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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • V.Chellammal
  • R.Singaravelan
Judges
  • K.Chandru
Acts
  • Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police State and Subordinate Service Rules
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • V.Chellammal
  • R.Singaravelan
Judges
  • K.Chandru
Acts
  • Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police State and Subordinate Service Rules
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner joined service on 09.01.1975 as a Grade II Police Constable, was promoted to Grade I Police Constable in 1990 and to Head Constable in 1996. A charge memo under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police State and Subordinate Service Rules alleged that on 26.03.2004, while in Patrol Vehicle No.1 attached to the Madurai City Control Room, the petitioner threatened the Supervisor of TASMAC Shop No.5135 (P. Theivam) and the salesmen Sellapandi and Satheesh and forcibly took a bribe of Rs.100/-, purportedly because the shop was kept open at midnight contrary to licence conditions.

An enquiry by the Assistant Commissioner of Police found the charge proved. The Commissioner of Police (third respondent) accepted the findings and, by order dated 19.08.2004, removed the petitioner from service. The Commissioner commented that the act tarnished the police force's image and said a harsh punishment was necessary for deterrence, but did not explain why removal was chosen over other major penalties nor refer to the petitioner’s long service (about 29 years) or age (51 at the time).

The petitioner appealed on 01.09.2004 to the Additional Director General of Police (second respondent), arguing inter alia that the punishing authority failed to consider his past service, family circumstances and that on the relevant date he acted under orders of a woman Sub-Inspector (Muthulakshmi) and was not to be singled out. The appeal was rejected on 18.10.2004 without detailed reasoning. The petitioner then filed a revision petition to the Director General of Police (first respondent), who on 28.01.2005 rejected it, stating charges were proved and punishment commensurate.

The petitioner filed the present writ petition; it was admitted on 29.04.2005. A counter affidavit was filed by the third respondent on 13.09.2005. The Court heard arguments of counsel for both sides and examined the original enquiry proceedings produced by respondents.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disciplinary findings and the domestic enquiry were vitiated by procedural infirmity or perversity in the evidence such that interference was warranted.
  2. Whether the penalty of removal from service was disproportionate to the proven misconduct, given the petitioner’s long service, lack of adverse entries and personal circumstances (including age and alleged terminal illness), and whether the disciplinary authority cogently applied its mind in selecting that penalty rather than an alternative major penalty (e.g., compulsory retirement).
  3. Whether the court should, in view of higher court precedents, exercise its power to modify a disciplinary penalty in an "exceptional" or "rare" case where the punishment offends proportionality or is not shown to have been reasoned properly.
  4. Whether the appellate and revisional authorities adequately considered the ground of disproportionality raised by the petitioner.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The charges were not based upon legal evidence and the petitioner had been victimised.
  • The punishing authority did not properly consider the quantum of punishment in relation to the gravity of the charges; it imposed removal primarily on grounds of deterrence rather than proportionate assessment of culpability.
  • A Government servant should be punished under Service Rules with punishment proportionate to the offence; punishment solely for deterrence is improper.
  • The petitioner suffers from a terminal disease, is the family's only potential caretaker, and the family has been struggling without a breadwinner; these aspects warranted a lesser penalty.

Respondents' Position (as reflected in the file and submissions)

