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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This civil revision petition was filed against an order and decretal order dated 26-4-1999 made in LA No. 511 of 1996 in O.S No. 556 of 1991 on the file of the Principal Sub-Judge, Tiruchirapalli. Plaintiffs 1 and 3 (the Revision Petitioners before the High Court) had earlier filed a suit against respondents 1 and 2 seeking, inter alia: (a) removal of the second respondent as Secretary of the first respondent institution (Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution, Tiruchirapalli) and appointment of a new Secretary; (b) vesting of all properties of the institution with a new management; (c) directions for accounts and enquiries; and (d) settling a scheme for administration of the institution under the control of the Sub-Court, Trichy. The suit was instituted under Section 32 of the Civil Procedure Code, construing the first defendant as a Trust.

Leave to institute the suit under Section 92 CPC was originally granted in I.A. No. 567 of 1988. A Civil Revision Petition (C.R.P. No. 2386 of 1991) against that grant of leave was dismissed by this Court by order dated 15-6-1992. The present revision challenges the orders of the lower court and contests the maintainability of the suit under Section 92 CPC on the basis that the first defendant is not a Trust but a society registered under the Societies Registration Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit seeking the remedies enumerated can be maintained under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which applies to alleged breaches of trusts created for public charitable or religious purposes.
  2. Whether the first respondent institution (Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution) is a Trust or a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, based on its Memorandum and Articles of Association and the manner in which its properties are held and managed.
  3. Whether a prior order granting leave to institute a suit under Section 92 CPC (which was the subject of a dismissed revision) operates as a bar (by res judicata or otherwise) to raising the maintainability of the suit at a later stage.
  4. Whether the plaintiffs/petitioners have shown the requisite "interestedness" in the administration of the alleged trust (if a trust) to maintain the suit under Section 92 CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Revision Petitioners' learned counsel submitted that nowhere had the defendants admitted that the first respondent institution is a Trust; thus the maintainability of the suit under Section 92 CPC could still be challenged.
  • It was argued that the earlier order concerning the grant of leave under Section 92 CPC related only to the correctness of leave and would not create a principle of res judicata preventing the defendants from raising the maintainability of the suit at the appropriate stage.
  • The petitioners relied on authorities (including Mitsubishi France v. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. and Guhan S. v. Rukmini Devi Arundale) for the proposition that an order granting leave does not necessarily preclude later challenge to maintainability or jurisdictional/defensive pleas when those pleas could not have been raised at the leave stage.

Respondents / Lower Court's Position (as recorded)

