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  • Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (Act XX of 1863) and in Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908)
  • provisions of the Muslim Wakfs Act (Act XXIX of 1954).
  • Section 539 C.P.C. of 1882,
  • Section 92 C. P. C. of 1908,
  • Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954,
  • Section 92 C.P.C.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (Act XX of 1863) and in Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908)
  • provisions of the Muslim Wakfs Act (Act XXIX of 1954).
  • Section 539 C.P.C. of 1882,
  • Section 92 C. P. C. of 1908,
  • Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954,
  • Section 92 C.P.C.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Annural Muhammadeeya Madarsa Trust was administered under a Scheme sanctioned by the High Court by decree dated 16-4-1956 in A.S. No. 235 of 1952, which provided for six trustees. The three petitioners and respondents 8, 9 and 10 were trustees appointed under that Scheme. The trust constituted a wakf now governed by the provisions of the Muslim Wakfs Act (Act XXIX of 1954).

Respondents 1 to 7 sought and obtained sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 92 C.P.C. to file a suit to amend the Scheme; that sanction was accorded on 9-12-1959 after the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954, had come into force. Section 55 of the Muslim Wakfs Act contains provisions authorising the Wakf Board to institute suits in relation to wakfs and requires the Board's written consent before any person or authority other than the Board may institute such suits.

Respondents 1 to 7 applied to the Board constituted under the Act (impleaded as 11th respondent) for consent under Section 55(2). The 8th respondent (M.S. Abdul Majid) was both a trustee under the Scheme and a member of the Wakf Board. Notice of the application was given to the trustees, including the petitioners, who opposed the grant of the sanction.

The Board heard the matter on multiple dates. On 19-12-1959 the 8th respondent, as a Board member, participated and proceedings were adjourned to enable the petitioners to file a counter-statement. On 16-1-1960 and 30-1-1960 the Board enquired into the petition; the 8th respondent did not participate on those dates, though the petitioners alleged he was present in the same room behind a screen and that some members met and spoke with him. On 1-2-1960 the petitioners challenged the validity of the Board proceedings on the ground of the 8th respondent's participation. On 27-2-1960 the Board granted the sanction sought by respondents 1 to 7 by a written order signed by nine members of the Board (the 8th respondent was not a signatory).

The petitioners applied under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the Board's order dated 27-2-1960 granting consent under Section 55(2).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the consent or sanction accorded by the Wakf Board under Section 55(2) of the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954, is an administrative act outside the scope of judicial review by writ of certiorari, or whether the Board acts as a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal when deciding whether to accord such consent.
  2. Whether the sanction accorded by the Advocate-General under Section 92 C.P.C. is amenable to correction by writ of certiorari (noting that other courts have taken conflicting views on this point).
  3. Whether the Board's proceedings in this case were vitiated by alleged participation or presence of a trustee (the 8th respondent) such that the principles against a person being a judge in his own case (nemo judex in causa sua) were violated (this issue was raised by the petitioners, though the Court declined to decide it after disposing of the preliminary objection).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The 8th respondent's participation in the Board's proceedings invalidated the proceedings and the sanction; the Board violated the principle that no one should be a judge in his own case (coram non judice).
  • The 2nd respondent's presence on the premises and in the same room on 16-1-1960, 30-1-1960 and 1-2-1960, with other members of the Board having access to him, vitiated the ultimate decision of the Board.
  • The Board took into account an irrelevant factor when granting sanction — namely, the prior sanction already accorded by the Advocate-General under Section 92 C.P.C.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The application for certiorari was not maintainable because the consent or sanction accorded by the Board under Section 55(2) of the Act is purely an administrative act and therefore outside the scope of correction by the issue of a writ of certiorari.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dhian Das v. Jagatram, 8 Ind Cas 1160 (Lah) Held that sanction accorded by the Collector under Section 539 C.P.C. (1882) was an executive/administrative order outside revisional jurisdiction of the Chief Court. Referred to as an authority supporting the proposition that certain statutory sanctions are administrative in character.
Abu Backer v. Advocate-General, Trav Co. State, AIR 1954 Trav-Co. 331 Held the decision which the Advocate-General arrives at under Section 92 C.P.C. was quasi-judicial in scope and capable of correction by certiorari. Cited as an opposing view; the Court acknowledged this decision but ultimately preferred the contrary view of other High Courts in the present case.
Shrimati Lal Kasliwal v. Advocate-General, (S) AIR 1955 Raj 166 Observed that the Advocate-General's function under Section 92 is administrative (prima facie satisfaction is sufficient) and not judicial or quasi-judicial; therefore not subject to Art.227 revision or Art.226 writ. Relied upon and extended by the Court: the Court preferred this principle over the Travancore Cochin view and applied it in concluding Section 55(2) consent is administrative.
Shantanand v. Advocate-General U.P. (Allahabad High Court) Expressed a view similar to the Rajasthan High Court, distinguishing administrative/executive acts from judicial/quasi-judicial acts with respect to Section 92. Noted as a contrary authority to the Travancore Cochin decision; the Court aligned with this view in preferring the administrative characterization.
Pitchayya v. Venkatakrishnamcharlu, AIR 1930 Mad 129 Explained the object of requiring sanction: to safeguard public and institutional rights; the authority granting sanction must consider status/position of applicants and (preferably) give notice to the institution or trustees. Used as a statement of principles relevant to the scope of Section 55: the Court examined Section 55 in light of these safeguards and procedural considerations.
King v. Electricity Commissioners, 1924-1 KB 171 (Atkin L.J.) Test: bodies having legal authority to determine rights and a duty to act judicially, when acting in excess of legal authority, are subject to controlling jurisdiction of King's Bench (judicial review). The Court applied this test to determine whether the Wakf Board under Section 55 had judicial/quasi-judicial duties; concluded it did not and therefore its decision was administrative and not amenable to certiorari.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting the absence of any decision directly on Section 55(2) of the Muslim Wakfs Act and observed the existing conflict in authorities on analogous Section 92 C.P.C. questions. The Court analysed both the statutory text of Section 55 and the practical consequences of construing the Board's functions as judicial/quasi-judicial.

