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  • 5.5.20067. Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure.(ii)
  • Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure.9.
  • Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • Section 199 of Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 204 of Code of Criminal Procedure
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citation codes
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  • 5.5.20067. Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure.(ii)
  • Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure.9.
  • Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • Section 199 of Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 204 of Code of Criminal Procedure
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Criminal Original Petition to Quash CC No. 4136/2006

Factual and Procedural Background

This Criminal Original Petition challenges proceedings initiated in CC No. 4136/2006 on the file of the XIV Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, seeking quashment of the complaint under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Relevant factual allegations, as set out in the complaint, are:

  • The Respondent/complainant was formerly President of the Young Women's Christian Association of Madras (YMCA) for 2004–05 and had long-standing involvement (over 25 years) with the YMCA. She is described as enjoying high social status and respectability. The Petitioner is the current President of the YMCA.
  • On 5.1.2006, at a YMCA meeting, the Petitioner allegedly rudely shouted at the Respondent and called her a "liar" in the presence of other members and staff.
  • The Respondent wrote to the Petitioner on 7.1.2006 asking her to desist from such words; the letter was received on 9.1.2006. The Petitioner replied on 18.1.2006. The Respondent again wrote on 25.1.2006 demanding an unconditional apology within three days; no unconditional apology was given.
  • Thereafter, the Respondent filed a complaint for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. Process issued and the Petitioner appeared and received a copy of the complaint. The Petitioner then filed the present petition to quash the complaint and the cognizance taken by the Magistrate.

Procedurally, the Petitioner challenged the validity of the cognizance taken by the learned XIV Metropolitan Magistrate and sought quashment of the complaint on multiple legal grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate was valid under Section 199(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), given that the complaint was presented by a Power of Attorney without any recorded leave of the court permitting someone other than the aggrieved person to present the complaint.
  2. Whether the complaint alleges the essential ingredients of defamation under Section 499 of the IPC — specifically, an averment that the imputation lowered the complainant's reputation "in the estimation of others" as required by Explanation 4 to Section 499.
  3. Whether the alleged utterance constituted "publication" within the meaning of Section 499 IPC (i.e., whether the defamatory matter was communicated to persons other than the person defamed), and whether there was the requisite intention to defame.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The cognizance taken under Section 199 CrPC is invalid because the complaint was presented by a Power of Attorney (J. Bharathi Raja) on behalf of the complainant without any leave of the court as required by the proviso to Section 199(1). The Power of Attorney's sworn statement lacked personal knowledge of the alleged defamatory words and did not show leave had been granted.
  • The complaint does not contain the necessary averment that the complainant's reputation was lowered in the estimation of others, which is an essential ingredient of defamation under Section 499 IPC together with Explanation 4.
  • The allegations do not satisfy the ingredients of Section 499 IPC; specifically, there is no adequate pleading of publication to others or of intention/knowledge that the imputation would harm the complainant's reputation.
  • Mere communication of defamatory matter directly to the person defamed (without communication to others) is not "publication" within the meaning of Section 499 IPC; here the complaint fails to name persons who heard the alleged words.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.K Ragunath v. S. Ganapathi [1989-LW-Crl-423] That issuing process under Section 204 CrPC (and related acts of taking cognizance/issuing process) is an important act which should not be performed perfunctorily; the Magistrate must apply his mind before taking such steps. The court relied on this authority to hold that the learned Magistrate failed to apply his mind when taking cognizance where the complaint was presented by a Power of Attorney without any recorded leave; hence the cognizance was vitiated.
J. Jayalalitha v. Arcot N. Veerasamy [1997-Crl.LJ-4585] That granting leave to a Power of Attorney to make a complaint without the complainant filing an affidavit narrating the circumstances seeking leave is a deficiency. The court used this decision to reinforce that leave to present a complaint by a Power of Attorney cannot be granted as a mere formality; no leave was shown, so the Magistrate's cognizance was defective.
Violet Wapshare v. Miss Maureen Fround [1970-Mad-LW-Crl-4] Two principles cited: (a) "Harm" in defamation relates to imputations made and expressed to others so as to lower a person in their estimation; harm in one's own estimation is insufficient. (b) Mere communication of defamatory matter only to the person defamed is not "publication" for Section 499 IPC. The court relied on these principles to hold that (a) the complaint lacked averment that the imputation lowered the complainant in the estimation of others and (b) publication was not established because persons present were not named, so the utterance could not be treated as publication.
Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi [1997-Cri.LJ-212:1996-AIR-SCW-4030] The Supreme Court observed that a complaint must contain allegations constituting the offence of defamation under Section 499 IPC (including lowering in public estimation) and dismissed a complaint lacking those allegations. The court cited this Apex Court decision to support the conclusion that absence of allegations showing lowering of reputation precludes sustaining a complaint under Section 500 IPC.
S. Seetharama Iyer v. K.C. Ramulu alias Ramanathan [1972-LW-Crl-226] That vulgar words, without intention to harm or knowledge that they would harm reputation, do not constitute defamation under Section 499 IPC. The court applied this authority to conclude that, on the material before it, the alleged word could be at best a vulgar abuse and there was no clear intention to defame; thus the offence under Section 499/500 IPC was not made out.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps, each anchored to statutory provisions and preceding authorities set out in the record:

  1. Examination of Section 199(1) CrPC and the proviso: The court observed that Section 199(1) requires that a court shall not take cognizance of defamation offences except upon a complaint by the person aggrieved, and the proviso permits another person to complain only with the leave of the court where the aggrieved person cannot complain due to age, mental incapacity, sickness, infirmity, or local customs concerning women.
  2. Application to the facts: The complaint in CC No. 4136/2006 had been presented by a Power of Attorney (J. Bharathi Raja) and the sworn statement was made by that Power of Attorney. There was no indication in the complaint, sworn statement, or the Magistrate's cognizance order that leave was sought or granted under the proviso to Section 199(1). The court emphasized that the Magistrate should have scrutinized any application for leave and recorded a reasoned finding before permitting another person to present the complaint.
  3. Reliance on precedent regarding magistrate's duty: C.K. Ragunath and J. Jayalalitha were cited to underscore that issuing process and permitting a non-aggrieved person to present a complaint require application of mind and cannot be done perfunctorily. Because no such leave or reasoning was recorded, the court concluded the cognizance was vitiated.
  4. Analysis of the ingredients of defamation (Section 499 IPC and Explanation 4): The court read Section 499 with Explanation 4 and held that a complaint must aver that the imputation lowered the complainant's reputation in the estimation of others. The court found that neither the complaint nor the sworn statement contained such an averment.
  5. Consideration of authority on "harm" and publication: The court applied Violet Wapshare and the Supreme Court decision in Shatrughna Prasad Sinha to show that absence of allegations that reputation was lowered in the estimation of the public defeats a defamation complaint. Further, the court noted that publication requires communication to others — in this case the complaint did not identify persons present who heard the alleged word.
  6. Intention to defame: The court evaluated whether the utterance was made with intention to harm or with knowledge that it would harm the complainant's reputation. Relying on S. Seetharama Iyer, the court concluded that the alleged word could at best be a vulgar abuse and there was no sufficient material to infer intention to defame.
  7. Cumulative conclusion: Because (a) the Magistrate took cognizance without recorded leave or scrutiny when the complaint was presented by a Power of Attorney, (b) the complaint lacked the essential averment that the complainant's reputation was lowered in the estimation of others, and (c) publication and intention were not satisfactorily pleaded, the court found no sufficient ground to sustain cognizance of the offence under Section 500 IPC.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Quashed — The impugned complaint in CC No. 4136/2006 was quashed and the Criminal Original Petition was allowed. The connected miscellaneous petition (MP) was closed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The immediate consequence is that the complaint and proceedings against the Petitioner in CC No. 4136/2006 are set aside; the petition succeeds and the impugned proceedings are terminated by quashment.
  • Grounds for quashment: The court's decision rests on procedural deficiency (absence of leave under Section 199(1) where complaint was presented by a Power of Attorney), inadequate pleading of the statutory elements of defamation (no averment of lowering of reputation in the estimation of others), absence of pleaded publication to others, and lack of material to show intention to defame.
  • Precedential note: The opinion applies established principles from earlier decisions and statutory text to the facts; the court did not indicate the creation of any new legal test beyond applying existing authorities and statutory interpretation to the record before it.

This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or arguments beyond what appears in that text.

    Renuka Iswariah Petitioner v. Cynthia Dulipsingh

    Prayer:- This Criminal Original Petition is filed to call for the records in CC. No. 4136/2006 on the file of the XIV Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai and quash the proceedings therein.

    ORDER

    The Petitioner seeks to quash the proceedings initiated against her by the Respondent/complainant for the alleged offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC, pending on the file of the learned XIV Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai in CC. No. 4136/2006.

    2. The brief facts are given below:-

    The Respondent/complainant was the former President of the Young Women's Christian Association of Madras (YMCA) and she held the said post during the period 2004-05 and had been an active member of the YMCA for more than 25 years and had served in a number of committees thereon. Presently, she is the Chair Person of the nominating committee and her husband is a senior advocate, practicing in the High Court of Madras. Both the Respondent and her husband enjoy a very high status and respectability in the Society. The Petitioner currently is the President of the YMCA. On 5.1.2006, the Respondent and the other members attended the meeting, wherein the Petitioner also attended in her ex-officio capacity. When deliberations were in progress and the Respondent was trying to put forth a suggestion about the proper functioning of the community college, the Petitioner intervened and rudely shouted at the Respondent not to interfere.

