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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision-petitioner is the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance, seeking a direction to the defendants to execute a sale deed in respect of certain immovable property. The plaintiff's case is that the first defendant agreed to sell the suit property on his behalf and on behalf of his minor and executed a sale agreement for Rs. 1,50,000/-. The plaintiff alleges that a prior suit (O.S. No. 39/96) filed by the first defendant prevented completion of the sale transaction; on this basis the plaintiff contended the present suit was not barred by limitation. The suit for specific performance was filed in 1996 and remained pending; the defendants filed a written statement alleging the suit is barred by limitation. After framing issues, the trial proceeded and P.W.1 was examined.

During trial the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 452/2003 seeking to introduce certain amendments described as clarificatory — including adjustments arising from subsequent subdivision of the suit property and inclusion of the date of withdrawal of the prior suit — and contending that the amendments were necessary to determine the real controversy and to meet the ends of justice. The defendants opposed the amendment application, arguing that under the amended Civil Procedure Code (Order 6, Rule 17 as amended by Act 22 of 2002) an amendment after commencement of trial is not maintainable unless the proviso's test (due diligence) is satisfied, and that the plaintiff was improperly seeking exemption from the Limitation Act by the amendment.

The learned Subordinate Judge, Hosur, dismissed the amendment application on 31-10-2003. The plaintiff filed the present revision challenging that dismissal. The High Court heard counsel for both sides and set aside the trial Court's order, allowed the amendment application, permitted the plaintiff to amend the plaint as prayed and directed the trial Court to dispose of the suit within three months from receipt of the order and to send the record if available.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application to amend the plaint after commencement of trial (P.W.1 examined) is maintainable in a suit filed before the amendment to Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code came into force (i.e., a suit filed in 1996) — in particular, whether the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 (as amended by Act 22 of 2002) operates as an absolute bar in such a case.
  2. Whether the proposed amendments are clarificatory in nature (thus permissible) or whether they introduce a new case, new cause of action, or relief that would be barred by limitation or prejudice the defendants.
  3. Whether the trial Court erred in dismissing the amendment application without properly applying the relevant statutory transitional provisions and precedents concerning amendments of pleadings.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision-Petitioner's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The proposed amendments are clarificatory and do not introduce any new case, change the character of the suit, or alter the relief sought.
  • Allowing the amendments would not prejudice the defendants and would assist in deciding the matter on merits.
  • Order 6, Rule 17 as amended by Act 22 of 2002 should not apply to this suit because the amended provision is not made applicable to suits/pleadings filed prior to 1-7-2002; the suit was filed in 1996, therefore the amended proviso should not obstruct amendment after the commencement of trial.
  • The trial Court committed an error in dismissing the application without considering the transitional application of the amended provision to suits filed before 1-7-2002.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The amended provision of Order 6, Rule 17 (as effected by Act 22 of 2002) is applicable to the present case and, accordingly, amendments after commencement of trial are not permissible unless the proviso's test is met.
  • By the proposed amendment, the plaintiff seeks to claim exemption from the Limitation Act; permitting such an amendment would cause prejudice to the defendants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Subba Naicker v. Veluchamy Naicker, 2004 (2) CTC 742 Statement that after the Amendment Act came into force, no amendment of the plaint can be allowed after commencement of trial unless the Court is satisfied that despite due diligence the matter could not have been raised before trial. The Court considered this ruling but limited its application: it noted the ratio applies to suits filed after 1-7-2002 and that P. Subba Naicker's case did not make clear the filing date; thus the principle could not be universally applied to suits (like the present one) filed before 1-7-2002.
Fritiz T.M. Clement v. Sudhakaran Nadar, (2002) 3 SCC 605 : AIR 2002 SC 1148 Permitted amendment of an ill-drafted plaint by way of elaboration and clarification where the amendment did not introduce a new case or fresh cause of action; a party should not be penalised for poor drafting. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that clarificatory amendments — which do not change the substantive cause of action — should be allowed so that the real controversy can be decided on merits.
Punjab National Bank v. Indian Bank, (2003) 6 SCC 79 : AIR 2003 SC 2284 Held that where an amendment clarifies pre-existing averments and does not introduce new relief or cause of action, such an amendment should be allowed; vagueness can be cured by amendment. The Court applied this principle to conclude that the proposed amendments (clarifying monetary/pleading or property description aspects and limitation-related averments) were clarificatory in nature and therefore proper to allow.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in several analytic steps, following the text of the opinion:

