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  • Section 151 of C.P.C, nor Article 227 of the Constitution of India
  • provision in Section 55(1) and (2) of Muslim Wakfs Act (1954).
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.I
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • General Acts under Section 92, C.P.C,
  • SECTION 92 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 92, C.P.C:A(i)
  • Section 92 of C.P.C,
  • Section 92, C.P.C
  • Order 7, Rule 11
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citation codes
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  • Section 151 of C.P.C, nor Article 227 of the Constitution of India
  • provision in Section 55(1) and (2) of Muslim Wakfs Act (1954).
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.I
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • General Acts under Section 92, C.P.C,
  • SECTION 92 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 92, C.P.C:A(i)
  • Section 92 of C.P.C,
  • Section 92, C.P.C
  • Order 7, Rule 11
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Civil Revision Petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the Order dated 06.07.2007 in I.A. No. 173 of 2006 in C.F.R. No. 917 of 2005 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Dharapuram. The petitioners are the defendants 1 to 3 in C.F.R. No. 917 of 2005; the respondents (particularly respondents 1 and 2) had filed C.F.R. No. 917 of 2005 under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking leave to institute a suit concerning property said to belong to the Eragampatty Sri Venkateswara Perumal Temple. The plaint sought multiple reliefs (a)–(i), including declaration of temple ownership of certain items, cancellation of a trust deed, declarations about use of certain titles/words, injunctions and delivery of temple property.

In the affidavit supporting C.F.R. No. 917 of 2005, respondents 1 & 2 asserted that the property was purchased out of temple funds and therefore belonged to the temple; they sought leave under Section 92 to institute a suit. The Trial Court, by order dated 16.07.2007, allowed the application for leave and the suit was subsequently numbered O.S. No. 80 of 2007. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present Civil Revision Petition under Article 227. The High Court granted interim stay on 21.02.2008 and proceeded to final hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable against an order of a Trial Court granting leave to institute a suit under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code?
  2. Whether the Trial Court committed illegality by granting leave under Section 92 of the C.P.C. in the present case (the petitioners contended that the suit was for private/individual rights rather than for protection of the public trust)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioners') Arguments

  • The petitioners argued that courts must ensure Section 92 is not used to institute suits against public trusts by persons acting for private or personal interests rather than for protection of the public trust's interest.
  • They contended that respondents 1 and 2 had filed the suit to vindicate individual and personal rights, not public rights, and therefore the Trial Court committed illegality in granting leave.
  • In support, petitioners relied on the decision in Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad, R. & others (2008 (3) CTC 868 (SC): 2008 (2) LW 724) to urge caution when granting leave under Section 92.

