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  • Sections 96 (2) (b) (ii) and 84 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.The
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  • Sections 96 (2) (b) (ii) and 84 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.The
Smart Summary

Concise, Structured Summary of the Judgment — A.S. Venkatachalamoorthy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a common judgment delivered by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Dindigul (Principal District Judge, Dindigul) on 28.02.1997 disposing M.C.O.P. Nos. 1260/94, 55/95, 56/95 and other claim petitions. Appeals were filed from those awards:

  • C.M.A. No. 1228 of 1997 — by claimants in M.C.O.P. No. 1260 of 1994 (seeking enhanced compensation);
  • C.M.A. No. 88 of 1998 — by claimant in M.C.O.P. No. 55 of 1995 (seeking enhanced compensation);
  • C.M.A. No. 327 of 1998 — by claimant in M.C.O.P. No. 56 of 1995 (seeking enhanced compensation);
  • CMA Nos. 1331, 1333 and 1337 of 1998 — filed by the insured/owner questioning the Tribunal's judgment that had exonerated the Insurance Company in respect of the MCOPs noted above.

The underlying accident occurred on 08.07.1994 at about 3:30 P.M. A Tempo Traveller Mini Van (Registration No. TN-59 A-3906) carrying a medical team from Aravind Eye Hospital to an eye camp met with an accident near Palakanuthu: the van struck a tamarind tree. Dr. Premachandran died in the accident; Dr. Reshmi and Dr. Shanthi suffered injuries. At the Tribunal stage the first respondent (Aravind Eye Hospital) was absent and was set ex parte; the second respondent (United India Insurance Company Ltd.) contested liability on the grounds that the accident resulted from heavy rain and brake failure (act of God) and additionally alleged breach of the insurance policy by carrying more persons than permitted.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by its driver?
  2. What is the amount of compensation payable to the claimants in M.C.O.P. No. 1260 of 1994 (appeal CMA No. 1228/97)?
  3. What is the amount of compensation payable to the claimant in M.C.O.P. No. 55/95 (appeal CMA No. 88/98)?
  4. What is the amount of compensation payable to the claimant in M.C.O.P. No. 56/95 (appeal CMA No. 327/98)?
  5. Whether the Insurance Company is absolved of its liability on the ground that the vehicle carried more persons than allowed by the insurance policy?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Claimants

  • The claimants alleged the driver drove rashly and negligently, causing the van to dash against a tree and causing death and injuries.
  • They sought specific amounts as compensation: Rs. 20,00,000 for the dependants of Dr. Premachandran (M.C.O.P. 1260/94); Rs. 5,00,000 for Dr. Reshmi (M.C.O.P. 55/95); and Rs. 10,00,000 for Dr. Shanthi (M.C.O.P. 56/95).
  • The claimants relied on witness testimony, FIR (Ex.P-7), salary certificate (Ex.P-3) and medical/disability evidence (various exhibits) to substantiate causation, income and injuries.

Second Respondent / United India Insurance Company Ltd. (Insurer)

  • Contended the accident occurred due to heavy rain and brake failure (an act of God) and not due to rash or negligent driving by the driver.
  • Argued the insured violated policy conditions by carrying more persons than permitted, and therefore the Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify; any compensation should be borne solely by the insured/owner.
  • Before the High Court, the Insurance Company's counsel contested enhancement of compensation and supported the Tribunal's award levels (or contended no interference was called for).