  • The earlier proceedings and the order in the Civil Revision Petition accepted (at least for the purposes of the leave application) that the first defendant institution would fall within the scope of a public trust for charitable purposes as contemplated under Section 92 CPC.
  • The plaintiffs were considered persons interested in the proper administration and management of the institution for the grant of leave under Section 92 CPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mitsubishi France (S.A.) v. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. (AIR 1985 Mad 300) The principle that an initial interlocutory order (e.g., on territorial jurisdiction or leave) may not bar a party from later raising a defence or plea which could not have been raised at the earlier stage; constructive res judicata does not always apply to successive stages where the party could not then raise the defence. The Court relied on this to accept that the earlier order granting leave would not necessarily bar the Revision Petitioners from raising the maintainability plea now.
Guhan S. v. Rukmini Devi Arundale (1987) 100 LW 182 The proposition that leave having been granted would not prevent the court later from going into the merits, including the maintainability of the suit or appeal; when the maintainability point arises it may be agitated notwithstanding prior leave. The Court cited this authority to support its view that the prior order granting leave would not be a bar to the Revision Petitioners raising the maintainability issue.
The Advocate General v. Bhartiya Adam Jati Sewak Sangh, 2002 (1) CCC 122 (HP) That formation of a society to carry out charitable or social purposes does not necessarily amount to creation of a trust, particularly where funds are not shown to have been collected from the general public. The Court relied on this to support the conclusion that registration as a society weighs against treating the institution as a trust for purposes of Section 92 CPC.
Travancore-Cochin Literary v. J.A. Raheem (AIR 2005 Kerala 233) Similar view that mere formation and registration as a society does not prima facie establish the existence of a public trust; absence of material showing a settled public trust prevents invocation of Section 92 CPC. The Court cited this for the proposition that there was no prima facie material to treat the society as a public trust and hence Section 92 could not be invoked on that basis.
Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. ((1984) 2 SCC 50 : AIR 1984 SC 192) A cautionary note (deprecatory) against proceeding under Section 92 CPC where the Societies Registration Act is applicable to the institution and its properties. The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that where the Societies Registration Act applies and property is vested in the society, a suit under Section 92 CPC is not maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, based strictly on the facts and materials recorded in the opinion:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court explained that Section 92 CPC applies where there is an alleged breach of an express or constructive trust created for public charitable or religious purposes and where directions by the Court are necessary for administration of such a trust; persons interested (or the Advocate General) may institute a suit under that Section after obtaining leave of the Court.
  2. Leave and res judicata issues: The Court noted that leave to institute the suit had been granted earlier and that a Civil Revision Petition contesting that grant was dismissed on 15-6-1992. The Court considered the Revision Petitioners' contention that that earlier order did not amount to an admission that the institution is a trust and that the question of maintainability could still be raised. The Court accepted authorities (Mitsubishi and Guhan S.) to the effect that an order granting leave does not necessarily preclude later raising of maintainability, because certain pleas could not have been raised at the leave stage.
  3. Threshold for maintaining a Section 92 suit: The Court emphasized that to maintain a suit under Section 92 CPC, petitioners/plaintiffs must demonstrate (a) existence of a trust (public/charitable), (b) alleged breach of trust terms, and (c) that the petitioners are persons interested in the running of that trust.
  4. Documentary/material inquiry: The Court examined the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution. The documents showed registration under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Certificate No. 13/1952), a Memorandum containing 13 life members and 30 rules; Clause 22 provided that life members of the Executive Committee alone shall be Trustees of properties already purchased; Clause 23 provided that the properties of the Institution shall be in the names of the President and the Secretary and that they possess the power to purchase and sell properties on behalf of the Institution.
  5. Legal significance of the clauses: The Court reasoned (based on the record) that if the properties were trust properties, there would not typically be a clause empowering the President (and Secretary) to sell properties on behalf of the institution. That feature, together with registration under the Societies Registration Act, indicated that the institution functioned as a society rather than as a trust.
  6. Support from authorities: The Court cited authorities (Advocate General v. Bhartiya Adam Jati Sewak Sangh; Travancore-Cochin Literary v. J.A. Raheem) which held that mere formation of a society does not amount to a trust and that, absent material showing a public trust, Section 92 CPC cannot be invoked. It also cited Guhan S. to underscore that in a Section 92 suit the appellant/respondent must show that the properties belong to a trust distinct from a society.
  7. Conclusion on maintainability: Applying those principles to the present record (the Memorandum and Articles and the manner in which property was vested in the President and Secretary under Clause 23), the Court concluded that the properties were vested with a society and not a trust. Consistent with the cited authorities, a suit under Section 92 CPC was therefore not maintainable in the present case. The Court also observed that the plaintiffs had not shown the requisite interestedness in the running of a trust.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision Petition was dismissed; the Court found no merit in the petition and confirmed the order and decretal order (the opinion records an order/decretal order dated 26-6-1999 as confirmed by the Court; the petition challenged an order dated 26-4-1999 earlier in the record). The Court ordered no costs and dismissed the petition.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The lower court's order and decretal order were confirmed and the Civil Revision Petition failed and was dismissed. The plaintiffs' attempt to proceed under Section 92 CPC was held to be not maintainable on the materials before the Court.
  • On legal principle: The opinion applies established principles that (a) registration as a society and provisions vesting property in office-bearers (e.g., President and Secretary with power to sell) point away from the existence of a trust for purposes of Section 92 CPC, and (b) an earlier grant of leave does not necessarily preclude later challenge to maintainability. The Court did not purport to set any new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Order: Petition dismissed. No costs.