  • Respondents produced the entire enquiry proceedings and the original file for the Court's review.
  • On review of the produced records, the Court notes that procedural formalities in the domestic enquiry were observed and the conclusions based on recorded evidence were not perverse.
  • The appellate authority rejected the petitioner's appeal by a brief statement recording that there were no fresh grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India and others v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari, 2007 (2) M.L.J. 278 (SC) Supreme Court's principle that courts should not interfere with administrative disciplinary decisions except where they are illogical, procedurally improper or "shock the conscience"; limited scope of judicial review (Wednesbury principle); in exceptional/rare cases court may interfere with disproportionate punishment or impose appropriate punishment after recording cogent reasons. The Court applied this ratio to conclude that, although the enquiry and findings were not perverse, the punishment of removal was shockingly disproportionate in the present circumstances and therefore required modification to compulsory retirement.
Union of India v. K.G. Soni, 2006 (6) Supreme 389 (SC) (as cited) Reiteration of the principle that interference is limited and only in exceptional cases for disproportionate punishment; follows prior authorities (including Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank v. Munna Lal Jain). The Court relied on the reaffirmation of this principle to justify modifying penalty in an exceptional case.
Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank v. Munna Lal Jain, AIR 2005 SC 584 : (2005) 10 SCC 84 Authority supporting the limited scope of judicial review on administrative punishment but permitting intervention in cases of shocking disproportionality. Used as part of the chain of precedent reinforcing the circumstances under which courts may interfere; supported the court's view that modification was permissible here.
V.C. Rajamanickam v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, W.P.No.22983 of 2005 (Division Bench, disposed 13.08.2007) Illustrative authority where dismissal from service was modified to compulsory retirement because of long service, absence of adverse entries, and disproportionate hardship to family; demonstrates practice of modifying major penalties to compulsory retirement in suitable cases. The Court relied on this recent Division Bench decision as a comparable example and authority for modifying removal to compulsory retirement in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  • Review of procedural regularity and evidence: After directing production of the original enquiry file, the Court found that procedural formalities in the domestic enquiry were observed and the enquiry officer's conclusions were not perverse on the material before the Court. Thus, there was no basis to set aside the finding of guilt on procedural grounds.
  • Assessment of penalty selection: The Court examined the reasoning of the disciplinary authority (third respondent) and concluded that the authority did not adequately apply its mind to the question of penalty. The recorded reasoning emphasized tarnishing of the police image and deterrence but did not explain why removal was selected over other major penalties, nor did it take into account the petitioner's long service (over 29 years), absence of prior adverse entries, age (51 at the time) or the consequences of removal on the petitioner’s family and livelihood.
  • Comparative consideration of penalties under Service Rules: The Court noted that under the relevant Service Rules, major penalties include dismissal, compulsory retirement and removal from service. Compulsory retirement would, unlike removal, permit the grant of terminal benefits. The disciplinary authority did not explain why compulsory retirement was not preferred if a major penalty was warranted.
  • Application of higher court precedents on proportionality: Relying on the Supreme Court's guidance (Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari and related authorities), the Court acknowledged that judicial interference in disciplinary penalties is generally limited but permissible in exceptional cases where punishment is shockingly disproportionate or the decision-making process is deficient. The Court considered the present case to fall within that exceptional category because the penalty selection lacked proportional reasoning and produced severe hardship.
  • Relevant comparative authority: The Court referred to a Division Bench decision (V.C. Rajamanickam) where dismissal was converted into compulsory retirement under similar circumstances, reinforcing the appropriateness of modification here.
  • Conclusion from analysis: Although the misconduct could not be condoned and a major penalty remained appropriate, the specific penalty of removal from service was disproportionate in the petitioner's factual context and required modification to compulsory retirement. The Court therefore exercised its limited extraordinary power to modify the penalty rather than to remit in order to achieve a just and proportionate outcome.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court modified the punishment of removal from service imposed upon the petitioner into one of compulsory retirement. The writ petition was allowed to that extent; in all other respects the writ petition was dismissed.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The petitioner is directed to submit his pension papers within four weeks from receipt of a copy of the order; the respondents are directed to process those papers and pass final orders within eight weeks thereafter.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The Court's modification leaves intact the finding of misconduct and the propriety of imposing a major penalty, but it alters the form of the penalty to preserve the petitioner’s entitlement to terminal benefits and to mitigate the severe personal and familial hardship that removal would cause.
  • The decision applies established precedents permitting judicial modification of disproportionate punishment in exceptional cases; the opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying existing Supreme Court and Division Bench authorities to the facts before it.
Show full summary ...

    K.Periyasamy v. The Director General Of Police

    The petitioner joined the service on 09.01.1975 as Grade II Police Constable. Subsequently, he was promoted as Grade I Police Constable in the year 1990 and thereafter, as Head Constable in the year 1996. The petitioner was given a charge memo under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police State and Subordinate Service Rules [for short, 'Rules']. In that charge memo, it was stated that on 26.3.2004, when he was in the Patrol Vehicle No.1 attached to the Madurai City Control Room, he had threatened a Supervisor of TASMAC Shop No.5135, by name, P.Theivam, and the Salesman Sellapandi and Satheesh and forced a bribe of Rs.100/- from them. This bribe was demanded on the basis that the TASMAC Shop was kept open on the midnight contrary to the licence condition. An enquiry was ordered and the Assistant Commissioner of Police, who conducted enquiry, held that the charge was proved against the petitioner and is of recorded evidence. After issuing show cause notice on the findings, the third respondent Commissioner of Police accepted the findings and removed the petitioner from service by an order dated 19.8.2004. Though the said order is a well reasoned order, on the question of penalty, the third respondent had stated that the action of the Government servant tarnished the image of the police Force and he must be given a harsh punishment. But, apart from that, the Commissioner of Police stated that by punishing the errant persons like the petitioner, it may restrain the others from indulging in such dishonest acts. But there is no finding that out of the several major penalties provided under the service Rules, as to why the third respondent chose the punishment of removal from service and there is no reference about the 29 years of service put by the petitioner and his past conduct including the age of the petitioner, who was 51 years at that time.

    2. The petitioner preferred an appeal dated 01.9.2004 to the second respondent Additional Director General of Police, being the appellate authority. In that appeal, apart from taking the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner also mentioned that the punishing authority did not take into account his past service and about his family circumstances. He had also stated that on the date of the alleged incident, he was on duty with a woman Sub-Inspector Muthulakshmi and three others in the Mobile Van. The second respondent, vide proceedings dated 18.10.2004, rejected the appeal by cryptically recording that he has gone through the minute connected records and the representation of the petitioner and as there was no fresh grounds, the charge was rightly held proved by letting in evidence. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a revision petition before the first respondent wherein he has stated that on the date of alleged incident, he was working under a woman Sub-Inspector and was acting under her orders and, therefore, he should not be singled out. Once again, he has stated about the disproportionality of the punishment. In the revision petition, the first respondent, reviewing authority, vide proceedings dated 28.01.2005 stated that the charges are proved in evidence and that the punishment was awarded as commensurate with the gravity of the charge. It is as against the said order, the present writ petition has been filed.