Note: The 1st respondent (Aravind Eye Hospital) was absent at the Tribunal and was set ex parte; the opinion does not contain an active defence presented by the 1st respondent in the High Court proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1943 PC 63 — Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Leonard Lockhart Distinction between restrictions affecting the sphere of employment and restrictions relating to the manner of performance of duties; passenger-number restriction is a manner-of-performance limitation. The Court used this distinction to treat the policy clause limiting passengers as pertaining to manner of performance (not to the sphere of employment) and therefore not a ground to automatically deny indemnity.
1981 ACJ 399 — K.R. Sivagami v. Mahaboob Nisa Bi and others Where a taxi carried more passengers than authorized, non-observance of passenger-number rules relates to improper performance of driver's duties and does not limit sphere of employment. The Court relied on this Division Bench ruling to support the view that exceeding passenger limits is a manner-of-performance breach and does not by itself absolve the insurer unless it contributed to the accident.
(1996) 4 SCC 647 — B.V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Divisional Officer, Hassan Merely carrying extra passengers (beyond policy limit) does not necessarily increase risk or amount to such a fundamental breach as to deny indemnity; insurer must show that the added persons contributed to the accident. The Court invoked this Supreme Court observation to hold the insurer liable unless it proves the additional passengers caused the accident; applied this principle because the insurer did not show causation by the extra passengers.
(1987) 2 SCC 654 — Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben (Kokibaben) Chandravadan Endorses the approach of 'reading down' exclusion clauses so as to harmonize exclusionary clauses with the main purpose of the contract (protecting victims); courts should prefer relief to victims over doctrines that defeat indemnity. The Court cited this authority to justify reading down policy exclusions and giving effect to the main purpose of compulsory third-party insurance — protection and recoverability of compensation for victims.
Glynn v. Margetson & Co. (1893 AC 351) — (cited via Carter on Breach of Contract) Main-purpose rule: construing a contract requires reading the whole instrument and rejecting provisions inconsistent with the main purpose. Used doctrinally to support the principle of reading down wide exclusion clauses so they do not defeat the main purpose of the insurance contract.
[1967] 1 AC 361 — Suisse Atlantique Societe d’ Armement Maritime SA v. NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale House of Lords rejected the doctrine of fundamental breach; wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent inconsistent with the main purpose. The decision was cited to show the modern approach (post-rejection of fundamental breach) that supports harmonizing exclusion clauses with the contract's primary object.
AIR 1997 Bombay 242 — Shivraj Vasant Bhagwat v. Shevanta Dattaram Indulkar Policy terms must be construed to advance the main purpose (indemnity to victims); carrying extra passengers beyond permitted number does not necessarily disentitle the insured to indemnity unless the breach contributed to the accident. The Court relied on this Division Bench reasoning to reinforce that merely exceeding passenger limits is not a conclusive ground for denying indemnity when causation is not established.
1998 (1) L.W. 59 — Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Murugesh Insurer must show wilful breach or prove that additional persons caused the accident; absent such proof, denial of liability is not justified. The Court cited this learned single judge decision to support its conclusion that the insurer bore the onus to show causation linking the extra passengers to the accident — no such proof was produced.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing each issue expressly framed in the appeal record and applied the evidence and established legal principles step by step:

  1. Causation and negligence: The Court accepted the testimony of occupants (PWs-1 to 11), found the FIR (Ex.P-7) supported the account, noted there were no material contradictions in witness testimony, and upheld the Tribunal's conclusion that the accident occurred due to the driver's rash and negligent driving. The Insurance Company's contention of an act of God (rain and brake failure) did not persuade the Court.
  2. Compensation for death (M.C.O.P. 1260/94): The Court examined documentary evidence (salary certificate Ex.P-3) and testimony (PW-1). Although the wife said the deceased would have drawn Rs.10,051 after a subsequent diploma, the Court adopted a forward-looking income estimate of Rs.11,000 per month and, using the unit method, posited monthly contribution of Rs.8,000. Applying multiplier 17 (deceased aged 33), the Court computed dependency loss and added conventional heads (loss of love and affection, consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenses) of Rs.40,000 to arrive at a rounded total of Rs.16,75,000, with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition.
  3. Compensation for Dr. A.R. Reshmi (M.C.O.P. 55/95): The Court accepted medical evidence (Exs.P-73 to P-75, PW-16) establishing fractures and a 25% permanent partial disability. The Court awarded itemised heads: medical expenses (Rs.30,000), transport (Rs.5,000), nourishment (Rs.10,000), pain and suffering (Rs.50,000), permanent partial disability (Rs.75,000), loss of earning capacity (Rs.1,75,000) and loss of earning (Rs.10,000), totaling Rs.3,55,000, with interest at 9% from the date of petition.
  4. Compensation for Dr. Shanthi (M.C.O.P. 56/95): The Court accepted testimony and medical evidence (PW-2; PW-17; Ex.P-32) supporting fractures, leg shortening and 50% permanent disability. After accepting medical-expense documents to the extent of Rs.55,000 and awarding other heads (transport, nourishment, pain and suffering, permanent partial disability, loss of earning power, loss of stipend), the total award fixed was Rs.3,90,000 with 9% interest from the date of petition.
  5. Insurer's liability despite policy breach (overloading): The Tribunal had held the insurer not liable because the insured carried more passengers than permitted. On appeal, the High Court examined a line of authorities (including Canadian Pacific, K.R. Sivagami, B.V. Nagaraju, Skandia and later High Court and single-judge decisions) and distilled these legal principles:
    • The clause limiting the number of passengers relates to the manner of performance of the driver's duties rather than to the sphere of employment.
    • Exceeding the permitted number of passengers is an irregularity but not necessarily a "fundamental" breach that terminates the insurer's obligation to indemnify.
    • The insurer bears the burden of proving that the additional persons carried contributed to the occurrence of the accident; absent such proof, mere excess of passengers does not absolve the insurer.
    Applying these principles to the facts — 16 persons were carried although policy prescribed 14 — the Court found no evidence that the extra two persons caused the accident. Further, there was no persuasive showing that the extra passengers were taken to benefit the insured owner in a way that changed the risk borne by the insurer. Consequently, the Court reversed the Tribunal's exoneration of the insurer and held the insurer liable to pay the awards.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • On causation: The accident was held to have been caused by the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle's driver.
  • On compensation:
    • The appellants in C.M.A. No. 1228 of 1997 (claimants in M.C.O.P. No. 1260/94) are awarded Rs. 16,75,000/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition.
    • The appellant in C.M.A. No. 88/1998 (claimant in M.C.O.P. No. 55/95) is awarded Rs. 3,55,000/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition.
    • The appellant in C.M.A. No. 327 of 1998 (claimant in M.C.O.P. No. 56/95) is awarded Rs. 3,90,000/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition.
  • On insurer liability: The Insurance Company is held liable to compensate the claimants for the amounts indicated above; the Tribunal's finding absolving the insurer was set aside.
  • Appeal Disposition: CMA Nos. 1228/97, 88/98 and 327/98 are allowed to the extent of the awards indicated; CMA Nos. 1331, 1333 and 1337/98 are allowed (as recorded in the judgment).

Implications and Consequences

Direct effect on the parties: the claimants and appellants receive the specific monetary awards described above with 9% interest from the date of the petition, and the Insurance Company is held liable to make good those awards. The Court applied and followed existing authorities to read down exclusionary policy clauses so as to preserve the protective object of compulsory third-party motor insurance; the judgment applies established precedents rather than announcing a novel legal principle. The opinion confines itself to applying those precedents to the facts and does not purport to lay down new law beyond that application.


Prepared strictly on the basis of the provided opinion text. No information was added beyond what appears in the opinion.

    M. Anandavalli Amma v. Arvind Eye Hospital

    Common Judgment — A.S Venkatachalamoorthy, J.

    By a Common Judgment, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Dindigul, (Principal District Judge, Dindigul), disposed of M.C.O.P Nos. 1260/94, 55/95 and 56 of 1995 and other Claim Petitions on 28.02.1997

    2. C.M.A No. 1228 of 1997 has been filed by the claimants in M.C.O.P No. 1260 of 1994, claiming enhanced compensation over and above what has been awarded by the Tribunal. C.M.A No. 88 of 1998 has been filed by the claimant in M.C.O.P No. 55 of 1995, claiming enhanced compensation over and above the amount awarded by the Tribunal. C.M.A No. 327 of 1998 has been filed by the claimant in MCOP. No. 56 of 1995, claiming enhanced compensation. CMA. Nos. 1331, 1337 and 1333 of 1998 have been filed by the Insured (owner of the vehicle), questioning the correctness of the Judgment of the Tribunal, exonerating the Insurance Company with reference to MCOP Nos. 1260/94, 55/95 and 56/95 respectively.

    3. Dr. Premachandran, Dr. Reshmi and Dr. Shanthi, working in Arvind Eye Hospital, Madurai, on the fateful day that was on 08.07.1994 at about 1.30 P.M, along with others, proceeded from Madurai in a Tempo Traveller Mini Van bearing Registration No. TN-59 A-3906 to render service in a Eye Treatment Camp that was being conducted by Aravind Eye Hospitals, Madurai at Sun-darapuram near Coimbatore. At about 3.30 P.M, the van reached the place called Palakanuthu and because of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle, it dashed against a tree and in the accident, Dr. Premachandran died while Dr. Reshmi and Dr. Shanthi sustained injuries.

