fundamental Rules extracted hereinabove would show that a person appointed as a Government servant is entitled to pay in time-scale of pay. He is also entitled to draw the increment as per time-scale of pay as a matter of course as long as such Government servant discharges duties of the post and such Government servant shall not be entitled to draw the pay and allowances attached to the post as soon as he ceases to discharge those duties. In other words, as per F.R 17 read with F.Rs 24 and 26 annual increment is given to a Government servant to enable him to discharge duty and draw pay and allowances attached to the post. If such Government servant ceases to discharge duties by any reason say, by reason of attainment of age of superannuation, such Government servant will not be entitled to draw pay and allowances. As a necessary corollary, such employee would not be entitled to any increment if it falls due after the date of retirement, be it on the next day of retirement or sometime thereafter.

    F.R.56(a) creates a legal fiction. Even if a person attains the age of 60 years on any day of the month, he shall be retired on the afternoon of the last day of the month. A Government servant, who attains the age of 60 years on any day in a month, is deemed to have not attained the superannuation till the last day of the month. In the case of a Government servant, whose date of birth is first of a month shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month on attaining the age of 60 years. In this case, actually and factually, a Government servant would have completed the age of 60 years a day before the date on which his date of birth falls. Therefore, there are two situations. In the first situation, a Government servant though he attains the age of 60 years on any day of the month, he is deemed to have not attained such age till the afternoon of the last day of that month. Assuming that such a situation is not contemplated - as in the case of persons holding constitutional offices like, Judges of Supreme Court, High Court Members of Election Commission, Comptroller and Auditor General etc., of a Government servant is retired on a day before the actual date of birth on any day of the month and the increment of such Government servant falls on the first of the succeeding month can he claim annual grade increment? The answer must be an emphatic “no”. Because, by the date on which the increment falls due, such Government servant ceased to be a Government servant. It is therefore logical and reasonable to conclude that merely because for the purpose of F.R.56(a), a person is continued till the last date of the month in which he attains the age of superannuation, such an employee cannot claim increment which falls due on the first day of the succeeding month after retirement.

    In second situation, a Government servant, who is covered by the proviso to F.R.56, that is to say, whose date of birth is first of a month, such employee has to retire on the last day of the preceding month. In Courts' considered opinion, no distinction can be made in both the cases, as the Government servants retired on the last day of the month and with effect from first day of succeeding month ceases to discharge Government duties and no pay is payable. If an increment is denied to a Government servant falling under F.R.56(a) though he retires on the last day of the month, the same principle will have to be applied to a Government servant falling under first proviso to F.R.56 Such interpretation would sub-serve the principle of equality and has to be preferred to any other possible and plausible method of interpretation. It is well settled that a provision of law has to be interpreted in a non-discriminatory manner in tune with principle of equality before law and equal protection of laws enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India (See in K.P Vargese v. I.T Officer, Ernakulam). Yet another situation is where the date of birth of a Government servant falls on the last day of the month. In such a case, he has to necessarily retire on the same day on which his date of month, he would not be entitled for any annual increment.”

    12. In another unreported decision of the High Court of Karnataka in W.P No. 18186 of 2003 (UNION OF INDIA v. Y.N.R RAO), disposed of on 8.12.2003, while dealing with the question of payment of retirement gratuity and a contention regarding applicability of the Rule, which enhanced the maximum amount of gratuity payable, after analysing F.R 56 and Rule 5 of the Pension Rules, a Division Bench speaking through Justice R.V Raveendran, as His Lordship then was, observed as follows:-

    “5. But for the provisions of FR 56, which provides that a Government Servant shall retire from service on the afternoon of last date of the month in which he had attained the age of 58 years, the respondent, who was born on 9-3-1937 would have retired on 8-3-1995. The provision for retirement from service on the afternoon of the last date of the month in which the Government Servant attains the age of retirement instead of on the actual completion of the age of retirement in FR 56 was introduced in the year 1973-74 for accounting and administrative convenience. What is significant is the proviso to clause (a) of FR 56 which provides that an employee whose date of birth is first of a month, shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last date of the preceding month on attaining the age of 58 years. Therefore, if the date of birth of a government servant is 1-4-1937 he would retire from service not on 30-4-1995, but on 31-3-1995. If a person born on 1-4-1937 shall retire on 31-3-1995, it would be illogical to say a person born on 9-3-1937 would retire with effect from 1-4-1995. That would be the effect, if the decision of the Full Bench of the CAT, Mumbai, is to be accepted. Therefore, a government servant retiring on the afternoon of 31-3-1995 retires on 31-3-1995 and not from 1-4-1995. We hold that the decision of the Full Bench (Mumbai) of the CAT that a government servant retiring on the afternoon of 31st March is to be treated as retiring with effect from the first day of April, that is same as retiring on the forenoon of first of April, is not good law.

