JUDGMENT
1. Petitioners are employees of a private company Indian Oxygen, Ltd. Petitioners are parties to a settlement entered into through their union with their employer under S. 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. That settlement is dated 19 December, 1996. Petitioners contend in this writ petition that the medical benefits given to them as per the settlement should be continued notwithstanding the extension of the Employees' State Insurance Act to workmen receiving wages up to Rs. 6,500 per month. Number of employees in the respondent company is said to be 115, of which according to the employer about 50 per cent will be covered by the E.S.I Act, after the coverage was extended with effect from 1 January, 1997.
2. It is the case of the employer that in view of what is provided in the settlement itself, the petitioners cannot claim medical benefit under the settlement after the E.S.I Act was applied to the petitioners by reason of amendment effected by the E.S.I (Central) Rules, 1950, and which amendment has been upheld by this and other High Courts.
3. At the threshold the respondent raised the issue of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the respondent is a private employer and no writ will lie against such an employer.
4. Learned counsel for the writ-petitioner, however, submitted that the workmen are entitled to seek a writ for the enforcement of the public duty cast upon the employer by a welfare legislation in this case, the E.S.I Act, and that under Art. 226 of the Constitution, this Court has wide powers which may be exercised in relation to all persons - whether public or private counsel referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd. v. Tarun Kanti Sengupta [1986 (2) L.L.N 382].
4A. Counsel also submitted that the effect of this and other decisions of the Apex Court have been considered and summarised by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 687], wherein in Para. 48, the Bench has set out the propositions which emerged from a consideration of the afore-mentioned and other decisions. That Para. 48, at pages 705 and 706, reads as under:
“(1) A private body which is not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India is not generally amenable to Art. 226 of the Constitution
(2) A writ will issue against a private body to protect the fundamental rights declared under Part III of the Constitution of India.
(3) A writ will issue in extraordinary circumstances if the monstrosity of the situation warrants it.
(4) A mandamus will be issued against a private body, if there is no equally convenient remedy and if there is a public duty.
(5) The implementation of a settlement under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is not a public duty and no writ will lie against a private body.
(6) If the features are patent and they establish gross violation of the mandates of law, the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution could be exercised to quash a settlement under S. 18(1) or S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.”
4B. Counsel also refers to another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in W.P No. 11862 of 1996 which was decided on 2 December, 1997, wherein these propositions were referred to, and it was observed that these propositions were a little too general and wide. Counsel however submitted that the propositions enumerated in decisions in the case of Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 687] (vide supra), are the propositions which are to be applied in this case.
5. Learned senior counsel for the respondent on the other hand relied on the decisions of the Division Bench in the case of Buckingham and Carnatic Mills v. State of Tamil Nadu [1992-II L.L.J 90] (sic), and also referred to Para. 15 of the judgment of the Apex Court, in the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R Rudani [1989 (2) L.L.N 281].
6. The scope of this Court's power under Art. 226 is indeed vast. There can be no doubt whatsoever that this Court can in appropriate cases issue a writ for “any purpose” to “any person”. However, there are self-imposed limitations on the exercise of this power in so far as private parties are concerned. The situations in which writs may be issued to private parties have been summarised by Srinivasan, J. (as he then was), in the case of Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 687] (vide supra).
7. Though in the early years of the Indian Republic, the Courts were of the view that the writs can only be issued to the State and local authorities, it was later extended to instrumentalities and agencies in the State. The law further developed in the direction of extending the jurisdiction to private bodies which performed public duties the inquiry being directed to the nature of the duty, and not merely to the private character of the person or the institution performing the duty.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent also contended that as there is an alternative remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act, this petition should not be entertained. Counsel relied on the judgment delivered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Basant Kumar v. Eagle Rolling Mills [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1260], wherein the Court while dealing with a matter arising under the Employees' State Insurance Act held that although powers conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 of the Constitution are very wide, they could not take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which the contestants had sought to raise. The proper remedy available to the workmen was to ventilate their grievances by taking recourse to S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, or, if possible, under Ss. 74 and 75 of the Employees' State Insurance Act.
9. Counsel also referred to an unreported judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1436 of 1997, dated 17 April, 1997, wherein the Court held that the dispute regarding the right of the workmen to receive medical benefits which they were receiving before the introduction of the E.S.I Scheme was a matter which required to be adjudicated upon under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
10. Counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that very legislation which provides a benefit to workmen, imposes a public duty on the person who is required to make such benefit available, and, therefore, whenever there is a complaint that the benefits conferred under the Act has been wrongly denied or that provision of an enactment has been violated to the prejudice of the complainant, the Court would entertain a writ petition and grant relief. Counsel referred to some passages in the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru v. V.R Rudani [1989 (2) L.L.N 281] (vide supra), as also the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union [1997 (1) L.L.N 75].
11. Article 226 of the Constitution was not meant to supplant all the adjudicatory forums set up under general law or special statutes This Court normally will not entertain such matters directly where other remedies are available. The exceptions are exceptions only and do not constitute a rule.