    K. Rajamanickam (D) And Anr. v. Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution, Tiruchirapalli & Ors.

    1. This civil revision petition arises against the order and decretal order dated 26-4-1999 made in LA. No. 511 of 1996 in O.S No. 556 of 1991 on the file of the Principal Sub-Judge, Tiruchirapalli.

    2. The plaintiffs 1 and 3 are the Revision Petitioners in a suit filed by them against the respondents 1 and 2 (a) for the removal of the second Respondent/second defendant (Thiru. R. Veeramani) as the Secretary of the first Respondent/first defendant institution (Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution, Tiruchirapalli) and to appoint a new Secretary in his place; (b) vesting all properties of the first respondent Institution detailed in the schedule with the new management; (c) directing accounts and enquiries: (d) to settle a scheme for the proper conduct of the institution and have the same administered under the control of the Sub-Court, Trichy. The said suit was filed under Section 32 of C.P.C; construing the first respondent/first defendant as a Trust.

    3. Section 92, CPC will be applicable in case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature or where a direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust. In that event the Advocate General or two or more persons in the Trust and having obtained the leave of the Court may institute a suit under that provision for similar remedies provided thereunder; for example removing any Trustee, appointing a new Trustee, vest any property in a Trustee, directing the removed Trustee to deliver possession of any Trust property, directing accounts and enquiry and also settling scheme etc.

    4. As a matter of fact, leave was originally granted for instituting the suit on the ground that the first defendant/Institution was a Trust. As against the said granting of leave by order of Court in I.A No. 567 of 1988, this Respondents preferred Revision is, C.R.P No. 2386 of 1991, which was dismissed by this Court by its order dated 15-6-1992.

    5. Thus it is that the following was observed in the order of the above said C.R.P:—

    “Thus, even from the stand taken by the Petitioners/defendants, it had been accepted that the 1st Petitioner/first defendant is a public trust and as pointed out earlier, the objects are charitable and the 1st petitioner would undoubtedly fall within the scope of a public trust for charitable purposes as contemplated under Section 92 of the Code”. It was also found that the Respondents/plaintiffs were persons interested in the proper administration and management. And therefore the revision against the order of granting of leave was dismissed.

    6. The learned counsel for the Revision Petitioners/Plaintiffs submitted that nowhere it has been admitted that the first Respondent/first defendant Institution is a Trust. It was further submitted that the order in the above C.R.P was only in respect of the correctness of the leave granted under Section 92, CPC; but what we are now dealing with is about the maintainability of the suit. According to the counsel, any order in respect of the issue of leave to grant may not form an impediment on the principle of res judicata in respect of the question regarding the maintainability of the suit. For this purpose, reliance was made upon in a case law reported in Mitsubishi France (S.A.) v. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. (AIR 1985 Mad 300). In that case the Division Bench observed that the initial plea of the defendant that the High Court had no territorial jurisdiction as the defendant was a Foreigner and the findings thereon will never act as a bar by principle of constructive res judicata by the defendants subsequent plea of want of jurisdiction. The following observation was made therein.

    “The plea of res judicata is a wholesome plea in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and is based on the principle that no party shall be vexed over the same cause of action twice. The principle of res judicata would apply not only to successive suits but also to the successive stages in the same proceedings. However, where in the suit to recover sum as damages for breach of contract instituted in the High Court on its original side the defendant in response to suit summons entered appearance under protest and raised the plea that the defendant being foreigner the Courts in India, including the High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the plea was negatived by the High Court on the ground that part of cause of action arose within its local limits, the defendant is not barred by the principle of constructive res judicata contained in S. 11. Explanation IV. from raising the plea in the written statement as one of the defences that in view of the clause in the suit contract the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit on its original side because such a plea could not have been raised at the earlier stage when the plea of want of territorial jurisdiction was raised because the defendant could not file the written statement at that stage and had entered appearance under protest”.

    7. It was also held at para 47 in Guhan S. v. Rukmini Devi Arundale, (1987) 100 LW 182 that The fact that leave had been already granted would not stand in the way of raising this vital point regarding the maintainability, of their appeal itself.”