  1. The Court examined the amended provision, Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. (as amended by Act 22 of 2002, effective 1-7-2002), which generally grants wide power to allow amendments at any stage but contains a proviso denying permission to amend after the trial has commenced unless the applicant shows that, in spite of due diligence, the matter could not have been raised before trial.
  2. The Court emphasised that the proviso is not an absolute, blanket ban; it restrains the otherwise liberal power to allow amendments but permits relief if the due-diligence test in the proviso is satisfied.
  3. The Court then analysed the transitional statutory scheme: Section 16 (and specifically Section 16(2)(b)) of Act 22 of 2002 (and related references to earlier amendment Acts) provides that certain amended provisions of Order VI shall not apply to pleadings filed before the commencement of the amended provisions. The Court observed that some provisions omitted, inserted or substituted by the amended Civil Procedure Code do not apply to pleadings filed prior to the effective date.
  4. Applying that transition rule to the facts, the Court noted the present suit was filed in 1996, i.e., before the amendments that took effect on 1-7-2002. Consequently, the Court held the proviso in the amended Order 6, Rule 17 cannot operate as an absolute impediment to amendment in this case; the proviso's restriction should not be applied to pleadings filed before the amendment's effective date.
  5. The Court then examined the nature of the proposed amendments by comparing the existing pleadings and the proposed additions. Regarding the property description, the Court found the amendment simply reflected a subsequent subdivision of the originally identified survey number; it did not change the subject-matter of the suit because the old survey number and boundaries already identified the property.
  6. Concerning the proposed additional averments on limitation (dates of filing and withdrawal of the prior suit and exclusion of the period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act), the Court characterised these averments as clarificatory — intended to improve and specify details already present in the plaint rather than introducing a new cause of action.
  7. The Court relied on the precedents in which the Supreme Court permitted clarificatory amendments (Fritiz T.M. Clement and Punjab National Bank) to support the conclusion that amendments which only clarify existing averments and do not introduce new claims or relief should be allowed. The Court distinguished or limited the applicability of P. Subba Naicker to suits filed after 1-7-2002.
  8. On this basis, the Court concluded the trial Court erred in dismissing I.A. No. 452/2003 as not maintainable and set aside that order, allowing the amendment application.
  9. Finally, as a procedural consequence of granting the amendment (and noting the suit is part heard and originates in 1996), the Court directed the trial Court to dispose of the suit within three months from receipt of a copy of the order and directed the Registry to send back records if they were available.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The revision is allowed: the trial Court's order dismissing I.A. No. 452/2003 is set aside and the plaintiff is permitted to amend the plaint as prayed for.

Direct implications for the parties and case management:

  • The plaintiff may file the proposed amendments to the plaint (as detailed in I.A. No. 452/2003).
  • No costs were awarded by the Court in the revision proceeding.
  • The trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit within three months from the date it receives a copy of this order; if the record is held at the High Court Registry, it is to be sent back forthwith along with the judgment.

Broader precedent or implications: The opinion primarily resolves the specific application of Order 6, Rule 17 to a suit filed before the amendment's effective date; it applies established principles allowing clarificatory amendments and limits the reach of an authority (P. Subba Naicker) to suits filed after 1-7-2002. The opinion does not purport to announce a broader or novel legal principle beyond the resolution of the present case.