    3. It is alleged that the Respondent/complainant continued to participate and when further discussions were going on, the Petitioner called the Respondent a “liar” in the presence of the other members and staff. The Respondent is said to have been deeply taken aback by the rudeness and the defamatory statement uttered by the Petitioner and the complainant had issued a letter to the accused on 7.1.2006, calling upon her to desist from use of such words in future and with a view to maintain harmony in a Charitable Association to refrain from using any harsh language. The said letter had been received by the Petitioner on 9.1.2006 and she had sent a reply on 18.1.2006 Again the complainant issued a reply on 25.1.2006, reiterating what was stated in the earlier letter dated 7.1.2006 and demanded unconditional apology within three days for making such a defamatory utterance against the complainant. Despite receipt of the said letter, the Petitioner had not issued any unconditional apology and therefore, the Respondent had filed the present complaint against the Petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC.

    4. Process had been issued to the Petitioner by the learned XIV Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai and the Petitioner had appeared in the court and had received a copy of the complaint.

    5. The Petitioner challenged the complaint and the cognizance taken by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on the following grounds:-

    (i) The cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is not valid in the eye of law, as it is not in conformity with Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure.

    (ii) The important ingredient in the complaint that the reputation of the complainant had been lowered in the estimation of others is absent and therefore, the offence of defamation as defined under Section 499 of IPC is not made out.

    (iii) The ingredients of Section 499 of IPC have not been met out on the allegation made in the complaint.

    6. Mr. A. Raghunathan, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner submitted that Section 199 of Code of Criminal Procedure is mandatory and if the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence of defamation on a complaint filed by a person, who is not aggrieved, the same would be illegal, as the Power of Attorney of the complainant has no personal knowledge of the alleged defamatory word uttered by the Petitioner, which is also not spelt out in the sworn statement of the Power of Attorney. It was pointed out by the learned senior counsel that the complaint has been filed by the Power of Attorney J. Bharathi Raja on behalf of the complainant and the sworn statement was made only by the Power of Attorney and it was recorded on 5.5.2006

    7. Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure provides thus:-

    “Prosecution for Defamation: No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some persons aggrieved by the offence.

    Provided that where such person is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a woman who according to the local customs and manners, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, some other person may, with the leave of the court, make a complaint on his or her behalf.”

    8. In the instant case, there is no indication either in the complaint or in the sworn statement or in the order passed by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the complaint that leave has been given to the Power of Attorney to make a complaint on behalf of the Respondent on the ground that she was unable to appear before the court for some reason or the other. The purpose and purport of the above provision is that if any deficiency, disability, difficulty or infirmity is shown by the Respondent seeking leave of the court to dispense with her appearance, then if the court finds it to be reasonable and sufficient to dispense with the personal appearance of the complainant to present the complaint, then leave could be granted. Admittedly, no leave has been sought for by the Respondent for presenting the complaint by a Power of Attorney Agent on behalf of the complainant showing the reason therefor. Despite the said deficiency, the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance without applying his mind and in total contravention of the proviso to Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure.

    9. In the case of C.K Ragunath v. S. Ganapathi [1989-LW-Crl-423], this court has held that the fact of issuing process under Section 204 of Code of Criminal Procedure to a person to appear before a court is an important act, which should not be performed perfunctorily and automatically. It is further held that the learned Magistrate should apply his mind before taking such steps.

    10. In the case of J. Jayalalitha v. Arcot N. Veerasamy [1997-Crl.LJ-4585], this court has held that the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate granting leave to the Power of Attorney to make the complaint on behalf of the Petitioner would definitely be a deficiency, when the complainant had not satisfied the court by filing an affidavit narrating the circumstances seeking for leave to file a complaint on her behalf by the Power of Attorney.

    11. In the instant case, no leave is sought for by the Respondent and the learned Magistrate has also taken cognizance without applying his mind as to whether the Petitioner was disabled from appearing in court to file the complaint in person. Granting leave could not be done for the mere asking since it involves a careful scrutiny before passing the orders under the proviso to Section 199(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure, as it would relate to relaxing the embargo embodied under Section 199 of Code of Criminal Procedure for the presentation of the complaint by any other person than the person aggrieved. Therefore, I hold that the complaint and the sworn statement recorded by the learned Magistrate are not valid in the eye of law and the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate on such invalid sworn statement given by the Power of Attorney gets vitiated.

    12. Mr. A. Raghunathan, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner drew the attention of this court to the materials produced viz. the complaint and the sworn statement and submitted that there is no averment either in the complaint or in the sworn statement that due to above imputation made by the Petitioner, the image and reputation of the Respondent/complainant has been lowered in the estimation of the public.