Respondents' (Caveators') Arguments

  • The respondents raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the Civil Revision under Article 227 against an order granting leave under Section 92, arguing that an application for leave under Section 92 is administrative in nature.
  • The respondents submitted that because the Section 92 application is administrative, the remedy is to approach the Trial Court (which granted the leave) with necessary documents to seek revocation of leave rather than to file a revision under Article 227. They relied on this Court's decisions including R. Kannan Adityan & 4 others v. B.S Adityan and six others (1996 (2) LW 364) and G.R. Govindarajulu & Sons Charities v. R. Sethurao (1998 (2) CTC 65: 1998 (2) LW 773).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad, R. & others (2008 (3) CTC 868 (SC); 2008 (2) LW 724) Courts must be careful to prevent suits under Section 92 being filed by persons whose activities are not for protection of the public trust. Cited by petitioners to challenge grant of leave; Court held that this decision does not authorise a conclusion that a revision under Article 227 is maintainable against an order granting leave under Section 92.
R. Kannan Adityan & 4 others v. B.S Adityan and six others (1996 (2) LW 364) Held that a proceeding under Section 92 C.P.C. is administrative in character and neither judicial nor quasi-judicial; an order granting leave is administrative. Relied upon by the Court as an authoritative High Court Bench decision supporting the administrative nature of Section 92 proceedings and the non-maintainability of revision under Article 227.
Abu Backer v. Advocate General (AIR 1954 Travancore-Cochin 331) Earlier case holding proceedings before Advocate General were quasi-judicial (referenced in historical survey). Not applied as controlling; cited as part of historical jurisprudence tracing earlier divergent views; Court noted later authorities rejected this view.
Sadhu Singh v. Mangal Gir Mohatmin (Pepsu High Court) Referenced as one of the early cases taking the view that proceedings were quasi-judicial. Used in the historical exposition to show divergence of early case law; not applied to change the Court's conclusion.
Shanthanand v. Advocate General (AIR 1955 Allahabad 372) Another early case treating proceedings as quasi-judicial (historical reference). Cited in the survey of authorities; the Court treated it as part of earlier views subsequently questioned or departed from.
Raju v. Advocate General (AIR 1962 Madras; 1962 LW 240) Case cited in the discussion about the nature of proceedings before Advocate General. Referenced in the historic analysis of authorities on administrative vs judicial character of Section 92 related proceedings.
Abdul Kasim v. Md. Dawood (AIR 1961 Madras 244; 1960 LW 649) Held decision to permit another to file suit (sanction) is administrative and outside the purview of writ certiorari. Used as authority for the administrative characterization of sanction/leave decisions.
Desraj v. Dy. Commissioner (AIR 1962 J & K 86) Another early authority referenced in the historical survey of the nature of such proceedings. Cited as part of the case-law background.
A.K. Bhaskar … v. Advocate General … (AIR 1962 Kerala 90, Full Bench) Full Bench held proceedings before Advocate General were administrative and not judicial/quasi-judicial; absence of notice to trust did not invalidate consent. Noted in the jurisprudential history; Court observed subsequent divergent Full Bench decisions on maintainability under Article 226.
R.M. Narayan Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar (AIR 1991 SC 221; 1990 (2) LW 468) Supreme Court held notice to defendants is not mandatory before granting leave under Section 92, but as a rule of caution courts should normally give notice; absence of reasons does not make leave invalid; remedy is revocation. Relied upon by the Court to support the proposition that leave granted without notice or reasons is not necessarily invalid and that remedy lies in applying for revocation of leave in the trial court.
Shav v. Masood Hasain (AIR 1965 A.P. 143) Cited in the historical exposition concerning notice to defendants and the nature of the proceedings. Used as part of background materials demonstrating earlier decisions on notice; not applied as altering the Court's conclusion.
New College v. Basheer Mohammed (1979 (1) MLJ 145) Division Bench held an order granting leave under Section 92 is a "judgment" under Letters Patent clause 15 because it determines the plaintiffs' right to get leave. Court observed this decision runs counter to the Supreme Court's test in Shah Babulal Mhimji and therefore cannot be regarded as good law for the proposition that such orders are judgments for Letters Patent purposes.
Shah Babulal Mhimji v. Jayaben (AIR 1981 SC 1786; 1981 LW 91 S.N.) Supreme Court test that only orders deciding matters of moment or affecting vital/valuable rights are "judgments" under the Letters Patent clause. Relied upon to critique New College's view that Section 92 leave orders are Letters Patent judgments; Court preferred the Supreme Court's narrower test.
Prithipal Sing v. Mah Singh (AIR 1982 P & H 137) Held order granting leave is administrative and reasons need not be given; notice not necessary. Cited as one of the authorities supporting administrative characterization and lack of mandatory notice/reasons in leave orders.
Lachman Dass v. Ranjit Singh (AIR 1987 P & H 108) Affirmed that orders granting leave are administrative in nature and notice not required. Included in the body of supporting authorities summarized by the Court.
T.M. Shanmugam v. Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution (AIR 1985 Madras 93; 1984 LW 480) Held that leave granted under Section 92 without notice to proposed defendants is void and subsequent actions are unsustainable (decision later considered impliedly overruled by R.M. Narayan Chettiar). Cited as a view that was later considered to have been impliedly overruled by higher authority; Court referenced it in discussing the need for caution but not as prevailing law.
Ambrish Kumar Singh v. Raja Abhushan Bran Bramhisha (AIR 1989 Allahabad 194) Held giving notice to proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92 is not contemplated; courts normally do not give notice. Cited in the discussion that notice is not a statutory requirement though it may be prudent.
Mayer Simon Parur v. Advocate General (AIR 1975 Kerala 57) Considered maintainability under Article 226 and the nature of proceedings before the Advocate General; held that administrative orders declining to grant leave could be questioned under Article 226 when leave is refused. Referenced in the historical overview of conflicting Full Bench decisions regarding writ jurisdiction; used to illustrate nuanced approaches in earlier authorities.
G.R. Govindarajulu & Sons Charities v. R. Sethurao (1998 (2) CTC 65; 1998 (2) LW 773) Held that a revision under Article 227 against an order granting leave under Section 92 is not maintainable; leave granting is administrative and revocation should be sought in the same Court. Specifically relied upon by the High Court as a decisive precedent that the present Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 is not maintainable.
Tirupattur Nagarathu Vysiyargal Sangam v. Tirupattyr Periyakulam Nandavanam Inam Land Tenants Association (1198 (1) MLJ 303) Held that leave granted even without hearing the proposed defendant is not justifiable under Section 115 of the CPC (as cited). Referred to as part of the case-law survey showing differing judicial views; used to explain the context though not decisive for the Court's ultimate conclusion.
Raju Pillai and 4 others v. V.P. Paramasivam and 7 others (1995 (1) LW 518) Held that a revision under Section 115 or Article 227 is not maintainable challenging an order granting leave under Section 92. Cited by the Court in support of its conclusion that revisional remedies under Article 227 are not appropriate against Section 92 leave orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first considered the preliminary objection raised by respondents that the Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 was not maintainable against an order granting leave under Section 92 C.P.C. The Court conducted a detailed review of relevant authorities, tracing earlier divergent views on whether proceedings for sanction/leave (historically before the Advocate General and now before the Court under Section 92) were judicial/quasi-judicial or merely administrative.