    4. In M.C.O.P No. 1260 of 1994, the claimants viz., the mother, widow and the minor son of Dr. Premachandran claimed that they should be paid a compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/-. In M.C.O.P No. 55/95, Dr. Reshmi claimed a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- by way of compensation. Dr. Shanthi, the Claimant in MCOP.56 of 1995 claimed a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- by way of compensation.

    The first respondent in all the above MCOPs viz., Aravind Eye Hospital, represented by its Secretary was absent and hence it was set ex parte. The 2nd respondent viz., the United India Insurance Company Limited, Madurai, resisted the claims, contending that the accident did not take place due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle. According to the 2nd respondent, the Driver was driving the vehicle slowly and cautiously, but however, because of the heavy rain and failure of the brake, the Driver was not able to control it and only in those circumstances, the vehicle dashed against the tree. Hence, the accident occurred only due to the act of God. That apart, the 2nd respondent also contended that the first respondent violated the terms and conditions of the policy inasmuch as in the said vehicle viz., Tempo Traveller Mini Van, more persons were carried contrary to the terms and conditions of the policy and hence, only the first respondent is solely liable to pay the compensation, if any.

    5. At the trial, witnesses were examined by both sides and several exhibits were marked. The Tribunal, after elaborately considering the materials available on record, came to the conclusion that the claimants in MCOP No. 1260/94 viz., the appellants in CMA.1228/97 would be entitled for a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- by way of compensation. The Tribunal fixed the compensation payable to the claimant in MCOP.55/95 viz., the appellant in CMA.88/98 as Rs. 45,500/-. So far as the claimant in MCOP No. 56 of 1995 (appellant in CMA.327 of 1998), the Tribunal fixed the compensation at Rs. 67,500/-.

    The Tribunal also held that since the insured carried more passengers in the said vehicle than prescribed in the terms and conditions of the policy, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any amount and that the entire compensation has to be paid only by the Insured viz., the owner of the vehicle.

    6. The following questions arise for consideration in this Appeal: —

    {a} Whether the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle in question by its Driver?

    (b) What is the amount of compensation payable to the claimants in M.C.O.P No. 1260 of 1994 viz., the appellants in CM A No. 1228 of 1997?

    (c) What is the amount of compensation payable to the claimant in MCOP No. 55/95, the appellant in CMA.88 of 1998?

    (d) What is the amount of compensation payable to the claimant in MCOP.56 of 1995, the appellant in CMA.327 of 1998?

    (e) Whether the Insurance Company is absolved of its liability on the ground that the vehicle carried more persons than what is allowed/prescribed in the policy?

    7. Issue No. 1: — The admitted case is that a team consisting of Doctors from Aravind Eye Hospital, Madurai, were proceeding in the Tempo Traveller Mini Van bearing Registration No. TN-59 A-3906, in the afternoon of 08/07/1994 to a place called Sundarapuram near Coimbatore to attend an Eye Treatment Camp to render free services to the needy poor. When the van was nearing the village called Semmadaipatti, there was a heavy downpour and the claimants would contend that the van after crossing G.V.G Mill, negotiating a bend and the driver of the van who drove it in a rash and negligent manner, dashed against a Tamarind tree on the left hand side and in the accident, Dr. Premachandran and the driver died and others got injured. A complaint was lodged before the Police and Ex.P-7 is the F.I.R As to how the accident took place, has been explained by the injured occupants of the van as Pws-1 to 11. Their testimonies infuse confidence and no material contradictions have been pointed out among their testimonies which would persuade this Court to come to a conclusion that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Tempo Traveller Mini Van. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company has not succeeded in persuading this Court to come to a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the Tribunal.