    6. Rule 5(2) of Pension Rules provides that the day on which a government servant retires from service shall be treated as his last working day. Rule 3(o) defines ‘pension’ as including gratuity except where the term ‘pension’ is used in contradistinction to gratuity. Rule 5(1) provides that any claim for pension (or gratuity) shall be regulated by the provisions of CCS Pension Rules in force at the time when a government servant retires from service. A combined reading of these clauses makes it clear that the date of retirement is the last date of the month in which the Government servant retires and the Retirement Gratuity is to be calculated as per Rules in force on that date. As the respondent retired on 31-3-1995, his entitlement to gratuity will be governed by the Pension Rules as on 31-3-1995. As per Rule 50 as it stood on 31-3-1995, the maximum amount payable as retirement gratuity of Rs. 1,00,000/- and therefore the Department was justified in paying only Rs. 1,00,000/- to the respondent.”

    13. In our considered opinion, the analysis made by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court with respect is in accord with the relevant provisions and has our unstinted concurrence.

    14. The decisions on the basis of which the Tribunal had granted the relief to Respondent No. 1 had inspiration from the observations made by the Supreme Court in Banerjee's case (cited supra). In the said case filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court, the petitioner was an Additional Registrar of the Supreme Court before his retirement. Even though his normal date of retirement was 31.3.1987, he had sought for voluntary retirement from service and by office order dated 6.12.1985 it was specifically indicated that the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India had “. . . permitted him to retire voluntarily from the service of the Registry of the Supreme Court of India with effect from the forenoon of January 1, 1986.” As per para 17.3 of Chapter 17 of Part II of the IV Central Pay Commission Report, it had been indicated:-

    “17.3 In the case of employees retiring during the period January 1, 1986 to September 30, 1986, government may consider treating the entire dearness allowance drawn by them up to December 31, 1985 as pay for pensionary benefits.”

    On the basis of such recommendation, which had been accepted by the Government, the petitioner had claimed that the entire Dearness Allowance drawn upto 31.12.1985 should be treated as pay for calculating pensionary benefits. The contention raised on behalf of the Union of India was to the effect that by virtue of proviso to Rule 5(2) of the Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972, it should be taken that date of retirement of the petitioner should be treated as non-working day and, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to salary for the day of his retirement and not entitled for the benefit of the recommendation of the Pay Commission as contained in para 17.3 of the Pay Commission Report. The above contention was repelled by the Supreme Court by observing inter alia:-

    “6. . . . But, in our opinion, that has no bearing on the question as to the date of retirement. Can it be said that the petitioner retired on 31-12-1985? The answer must be in the negative. Indeed, Mr Anil Dev Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, frankly conceded that the petitioner could not be said to have retired on 31-12-1985. It is also not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had retired from the service of this Court on 31-12-1985. Then it must be held that the petitioner had retired with effect from 1-1-1986 and that is also the order of this Court dated 6-12-1985. It may be that the petitioner had retired with effect from the forenoon of 1-1-1986 as per the said order of this Court, that is to say, as soon as 1-1-1986 had commenced the petitioner retired. But, nevertheless, it has to be said that the petitioner had retired on 1-1-1986 and not on 31-12-1985. In the circumstances, the petitioner comes within the purview of para 17.3 of the recommendations of the Pay Commission.”

    15. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, after taking note of the observations made in S. Banerjee's case, has concluded that the ratio of the said decision was not applicable for considering the question as to whether the person who retires on the last day of a month can claim that the increment which falls due on the first day of the subsequent month is to be taken into account for the purpose of payment of retiral benefits.