    3. The writ petition was admitted on 29.4.2005. A counter affidavit dated 13.9.2005 has been filed by the third respondent setting forth the circumstances that led to the dismissal of the petitioner.

    4. I have heard the arguments of Mr.R.Singaravelan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mrs.V.Chellammal, learned Special Government Pleader representing the respondents and have perused the records.

    5. Learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to argue on the merits of the case and made elaborate submission as to how the charges were not based upon any legal evidence and the petitioner was victimised. He also submitted in the alternative that the punishing authority, at the time of passing of final orders, did not consider the quantum of punishment on the basis of the gravity of the charges but went on the premises that punishing the petitioner will deter others from committing similar misconducts. He submitted that a Government servant can be dealt with in terms of Service Rules and punishment also should be proportionate to the gravity of the charges. If a punishment is accorded only with a view to make others deter from indulging in similar acts, then it is not a punishment given to the petitioner and it has been done for other reasons. In view of that matter, he submitted that the order should be set aside and remanded for fresh consideration by the authorities. Finally, he submitted that the petitioner is suffering from terminal disease and he has nobody else to take care of the family and for the last two years, the family was in struggling without there being any breadwinner to save the family and pleaded for a lesser penalty.

    6. With reference to the first submission, it may be stated that since no materials were placed by the petitioner before this Court, the learned Special Government Pleader was directed to produce the entire enquiry proceedings and the original file was produced. Having gone through the same, it is to be noted that there is no infirmity in the procedural formalities being observed by the respondents. Even the conclusions reached on the basis of the evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry, cannot be said to be perverse. But, however, it is not clear from the original file produced by the respondents that whether the other persons, who were in the Patrol Van were subjected to any departmental action and as to how the petitioner alone was singled out for any disciplinary action. Even otherwise, the disciplinary authority (third respondent) did not apply his mind on the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner rather went on an exercise basing upon the theory of deterrence. In the modern times, in the theories of Penology, the concept of deterrence, has given its way to the concept of reformation.

    7. In any event, in the decision reported in 2007 (2) M.L.J. 278 (SC) [Union of India and others v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari], the Supreme Court held that in an exceptional rare case, the Court can interfere with the disproportionate punishment. The following passages found in paragraphs 15 to 17 may be usefully extracted below:

    Para 15: "The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury's (supra) the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.

    Para 16: To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.

    Para 17: The above position was recently reiterated in Union of India v. K.G. Soni 2006 (2006 (6) Supreme 389 : 2006 - III - LLJ - 802 (SC) following Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank v. Munna Lal Jain AIR 2005 SC 584 : (2005) 10 SCC 84 : 2005 - I - LLJ 730 (SC)."

    8. Under the relevant Service Rules, the imposition of major penalty includes dismissal, compulsory retirement and removal from service. In the present case, considering the fact that the petitioner had worked for more than 29 years there being no previous adverse remarks noted by the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority ought to have borne in mind that even if he wants to impose a major penalty as to why he had preferred the penalty of removal from service and not the compulsory retirement. In case of compulsory retirement, at least the petitioner is entitled for terminal benefits and that has not been done in this case. Even in appeal and revision, though the ground of disproportionality was raised, that was not answered by the appellate authority but the revisional authority rejected it by a one sentence order. This Court is of the view that while the petitioner's misconduct cannot be condoned and he must be imposed only with major penalty, but, however, considering the penalty now imposed, it is clear that it will result in serious consequences of not only depriving the petitioner his employment but also the very survival of the family will be in question. Therefore, applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in its decision referred to above, this Court is of the view that punishment of removal from service requires modification.

    9. In this context, it is relevant to refer to a recent decision of the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.22983 of 2005, disposed on 13.8.2007, [V.C.Rajamanickam v. State of Tamil Nadu and another] and the following passage found in paragraph 18 of the said order is reproduced below:

    As contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner the petitioner has put in a long number of years of service and there is no adverse entries in his annual confidential reports and in such circumstances if the punishment of dismissal from service is imposed not only the petitioner but his entire family will be put to great hardship. Therefore we are of the considered view that the ends of justice will be met if punishment of dismissal from service is modified into one of compulsory retirement since both the penalties are major penalties and the punishment of dismissal from service appears to be disproportionate and not commensurate with the act of delinquency of the petitioner. Hence we modify the dismissal from service into one of compulsory retirement.

    10. Under the above circumstances, the punishment of removal from service ordered against the petitioner is modified into one of compulsory retirement and the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. In all other respects, the writ petition shall stand dismissed. The petitioner is hereby directed to submit his pension papers within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the respondents are directed to process the same and pass final orders within a period of eight weeks thereafter. However, there will be no order as to costs.

    gri To

    1. The Director General of Police Kamarajar Salai Chennai

    2. The Additional Director General of Police (Law & Order) Kamarajar Salai Chennai

    3. The Commissioner of Police Madurai City Madurai

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    Comments

    K.Periyasamy v. The Director General Of Police
    (Oct 1, 2007)