Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.:— The appellant is aggrieved against the order of the learned Single Judge in setting aside the order of the appellant, dated 18 February, 1999, in and by which, the appellant informed the respondent herein that his term of employment expired and therefore, he would be relieved on and from 31 March, 1999.
2. The brief facts which are required to be stated are that the respondent joined as a ‘security supervisor’ in 1983 in the appellant-Corporation as contract labourer. The contractor was stated to be one M/s. Thai Security. Subsequently, in the year 1987, the contractor got changed and another establishment, called Priyadharsini Indira Gandhi Security Services came into picture and the respondent continue to serve in the same capacity as a “contract labourer”. Subsequently, by an order, dated 21 January, 1988, the respondent was directly employed by the appellant-Corporation as “security supervisor” with effect from 13 January, 1988 for a fixed period. Similar such orders were issued fixing specific period of employment of the respondent and last of such order was, dated 28 September, 1989, in and by which, the appointment of the respondent as “security supervisor” was continued till 31 October, 1989. It is common ground that after the issuance of the order, dated 28 September, 1989, and after the expiry of the term fixed therein, dated 31 October, 1989, though no orders were issued, the respondent's services as ‘Security Supervisor’ was continued. It is also not in dispute that such employment of the respondent was continuous till the impugned order, dated 18 February, 1999 which directed to relieve the respondent from service from 31 March, 1999 came to be made. Therefore, the uncontroverted fact remains that after the initial engagement of the respondent as a “contract labourer” in the year 1983 which status was prevailing till the end of 1987, from January, 1980, the respondent came to be directly employed by the appellant as “security supervisor” and that the said employment continued till the end of March, 1999.
3. According to the respondent, after the issuance of the order, dated 18 February, 1999, when he enquired in the office of the appellant as to why he was being relieved from duty with effect from 31 March, 1999, while other security supervisors were being retained, he was informed that since he has reached the age of 58 years, he was being relieved from service. The respondent, therefore, preferred the above said Writ Petition No. 4710 of 1999 challenging the order, dated 18 February, 1999, inter alia contending that in the appellant-Corporation, the age of retirement of the employees below Board level is 60 years end therefore, the relieving of the respondent at the age of 58 years was illegal. It was also contended that since after 1989, his employment was not for any fixed period and since the employment continued without any break, the respondent cannot be treated differently than that of other employees. It was further contended that the order, dated 18 Febuary 1999, was also invalid for non-compliance of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was lastly contended that since by notification, dated 9 December, 1976, the General Government abolished engagement of “contract labourer” in the Public Sector Corporation, the respondent should be deemed to be the employee of the appellant-Corporation in every respect and therefore, he was governed by the conditions of service applicable to regular employees and therefore, all the benefits that are available to a regular employee ought to have been extended to him as well.
4. The challenge made by the respondent was registed by the appellant-Corporation, by contending that the engagement of the service of the respondent was on the basis of a fixed term on daily rate basis and therefore, the engagement or the services respondent cannot be construed as that of a regular employee of the appellant. According to the appellant, such term based employees were not engaged after the age of 53 years. It was therefore, contended that the age of superannuation, namely, 60 years, which is applicable to the employees of the appellant-Corporation would not apply to the respondent.
5. Before the learned Single Judge, significantly, no records were produced at the instance of the appellant to show that any specific orders for fixed term of engagement was issued to the respondent for the period subsequent to October, 1989. Even before us, no such records were produced. Even along with the written submissions what was produced was the memorandum, dated 21 January, 1988 which confirmed the engagement of the services of the respondent on “term basis” with effect from 31 January, 1988 which came to an end by 29 February, 1988.
6. The learned Judge held that the respondent was entitled for the benefits under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, that in view of the abolition of contract labour for engagement of any workman for watching of the buildings, owned and occupied by the respondent-Corporation, by necessary implication, the absorption of the respondent as a “security supervisor” became imperative and therefore. It should be construed that the respondent became the ‘regular employee’ of the appellant-Corporation. The learned Judge, further held that Cl. (6) of the memorandum of the respondent-Corporation, dated 21 January, 1988, in excluding the application of the provisions of the Standing Orders was violative of Art. 14 and therefore, the same cannot be approved and consequently, the learned Judge took the view that the claim of the respondent, to continue in the service of the appellant-Corporation till the age of 60 years was justified as per rule 26 of the service rules of the appellant-Corporation and accordingly, set aside the order, dated 18 February, 1999, by directing the appellant-Corporation to continue to engage the respondent till he attains the age of 60 years though on consolidated, pay, to which condition, therespondent originally agreed.
