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Structured Summary of the Opinion (N.V. Balasubramanian, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a combined reference arising from appeals by both the assessee and the Revenue under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in relation to the assessment year 1977-78.

The assessee was employed by I.B.M. World Trade Corporation. By a letter dated 1 November 1976, the employer offered a voluntary separation programme to employees with more than one year of service, because the employer expected a decline in workload and could not provide the usual career prospects. The special payment under the programme was calculated as a minimum of six months' salary for the first year of service plus 1½ months' base salary for each additional year, with a maximum of 30 months' base salary.

The assessee accepted the offer and became entitled to Rs. 1,56,200, payable in three equal instalments across different years. The first instalment of Rs. 52,200 was received in the relevant year. The assessee also received Rs. 23,990 as salary in lieu of 91 days' vacation (leave encashment).

The Assessing Officer taxed both sums; the Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld that taxation; the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held Rs. 52,200 taxable as "profit in lieu of salary" under clause (3)(i) of section 17 but held Rs. 23,990 (leave encashment) to be a capital receipt and not taxable, following an earlier Tribunal order (I.T.A No. 348 (Mds.) of 1978-79, dated 31 March 1980). Both the assessee and the Revenue filed references on points of law arising from the Tribunal's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that Rs. 52,200 received by the assessee under the voluntary separation programme was liable to be included in the assessee's total income for the assessment year 1977-78 (i.e., taxable as "profit in lieu of salary")?
  2. Whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that Rs. 23,990 received in lieu of vacation was a capital receipt and therefore not taxable in the hands of the assessee?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments (as presented by Mr. R. Balasubramanian)

  • The payment under the voluntary separation programme was in connection with the intended closure/scaling down of the employer's business, and therefore arose from loss of office; it should be treated as a capital receipt, not income.
  • The payment was voluntary on the part of the employer, with no legal obligation to pay, and thus could not be regarded as "profit in lieu of salary".
  • Relied on decisions of the Bombay High Court (W.A. Guff v. CIT), this court (Commissioner of Income-Tax v. J. Visalakshi), and two Calcutta High Court decisions (Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Ajit Kumar Bose; Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Jamini Mohan Kar) to support the contention that the receipt was capital in nature.

Revenue's Arguments (as presented by Mr. C.V. Rajan)