    L. Narayan Reddy v. P. Narayan Reddy And Others

    1. The plaintiff is the revision-petitioner.

    2. The revision-petitioner, impleading the respondents herein as defendants, has filed a suit for Specific Performance of contract, seeking direction to the defendants to execute a sale deed in respect of some immovable properties. According to revision-petitioner/plaintiff, the first defendant had agreed to sell the suit property on his behalf and on behalf of his minor and in pursuance of the same, he had also executed a sale agreement in his favour agreeing to sell the property for a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-. It is the further case of the plaintiff/revisions-petitioner, as seen from paragraph 4 of the plaint that because of the suit filed by the first defendant in O.S No. 39/96 on the file a District Munsif, Hosur, he was unable to complete the sale transaction and there was some dispute. It is the further contention of the revision-petitioner as seen from paragraph 8 of the plaint that because of the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff was legally prevented from filing the suit for specific performance and, therefore, the suit is not barred by limitation. On the above basis, accusing the defendants, as if they have committed breach of contract, the suit was filed for specific performance in the year 1996 and the said suit is still pending. The contesting defendants/respondents filed a detailed written statement informing the Court, how the suit is barred by limitation and how the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for specific performance. On the basis of the plea and counter-plea, after framing issues, the trial has been commenced and at present, P.W 1 was examined.

    3. At this stage, the plaintiff has filed I.A No. 452/2003 in order to introduce certain amendments, as detailed in the petition, contending that the proposed amendment is in the nature of clarificatory statement based on subsequent to sub division of suit property as well as on the basis of subsequent withdrawal of previous suit, filed by the first defendant and therefore, in order to meet the ends of justice and to decide the case once for all finally, the proposed amendments are absolutely necessary. The contesting defendants, opposed the same on the ground that the petition filed for amendment after P.W 1 has been examined is not maintainable in view of the amended Civil Procedure Code and that the plaintiff cannot claim exemption on the basis of pendency of the previous suit, which has nothing to do with the filing of the present suit.

    4. The learned Subordinate Judge, Hosur, weighing the rival contentions of the parties, scanning the previous pleadings as well as the proposed amendment, tested the same with judicial precedent, which brought to surface that the petition is not maintainable. In this view, the petition came to be dismissed on 31-10-2003, which is under challenge in this revision.

    5. Heard Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P. Mani, learned counsel for the respondents.

    6. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. V. Raghavachari submits that by the proposed amendment, the plaintiff is not introducing any new case, not changing the character of the suit, including the prayer and the aim of the petition is only to clarify the existing pleadings, if the same is allowed, it would not cause any prejudice to the other side. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that the amended Civil Procedure Code relating to the provision under Order 6, Rule 17 could not be made applicable to this case, since the amended provision is not made applicable to the existing pleadings viz., the suits filed prior to 1-7-2002. Unfortunately, without considering these aspects the trial Court committed an error, in dismissing the application, which error should be rectified by this Court.

    7. The learned counsel for the respondents/defendants, opposing the above contentions, submits that the amended provision is applicable even to the present case and not only that, by the proposed amendment, the plaintiff wants to claim exemption from the Limitation Act, which could not be allowed to be raised. If allowed much prejudice would be caused to the defendants.

    8. Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C has been amended under Act 22 of 2002 with effect from 1-7-2002, which reads as follows:

    “The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:

    Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.”

    9. Though the first part of the section gives wide power to the Court to allow the amendment of pleadings at any stage of proceedings, which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the litigants, the proviso restricts the liberal view to certain extent, since it commands no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has been commenced. Here also, it is not a blanket ban refusing the amendment after the trial has been commenced and the same is subject to further liberalisation, if the parties, who moved the Court for amendment, had shown that in spite of due diligence, it was not within his reach to raise the matter, which he is now raising, before the commencement of the trial, then the Court should be so liberal in allowing the amendment in order to meet the ends of justice, deciding and determining the question, in controversy, between the parties, thereby avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or driving the parties to commence subsequent litigation.

    10. The learned counsel for the respondent, in support of his contentions that amendment of plaint is not permissible, after coming into force of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, relied on a decision of this Court in P. Subba Naicker v. Veluchamy Naicker (2004 (2) CTC 742), wherein Lordship P. Sathasivam, J. held as follows,:

    “After Amendment Act came into force no amendment of Plaint can be allowed after commencement of trial unless Court comes to conclusion that in spite of due diligence plaintiff could not have raised plea before commencement of trial.”