Key steps in the Court's analysis:

  1. The Court observed that although in the present case the Board's proceedings had many trappings of a lis (notice, representation by counsel, elaborate argument, reserved orders and a reasoned order styled a judgment), the true scope of Section 55 could not be determined from what occurred in a single case.
  2. The Court set out the statutory scheme: Section 55(1) empowers the Board itself to file a suit and dispenses with the need to obtain the Advocate-General's sanction under Section 92 C.P.C.; Section 55(2) allows another person to file a suit only with the Board's written consent.
  3. The Court emphasised the discretionary and expediency-oriented nature of the Board's choices: the Board may decide suo motu to file a suit, or on an application may decide whether to file a suit itself, give consent to others to file, or decide that no suit should be filed. The Board is under no statutory obligation either to file a suit or to grant consent.
  4. Applying the test from King v. Electricity Commissioners (Atkin L.J.), the Court asked whether the Board was invested with legal authority to determine rights of subjects and had a duty to act judicially. The Court concluded it was not so invested; its decisions under Section 55 are largely administrative and concerned with expediency rather than adjudication of rights.
  5. The Court reasoned that if a decision by the Board to file or not to file a suit under Section 55(1) is not judicial or quasi-judicial, then it is difficult to see how the separate decision to permit another to file a suit under Section 55(2) becomes judicial or quasi-judicial. Neither granting nor withholding consent, the Court observed, directly determines the substantive rights of the applicant or the wakf.
  6. Having surveyed the conflicting authorities (including Dhian Das, Abu Backer, Shrimati Lal Kasliwal, Shantanand and Pitchayya), the Court expressly preferred and extended the view taken by the Rajasthan and Allahabad High Courts — namely, that the relevant sanction/consent in this statutory context is administrative — over the Travancore Cochin view that the Advocate-General's decision was quasi-judicial.
  7. On this basis the Court upheld the preliminary objection that the Board's decision of 27-2-1960 was outside the scope of correction by certiorari and therefore that the petition was not maintainable on that ground.

The Court expressly declined to decide or express views on the other contentions of law or fact raised by the parties (for example, whether specific participation by the 8th respondent vitiated the proceedings), so as not to pre-empt or prejudice those issues if they arise in other proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court upheld the preliminary objection and held that the decision of the Wakf Board granting consent under Section 55(2) of the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954, is an administrative act outside the purview of correction by the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The rule nisi was discharged and the petition under Article 226 was dismissed.
  • There was no order as to costs.