    8. Issue No. 2: — There are three appellants in CMA. No. 1228 of 1997 (Claimants in MCOP. 1260/94), who are the mother, widow (aged 29 years) and son (aged 3 years) of Dr. Premachandran respectively. It is claimed by them that the deceased Premachandran was a Doctor working in the said Aravind Eye Hospital and getting a salary of Rs. 8,786/-. In support of the same, the claimants have examined the widow viz., Dr. Reshmi as PW-1 and the salary certificate of Dr. Premachandran has also been marked as Ex.P-3. The said witness has deposed before Court that before the accident, the deceased appeared for the examination viz., Diploma in National Board in Ophthalmology and was waiting for the results. In fact, after the accident, results were published and Dr. Premachandran got through the same successfully. According to PW-1, Doctors with said Diploma are being paid a sum of Rs. 10,051/- as salary. This witness has also testified to the effect that the deceased, who was at that time aged 33 years, was hale and healthy and would have survived beyond 70 years of age and during which period, apart from working in the Hospital, he would have earned by his private practice also. Because of the loss of her husband, she would claim that the family consisting of the appellants, lost a valuable contribution from him and further, the 3rd appellant, who is a young boy as well as the others are put to hardship and irreparable loss. The appellants would claim that the maximum multiplier has to be applied and a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- as total compensation should be awarded.

    9. Learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company would contend that as far as the amount of compensation payable is concerned, there is no clear evidence and that the amount of compensation fixed by the Tribunal at Rs. 10,00,000/- is just and proper. Learned counsel would further submit that the deceased Dr. Premachandran was getting only a salary of Rs. 8,786/- at that time and in the absence of clear evidence with regard to his contribution to the family, the Court can at best take only 2/3rd of the said amount as the amount which he would have contributed for the family and as he was aged 35 years at that time, the reasonable multiplier that can be adopted is 15 and on that basis, one can arrive at only a figure of Rs. 10,00,000/-. According to the learned counsel, no interference is called for with reference to the amount of compensation fixed.

    10. There is no dispute that Dr. Premachandran was working in Aravind Eye Hospital and drawing a salary of Rs. 8,786/- as evidenced by Ex.P-3. Equally, there is no dispute that before the accident, late Dr. Premachandran appeared for an examination ie., Diploma in National Board in Ophthalmology. PW-1, the wife of the victim, would claim that the results were announced subsequent to the accident and Dr. Premachandran was declared as having successfully passed out. Her further evidence is to the effect that her Husband Dr. Premachandran would have got increment and drawn a sum of Rs. 10,051/- per month from the date of obtaining the said Diploma. Keeping in mind that the young and efficient Doctor, who was working in a well known Hospital and had also bright prospects of improving his practice privately, we are inclined to proceed on the basis that he would be earning about Rs. 11,000/- per month and would have contributed a sum of Rs. 8,000/- to the appellants per month (adopting unit method), in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Adopting the multiplier of 17 as he was only aged 33 years at that time, we arrive at a figure of Rs. 16,32,000/-. With this, we add the conventional compensation under various heads viz., loss of love and affection, loss of consortium, loss of estate and funeral expenses, a sum of Rs. 40,000/- and arrive at a figure of Rs. 16,72,000/-, which, we round it to Rs. 16,75,000/-. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the appellants in CMA. No. 1228 of 1997 and claimants in O.P 1260 of 1994 would be entitled for a sum of Rs. 16,75,000/- (Rupees sixteen lakhs and seventy five thousand only) with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition.

    11. Issue No. 3: — The question is, what is the amount of compensation, that has to be fixed for the injured-claimant viz., Dr. A.R Reshmi. The Claimant, as PW-1, has deposed before Court that at the time of accident, she was studying P.G Course in Aravind Eye Hospital and getting a stipend of Rs. 1,200/-. According to her, she sustained serious injuries in the said accident and her hip bones got fractured and that there was multiples injuries also. After the accident, she was an in-patient for two months. She has testified before Court that because of the injuries, even after treatment, she is not in a position to conduct surgeries continuously. Ex.P-73 is the X-Ray taken and Ex.P-75 is the Disability Certificate issued by the Doctor, according to which, she has suffered 25% permanent partial disability. PW-16, the Doctor has deposed before Court about the nature of injuries sustained by the appellant. He has stated that her left hip muscle has lost its capacity to the extent of one grade and that she also gets pain in the left hip joint and the spinal cord. According to the Doctor, the claimant/appellant would find it difficult to climb the steps freely and she would not be able to operate the instruments which she has to do with her left leg at the time of surgery. This Court carefully examined the testimonies of PW-1, the appellant, PW-16, the Doctor as well as Exs.P-73 to P-75 and is satisfied that she sustained injuries at the time of the accident and that she is entitled to receive the compensation.