    11. This ratio could be made applicable in a case, which was filed only after 1-7-2002, which could be seen from Section 16 of Act 22 of 2002. In P. Subba Nicker's case, it is not clear whether the suit was filed before 1-7-2002 or after 1-7-2002. Therefore, as such, this ruling cannot be made applicable to all the cases and it would depended upon the filing of the suit.

    12. Section 16(2)(b) of Act 22 of 2002 reads as follows:

    (b) the provisions of Rules 5, 15, 17, and 18 of Order VI of the First Schedule as omitted or, as the case may be, inserted or substituted by Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 and by Section 7 of this Act shall not apply to in respect of any pleading filed before the commencement of Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 and Section 7 of this Act.

    13. Thus it is seen, some of the provisions omitted in Order 6, some of the provisions inserted or substituted by Amended Civil Procedure Code shall not apply to in respect of any pleading filed before the commencement of implementing the amended provisions. In this case, admittedly, the suit was filed in the year 1996 i.e, before the amendments introduced under Act, 22 of 2002 and in this view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion, the proviso cannot be an impediment or bar in allowing the amendment application, if it otherwise deserves on merit to be allowed, on the basis that the trial has been commenced and, therefore, no amendment shall be allowed after commencement of the trial. Next we have to see whether the proposed amendment deserves acceptance.

    14. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the revision-petitioner that no prejudice would be caused to the respondents, if the proposed amendment is allowed, which aids to decide the case on merit giving clarification to the existing pleading and in support of the above contention, aid is sought from Fritiz T.M Clement v. Sudhakaran Nadar, (2002) 3 SCC 605 : (AIR 2002 SC 1148) and Punjab National Bank v. Indian Bank, (2003) 6 SCC 79 : (AIR 2003 SC 2284).

    15. In the first case, an ill drafted plaint with cryptic and inaccurate averments sought to be amended by way of elaboration and clarification, that is even before the commencement of the trial not introducing any new case or fresh cause of action. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court has held as follows:

    “The original plaint, though set out the main basis of the suit, was rather cryptic and lacking in relevant particulars. There was a bare reference to the agreement which was the foundation for the appellant's claim. Not only that, the basic terms of the agreement were not accurately stated in the original plaint. Even the specific date of the agreement had not been mentioned; instead only the year was mentioned. Thus sufficient care had not been taken in drafting the plaint. The party shall not be penalized for that reason.”

    16. In this view, the proposed amendment, which was refused by the Courts below, was allowed by the Apex Court.

    17. In the Punjab National Bank case, the Apex Court has observed, if the amendment sought to be made is in the nature of clarification of pre-existing averments in the plaint, that should be allowed. The relevant portion reads as follows:

    “Reading the plaint as a whole, it is found that although in some paragraphs and in the caption of the cause title of the suit, the rupee equivalent of the amount in USD has been indicated first and in dollars later as well as in prayers (i) and (interim injunction); that would not mean that there is no claim and prayer for decree in terms of dollars at all. However, there is some vagueness in the plaintiffs case regarding the claim and decree in terms of dollars or rupees but there can always be an amendment of the pleading to clear such confusions and vagueness. The present case is not one in which something fresh or new is sought to be added. The claim in terms of dollars has been made in different paragraphs of the plaint as well as in clause (v) of the prayer clause, no new relief is sought to be added, only the part claiming the relief in rupee terms is sought to be deleted and a clear prayer for a decree in dollars would resultantly remain there by deletion of the rupee component. Therefore, no question of introducing any new case, a new cause of action or seeking new relief which may be barred by limitation arises. It is an amendment more clarificatory in nature.

    18. Having the above principles in mind, we have to see whether the proposed amendment is in the nature of clarification or whether it introduced a new case, destroying the basic structure, on which a suit has already been filed. To understand the nature of the amendment, we have to see the previous pleadings as well as the proposed amendment.