Key elements of the Court's analysis (as articulated in the opinion):

  • The Court accepted the principle from R. Kannan Adityan and related authorities that a proceeding under Section 92 is administrative in character and not judicial or quasi-judicial. The order granting leave is administrative—its function is to satisfy whether the applicants have an interest in the trust, whether the trust is a public trust specified in the Section, and whether there are prima facie grounds for thinking there has been breach of trust.
  • The Court reviewed the jurisprudence on notice and reasons: it acknowledged the Supreme Court's decision in R.M. Narayan Chettiar that notice to proposed defendants is not a statutory requirement before granting leave and that, as a rule of caution, courts should normally give notice; absence of reasons or notice does not automatically invalidate leave but revocation may be sought at the trial court level.
  • The Court considered the decision in G.R. Govindarajulu and similar rulings which categorically held that a revision under Article 227 is not maintainable against orders granting leave to institute a suit under Section 92. Those authorities were treated as controlling for the proposition that the appropriate remedy for contesting the grant of leave is to apply in the trial court for revocation of leave on the basis of relevant materials, not to file an Article 227 revision.
  • The Court addressed the petitioners' reliance on Vidyodaya Trust, observing that while that decision calls for caution to prevent misuse of Section 92 by persons not acting for the protection of public trusts, it does not by itself make Article 227 revision maintainable against an order granting leave under Section 92.
  • On balance, taking into account the High Court and Supreme Court authorities surveyed, the Court concluded that the present Civil Revision Petition was not maintainable and that the petitioners had an alternate remedy to approach the same Trial Court (which had granted leave) for revocation on proper materials.

The Court therefore did not proceed to re-evaluate the merits of the Trial Court's decision to grant leave on a full evidentiary basis, but disposed the petition on the threshold ground of non-maintainability of the revision under Article 227.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 challenging the order granting leave under Section 92 of the C.P.C. was dismissed. The Court also dismissed the connected M.P. No. 1 of 2008 and awarded no costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Trial Court's order granting leave to institute the suit (I.A. No. 173 of 2006 in C.F.R. No. 917 of 2005) remains intact; the suit proceeded as O.S. No. 80 of 2007. The petitioners' remedy is to approach the Trial Court which granted the leave to seek revocation of the leave on the basis of supporting documents and materials.
  • Broader precedent: The Court relied on and followed existing High Court and Supreme Court authorities treating leave under Section 92 as an administrative function and reaffirmed that a revision under Article 227 is not the appropriate remedy against an order granting leave. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the precedents it applies; it rather applies and re-affirms the line of authorities that place the appropriate remedy at the trial court stage (revocation) rather than by Article 227 revision.