7. Sri Rathinadurai, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Corporation reiterated his contentions which were raisedbefore the learned Single Judge. According to the appellant, having regard to the nature of engagement of the respondent as per memorandum, dated 21 January, 1988, which was for a fixed period, the respondent cannot be equated to that of a regular employee of the appellant-Corporation. It is further contended that in view of the said position, the direction of the learned Single Judge to continue the services of the respondent till he attained the age of 60 years was not justified. As regards violation of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, here again, according to the learned counsel, since the engagement of the service of the respondent was for a fixed period, he would fall within the “excepted category” as provided under S. 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently, the non-engagements of the respondent, after the expiry or the period of his term, would not amount to “retrenchment” in order to attract compliance of S. 25-F of the Act.
8. As against the above submissions, Sri Hariparanthaman, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that after 31 October, 1989 since the service of the respondent was continued till he was relieved on 31 March, 1999, the respondent should be held to have acquired the status of a regular employee of the appellant-Corporation and therefore, he was bound to have been retained in service till he attained the age of 60 years. According to the learned counsel since the respondent satisfied the definition of “workman” within the meaning of S. 2(i) of the Standing Orders Act, 1946, the exclusion of the applicability of Standing Orders Act in the memorandum, dated 21 January, 1988, will have no force. It was, therefore, contended that the respondent was entitled to the benefit of ONGC Service Rules providing foe retirement only at the age of 60 years as applicable to all other employees. According to the learned counsel, the illegality committed by the appellant in not granting the regular scale of pay to the respondent cannot be a ground to deprive the valuable right to the respondent to remain in service till the age of 60 years.
9. Having considered the respective submissions or the learned counsel on either side, in the forefront, we wish to consider the issue involved in this writ appeal in the anvil of S. 2(oo)(bb) vis-a-vis S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as in our considered opinion, the whole of the right of the respondent as against the appellant-Corporation centers around the said legal question. We could have straight away held that the issue relating to the applicability of S. 2(oo)(bb) or non-compliance of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, can be left to be agitated by the respondent by raising an industrial dispute under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. But having regard to the fact that the respondent is 64 years old and also taking note of the uncontroverted facts placed before us, we feel that driving the respondent to resort to such a course would be travesty of justice and therefore, we do not wish to dispose of this appeal on that ground.
10. Having steered clear of the above hurdle, when we consider the facts involved, we find that the respondent who was initially engaged as a “contract labour” under two different Contractors, between 1983 and at the end of 1987, came to be employed by the appellant from 31 January, 1988 by a specific order, dated 21 January, 1988. It is no doubt true that the said order among the other things, mentions that, his monthly images would be Rs. 445, that, his engagement was temporary for the period between 13 January, 1988 (F.N) and 29 February, 1988 (A.N), that, such engagement would stand terminated on 29 February, 1988 (A.N) without further notice, unless otherwise extended by the Commission in writing and that, such engagement being on the basis of that memorandum, the Standing Order of ONGC was not applicable to him.
11. At the risk of repetition, we wish to state that though such engagement for fixed period was stated to have been periodically made by the appellant-Corporation till 31 March, 1989, the services of the respondent as “security supervisor” continued beyond 1 April, 1989 in the appellant-Corporation till he was relieved on 31 March, 1999. Therefore, we are bound to take note of the uncontraverted fact of the uninterrupted continuous employment of the respondent in the appellant-Corporation between 13 January, 1988 and 31 March, 1999, namely for 11 long years. The above said period is de hors the earlier period of engagement of the respondent as a “contract labour” between 1983 and 1987. We feel that the above uncontraverted factual details relating to the period of employment of the respondent in the appellant-Corporation, undoubtedly created a very valuable right in his favour when it came to the question of his non-employment on and after 31 March, 1999. Even though such an engagement of the respondent continuously lasted for nearly 11 long years atleast from 1988, we wonder whether there could be an un-ceremonial termination as resorted to at the instance of the: appellant in total violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. In other words, we are obliged to state that the stand of the appellant that the engagement of the services of the respondent was for a fixed period, which commenced on 13 January, 1988 and therefore, disengagement from 31 March, 1999 should be merely taken as a disengagement in terms of the original order of engagement, dated 21 January, 1988, and therefore, it should be held that the respondent was not entitled for any relief would be in total derogation of and on a misreading of S. 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. We are afraid that such blind folded approach cannot be made when the facts involved disclose that the respondent would atleast be entitled for certain consequential benefits in pursuance of such termination. In our considered view, in the case on hand, the termination of the service of therespondent by the order, dated IB February, 1999, relieving the respondent from 31 March, 1999 would squarely fall within the definition of retrenchment under S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently, non-compliance of the stipulations contained under S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act would render the very order, dated 18 February, 1999, invalid.