Wider implications as stated in the opinion:

  • The Court preferred and extended the principle laid down by the Rajasthan and Allahabad High Courts over the contrary view taken by the Travancore Cochin High Court (AIR 1954 Trav Co. 331) with respect to the characterisation of statutory sanctions/consents under provisions analogous to Section 55 of the Muslim Wakfs Act.
  • The decision establishes (in this opinion) that the Board's discretion under Section 55 — whether to institute a suit itself or to grant consent to others to institute a suit — is primarily administrative and concerned with expediency rather than the judicial determination of parties' rights; accordingly, such decisions are not amenable to certiorari under Article 226 in the circumstances considered by the Court.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the statements, findings and citations contained in the provided opinion. Sections or implications not discussed in the opinion have not been inferred or added.

    Haji K.M Abdul Kasim And Others v. P.M.N Mohamad Dawood And Others.

    1. The administration of the Annural Muhammadeeya Madarsa Trust was governed by a Scheme sanctioned by the High Court by its decree dated 16-4-1956 in A.S. No. 235 of 1952. The Scheme provided for six trustees. The three petitioners and respondents 8, 9 and 10 were the trustees appointed under the scheme. The trust constituted a wakf now governed by the provisions of the Muslim Wakfs Act (Act XXIX of 1954).

    2. Respondents 1 to 7 sought and obtained the sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 92 C. P. C. to file a suit to amend the scheme now in force for the administration of the trust. That sanction was accorded on 9-12-1959, after the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954, to which I shall hereafter refer as the Act, came into force. Section 55 of the Act provided:-

    "1. A suit to obtain any of the reliefs mentioned in Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (Act XX of 1863) and in Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908) relating to any wakf, may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in those Acts, be instituted by the Board without obtaining the leave or consent referred to in those Acts.

    2. No suit to obtain any of the reliefs referred to in Sub-section (1) relating to a wakf shall be instituted by any person or authority other than the Board without the consent in writing of the Board." (proviso omitted) Respondents 1 to 7 therefore applied to the Board constituted under the Act impleaded as the 11th respondent in these proceedings, for obtaining the consent prescribed by Section 55(2). The 8th respondent, M.S. Abdul Majid, who was one of the trustees appointed under the scheme was also a member of the Wakf Board. Notice of the application presented by respondents 1 to 7 under Section 55 (2) of the Act was given to the trustees including the petitioners. It was the petitioners that opposed the grant 61 the sanction sought by respondents 1 to 7.

    3. On 19-12-1959, when the application preferred by respondents 1 to 7 under Section 55 (2) of the Act came up before the Board, the 8th respondent, as a member of the Board, participated in the proceedings. But nothing was done that day except to adjourn the proceedings to 16-1-1960, to enable the petitioners to file their counter statement to the application preferred 'by respondents 1 to 7. The Board enquired into the petition on 16-1-1960, and again on 30-1-1960. In these proceedings the 8th respondent did not participate.

    The petitioners, however, alleged that the 8th respondent was present in the same room on the other side of a screen, and while he was there some of the members of the Board met and talked to him. On 1-2-1960 the petitioners challenged the validity of the proceedings before the Board on the plea, that the 8th respondent who was one of the trustees had participated in the proceedings of the Board. On 27-2-1960 the Board accorded the sanction sought by respondents 1 to 7 by a written order. The 8th respondent was not a party to that order. It was signed only by the other nine members of the Board.

    4. The petitioners applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of writ of Certiorari to set aside the order of the Board dated 27-2-1960 giving the sanction sought under Section 55 (2) of the Act by respondents 1 to 7.

    5. The learned counsel tor the petitioners challenged the validity of the sanction accorded by the Board on 27-2-1960 on the following grounds; (1) The 8th respondent's participation in the proceedings invalidated the proceedings and the sanction. The Board violated the principle that no one should be a judge in his own case. It was coram non judice. (2) The 2nd respondent's presence on the premises and in the same room on 16-1-1960, 30-1-1960 and 1-2-1960, with the other members of the Board having access to him vitiated the ultimate decision of the Board. (3) The Board in giving sanction took into account what should be viewed as an irrelevant factor, the sanction already accorded by the Advocate-General under Section 92 C.P.C.

    6. In the view I propose to take it is not necessary for me to express any opinion on the soundness or otherwise of any of the three contentions, I bave mentioned above. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the application for the issue of writ of certiorari was not maintainable at all, because the consent or sanction accorded by the Board under Section 55 (2) of the Act on 27-2-1960 could only be viewed as an admi-nistrative act ot the Board, outside the purview of correction by the issue ot a writ of certiorari.