12. The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act provide for a machinery for the adjudication of industrial disputes Provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act also provide for a machinery for the resolution of the disputes arising thereunder When matters which fall within the ambit of these enactments arise, the proper course is to seek redressal under the provisions of those enactments and not to by pass those enactments altogether and seek adjudication from this Court. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Bareilly Holdings, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1979 (1) L.L.N 516] and Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd. v. Calcutta Electric Supply Workers' Union [1995 (1) L.L.N 1154], are cases which went up to Supreme Court, after adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the complaint in this case is the violation of S. 72 of the Employees' State Insurance Act and the law with regard to the scope of the provision has already been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Bareilly Holdings, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1979 (1) L.L.N 516] (vide supra) and Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd. v. Calcutta Electric Supply Workers' Union [1995 (1) L.L.N 1154] (vide supra), and what is now required to be done is merely to apply that law to the indisputable facts of the case, the petitioner should not be directed to avail of the remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that S. 72 of the Employees' State Insurance Act places an embargo on employers not to stop the medical benefits, hitherto made available to their employees, merely on the ground that the coverage of the Act has been extended to those employees. The limited extent to which the benefit can be reduced, it was submitted, is set out in regulation 97. According to the petitioner, the respondent herein is guilty of having violated S. 72 of the Act by withholding the medical benefits which are required to be paid by the employer even after the extension of the coverage of the E.S.I Scheme. That monetary benefits can be withheld only if the workmen besides being entitled to such benefit under the E.S.I Act avail of the same.
15. The principal contention by the petitioner thus is that the payment of what petitioner refers to as “medical allowance” and, what is described in the settlement as the “medical benefit,” is a part of the conditions of service of the workmen and these conditions cannot be altered even after the introduction of the Employees' State Insurance Act. This contention was advanced in the face of what is contained in Art. 5 Cl. 5(d) of the settlement under which the medical benefit is given.
16. The settlement between the workmen and the management in Cl. 5 deals with medical benefits. Clause (a) provides for domiciliary treatment up to a maximum of Rs. 200, Cl. (b) provides for medical consultations, Cl. (c) provides for hospitalisation. Clause (d) which is material, reads thus:
“…As and when the provisions of Employees' State Insurance Act or any other enactment covering medical facilities for the time being in force or as may be in force in future are made applicable to those employees who are presently not covered by the said Act/such enactment the above medical reimbursement of domiciliary treatment and hospitalization/chamber consultation facilities will stand withdrawn with effect from the date such employees are brought under the purview of the ESI Act/such other enactment.”
17. Unlike the cases which were considered by the Supreme Court and on which reliance was placed by the counsel for the petitioner, in this case, the condition of service providing for medical benefits to those not covered by the Employees' State Insurance Act, is a condition which incorporates within itself a further condition that the medical benefits under the settlement are available to the workmen only till such time as they become entitled to the benefits provided under the Employees' State Insurance Act. The settlement as noticed already is one under S. 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the settlement which was voluntarily entered into was meant to bind the parties to the settlement. It was pointed out by the counsel for the respondent that similar provisions had been incorporated in the settlement, dated 29 February, 1992, which preceded the settlement, dated 19 December, 1996. It is clear from this clause that the parties at all times visualised the extension of the E.S.I Act to the workmen at some point of time in future and agreed that the medical benefits which the workmen would receive under the settlement will only be till such time as the Employees' State Insurance Act is extended to cover the workmen who were parties to the settlement.
18. Section 72 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, which is the sheet anchor of the petitioner's case, expressly provides that what is prohibited is the discontinuance or rejection of benefits payable to the employees “under the conditions of their service which are similar to the benefits conferred by the Act”. It is, therefore, not each and every benefit that is the subject-matter of S. 72 of the Act. It is only the benefits which beside being similar to those conferred by the Act constitute “conditions of service of the employee”. It is, therefore, necessary that an enquiry must be made as to what the conditions of services are, before S. 72 of the Act can be invoked for the purpose of contending that a benefit available under the conditions of service are being withheld contrary to the terms of S. 72 of the Act.
19. If in a given case, as it is in the present one, the conditions by which the workmen have agreed to be governed expressly provide for the benefits being given to them being limited to a point of time when the Employees' State Insurance Act is made applicable to them, it is difficult to visualise as to how such workmen can still contend that even after event contemplated by them has occurred, that event is to be ignored. The petitioners are in reality seeking to unilaterally rewrite the settlement. A writ petition cannot be entertained tor that purpose. The petition also does not fall within any of the exceptions to the normal rule of not entertaining writ petitions against private bodies.
20. Counsel for the respondent also submitted that the benefits given under the settlement are not similar to the benefits conferred by the act. This is again a matter on which the parties disagree. This is not the forum in which an enquiry should be initiated to ascertain as to whether the benefits given are similar or dissimilar, and as to whether notwithstanding Cl. 5(d) of the settlement, the petitioner is still entitled to complain or breach of S. 72 of the Act. Prima facie, Art. 5(d) supports the case of the respondent rather than that of the petitioner.
21. Petitioner, therefore, is not entitled to any relief in this writ petition. This writ petition is dismissed It is, however, made clear that if the petitioner-union wishes to avail the remedies available to them under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or Employees' State Insurance Act, it will be open to them to avail of the same. Consequently, W.M.P is closed.