  • Although the employer scaled down operations and made the offer, the assessee exercised the option and the employer accepted it; the termination of employment arose at that point.
  • The assessee thereby acquired a right to receive the special payment and the employer had an obligation to pay; accordingly the payment falls within sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 (i.e., "compensation ... at or in connection with the termination of his employment").
  • The payment was not an ex gratia payment, and the case was never presented as one of ex gratia payment before the Assessing Officer or on appeal; therefore the Tribunal's conclusion that the sum was taxable was correct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
W.A. Guff v. CIT, [1957] 31 ITR 826 (Bombay) Explanation under the 1922 Act: "compensation for loss of employment" includes payments made either under legal liability or voluntarily as solatium for loss of employment. The court noted the Bombay High Court's construction of the 1922 Act explanation but observed that the 1961 Act (section 17(3)(i)) omitted the specific words. The opinion used the historical comparison to show the 1961 Act's wording captures compensation received "at or in connection with" termination and that such receipts fall within clause (3)(i).
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. J. Visalakshi, [1994] 206 ITR 531 (Madras) Held that the term "termination" in clause (3) of section 17 should receive a wide meaning, including resignation, dismissal, compulsory retirement, etc. The court relied on Visalakshi to conclude that the assessee's acceptance of the offer and consequent cessation of service amounted to "termination" within the meaning of clause (3)(i); the decision did not support the assessee's contention that the receipt was necessarily a capital receipt.
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Ajit Kumar Bose, [1987] 165 ITR 90 (Calcutta) Case involved an employee who had no right to continue in service till superannuation and whose services could be terminated on three months' notice; the court held there was no obligation to pay anything at or in connection with termination beyond salary for notice period. The present court distinguished this case on facts: here there was an enforceable obligation to pay the compensation in connection with termination, so Ajit Kumar Bose did not apply.
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Jamini Mohan Kar, [1989] 176 ITR 127 (Calcutta) Similar in principle to Ajit Kumar Bose (distinguishing factual matrix concerning entitlement to continue in service and employer's obligations). The court observed this decision runs on the same lines as Ajit Kumar Bose and therefore held it was not necessary to deal with it separately; it did not assist the assessee on the facts before the court.
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. N.B. Tendolkar, [1996] 221 ITR 268 (this court) Held that encashment of leave (leave salary) is a "profit in lieu of salary" and therefore taxable under clause (3) of section 17. The court followed Tendolkar to hold that the sum of Rs. 23,990 (leave encashment) was taxable as a profit in lieu of salary under clause (3)(ii) of section 17, and rejected the Tribunal's view that it was a capital receipt.
Krishna Murthy (M.) v. CIT, [1985] 152 ITR 163 (Andhra Pradesh) / Patil Vijaykumar v. Union of India, [1985] 151 ITR 48 (Karnataka) / Shailendra Kumar v. Union of India, [1989] 175 ITR 494 (Allahabad) Cases dealing with taxation of leave encashment/leave salary and related principles; these were noticed in Tendolkar. The court observed that Tendolkar had considered these cases; Tendolkar's conclusion (that leave encashment is taxable) was applied in this opinion to determine that Rs. 23,990 was taxable.
I.T.A No. 348 (Mds.) of 1978-79 (Tribunal order dated 31 March 1980) Tribunal had earlier held that a payment for not availing vacation was a cash compensation and a capital receipt. The present Tribunal had applied that earlier Tribunal order to hold Rs. 23,990 was not taxable; the High Court examined and rejected that conclusion, preferring Tendolkar and other authorities to hold such encashment is taxable as salary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main strands corresponding to the two questions referred.

  1. Regarding the Rs. 52,200 payment under the voluntary separation programme:
    • The court examined the text of the Income-tax Act, 1961: section 15 (charge on salaries), section 16 (deductions), and section 17 which defines "salary" and includes "profits in lieu of salary" in clause (3).
    • The court quoted clause (3)(i) of section 17 verbatim: it covers "the amount of any compensation due to or received by an assessee from his employer or former employer at or in connection with the termination of his employment or the modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto."
    • The court observed the legislative history: under the 1922 Act Explanation 2 expressly mentioned "compensation for loss of employment," language omitted in the 1961 Act; but the 1961 wording is broad and covers any compensation at or in connection with termination.
    • The court referred to W.A. Guff's interpretation of the 1922 Act but concluded that the 1961 Act's clause (3)(i) itself is clear and encompasses compensation received in connection with termination, whether termination is voluntary or otherwise.
    • The court relied on its earlier decision in Visalakshi that "termination" has a wide meaning (including resignation, dismissal, compulsory retirement), and found that the assessee's acceptance of the voluntary separation offer constituted a termination within clause (3)(i).
    • The court distinguished the Calcutta decisions (Ajit Kumar Bose; Jamini Mohan Kar) on their facts because in those cases there was no showing that the employee was entitled to continue in service up to superannuation and the employer had no obligation to pay compensation at termination beyond salary for notice period; in the present case there was an enforceable obligation to pay the compensation on acceptance and hence the payment fell within clause (3)(i).
    • Consequently, the court concluded the Tribunal correctly held that the Rs. 52,200 received was a "profit in lieu of salary" under sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 and thus taxable as salary.
  2. Regarding the Rs. 23,990 received in lieu of vacation (leave encashment):
    • The Assessing Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioner had taxed the amount as salary (on the view that it was payment for services rendered instead of enjoying vacation).
    • The Tribunal had held it to be a capital receipt following an earlier Tribunal order and therefore not taxable.
    • The court referred to its earlier decision in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. N.B. Tendolkar, where this court (after noticing decisions from Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Allahabad High Courts) held that encashment of leave salary is a profit in lieu of salary and therefore taxable under clause (3) of section 17.
    • The court found that the leave salary/allowance arises from the employment, the encashment arises because of the employment, and the payment is from the employer; thus such encashment falls within sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) of section 17.
    • Following Tendolkar, the court held the Tribunal was not justified in treating Rs. 23,990 as a capital receipt and concluded it was taxable as a profit in lieu of salary.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • Rs. 52,200 (first instalment of voluntary separation payment) is taxable as a "profit in lieu of salary" under sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court answered the assessee's reference in the affirmative and against the assessee.
  • Rs. 23,990 (encashment of leave / salary in lieu of vacation) is taxable as a "profit in lieu of salary" under sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court answered the Revenue's question in the negative (i.e., the Tribunal was not justified in holding it to be a capital receipt) and in favour of the Revenue.