    7. No decision directly bearing on Section 55 (2) of the Act has been "brought to my notice to determine the question, whether the consent of the Board prescribed by Section 55 (2) is wholly administrative in its scope, or whether the Board acts as a judicial or a quasi-judicial Tribunal in deciding whether the sanction or consent sought under Section 55(2) should be accorded or not. Section 55 (2) of the Act is however analogous to some extent to Section 92, C.P.C. There is no decision of this court on the question, whether a sanction accorded by the Advocate-General under Section 92 C.P.C. can be corretced in appropriate cases by the issue of a writ of certiorari, There is a conflict between the views taken :by the other courts.

    8. In Dhian Das v. Jagatram, 8 Ind Cas 1160 (Lah), the Chief Judge of the Punjab Chief Court held that the sanction accorded by the Collector under Section 539 C.P.C. of 1882, which has since been replaced by Section 92 C. P. C. of 1908, was an executive or administrative order and was outside the scope of the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the Chief Court.

    9. In Abu Backer v. Advocate-General, Trav Co. State, AIR 1954 Trav-Co. 331 a Division Bench of the Travancore Cochin High Court held that the decision which the Advocate-General arrived at under Section 92 C. P. C. was qua si-judicial in its . scope and was capable of correction by the issue of a writ of certiorari.

    10. The High Courts of Rajasthen and Allahabad took a contrary view and expressly dissented from the view taken in AIR 1954 Trav Co 331. In Shrimati Lal Kasliwal v. Advocate-General, (S) AIR 1955 Raj 166 , Wanchoo C.J. after declining to accept as correct the view taken in AIR 1954 Trav Co 331 observed:-

    "All that is required is that Advocate-General should be prima facie satisfied that the Case is of the nature mentioned in Section 92 and then he can give his permission. It may also be mentioned that under Section 92 the Advocate-General can file a suit himself or give permission to two or more persons to do so. Obviously this function of the Advocate-General cannot be Called judicial or quasi-judicial function in the circumstances and there is no question of revising it under Art. 227 or issuing a writ under Art. 226 compelling him to do this, that or the other."

    A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Shantanand v. Advocate-General U.P. Allahabad, (S) . There was a more elaborate discussion of what constituted administrative or executive acts as distinct from judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

    11. In Pitchayya v. Venkatakrishnamcharlu, AIR 1930 Mad 129, the learned Judges observed at page 131:

    "The object of requiring sanction or permission before such suits are instituted under Section 92 is to safeguard not only the rights of the public but also the rights of the institution and the trustees. The suit being a representative suit, it is necessary to see that the persons who come forward are persons who have an interest in the temple and persons who can Be safely entrusted with the conduct of the suit. Even though the whole public are technically parties, still the plaintiffs who file the suit have the conduct of the suit and very large powers in the shaping and the conduct of the suit. As a matter of general experience, the public leave it to the plaintiffs to conduct all the proceedings and to take the various steps necessary for its successful prosecution. It is also for the benefit of the institution and of the trustees because it affords a safeguard against the impecunious improper persons coming as plaintiffs and involving the trust in litigation expenses and it is also a safeguard that the persons are substantial persons from whom, it the suit fails, the costs can be recovered and not merely men of straw..... The authority giving the sanction must consider the various aspects before giving the sanction and one important Consideration should be as regards the status and position of those who come forward to represent the community. We may in this connection state that it would be more desirable, before giving the sanction that notice should be given to the institution or the trustees although it is not obligatory."

    It is in the light of these principles that I shall examine the scope of Section 55 of the Act.

    12. The scope of Section 55 of the Act cannot obviously be decided with reference to what the Board did or purported to do in this case. It gave notice to the petitioners, who contested the application preferred to the Board by respondents 1 to 7. The Board permitted counsel to represent the applicants and the respondents before it. Elaborate arguments were heard. Orders were reserved, and a reasoned order styled a judgment was given. Thus there were all the trappings of a lis and of a determination of this lis by the Board. But what happened in one case or in the case before me cannot determine the true scope of Section 55 of the Act.