    13. According to the definition of ‘defamation’ as provided under Section 499 of IPC, whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or punishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person.

    14. Explanation 4 to Section 499 of IPC runs as follows:-

    “No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person, in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or caused it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.”

    15. Thus, the conjoint reading of Section 499 of IPC with this Explanation 4, would make it clear that in the complaint, there shall be an averment to the effect that because of the imputation, the complainant's reputation had been lowered in the estimation of others. As indicated earlier, this important ingredient is absent in the complaint and in the sworn statement.

    16. While interpreting Section 499 of IPC and Explanation 4 thereto, this Court, in the case of Mis. Violet Wapshare v. Miss Maureen Fround [1970-Mad-LW-Crl-4), has held as follows:-

    “The word “harm” used here relates to imputations on a man's character made and expressed to others; so as to lower him in their estimation and anything which lowers him merely in his own estimation certainly does not constitute defamation.”

    17. In a recent judgement of the Honourable Supreme Court rendered in the case of Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi [1997-Cri.LJ-212:1996-AIR-SCW-4030), while answering similar question, the Apex Court after extracting Section 499 of IPC and Explanation 4 thereto, has observed as follows:-

    “A reading of the complaint does not contain any of the allegations constituting the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of IPC. The contents of the magazine are alleged to be defamatory against the Marwari community, lowering them in the estimate of the public or their reputation is lowered in the Society. But we do not find any allegation made in the complaint. Accordingly, we hold that the complaint filed in the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class in Court NO. 4, at Pune does not contain any of the allegations so as to constitute the offence of defamation defined in Section 499 and punishable under Section 500 of IPC.”

    18. In the instant case, the concentration of the Respondent was only in narrating her standing in the Society and about her respectability, but there is no averment either in the complaint or in the sworn statement that as a result of the imputation, the prestige, image and reputation of the Respondent has been lowered in the estimation of the public. In the absence of such averment in the complaint with reference to the fact of the reputation of the Petitioner having been lowered down in the estimation of others, it cannot be said that sufficient ground is made out for proceeding further by taking cognizance of the complaint. On the said ground also, the complaint stands unsustainable.

    19. The last submission made by the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner is that mere communication of defamatory matter directly to the person defamed is not publication within the meaning of Section 499 of IPC. In other words, the defamatory matter must be published, that is communicated to some other person other than the person concerned to whom it is addressed. The learned senior counsel relied on a decision of this court rendered in the case of Mis. Violet Wapshare v. Miss Maureen Fround [1970-Mad-LW-Crl-4), wherein it is held as under:-

    “Mere communication of defamatory matter merely to the person defamed is not publication within the meaning of Section 499 of IPC. In other words, the defamatory matter must be published, that is communicated, to some person other than the person concerned to whom it is addressed. The word ‘publish’ in Section 499 of IPC is used in its etymological sense as connoting “to make public” or “to make known to people in general”. Since “publication” implies communication to the public or the people, it follows that it is not publication if the libeler merely communicate his libel to the person defamed. Such communications may amount to an insult and be punishable as such, but it is not publication for which he could be held liable under Section 499 of IPC. Further, publication to constitute defamation should be made with the intention to defame some person.”

    20. In the instant case, in the complaint the Respondent has not given the names of those persons, who were present at the time when the said defamatory word had been uttered by the Petitioner. In the absence of any such reference to any person present at that time, it cannot be said that the publication was made within the meaning of Section 499 of IPC. Even while considering as to whether the word uttered by the Respondent would amount to defamation, I am unable to hold that the same was uttered with any intention on the part of the Petitioner to harm or defame the complainant.

    21. In the case of S. Seetharama Iyer v. K.C Ramulu alias Ramanathan [1972-LW-Crl-226], this court has held thus:-

    “On the facts, that the words uttered are only vulgar without any intention on the part of the Petitioners accused herein to harm or defame the complainant Respondent. From the complaint it was clear that there was no intention to harm, and there was also no knowledge to the Petitioners that such imputation will harm the reputation of the Respondent in any sense. Considering that the words uttered can at best amount to only vulgar abuses, no offence under Section 499 of IPC which is punishable under Section 500 of the same has been made out against the Petitioners herein.”

    22. For the reasons aforesaid, viewed at any angle, I am unable to find any sufficient and valid ground to sustain the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate of the offence under Section 500 of IPC against the Petitioner. Hence, the impugned complaint deserves to be quashed and accordingly, it is quashed and this Criminal Original Petition is allowed. Consequently, the connected MP is closed.

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    Renuka Iswariah Petitioner v. Cynthia Dulipsingh
    (Jul 23, 2009)