Direct consequences for the parties: both amounts previously treated as not taxable by the Tribunal (in part) are to be regarded as taxable income under the head "Salaries" in accordance with clause (3) of section 17. The opinion records that there will be no order as to costs.

Broader precedential implication: The court applied the statutory language of section 17(3) and followed relevant earlier decisions (including this court's decision in N.B. Tendolkar) to clarify that both compensation in connection with termination and encashment of leave fall within the meaning of "profits in lieu of salary." The opinion does not purport to establish a novel principle beyond applying existing statutory provision and precedent to the facts; its effect is to affirm taxability of the receipts in issue on the facts before the court.

    G.N Badami v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax. (And Vice Versa)

    N.V Balasubramanian, J.:— This is a combined reference both at the instance of the assessee and at the instance of the Revenue. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has stated a case and referred the following questions of law under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for our opinion for the assessment year 1977-78.

    Question of law at the instance of the assessee:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the amount of Rs. 52,200 received by the applicant as payment under the “voluntary separation programme” from I.B.M World Trade Corporation was liable to be included in the applicant's total income for the assessment year 1977-78?”

    Question of law at the instance of the Revenue:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the sum of Rs. 23,990 the amount received in lieu of vacation at the time of the assessee leaving his service with I.B.M World Trade Corporation is a capital receipt and therefore not taxable in the hands of the assessee?”

    2. The assessee was employed by I.B.M World Trade Corporation, a multinational company. On November 1, 1976, I.B.M World Trade Corporation, New Delhi, addressed letters to all its employees stating that it had to reduce its operation in India because of the requirement of the Government of India for diluting its ownership with Indian capital. Therefore, it was of the view that its workload declined significantly in several areas of the business of the company and the company expected that there would be further decline in the business until its business position under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was resolved. The company therefore, felt that it was unable to provide the challenging work environment and prospects for career growth which was normal for the said company to its employees in every area of the business. Therefore, the company offered an opportunity to all its employees who had served more than one year of service to receive a special payment subject to a condition that they should leave the company.