    Anikadavu Madamanai Lathekarar, Kulam Sri Venkatesa Perumal Thirukovil Arakkattalai, Rep. By Its President, R. Venkudusamy And 2 Others Petitioners v. K. Thandapani And 5 Others S

    Prayer: This Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the Order dated 06.07.2007 in I.A No. 173 of 2006 in C.F.R No. 917 of 2005 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Dharapuram.

    JUDGMENT

    1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioners herein/defendants 1 to 3 in C.F.R No. 917 of 2005 to set aside the Order dated 06.07.2007 in I.A No. 173 of 2006 in C.F.R No. 917 of 2005 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Dharapuram.

    2. The respondents 1 to 3 in C.F.R No. 917 of 2005 are the revision petitioners before this Court. C.F.R No. 917 of 2005 has been filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein under Section 92 of C.P.C, to grant leave to institute suit. The prayer in the Suit reads as under:

    (a) Declaring that the item I of the suit property purchased in the name of the first and second defendant belongs to Sri Venkatesa Perumal temple Eragampatty and for delivery possession of the item I of the suit property to the 5th defendant for the benefit of the Sri Venkatesa Perumal Temple Eragampatty.

    (b) Declaring that the Trust deed created under Document No. 778 of 2004 in the name of the Anikadavu Madamanai Lathekarar Kulam Sri Venkatesa Perumal temple Thirukovil, Arakkattalai is null and void and cancel the same.

    (c) Declaring that the titles namely: (i) Mookan Chettiar (ii) Karunagi Chettiar (iii) Chinnan Chettiar (iv) Jamedarar (v) Rama Banam (vi) Kattiyakarar (vii) Arputha Dasar should be used only by the present holders of the title of the Eragampattu Sri Venkatesa Perumal temple.

    (d) Declaring that the word ‘Anikadavu Madamanai’ or ‘Anikadavu Madamanai Lathekarar Kulam’ or ‘Anikadavu Madamanai Lathekararkulam Devangar vamsam’, ‘Agasthia magarisi Kotram’, Arupathu Annan Thambimargal belong to Sri Venkatesa Perumal temple Thirukovil, Eragampattu and that the words can be used only by the worshippers of the Eragampatty Sri Venkatesa Perumal temple Thirukovil.

    (e) Granting a permanent injunction restraining any person from using the tiles mentioned in the relief (d) who is unconnected with Eragampatty Sri Venkatesa Perumal Temple.

    (f) Granting a permanent injunction restraining any person or community member to use the word ‘Anikadavu Madamanai Lathekarar Kulam’ or word ‘Anikadavu Madamanai Lathekararkulam Devangar vamsam’, ‘Agasthia magarisi Kotram’, Arupathu Annan Thambimargal' other than the community members worshipping Sri Venkatesa Perumal temple Thirukovil, at Eragampatty.

    (g) Granting a permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 4 or their men, agents assignsm successors in interest, etc. from selling or alienating the suit property which was purchased out of the funds of the Sri Venkatesa Perumal temple Eragampatty.

    (h) Directing the 3rd defendant to deliver possession of Panchalokha Virgrahams of Sri Venkatesa Perumal temple Thirukovil, Sridevi, Bhudevi, Silver Jadari, Silver Kalasa Pathram Bell, Sangu, Segandi and other Pooja materials described in item 2 of the property to the 6th defendant.

    (i) Directing the 4th defendant to deliver possession of Sembu Pattayam of the Sri Venkatesa Perumal temple Thirukovil, Eragampatty described as item 3 of suit property to 5th defendant and grant such other relief as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case and render justice.