12. As far as the contention that the respondent would fall within the excepted category as provided under S. 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, we are of the considered view that such a stand of the appellant cannot be accepted. To appreciate the above legal position, extraction of Ss. 2(oo) and 2(oo)(bb) is required, which reads as under:
Section 2(oo):
“retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment infliced by way of disciplinary action but does not include-
(a) ……..……………..
(b) … …..……………..
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the nonrenewal of the contract of employment between, the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation on that behalf contained therein”.
13. The definition of “retrenchment” under S. 2(oo) and exception provided under S. 2(oo)(bb) came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Judgment reported in M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh [1994 (1) L.L.N 545], and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated the legal position, thus in Para. 9, at page 549, which reads as under:
“… This Court from time to time held that the definition of ‘retrenchment’ being very wide and comprehensive in nature shall cover, within its ambit termination of service in any manner and for any reason, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The result was that even discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of “retrenchment”. State Bank Of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money (1975 (2) L.L.N 101), Santosh Gupta v. State Bank Of Patiala (1980 (2) L.L.N 170) Now with introduction of one more exception to S. 2(oo), under Cl. (bb) the Legislature has excluded from the purview of ‘retrenchment.’
(i) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the nonrenewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry;
(ii) such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment.
It need not be impressed that if in the contract of employment no such stipulation is provided or prescribed, then such contract shall not be covered by Cl. (bb) of S. 2(oo)……”
14. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, in its judgment reported in Shailendra Nath Shukla v. Vice-Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 L & I.C 1607, has examined the position as to in what cases. Section 2(oo)(bb) can be applied and stated the legal position as under in Para. 5:
“Terminations which are included in it are those which are brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated period or completion of work whichever may be earlier.’ May be covered in this clause. But if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate the claim of employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from the Principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on anvil of fairness and bona fide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to employer not to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstance then the protection afforded to a workman by treating every termination of service as retrenchment shall be rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bond fide. It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That would be unfair labour practice See H.D Singh v. Reserve Bank of India [1985 L & I.C 1733]”.
15. In another Division Bench judgment or Orissa High Court, reported in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Orissa Road Transport Company, Ltd. v. Ramesh Chandra Gouda, 1994 (2) L.L.J 1127, whereagain, while interpreting S. 2(oo), the Division Bench has stated as under in Para. 3:
“…It is hence the general intention of the Legislature that all types of termination of services are to be covered by ‘retrenchment’ except the events excepted in Sub-cls(a) to (c). It is well known that exceptions to a general provision are to receive a rigours interpretation and only govern specifically the situations covered by them and no further. An exception cannot be permitted to frustrate the general provisions of the Act in this case to treat any termination of services are retrenchment except what is strictly excepted. …”.
16. In another Division Bench Judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Bhikku Ram v. Presiding Officer Indusrial-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, 1995 L & I.C 2448, the Division Bench has explained the legal position as under in Para. 35:
“If the employer resists the claim of the workman and invokes S. 2(oo)(bb), burden lies on the employer to show that though the employee has worked for 240 days in twelve months prior to termination of his service, such termination of service cannot be treated as retrenchment because it is in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment or on account, of non-renewal of the contract of employment. Only a bona fide exercise of right by an employer to terminate the service in terms of the contract of employment or for non-renewal of the contract will be covered by Cl. (bb). If the Court finds that the exercise of rights by the employer is not bona fide or the employer has adopted the methodology of fixed term employment as a conduct or mechanism to frustrate the rights of the workman, the termination of the service will not be covered by the exception contained in Cl. (bb). Instead the action of the employer will have to be treated as an act of unfair labour practice, as specified In the fifth schedule of the Act”.
“…. In all other cases, the termination of service will be treated as retrenchment unless they are covered by other exceptions set out hereinabove”.