    3. It is a voluntary programme so that the employees, if they wish to follow other pursuits or start new careers may have the chance to do so with the assistance of the company. The special payment that was offered was measured on the basis that it would provide a minimum of six months salary for the first year of service plus 1½ months base salary for each additional year of service. It was also provided in the letter that the maximum payment under the programme would be 30 months base salary. The assessee exercised his option to leave the company and the assessee was entitled to receive a total sum of Rs. 1,56,200 as compensation by virtue of his acceptance of the offer of the I.B.M World Trade Corporation. The said compensation was payable in three equal instalments in different years. The assessee received the sum of Rs. 52,200 as his first instalment and similarly payments were made as second and third instalments during the succeeding years. The assessee also received another sum of Rs. 23,990 as salary in lieu of vacation for 91 days. The Income-tax Officer during the course of the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1977-78 brought to tax both the amounts. The Appel late Assistant Commissioner, on appeal by the assessee, also held that the assessee would be liable to tax on both the amounts in view of the provisions of clause (3) of section 17 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to “the Act”). In other words, he upheld the order of the Income-tax Officer levying the tax on both the amounts. The Appellate Tribunal, on further appeal by the assessee, also reached the same conclu-sion. As regards the taxability of the amount of Rs. 52,200, the Appellate Tribunal held that there was a termination of employment and in connection with the termination of the employment the amount was received as compensation and, therefore, the amount received should be regarded as profit in lieu of salary within the meaning of sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. The Tribunal, however, took the view that the sum of Rs. 23,990 received by the assessee was received in lieu of the vacation. Following its earlier order in I.T.A No. 348 (Mds.) of 1978-79, dated March 31, 1980, the Tribunal held that it was a cash compensation for not having availed of the right of vacation and, therefore, the amount received was not taxable. As a result, the assessee as well as the Revenue have come before us by way of reference on the questions of law set out above.

    4. We presently take up the assessee's reference. Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the assessee, submitted that the payment received by the assessee was in connection with the termination of the employment of the assessee for the reason that the employer had scaled down its business, and hence the amount received is a capital receipt and cannot be regarded as profit in lieu of salary. According to him, the termination of employment arose only because of the intended closure of the business, and since it is for the loss of the office, it should be regarded as a capital receipt. He strongly placed reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of W.A Guff v. CIT, [1957] 31 ITR 826, a decision of this court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. J. Visalakshi., [1994] 206 ITR 531 and two decisions of the Calcutta High Court in the cases of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Ajit Kumar Bose, [1987] 165 ITR 90 and Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Jamini Mohan Kar., [1989] 176 ITR 127. He therefore, submitted that the amount was paid by the employer voluntarily and there was no obligation on the part of the employer to pay the amount and, hence, the amount received by the assessee cannot be regarded as a profit in lieu of the salary.

    5. Mr. C.V Rajan, learned counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, submitted that it may be due to closure of the business or due to scaling down of the business of the company, the company might have made an offer to all of its employees to receive special payment, if they desired to exercise the option, but the fact remains that the assessee has exercised his option and has chosen to leave the company and at that point of time, the termination of the employment of the assessee arose when the employer accepted the offer of the assessee. Hence, the assessee, on the basis of the letter dated November 1, 1976, was entitled to receive the special payment and when the assessee agreed to receive the amount, there was an obligation on the part of the employer to pay the amount and the employer was obliged to pay the compensation to the assessee in exercising his option and, hence, according to learned counsel for the Revenue, the compensation received would come within the purview of sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. He also submitted that the amount cannot be regarded as ex gratia payment and it is not the case of the assessee before the Assessing Officer or before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or even before the Appellate Tribunal that it was an ex gratia payment. He therefore submitted that the Tribunal has come to the correct conclusion in holding that the amount was taxable as profit in lieu of the salary.

    6. We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the assessee and learned counsel for the Revenue. Before considering the rival submissions, it is necessary to notice the relevant provision of the Act. Section 15 of the Act deals with the charge to income-tax on income falling under “salaries”. Section 16 provides for deduction from salaries and section 17 defines the expression, salary and under clause (1) of section 17, salary includes wages, any annuity or pension, any gratuity, any fees, commissions, perquisites or profits in lieu of or in addition to any salary or wages. The expression, “profits in lieu of salary” is defined in clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. Clause (3) of section 17 of the Act reads as under:

    “‘profits in lieu of salary’ includes—

    (i) the amount of any compensation due to or received by an assessee from his employer or former employer at or in connection with the termination of his employment or the modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto;

    (ii) any payment (other than any payment referred to in clause (10), clause (10A), clause (10B), clause (11), clause (12) or clause (13A) of section 10), due to or received by an assessee from an employer or a former employer or from a provident or other fund (not being an approved superannuation fund), to the extent to which it does not consist of contributions by the assessee or interest on such contributions.”