    3. In the affidavit filed in support of C.F.R No. 917 of 2005, the respondents 1 & 2 herein have stated that the first respondent, as a title holder of Sri Venkatesa Samy Temple and the second respondent herein, as also a title holder namely Karungaiya Chettiar filed the Suit for the various reliefs claimed in the plaint. Since, the property involved belongs to a temple and a Trust Deed has been executed purporting to act for the temple, it has become necessary to file the present Suit for the various reliefs. The property purchased under the Sale deed dated 18.11.2004 belongs to the Eragampatty Sri Venkateswara Perumal Temple, as it was purchased out of the funds of the temple and it actually belongs to the temple. Since there is a dispute regarding the same, they filed C.F.R No. 917 of 2005 under Section 92 of C.P.C, to obtain leave of the court for instituting the Suit. This was opposed by the first petitioner herein by filing a counter affidavit. The Trial Court, by order dated 16.07.2007, allowed the Application filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein and thereby granted leave to institute the Suit and consequently the Suit was numbered as O.S No. 80 of 2007. Aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court, dated 16.07.2007, the above Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

    4. This Court, on 21.02.2008, granted interim stay and posted the matter for final hearing.

    5. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 (Caveators). I have also gone through the documents and judgments filed in support of their submissions.

    6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners submits that Courts have to be careful to eliminate the possibility of a suit being filed against a Public Trust under Section 92 of C.P.C, by persons whose activities were not for protection of the interest of the Public Trust. In the present case, according to the learned counsel, the respondents 1 and 2 have filed the suit not for public rights, but for the vindication of individual and personal rights. Hence, the Trial Court has committed an illegality in granting leave to institute the Suit. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad, R. & others, 2008 (3) CTC 868 (SC): 2008 (2) LW 724.

    7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 raised a preliminary objection as to the very maintainability of the Revision itself, against an order granting leave to institute a Suit against a Public Trust under Section 92 of C.P.C According to the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2, the Application under Section 92 of C.P.C, for grant of leave, is administrative in nature and therefore, it is always open to the other side to approach the Trial Court itself with necessary documents, to revoke the leave and therefore, the Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. He relied on a decision of this Court reported in R. Kannan Adityan & 4 others v. B.S Adityan and six others, 1996 (2) LW 364 and another decision in G.R Govindarajulu and sons Charities, Coimbatore and 2 others v. R. Sethurao and 12 others, 1998 (2) CTC 65: 1998 (2) LW 773.

    8. I have considered the rival submissions carefully with regard to facts and citations.

    9. Before deciding the issue whether the Trial Court has correctly granted leave, which is under challenge, let me consider the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 as to the maintainability of the Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

    10. In R. Kannan Adityan & 4 others v. B.S Adityan and six others, 1996 (2) LW 364, a Division Bench of this Court held that a proceeding under Section 92 of C.P.C, is administrative in character and it is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. The relevant portion reads as under.

    “Before considering the validity of the respective contentions, it is necessary for us to advert to the general principles governing an Application for leave under Section 92, C.P.C:

    A(i) A proceeding under Section 92, C.P.C is administrative in character and neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. An order granting leave does not affect the rights of any party, though an order refusing to grant leave may affect the rights of the persons who seek such leave. In any event, the nature of the proceedings is only administrative. In Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edition, Volume I, at pages 634 and 635, the following passage occurs:

    “Nature of the order granting leave by the Court − Under the Section as it stood before is recent amendment and when what was required was the consent of the Advocate General, there was some divergence of opinion on the question whether the proceedings for consent before the Advocate General were quasi-judicial in character, and if they were, whether they were open to challenge in Writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Abu Backer v. Advocate General, AIR 1954 Travancore-Cochin 331, the High Court of Travancore Cochin held that such proceedings were quasi-judicial and that view was shared by the Pepsu High Court in Sadhu Singh v. Mangal Gir Mohatmin, AIR 1955 Raj 166; Allahabad in Shanthanand v. Advocate General, AIR 1955 Allahabad 372; Madras in Raju v. Advocate General, AIR 1962 Madras: 1962 LW 240 and in Abdul Kasim v. Mohd Dawood, AIR 1961 Madras 244: 1960 LW 649; and Jammu and Kashmir in Desraj v. Dy. Commissioner, Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1962 J & K 86. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court later on reconsidered the position and held reversing Abu Backer's case (supra) that the proceedings before the Advocate General were only administrative (A.K Bhaskar… v. Advocate General…., AIR 1962 Kerala 90 F.B). Further, it has also been held that the function of the Advocate General not being a judicial one, notice by him to the trust or its trustees was not obligatory and that the absence of such notice did not invalidate the consent given by him. All that was required of him at that stage was to satisfy himself that it was worthwhile to institute the Suit Shav v. Masood Hasain, AIR 1965 A.P 143. Notice to the defendants before granting leave is not mandatory. The Supreme Court new so held. Although as a rule of caution, such notice should be given, leave granted without notice is not bad in law. The proposed defendants can always apply for revocation of leave already granted. R.M Narayan Chettiar v. Lakshmanan Chettiar, AIR 1991 SC 221: 1990 (2) LW 468. The mere fact that the amended section now requires leave of the Court in place of consent by the Advocate General does not seem to change the nature of the order of leave made by the Court. In making such an order the Court, like the Advocate General earlier, would no doubt have to apply its mind but that is only to satisfy itself whether the persons asking leave have interest in the trust, whether the trust is a public trust specified in the Section and whether there are prima facie grounds for thinking that there has been a breach of the trust. At that stage the Court would not have before it all the parties to the proposed Suit nor the evidence from which it would called upon to adjudicate any issue. All that it would have to see in whether it is in the interest of the trust to file the Suit for which leave is sought”

    We are entirely in agreement with the view expressed by the learned author that the amendment of the Code in 1976 requiring leave of the Court in place of consent by the Advocate General does not change the nature of the other.

    (ii) In Abdhul Kasim v. Md. Dawood, AIR 1961 Madras 244: 1960 LW 6490, a learned Single Judge of this Court had to consider a similar provision in Section 55(1) and (2) of Muslim Wakfs Act (1954). After referring to the earlier ruling under Section 92, C.P.C, the learned Judge held that the decision of the Board to file or not to file a Suit itself, or to sanction or withhold sanction to another person to file a Suit is not equivalent to a judicial or quasi judicial decision affecting the rights of parties and the decision to permit another to file Suit is an administrative act and is outside the purview of correction by the issue of a Writ certiorari.

    (iii) Another learned Judge of this Court in Raju v. Advocate General, H.C Buildings, AIR 1962 Madras 320: 1962 LW 240 held that a Writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of the Advocate General on a sanction application is not maintainable. He dissented from the view expressed in Abu Backer v. Advocate General, AIR 1954 Travancore-Cochin 331. The learned Judge held that the nature of the proceeding was only administrative.

    (iv) A Full Bench of Kerala High Court in A.K Bhaskar… v. Advocate General…., AIR 1962 Kerala 90 over-ruled the above decision of the Travancore Cochin High Court in Abu Backer's case, AIR 1954 Travancore-Cochin 331 and held that when the Advocate General Acts under Section 92, C.P.C, it is neither judicial nor a quasi judicial order as it does not decide anybody's right, though it may be proper for him to issue notice to the proposed defendants and hear their view-point also. It was held that the order passed by the Advocate General giving or refusing sanction cannot be judicially reviewed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    (v) In Mayer Simon Parur v. Advocate General, AIR 1975 Kerala 57, a larger Bench considered the question once again and overruled the decision of the earlier Full Bench in A.K Bhaskar's case, AIR 1962 Kerala 90, in so far as in negatived the maintainability of a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the Full Bench accepted the view that the proceeding before the Advocate General was administrative in character. After considering all the relevant rulings on the question, the Full Bench negatived the contention that the Advocate General was performing a judicial or quasi judicial act. But, even as an administrative order, the Full Bench held that it was liable to be questioned under Article 226 of the Constitution, when it declined to grant leave.