    As far as compensation is concerned, this Court is inclined to award a sum of Rs. 30,000/- for medical expenses; a sum of Rs. 5,000/- for transportation; a sum of Rs. 10,000/- for nourishment; a sum of Rs. 50,000/- for pain and suffering; a sum of Rs. 75,000/- for permanent partial disability; a sum of Rs. 1,75,000/- for loss of earning capacity and a sum of Rs. 10,000/- for loss of earning, and in all, we fix the compensation at Rs. 3,55,000/-.

    12. Issue No. 4: — The appellant was also one of the persons, who travelled in the ill-fated vehicle and sustained injuries in the accident. The appellant herein viz., Dr. Shanthi, as PW-2, has narrated not only the entire accident but also the nature of injuries sustained by her. According to PW-2, she was an in-patient in the Government Hospital, Dindigul and thereafter she was in Jawahar Hospital, a private Hospital at Madurai and thereafter at Coimbatore Medical Centre. In view of the accident, she is not able to walk as she was doing earlier. In the accident, she sustained fracture in three places. The right leg is now shortened by one inch and because of which, she is not able to peddle the instrument which she has to do at the time of conducting surgery. Apart from that, she is also not in a position to sit for a long time and discharge her duties. PW-17 was the Doctor, who assisted at the time of surgery by Dr. Venkat, conducted on PW-2. According to the Doctor, she has suffered 50% of permanent disability. Ex.P.32 is the Disability Certificate issued in that regard. Because of the fracture and subsequent injuries, there is considerable rick in the movement of ankle and that her right leg has become shortened by two inches and that she would not be in a position to conduct operations for a long time. This Court carefully examined the testimonies of Pws-2 and 17 and Exhibits filed in support of the claim and is of the opinion that a sum of Rs. 3,90,000/- would be the proper compensation that can be awarded. We examined the documents produced to show the extent of expenses incurred for the medical treatment and we are inclined to accept to the tune of Rs. 55,000/-. The various exhibits filed by the claimants, evidencing the expenses incurred for medical treatments have to be accepted and a sum of Rs. 55,000/- has to be fixed under that head. Apart from that, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- each can be awarded for transport and nourishment. Coming to pain and suffering, fixation of Rs. 75,000/- would meet the ends of justice. For permanent partial disability, a sum of Rs. 70,000/- can be awarded. Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, towards loss of earning power, a sum of Rs. 1,75,000/- is awarded. Because she was an inpatient for five months, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- has to be awarded as loss of stipend.

    The appellant shall be entitled for a compensation of Rs. 3,90,000/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition.

    13. The next question arises for consideration is as to whether, in view of the fact that a medical squad consisting of 16 persons were taken in the ill-fated van and which is contrary to one of the conditions that is found in the conditions of the policy, the Insurance Company is absolved from liability.

    14. The earliest ruling which has direct relevance to the case is the one reported in AIR 1943 PC 63 (Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Leonard Lockhart). In the said Judgment, the Court pointed out that there is a clear cut distinction between a restriction or a limitation which pertains to the sphere of employment and those which relate to the manner of performance of his duties within the sphere of his employment.

    A restriction relating to the number of passengers to be carried only be taken to be a restriction relating to the manner of performance of the driver's duties and it does not relate to the sphere of the employment.

    15. The above ruling came to be referred to and relied on by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in 1981 ACJ 399 (K.R Sivagami v. Mahaboob Nisa Bi and others). In that case, the taxi was authorised to carry only five passengers, but the driver unauthorisedly carried two more passengers and that as the taxi which was authorised to carry only five passengers carried seven passengers, the accident can be taken to be due to the negligence of the driver. In that case the Court ruled that the driver of the vehicle has carried more than the permitted load of passengers and this is contrary to the conditions of the permit under which the vehicle was allowed to be used as a tourist taxi. The Court held that the non-observance of the rules relating to the number of passengers to be carried, can only be said to be an improper performance of the driver's duties and even assuming that the permit condition not to take more than the permitted number of passengers is taken as a prohibition or restriction, that relates only to the manner of performance of the driver's duties in the course of his employment and that cannot in any way limit the sphere of his employment.