17. In yet another Division Bench judgment of Orissa High Court, reported in Chakradhar Tripathy v. State of Orissa, 1992 L & I.C 1813, in a concurring judgment, the Hon'ble Chief Justice B.L Hansaria as he then was, has stated the position as under in Paras. 19 and 20:
“19. It has been stated in the leading judgment that by taking resort to ‘colourable’ contracts, the protection of S. 25-F cannot be allowed to be frustrated. I think this statement of law takes care of the apprehension of Sri Nanda
20. There may be other cases also these cannot be categories as observed by my learned sister. All that I would like to emphasise is that the Courts would remove the veil in such cases and see the reality of the matter…”.
18. A learned Single Judge or Madhya Pradesh, in his judgment reported in Madhya Pradesh Bank Karmachari Sangh (M.P) v. Syndicate Bank 1996 (2) L.L.N 747, after considering the various Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as other High Courts, has concluded as under in Para. 18, at page 754:
“From the decisions noted above, it becomes apparent:
(i) that the provisions of S. 2 (oo)(bb) are to be construed benevolently in favour of the workman;
(ii) that if the workman ia allowed to continue in service by making periodic appointments from time to time, then it can be said chat the case would not fall under S. 2(oo)(bb);
(iii) that the provisions of S. 2 (oo)(bb) are not to be interpreted in the manner which may stifle the main provision;
(iv) that if the workman continues in service, the non-renewal of the contract can be deemed as mala fide and it may amount to be a fraud on statute;
(v) that there would be wrong presumption of non-applicability of S. 2(oo)(bb) where the work is of continuous nature and there is nothing on record that the work for which a workman has been appointed had come to an end”.
19. His Lordship Sri Justice Srikrishna, as he then was, has interpreted Cl. (bb) of S. 2 (oo) in the following words, in the judgment reported in Alexandar Yesudas Mailkel v. Perfect Oil Seals and IRP, 1995 (1) L.L.N 1165, in Para. 5, at page 1168:
“In any event, one cannot lost right of the fact that Cl (bb) has itself been restrictively interpreted and the judicial consensus appears to be that, if the post continues and the work continues, Cl. (bb) cannot be said to operate as a charter for unscrupulous employers to jettison their workmen. …”.
20. In another judgment reported in Deputy Director of Health Services, Nasik, Mandal Nasik v. Latabai Rajdhar Paturkar, 1996 (3) L.L.N 675, the very same learned Judge has explained the position as under in Para. 8, at page 681:
“It will at once be seen that, just as there are no word of limitation in the main body of the definition, equally, there are no words of limitation in the exception Cl. (bb). As long as either of the two contingencies contemplated by the clause is fulfilled, the situation would not amount to ‘retrenchment’ within the main body of the definition in S. 2(oo). However, by a series of judgments of our High Court and of other High Courts import of the words used and the amplitude of this have been whittled down and the judicial consensus on the construction of this clause appears to be that the sweep of Cl. (bb) of S. 2(oo) cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also satisfactory, and yet periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employee, where the circumstances indicate that the letter of appointment is a camouflage to circumvent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or the benefit of permanency on workers who have worked continuously for a period of more than 240 days”.
21. In a recent judgment or me Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in S.M Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, 2003 (2) L.L.N 1134, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has set out the necessary ingredients to be satisfied for the application of S. 2(oo)(bb) in the following words in Para 13, at page 1140:
“The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Sub-cl. (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:
(i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract; and
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment”.
Further, in Para. 14, at page 1140 the Hon'ble Supreme, Court made it clear that:
“. . To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the abovesaid ingredients so has to attract the applicability of Sub-cl.(bb) abovesaid…”.
22. The above referred to decisions on “interpretation of S. 2(oo)(bb)” explain the legal position to the effect that a claim of an employer on a term based employee providing for automatic termination whether within the terms fixed or on expiry of the said term, cannot be taken for granted to sustain the order of termination. On a plain reading of S. 2(oo)(bb), it is quite clear that such term based employment would fall out side the scope of “retrenchment” is long as the requirement of such fixed period of employment was bona fide required by the employer. It was, therefore, repeatedly pointed out that such excepted categories required a rigorous test rather than accepting the plea of employer on its face value or otherwise it would cause serious prejudice to an employee, who can be taken for a vide by unscrupulous employers by contending that the term of employment was for specific period though as a matter of fact such period of employaient lasted quite for a long spell, In other words even enough the requirement: of employment was perennial by adopting the methodology of employing a person for a specific period as many a times, an unscrupulous employer can always resort to abusing the provision contained in S. 2(oo)(bb) to thwart the other statutory protection available to an employee under S. 2(oo), namely, in the case of a “retrenchment” vis-a-vis the consequential benefits contained under S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, when such extraordinary circumstances are brought out in the matter of employment and termination is resorted to by taking umbrage under S. 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the interest of justice, we are of the view that a close scrutiny of the real position will have to be necessarily made to rule out the possibility of any injustice being caused to an employee. It cannot be lost sight of that S. 2(oo)(bb) is specifically meant to cover only such employment which would be needed for an employer for a specific period alone and beyond which the requirement will not be there end even on such occasions, the employer should not be put into an unnecessary predicament of facing the other consequences that would normally occur while resorting to retrenchment. The benefit of the said exception will have to be strictly restricted to such specific situations alone and the same cannot be allowed to be misused or abused by the employers even in regard to cases where the nature and requirement of employment is perennial.