    (vi) In New College v. Basheer Mohammed, 1979 (1) MLJ 145, a Division Bench of this court held that an order granting leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters patent. The Bench took the view that the order, though preliminary or interlocutory in nature, definitely determines some right or liability of the parties to the Suit and once for all decides the right of the plaintiffs to get the leave under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code and negatives the contention of the opposite party that leave should not be granted and, therefore, it is a judgment. The Bench did not consider the question whether the order under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, is administrative in nature. In our view, the decision of the Bench runs counter to the dictum of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Mhimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 1786: 1981 LW 91 S.N, wherein the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, only those orders will be judgments which decides matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. If the test prescribed by the Supreme Court is applied, the ruling of the Division Bench in New College v. Basheer Mohammed, 1979 (1) MLJ 145 cannot be considered to be good law.

    (vii) In Prithipal Sing v. Mah Singh, AIR 1982 P & H 137, a learned Single Judge of that Court held that order granting leave is administrative in nature and reasons need not be given in that order. The same proposition was reiterated by a Division Bench of that Court in Lachman Dass v. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1987 P & H 108. The Division Bench also held that no notice was necessary to the defendants before granting leave.

    (viii) In T.M Shanmugam v. Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution, AIR 1985 Madras 93: 1984 LW 480, a learned Single Judge of this Court relying upon the judgment of the Division Bench in New College case, 1979 (1) MLJ 145 held that if leave is granted under Section 92, C.P.C, without ordering notice to the defendants, the same is void in law and further action in pursuance of such order, namely, entertaining and numbering of Suit, is unsustainable in law. This judgment is considered to have been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in R.M Narayan Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar, AIR 1991 SC 221: 1990 (2) LW 468, to which we are going to refer in detail a little later.

    (ix) In Ambrish Kumar Singh v. Raja Abhushan Bran Bramhisha, AIR 1989 Allahabad 194, it was held that giving notice to proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92, C.P.C, is not contemplated, as the Court is not deciding the rights of parties but merely sees whether prima facie case for granting leave is made out.

    (x) While upholding the principle that notice to defendants before granting leave is not necessary as a rule of law, the Supreme Court held in S.R.M Narayanan Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanna Chettiar, AIR 1991 SC 221: 1990 (2) LW 468 that as a rule of caution, the Court should normally give notice to the defendants before granting leave under the said Section to institute a Suit. The Court observed that the defendants could bring to the notice of the Court, for instance that the allegations made in the plaint are frivolous or reckless and that in a give case, they could point out that the persons who are applying for leave are doing so merely with a view to harass the trust or have such antecedents that it would be undesirable to grant leave to such persons. The Court hastened to add that the desirability of the issue of such notice being given to the defendants cannot be regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under Section 92 can be granted, as that would lead to unnecessary delay and, in a given case, cause considerable loss to the public trust.”

    11. In G.R Govindarajulu and G.R. Govindarajulu & Sons Charities v. R. Sethurao, 1998 (2) CTC 65: 1998 (2) LW 773, a learned Judge of this Court has categorically held that a revision petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order granting leave to institute the Suit against Public Trust, under Section 92 of C.P.C, is not maintainable. The learned Judge further held that granting of leave by a Court under Section 92 C.P.C, is an administrative function and therefore, neither Section 151 of C.P.C, nor Article 227 of the Constitution of India Could be invoked against an order granting leave by a person aggrieved against that order. The learned Judge has further concluded that it is always open to the other side to approach the same Court which granted the leave to revoke the same by producing necessary documents and relevant materials. The relevant portion reads as under:

    “In a Bench decision of this Court in R. Kannan Adityan and four others v. B.S Adityan and six others, 1996 (2) LW 364 the scope of an order under Section 92 of the CPC, was considered in detail. In para 19 of the judgment their Lordships held thus: “A proceeding under Section 92, C.P.C is administrative in character and neither judicial nor quasi judicial. An order granting leave does not affect the rights of any party, though on order refusing to grant leave may affect the rights of persons who seek such leave. In any event, the nature of the proceedings is only administrative.” Their Lordships observed that originally, before 1976 it was the view of the Court that with the permission of Advocate General a Suit could be instituted. It is the duty of Advocate General that has now been delegated to the Court for the reason that the Advocate General will have no sufficient time to enquire into such allegations and therefore, it is better that portion of their duties as Advocate General be delegated to Court. The effect of such a relief is that instead of Advocate General filing a Suit, two or more persons took the responsibility of the Advocate General and filed a Suit against the public trust.