    16. Yet another citation which will be of much use is reported in (1996) 4 SCC 647 (B.V Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Divisional Officer, Hassan.). That was a case where according to the terms of Insurance policy, insured vehicle was authorised to take six workmen excluding the driver. But, at the time of accident, it carried nine persons. The Insurance Company raised a similar contention viz., that it is not liable to indemnify. Rejecting the said contention, the Supreme Court observed as under,

    “It is plain from the terms of the Insurance Policy that the insured vehicle was entitled to carry 6 workmen, excluding the driver. If those 6 workmen when travelling in the vehicle, are assumed not to have increased any risk from the point of view of the Insurance Company on occurring of an accident, how could those added persons be said to have contributed to the causing of it is the poser, keeping apart the load it was carrying. Here, it is nobody's case that the driver of the insured vehicle was responsible for the accident…….. Merely by lifting a person or two, or even three, by the driver or the cleaner of the vehicle, without the knowledge of the owner, cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach that the owner should, in all events, be denied indemnification. The misuse of the vehicle was somewhat irregular though, but not so fundamental in nature so as to put an end to the contract, unless some factors existed which, by themselves, had gone to contribute to the causing of the accident…..”

    At the conclusion, the Supreme Court has referred to the ruling reported in (1987) 2 SCC 654 (Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan) and observed that it paved the way towards reading down the contractual clause. In that case, the Court was considering the breach of condition of excluding driving of vehicle of the insured owner by a person not duly licensed and as to the extent of vicarious liability of the owner in case of an accident in the light of Sections 96 (2) (b) (ii) and 84 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

    The Supreme Court in that case viz., (1987) 2 SCC 654 (referred supra) observed as under: — “When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependants on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of ‘reading down’ the exclusion clause in the light of the ‘main purpose’ of the provision so that the ‘exclusion clause’ does not cross swords with the ‘main purpose’ highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose.

    The theory which needs no support is supported by Carter's ‘Breach of Contract’ vide paragraph 251. To quote:

    “Notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule, usually referred to as the ‘main purpose rule’, which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promisor's contractual obligations. For example, in Glynn v. Margetson & Co. (1893 AC 351 at page 357) Lord Halsbury, L.C stated:

    ‘It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument, and seeing what one must regard… as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract.’

    Although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique Societe d’ Armement Maritime SA v. NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale ([1967] 1 AC 361). Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose, or object of the contract.”

    17. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the decision reported in AIR 1997 Bombay 242 (Shivraj Vasant Bhagwat v. Shevanta Dattaram Indulkar) had occasion to consider a case in which the clause in the Insurance policy was that carrying of passengers in the vehicle except employees not exceeding six in number, where ten employees were taken in the motor truck, whereas the policy also contemplated that maximum of only six persons can be carried. There the Insurance Company claimed that inasmuch as there is violation of terms and conditions of the policy, it is not liable in any way to pay compensation. There the Court ruled thus,

    “… The terms of the policy of Insurance has to be construed strictly and to be read down to advance the main purpose of the contract. The main purpose of the policy is to indemnify the damage caused to the vehicle and the inmates, who are injured. It is plain from the terms of the insurance policy that insured vehicle was entitled to carry six workmen excluding driver. If six persons travelling in the vehicle are assumed not to have increased any risk from the point of view of the Insurance Company on occurring of an accident, how could these added persons be said to have contributed to the causing of it. Admittedly, all the 11 persons in the truck were working as labourers on the quarry of the appellant, who is also owner of the truck. Merely because 4/5 labourers more than the agreed six labourers were taken in the truck, it cannot be said to be such fundamental breach that the owner should in all events be denied the indemnification”

    18. In 1998 (1) L.W 59 (Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Murugesh), a learned single Judge of this Court had occasion to consider a similar point. There also as against permitted six persons, 13 persons travelled in a lorry, which is in violation of condition of the policy. The learned single Judge considered various rulings on that point and came to the conclusion as under,

    “If we approach the question in this background, it cannot be said that there was any wilful breach of any of the conditions of the policy. While disowning the liability, a duty is also cast on the Insurance Company to show that it is because of the presence of the additional persons who were allowed to be in the lorry, the accident happened. Absolutely no evidence was adduced in that regard.”