    16. The ratio of the said decision would have no application inasmuch as it has been emphasised in the said decision of the Supreme Court that as a matter of fact the person had retired in the forenoon of January 1, 1986 and as such he was coming within the purview of para 17.3 of the Pay Commission Report, which was made applicable to the employees during the period 1.1.1986 to 30.9.1986

    17. As a matter of fact, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court has been distinguished in a very recent case of the Supreme Court in (2008) 2 SCC 639 (ACHHAIBAR MAURYA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH). In the above decision, the date of birth of the appellant before the Supreme Court, who was an Assistant Teacher in a primary school, was 1.7.1943 and, as per the relevant rule, his age of superannuation was “. . . in the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 60 years”. The proviso to the aforesaid rule was to the following effect:-

    “Provided that a teacher who retires during an academic session (July 1 to June 30) shall continue to work till the end of the academic session, that is, June 30 and such period of service will be deemed as extended period of employment.”

    The contention of the appellant was to the effect that he was to retire from service on 1.7.2003 and, therefore, he should have been extended the benefit contemplated in such proviso. Strong reliance was placed by the appellant on the decision of the Supreme Court in S. Banerjee's case. The Supreme Court negatived the contention by observing:-

    “8. As the appellant was born on 1-7-1943, he would retire on 30-6-2003. The question as to whether he would obtain the benefit of extended period of service up to 30 June and the next year will depend upon the situation as to whether the teacher retires on or after 1 July or not.

    . . .

    10. A benefit of getting an extended period of service must be conferred by a statute. The legislature is entitled to fix a cut-off date. A cut-off date fixed by a statute may not be struck down unless it is held to be arbitrary. What would, therefore, be an employee's last working date would depend on the wordings of the Rules. It may seem unfortunate as some people may miss the extended period of service by a day, but therefor a valid provision may not be held to be invalid on the touchstone of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. A statute cannot be declared unconstitutional for conferring benefit to a section of the people. We, therefore, do not agree with the view taken in Khan Chandra Madhu.

    11. In S. Banerjee v. Union of India, whereupon reliance has been placed, the fact situation obtaining was completely different. In that case, the appellant filed an application for voluntary retirement which was accepted from the forenoon of 1-1-1986. In that view of the matter, he was found to be entitled to the benefit of Para 17.3 of the Recommendations of the Pay Commission.”

    18. In our considered opinion, the analysis made by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court is in accord with the ratio of the above decision of the Supreme Court, which even though rendered slightly on a different context appears to be squarely applicable.

    19. As already noticed at the threshold, the Tribunal had granted the relief on the basis of an earlier decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has been overruled by the Full Bench decision which had in fact reversed the decision of the Tribunal. In our considered opinion, the analysis made by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is squarely applicable and is consistent with the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Achhaibar Maurya's case.

    20. It is also necessary to notice another feature in the present case. Respondent No. 1 had retired on 31.5.1990 Respondent No. 1 was essentially claiming that DCRG and SLS should be recalculated by taking into account the increment due on 1.6.1990 Even though Respondent No. 1 had also claimed “. . . consequential increments in pension due to increase in salary”, the Tribunal appears to have specifically granted the relief of DCRG and SLSby observing that the Department should consider the case of the applicant and allow the date of increment on 1.6.1990 Even though it may be stated that right to get pension may be a continuing cause of action and therefore the right to get appropriate pension can be said to accrue every month, the DCRG and SLS have been calculated on the basis of the last pay actually drawn by the applicant and must have been paid to the applicant soon after 31.5.1990 and in any case long before 2004. If at all the applicant (Respondent No. 1) had any grievance relating to payment of DCRG and SLS, the cause of action had arisen long before. It is obvious that Respondent No. 1.applicant got the inspiration to file the Original Application by first making a representation on 22.2.2002, long after the period of limitation. Merely because such representation was rejected by the Government on a subsequent date, it cannot be said that the period of limitation for getting DCRG and SLS (as we have already expressed that we are not considering the question of grant of pension at the proper rate as in the present case there has been no such direction by the Tribunal) got extended or gave rise to a fresh cause of action. Under such circumstances, in our considered opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court in 2008 AIR SCW 7233 (C. JACOB v. DIRECTOR OF GEOLOGY & MINING) is also applicable. The Original Application was also liable to be dismissed on the aforesaid ground.

    21. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to uphold the order passed by the Tribunal, which is accordingly quashed. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. No costs. Consequently, WPMP. No. 30978 of 2005 is closed.

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