    The provision of sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act, in our opinion, includes within its ambit, any compensation due to or received by the assessee from his employer at or in connection with the termination of his employment. In our view, the said provision makes it clear that any compensation received at or in connection with the termination of the employment will be treated as a profit in lieu of salary and therefore, taxable under the head “Salary”.

    7. It is also relevant to notice the legislative history behind the provision of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. Under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the expression “salary” was defined under section 7 of the said Act and Explanation 2 to section 7 of the 1922 Act provided a definition of the term, “profits in lieu of salary”. The said Explanation 2 to section 7 of the 1922 Act postulates that a profit in lieu of salary must be an amount of any compensation due to or received by the assessee from the employer or former employer at or in connection with the termination of his employment whether solely as compensation for loss of employment or for any other consideration. When the Income-tax Act, 1961, was introduced in the year 1962, there is a significant omission of the words, compensation for loss of employment or for any other consideration as found in Explanation 2 to section 7 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 in sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act.

    8. The Bombay High Court in W.A Guff v. CTT, [1957] 31 ITR 826, had an occasion to consider the provisions of section 7 of the 1922 Act and it considered Explanation 2 before the amendment of 1955 and the Bombay High Court held that the expression, “compensation for loss of employment” used in Explanation 2 to section 7 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, refers to any payment made whether under a legal liability or voluntarily to compensate or act as a solatium for loss of employment suffered by an employee. The present Act has significantly omitted the expression, “compensation for loss of employment” when “profit in lieu of salary” is defined in clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. Therefore, on the words found in clause (3) of section 17 of the Act, if any compensation is received by the employee from his employer at or in connection with the termination of the employment, that would be regarded as profits in lieu of salary and liable to tax under the head “Salary”. In view of the specific statutory provision, it not necessary to consider other decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the assessee. However, since those decisions are brought before us, it is necessary for us to deal with these case laws also.

    9. The decision of this court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. J. Visalakshi., [1994] 206 ITR 531, cannot be said to in any way support the case of the assessee. This court, in that case, while considering the provisions of sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act held that the expression, “termination” found in clause (3) of section 17 of the Act should receive a wider meaning and this court also held that the word “termination” cannot be confined only to the cases of voluntary retirement or superannuation, but includes cases like resignation, dismissal or compulsory retirement as well. Admittedly, in the instant case, the assessee exercised the right of option to leave the service of the company and on the acceptance of the offer of the employer by the assessee, the services of the assessee to the company were terminated. Therefore, it is a case of termination of employment within the meaning of sub-clause (i) Of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. Mr. R. Balasubramanian learned counsel for the assessee contended that the decision of this court in Visalahshi's case, [1994] 206 ITR 531 (Mad), has held that the compensation would be a capital receipt. A careful reading of the decision in Visalahshi's case, [1994] 206 ITR 531 (Mad) shows that this court has not decided that the amount received would be a capital receipt, but observed that if the amount does not fall within the meaning of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act, it cannot be construed as an income assessable under the Act as it would be regarded only as a capital receipt. From the above observation, it cannot be deduced that this court has held that the said compensation would not fall within the scope of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. The decision of this court in Visalakshi's case, [1994] 206 ITR 531, far from supporting the case of the assessee, really supports the case of the Revenue.