    19. In paragraph 6 of the plaint, the plaintiff has stated about the suit filed by the first defendant, which was pending before the District Munsif Court, Hosur as O.S 39/96, though the suit was filed elsewhere in the year 1989, later transferred to Hosur District Munsif Court and renumbered as O.S No. 39/96. The plaint further reads that in view of the assurance given by the first defendant that he will withdraw the suit, the plaintiff was waiting patiently for an year in O.S No. 39/96. Paragraph 8 of the plaint gives certain details how the suit is not barred by limitation though the dates were not given claiming exclusion from the Limitation Act. Only to improve those averments, which are already in existence by way of clarification, the petition is filed seeking amendments. In the affidavit also, the plaintiff has stated that he came to know about the withdrawal of the suit later and the date should be included. It is the further case of the plaintiff that after the suit was filed, the patta was transferred, suit survey number was sub-divided. In this view, the plaintiff wants to amend the description of the property as well as add some more averments at the end of pararaph-8, which says the suit is not barred by limitation.

    20. The subject-matter of the suit in the original plaint is dry land bearing S. No. 13/2A, Dry Ext. Hec. 0.76.5, for the above extent, boundary also was given. It seems sub-division was taken place and, therefore, the plaintiff wants to have the sub-division as 13/2A1 and 13/2A2, further clarifying that the suit property is in 13/2A1 measuring 0.59.5 Hec. In my considered opinion, there is no change of property, since such property is already identified with old Survey Number, giving boundary also. In this view, by the proposed amendment, there is no change in the subject-matter of the suit and by allowing the same, the parties would stand benefited in reaching a final conclusion.

    21. As far as the second amendment is concerned, it reads as follows:

    “The O.S No. 39/96 was filed in Sub-Court, Krishnagiri on 7-12-1989 (O.S No. 222/89) Sub-Court, Krishnagiri) and the petition for withdrawal was ordered on 14-10-1996 by the District Munsif, Hosur, though wrongly mentioned as 17-10-1996, in the suit register, any how the period commencing from 7-10-89 to 14-10-1996 i.e, a period of 6 years 10 months and 7 days is to be excluded, and in fact the 7th defendant filed a revision against the orders in I.A No. 1411/96 and the High Court, dismissed the revision on 25-4-1997. So the period commencing from 7-12-1989 to 14-10-1996 is to be excluded, because the plaintiff was prosecuting the case under the bona fide impression that the vendor will establish his title for the property, and so under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the period of 6 years 10 months and 7 days is to be excluded, and in fact to show the bona fide of the plaintiff, the present suit was filed even before withdrawal petition is ordered and so the question of limitation does not arise, because even the 1st defendant himself has not chosen to claim the period of 11 months mentioned in the agreement as time is the essence of contract, because he himself has wanted the document to be completed on 15-12-1989, after expiry of 11 months. So the present suit filed is in time for the reasons stated above, and in the earlier paras.

    22. As aforementioned, the plaintiff claimed exemption from the Limitation Act and explained how the suit is in time and in this view, the above averment reproduced is in the nature of clarification, as held by the Apex Court and, therefore, by allowing this proposed amendment, no prejudice would be caused and an opportunity must be given to the plaintiff to agitate his case in detail, clarifying the existing pleading and for that purpose, in my considered opinion, revision deserves acceptance.

    23. Unfortunately, the trial Court, without approaching the case from its proper perspective, dismissed the amendment application, as if not maintainable and if allowed, it would cause prejudice, erroneously which, therefore, deserves setting aside.

    24. In the result, revision is allowed by setting aside the order of the trial Court in I.A No. 452/2003 and allowing the same, thereby permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint, as prayed for. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P is closed.

    25. Since the suit is part heard and of the year 1996, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If the records are available here, Registry is directed to send back the records also forthwith along with the Judgment.

    26. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    L. Narayan Reddy v. P. Narayan Reddy And Others
    (Jul 16, 2004)