23. In the above said legal background, when the case on hand is examined, we find that even excluding the earlier period of engagement, of the respondent as “security supervisor” in his capacity as a contract labour between 1983 and 1987, from 13 January, 1988 his employment with the appellant was a direct one. While it is stated that between 13 January, 1988 and 31 March, 1989 such employment as security supervisor with the appellant was pursuant to specific orders for fixed period, the said position was given a go-by by the appellant after 1 April, 1989 till the respondent came to be relieved of his duties on and after 31 March, 1999. To put it more clearly, on and after 1 April, 1989 up to 31 March, 1999 for a period of 10 long years, the service of the reapondent was availed of by the appellant in the post of “security supervisor” continuously without any break and the said period of employment was not covered by any specific written orders of contract employment providing for either automatic termination on the expiry of the period ending with 31 March, 1999 or was such termination dependent upon any other contingencies. It is not the case of the appellant that the cessation of the employment of the respondent on and after 1 April, 1999 was either due to the post not being available nor any other contingencies depriving the appellant to continue the services of respondent in the said post.
24. On a perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition as well as the counter-affidavit, it transpires that the appellant took the stand that since the respondent was not a regular employee of the appellant, the age of retirement or 60 years applicable to other employees would not apply to the respondent and therefore, he had to be relieved on completing the age of 58 years as on 31 March, 1999. Even such a stand of the appellant further strengthens the claim of the respondent, that his employment with the appellant did not fall within the exception provided under S. 2(oo)(bb) and thereby the termination on and after 31 March, 1999 amounted to a clear case of retrenchment1 falling under S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and when such “retrenchment” was in violation of 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act that would render the order of termination void ab initio. Admittedly, while relieving the respondent by issuing thy impugned order dated 19 February, 1999, the appellant did not comply with the legal requirement of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. While according to the respondent, he was entitled to be continued in service till he reached the age of 60 years, according to the appellant, the said condition of service was not applicable to him.
25. As we have found from the factual matrix involved in the case on hand that the claim of the appellant as regards the employment of the respondent does not fall within S. 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it will have to be held that the services of the respondent could not have been terminated atleast without following the statutory requirements as stipulated under S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as the termination resorted to by the appellant squarely falls within the definition of ‘retrenchment’ as defined under S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, we are obliged to state that the impugned order of termination, dated 18 February, 1999, issued in violation of S. 25-F of the Act was wholly “ab initio void”. In such circumstances, it will have to be held that the respondent was entitled to be continued in service atleast up to the age of 60 years. When once we reach the conclusion that the appellant though initially employed the respondent for fixed period between 13 January, 1988 and 31 March, 1989 after 1 April, 1989, the employment of the respondent was on a regular basis and such employment continued for 10 long years till 31 March, 1999. When that be so, it will have to be held that such sustained employment provided by the appellant in an uninterrupted manner by itself conferred every legal right on the respondent to claim that he was employed on a regular basis. In such circumstances, the consequential benefit of continuation in employment till 60 years should, automatically follow, to which the respondent was legally entitled to. Therefore, we are of the confirmed view that the impugned order of termination, dated 18 February, 1999, relieving the respondent on and after 31 March, 1999 was colourable exercise of power and consequently, the respondent should be deemed to have been in service till he attained the age of 60 years, i.e, ending with 31 March, 2001.
26. Having regard to the said position, the appellant is bound to pay the wages that were payable to the respondent. Since the respondent has crossed the age of 60 yeers, the appellant is directed to pay the wages payable to the respondent between 1 April, 1999 and 31 March, 2001 apart from other consequential benefits payable to him pursuant to his employment with the appellant-Corporation as a security supervisor. The appellant shall comply with the above direction with in one month from the date of receipt of this order.
27. In the result, the writ appeal falls and the same is dismissed with the above direction. No costs.