    13. Section. 55 (1) empowers the Board to file a suit, and it specifically dispenses with the need to obtain the sanction of the Advocate-Genera1 under Section 92 C.P.C., or the need to obtain the sanction of the Court under Act XX of 1863. With reference to a wakf, the question, whether a suit should be instituted to obtain any of the reliefs mentioned in Section 92 C.P.C., could be taken up for consideration by the Board suo motu or on the matter being brought to its notice by any interested person. In either case the Board can decide whether it should file a suit or not.

    Even if one or more persons claiming to be interested in the proper administration of the wakf preferred an application to the Board for sanction to institute a suit, jt is open to the Board to decide whether a suit should be instituted. After reaching that decision it is open to the Board to file a suit itself in exercise of the right conferred upon it to file such a suit; it is equally open to the Board to give them its consent under Section 55 (2). It is equally open to the Board to decide that it is not in the interests of the wakf to file any suit at all. In that case no question of exercising the statutory right to file a suit under Section 55 (1) couM arise. Ti e consent sought under Section 55 (2) would have to be refused, if the Board is convinced that no suit need be filed.

    14. In proceedings taken suo motu, where the Board comes to a conclusion that a suit should be filed or it should not be filed, there can obviously be no lis, and there is no determination of right, either the rights of the Board or the rights and liabilities of the wakf. If the Board considers on an application preferred to it that it should itself file a suit, the position would still be the same. There is no judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of anv person.

    If the Board comes to the conclusion that it is desirable to file a suit but that it need not file a suit itself, the Board could permit another person to file the suit and give the requisite consent under Section 55 (2) of the Act. In deciding whether it should itself file the suit in exercise of the right conferred upon it by Section 55 (1) or give its consent to another under Section 55 (2) the question would be one of expediency. The Board is under no statutory obligation to give the consent asked for under Section 55 (2). In fact the Board is under no statutory obligation to file a suit or give its Consent to another to file a suit.

    15. It is against this scheme that I have to apply the test postulated by Atkin L.J. in King v. Electricity Commissioners, 1924-1 KB 171:

    "Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having a duty to act Judicially act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs."

    In deciding whether it should file a suit or not under Section 55 (1), the Board is not invested with any legal authority to determine question affecting the rights of subjects. Nor has it a duty to act judicially in arriving at a decision one way or the other. No doubt the discretion should be exercised on sound lines, but to a large extent it would be a question of expediency. Expediency would enter even more into the decision of the question, whether the Board should itself file a suit or should permit another to file a suit under Section 55 (2) of the Act.

    If the decision of the Board to file or not to file a suit, that is, to exercise or not to exercise a statutory right given to it by Section 55 (1) of the Act is not equivalent to a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of rights, it is a little difficult to see how the decision to permit another to file a suit could be viewed as a decision determining questions affecting the rights of parties. No doubt, unless consent is given no suit can be filed. But neither the grant of consent nor the withholding of consent can really be said to affect the rights of parties, either of the applicant who seeks the consent, or of the wakf against whom it is intended to file a suit.

    16. To put it in other words, if the decision reached by the Board either to file a suit or not to file a suit under Section 55 (1) of the Act is not a judicial or a quasi-judicial decision, it is a little difficult to see how the alternative open to the Board to sanction or withhold sanction to another person to file a suit becomes a judicial or quasi-judicial decision affecting the lights of parties. In arriving at a decision in none of the contingencies mentioned above is there any statutory obligation Cast on the Board to act in a Judicial or a quasi-judicial manner. Of course, there is a decision, but every decision is not necessarily judicial or quasi-judicial in its scope. Even administrative acts are based upon the decisions taken.

    17. In my opinion the principle laid down by the Rajasthan and Allahabad High Courts should be extended to this case in preference to that laid down by the Travancore Cochin High Court in AIR 1954 Trav Co. 331.

    18. I uphold the preliminary objection and I hold that the decision of the Board is outside the purview of correction by the issue of a writ of certiorari.

    19. I do not thereore propose to discuss the other questions at issue between the parties, neither the questions of law nor the disputed questions ot fact. At one stage, I thought of recording my views on these contentions also, but I have refrained from doing so, lest it should embarrass the determination of these issues, should they arise for determination in other proceedings, where the validity of the sanction given by the Board is put in issue.

    20. The rule nisi is discharged and the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Haji K.M Abdul Kasim And Others v. P.M.N Mohamad Dawood And Others.
    (Aug 25, 1960)