    Thereafter, the Division Bench considered various decisions of various High Courts and also Supreme Court and held that even the provision under Section 141 of the C.P.C, will have no Application in such cases. The Division Bench has considered the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court which directed the rejection of the leave Application. The learned Judge has held that the Application for leave is not maintainable and directed to reject the same. The same was challenged by the respondents in that case. The Division Bench held that Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P.C, will also have no application in such cases. Reading of the Bench decision makes it clear that even though the proceedings are before the Court, it is purely administrative in character i.e, it only considers whether the leave should be granted for instituting the Suit or not. The Code of Civil Procedure will apply only when a Suit is properly instituted. To grant leave is a step or a condition precedent for filing a properly instituted Suit.

    In a recent decision of our High Court in Tirupattur Nagarathu Vysiyargal Sangam v. Tirupattyr Periyakulam Nandavanam Inam Land Tenants Association, 1198 (1) MLJ 303, Their Lordships held that the leave granted even without hearing the proposed defendant is not justifiable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    I also had an occasion to consider a similar question in Raju Pillai and 4 others v. V.P Paramasivam and 7 others, 1995 (1) LW 518, wherein I have held that a Revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or a Revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable.

    In this Connection, it is worthwhile to note that in all these decisions cited supra reference is made to the decision of Supreme Court in R.M Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmana Chettiar, AIR 1991 SC 221: 1190 (2) LW 468. Their Lordships, in para 17 of the judgment have held that the grant of leave is a condition precedent against a public trust. Their Lordships further said that merely because notices were not given to the proposed defendants before the grant of leave, the leave granted will not become invalid or void. Likewise if no reasons in the order is given, that will not make the leave invalid and there is remedy in such cases. Their Lordships also held that grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or even seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed defendants because it is always open to them to file an Application for revocation of the leave which can be considered on merits and according to law.

    Considering the case law, it cannot be doubted that this Revision is not maintainable. The petitioners submitted that they have already filed an objection before the Court had contested the Application that the same should not be granted. Learned counsel apprehended that if there is already an order against them, it would prevent them from filing an Application for revoking the leave.

    Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that if there is no Application of mind, remedy is open under Article 227 of the Constitution. In my view, if that principle is applied to the Application for a leave to institute a Suit, I feel that the non-application of mind will be a ground to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution only if the leave to institute the Suit is refused. Now, it is governed by Section 104 of the C.P.C, where such orders are made appealable.

    Granting of leave, though being exercised by the Court, it is not by a Court of law in the sense that the Court is discharging its administrative function and not the judicial or quasi-judicial one. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure also may not have any application. Learned counsel submitted that if that Section will also not apply, then their grievance can never be redressed and they have no alternative remedy. I do not think that such a contention could also be accepted.

    In view of the declaration of law by this Court and the Supreme Court, leave alone is granted. After granting of leave, a Suit is instituted. Thereafter the Court functions as a Court of law. At that time, the petitioners or any persons, who are also likely to be impleaded can very well bring to the notice of the Court that the leave was granted without taking into consideration the relevant materials or that the principles settled for granting leave were not followed, etc. and can apply to have the leave revoked. That power is given to the Court of law.”

    12. It is true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad, R. & others, 2008 (3) CTC 868 (SC): 2008 (2) LW 724 held that Courts have to be careful to eliminate the possibility of a Suit being filed against a Public Trust under Section 92 by persons whose activities were not for the protection of the interest of the public Trust. But, this decision is not an authority to hold that a Revision is maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order of the Court granting leave to institute a Suit under Section 92 of C.P.C In the light of the categorical pronouncement of this Court reported in G.R Govindarajulu and G.R. Govindarajulu & Sons Charities v. R. Sethurao, 1998 (2) CTC 65: 1998 (2) LW 773 that no Revision could be maintained under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order granting leave to institute Suit against Public Trust under Section 92 of C.P.C, I have no hesitation to hold that the present Civil Revision Petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable and it is always open to them to approach the Trial Court itself by filing necessary Application for revoking the leave on the basis of acceptable documents and materials.

    13. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected M.P No. 1 of 2008 is also dismissed.

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