    8. It was observed in that case as follows:—

    “Having taken the view that any decision arrived at in an order granting leave would not prevent the Court while disposing of the suit or appeal to go into the merits of the case and that maintainability of the suit or appeal itself could be agitated; this point is taken into account”.

    For this reason, I find that the Order of this Court in its C.R.P No. 2986 of 1991 may not be a bar for this new plea of the Revision Petitioners that the suit is not maintainable; further, nowhere the defendants do admit that the first defendant is a Trust as was solely based for the order in the above civil revision petition.

    9. In order to maintain the suit under Section 92 CPC the petitioners/plaintiffs should show the existence of a Trust and the alleged breach of the terms of the Trust; besides which the interestedness of the petitioners/plaintiffs in the running the Trust shall also be made known.

    10. But as seen from the Memorandum of Articles of Association of the Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution (first defendant), Tiruchirapalli, it is found that it was incorporated and found to have been registered under the Societies Registration Act 21/1860. That Certificate number is 13/1952 with a Memorandum of Articles of Association containing 13 life members and 30 Rules; according to Clause 22, the life members of the Executive Committee alone shall be the Trustees of the properties already purchased. According to Clause 23, the properties of the Institution shall be in the names of the President and the Secretary and they shall have to power to purchase and sell the properties on behalf of the Institution. If it is a Trust Property, there will not be a clause empowering the President to sell the properties. That itself indicates that it is not a Trust. The fact that it was registered under the Societies Act may also lend support to the above view.

    11. In fact, it was held in The Advocate General v. Bhartiya Adam Jati Sewak Sangh, 2002 (1) CCC 122 (HP) that even though the formation of society to carry out a charitable or useful or social purpose, it could not be regarded as amounting to creation of a Trust and especially when none of its funds shown to have been collected from general public. The same view as taken in Travancore-Cochin Literary v. J.A Raheem (AIR 2005 Kerala 233). It was held that:

    “The learned District Judge allowed the original petition on a wrong assumption that the 1st petitioner society is a Trust. There is absolutely no material to show prima facie that 1st petitioner is a trust, either public or private. There is also no material to show that there was a Trust of Public nature, which subsequently got registered under the provisions of Act XII of 1955. Since there is no material to make out a prima facie case that the 1st petitioner is a public Trust and any person had settled any properties for the benefit of the beneficiaries, the provisions of section 92 of CPC cannot be invoked. So, the impugned order is illegal, unsustainable and liable to be set aside.”

    12. Again in Guhan, S. v. Rukmini Devi Arundale, (1987) 100 LW 182 it was found in para 53 of its judgment as follows:—

    “Hence, even in a suit filed under S. 92, CPC, whether the properties included in the schedule to the plaint belong to the Trust or not would be a relevant aspect and when such a point is taken in the appeal, it has become obligatory on the part of the respondents to show to the Appellate Court that the properties belong to the trust, which is distinct and different from the society.”

    13. It was further held in that case that if it was shown that the properties of the defendants was owned by a society then a suit under Section 92, CPC is not maintainable.

    14. In this case also the property vest with the President and Secretary of the first defendant as per clause 23 of the Memorandum of Articles of Association of the first defendant Institution, which was registered under the Societies Registration Act 21/1860. Therefore, the property is vested with a society and not with a Trust and as per the observations made in the above cited case a suit under Section 92, CPC is not maintainable, (to) which Societies Registration Act is applicable, proceeding with a suit under Section 92, CPC was deprecated in Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., Nasik ((1984) 2 SCC 50 : AIR 1984 SC 192). There is also no interestedness shown upon the plaintiffs in the running of the Trust.

    15. For all the reasons above mentioned, I find no merit in this Civil Revision Petition. This Civil Revision Petition fails and is dismissed.

    16. The order and decretal order dated 26-6-1999 made in LA. No. 511 of 1996 in O.S No. 556 of 1991 on the file of the Principal Sub-Judge, Tiruchirapalli is confirmed. No costs.

    17. Petition dismissed.

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    K. Rajamanickam (D) And Anr. v. Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution, Tiruchirapalli & Ors.
    (Apr 13, 2006)