    10. The next decision that was relied upon by learned counsel for the assessee is a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Ajit Kumar Bose, [1987] 165 ITR 90. A careful reading of the said decision would clearly show that the decision has no application to the facts of the case. In that case before the Calcutta High Court, there was nothing to indicate that the assessee therein was entitled to continue in the employment of the company till he reaches the age of superannuation and under the terms and conditions of the service, his services were liable to be terminated on giving three months notice without assigning any reasons. In those circumstances, the Calcutta High Court was of the view that the assessee was not entitled to remain in service, after the expiry of the period stated in the requisite notice and there was no obligation on the part of the employer to pay anything at or in connection with the termination of the employment to him other than the salary for the period of notice. The decision of the Calcutta High Court is distinguishable because there is nothing to show on the facts of this case that the assessee was not entitled to continue in the employment of the company up to his superannuation age. The assessee has not produced or proved before the taxing authorities or before the Tribunal the conditions of service and when his services were liable to be terminated. Further, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the Revenue, the employer was obliged to pay compensation in connection with the termination of the employment of the assessee. Hence, there is an enforceable obligation against the employer and there is a corresponding right accrued in favour of the assessee to receive the amount. The compensation received, in our opinion, would squarely fall within the ambit of sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. The other decision relied upon by Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the assessee, in Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Jamini Mohan Kar., [1989] 176 ITR 127 (Cal), runs on the same lines as the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Ajit Kumar Bose, [1987] 165 ITR 90 (Cal) and it is not necessary to deal with that case separately. In our opinion, the Tribunal has come to the correct conclusion that there was a termination of the assessee's employment and the termination of the employment may be either at the instance of the assessee or at the instance of the employer but the words, “in connection with” found in sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act are wide enough to include any compensation received in connection with the termination of the employment of the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal has come to the correct conclusion in holding that the compensation received by the assessee in connection with the termination of his employment would be a profit in lieu of salary within the meaning of sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider other reasons given by the Tribunal with reference to the taxability of the amount under sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. In fine, we answer the question of law referred to us at the instance of the assessee in the affirmative and against the assessee.

    11. In so far as the question of law referred at the instance of the Revenue is concerned, a sum of Rs. 23,990 was received by the assessee in lieu of vacation. The Income-tax Officer brought the said sum to tax and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that this was an amount paid in addition to the salary and not otherwise. According to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the assessee instead of enjoying the vacation of 91 working days to which he was entitled, did some extra work for which he was paid a sum of Rs. 23,990 and the amount received would be taxable as salary as the amount was paid for the services rendered by the assessee. The Appellate Tribunal, however held that it was a cash compensation for not having availed of the right of vacation. Therefore, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the amount was received by way of capital receipt. The question whether the amount received towards the leave encashment can be regarded as salary or not came up for consideration before this court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. N.B Tendolkar., [1996] 221 ITR 268, wherein this court after noticing a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Krishna Murthy (M.) v. CIT, [1985] 152 ITR 163, a decision of the Karnataka High Court in Patil Vijaykumar v. Union of India, [1985] 151 ITR 48 and a decision of the Allahabad High Court in All India Defence Accounts Association, In re: Shailendra Kumar v. Union of India, [1989] 175 ITR 494, held that the encashment of the leave salary would be a profit in lieu of salary and therefore, taxable under the provisions of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. It is fairly clear that the leave salary and allowances are not paid outside the terms of the employment and the encashment of the unavailed leave arose only because of the employment and the amount was received by the assessee from the employer. Therefore, there can be no dispute that the amount received as encashment of the leave salary would be a profit in lieu of salary even within the meaning of sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) of section 17 of the Act. Learned counsel for the assessee has not seriously disputed the position that the decision of this court in N.B Ten-dolkar's case, [1996] 221 ITR 268, would apply to the facts of the case. Accordingly and following the earlier decision of this court in Tendolhar's case, [1996] 221 ITR 268, we hold that the Tribunal was not correct in hold ing that the sum of Rs. 23,990 was a cash compensation for not having availed of the right of vacation and, therefore, it should be treated as capital receipt. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the amount is not taxable under the provisions of the Act. We hold that the amount received for encashment of the leave salary would be a profit in lieu of salary and, therefore, taxable as salary. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred at the instance of the Revenue in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. However, there will be no order as to costs.

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    G.N Badami v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax. (And Vice Versa)
    (Oct 21, 1997)