    19. Coming to the case on hand, as many as 16 persons were taken in the ill-fated van, when the terms and conditions of the policy prescribe or restrict the maximum number as 14. From the cases cited supra and other rulings, it could be seen that in most of the cases, the driver took additional passengers without the knowledge of the owner that is insured and in the rest, it is not clear as to whether the owner had knowledge. As far as the present case is concerned, the insured is none else than the Arvind Eye Institute. It cannot be said, in this case, that the Driver took two extra persons without the knowledge of the insured or to benefit him in any manner. Then the question is, whether it would make any difference. We may straight away say, the answer is in the negative. Merely by lifting a person or two, it cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach that the owner should, in all events, be denied indemnification. The breach of the condition of the policy was somewhat irregular, though, but not so fundamental in nature, so as to put an end to the contract, unless some factors existed, which, by themselves, had gone to contribute to the causing of the accident. If the Insurance Company is able to prove that it is because of the presence of the additional persons who were allowed to occupy the vehicle, the accident occurred, the position would be different, consequently, we hold that even in cases where more passengers are taken with or without the knowledge or implied consent or even consent of the owner, unless the Insurance Company is able to prove that the accident took place only because of such act (taking more passengers) the Insurance Company will be liable to make good the loss/compensation. It has to be noted that in the case on hand, it is not the contention of the Insurance Company that the accident had occurred because two persons, over and above the prescribed limit in the policy, were travelling at the relevant time in the vehicle. At this juncture, we may refer to a passage from the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokibaben Chandravadan ([1987] 2 SCC 654), wherein the Court observed as under: —

    “Ordinarily it is not the concern of the legislature whether the owner of the vehicle insures his vehicle or not. If the vehicle is not insured any legal liability arising on account of third party risk will have to be borne by the owner of the vehicle. Why then has the legislature insisted on a person using a motor vehicle in a public place to insure against third party risk by enacting Section 94? Surely the obligation has not been imposed in order to promote the business of the insurers engaged in the business of automobile insurance. The provision has been inserted in order to protect the members of the community travelling in vehicles or using the roads from the risk attendant upon the user of motor vehicles on the roads. The law may provide for compensation to victims of the accidents who sustain injuries in the course of an automobile accident or compensation to the dependants of the victims in the case of a fatal accident. However, such protection would remain a protection on paper unless there is a guarantee that the compensation awarded by the courts would be recoverable from the persons held liable for the consequences of the accident. A court can only pass an award or a decree. It cannot ensure that such an award or decree results in the amount awarded being actually recovered, from the person held liable who may not have the resources. The exercise undertaken by the law courts would then be an exercise in futility. And the outcome of the legal proceedings which by the very nature of things involve the time cost and money cost invested from the scarce resources of the community would make a mockery of the injured victims, or the dependants of the deceased victim of the accident, who themselves are obliged to incur not inconsiderable expenditure of time, money and energy in litigation.”

    20. Following the rulings stated supra, this Court is inclined to hold that the Insurance Company is certainly liable to compensate the claimants to the extent indicated above.

    21. In this view of the matter, we hold: —

    a. The appellants in C.M.A No. 1228 of 1997 and claimants in M.C.O.P No. 1260 of 1994 would be entitled for a sum of Rs. 16,75,000/- (Rupees sixteen lakhs and seventy five thousand only) with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition.

    b. The appellant in CMA.88/1998 and the claimant in MCOP No. 55/95 would be entitled for a sum of Rs. 3,55,000/- (Rupees three lakhs and fifty five thousand only) with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition.

    c. The appellant in CMA No. 327 of 1998 and the claimant in MCOP. No. 56 of 1995 would be entitled for a sum of Rs. 3,90,000/- (Rupees three lakhs and ninety thousand only) with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition.

    d. The Insurance Company is liable to compensate the claimants/appellants.

    e. CMA. Nos. 1228/97, 88/98 and 327 of 1998 are allowed to the extent indicated above.

    f. CMA. Nos. 1331, 1333, and 1337/98 are allowed.

    VCJ/VCS

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    M. Anandavalli Amma v. Arvind Eye Hospital
    (Jun 20, 2002)