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Acts
  • Registration Act (Central), (for short the Act) and the Rules
  • provisions of the Registration Act and the Rules
  • Nadu Panchayats Act,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Registration Act (Central), (for short the Act) and the Rules
  • provisions of the Registration Act and the Rules
  • Nadu Panchayats Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners in these writ petitions sought to quash the Government Order G.O.Ms No. 542, issued by the Local Administration and Water Supply Department on 29-4-1986. The Government Order mandated Municipalities and Corporations to send objections regarding the registration of layout sites within 45 days to the Registration Department, effectively imposing conditions on the registration of sale of house sites to ensure development charges were collected for infrastructure facilities. The State Government issued this order purportedly under its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution. The petitioners challenged the validity of this Government Order, contending it was beyond the executive power of the State as the matter was governed by the Registration Act (Central) and the rules framed thereunder. The case proceeded to adjudicate the legality of the Government Order vis-à-vis the legislative framework governing registration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Government could validly issue the impugned Government Order under its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution in respect of matters covered by the Registration Act and the rules framed thereunder.
  2. Whether the executive power of the State can override or act contrary to the statutory provisions enacted by the competent Legislature in the field of registration of documents.
  3. The validity of the Government Order imposing procedural conditions on registration pending legislative amendments.

Arguments of the Parties

State Government's Arguments

  • The Government Order was issued in exercise of executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution to urgently address the issue of development charges and infrastructure provision related to registration of house sites.
  • Pending the formal amendment of the Registration Act, the Government Order was a necessary executive instruction to implement the policy decision of the State.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The matter of registration of documents is governed exclusively by the Registration Act (Central) and rules framed thereunder, which constitute a legislative field occupied by law.
  • The State Government cannot exercise executive power to impose conditions or procedures that conflict with or override the statutory provisions enacted by the competent Legislature.
  • The impugned Government Order is ultra vires as it attempts to legislate or impose procedural conditions without legislative authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.N Nagarajan and others v. State of Mysore and others, AIR 1966 SC 1942 Executive power under Article 162 cannot override statutory rules or Acts; executive must abide by enacted laws. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the State's executive power cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to the Registration Act and rules.
V. Chandra v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, I.L.R 1996 (1) Mad. 1007 Executive power under Article 162 is not available over subjects already covered by legislation (Theory of Occupied Field). The Court applied this principle to affirm that the Government Order encroached upon a legislative field and was therefore invalid.
Ram Jaaway v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549 Scope and limits of executive power under Article 162; executive functions are subject to legislative provisions. The Court used this case to emphasize that executive actions must conform to legislative enactments and cannot supersede them.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the scope of the State Government's executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution in relation to the Registration Act and the rules framed thereunder. It noted that the registration of documents is governed by a central legislative enactment, which occupies the field of registration procedures. The Court held that the executive cannot act contrary to or override statutory provisions, as established in precedents like K.N Nagarajan and Ram Jaaway. The impugned Government Order attempted to impose procedural conditions on registration without legislative authority, thereby encroaching upon a field covered by law. The Court found that the State Government's action was an improper exercise of executive power, as the executive cannot legislate or alter statutory procedures. The Court also pointed out that if urgency existed, the State could have resorted to the ordinance-making power rather than issuing an executive order contrary to existing law. The decision was grounded firmly in the principle that the State is bound by the rule of law and cannot act beyond its constitutional authority.

Holding and Implications

The writ petitions are allowed and the impugned Government Order G.O.Ms No. 542 dated 29-4-1986 is quashed.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Government Order imposing conditions on registration of house sites is invalid and cannot be enforced. Registration of documents must proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act and the rules framed thereunder. The Court clarified that this ruling does not prevent the competent legislature from enacting appropriate legislation in the future. No new precedent beyond the invalidation of the impugned order was established. Actions taken pursuant to interim orders passed in these cases are protected and will not be disturbed.

    S. Arunachalam And Others Petitioners v. State Of Tamil Nadu Rep. By Its Commissioner And Secretary, Local Administration And Water Supply Department, Madras-9 And Others S

    1. In all these writ petitions, the petitioners have sought for quashing the Government Order, G.O.Ms No. 542, Local Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 29-4-1986. They have also sought for consequential relief flowing from quashing of the aforesaid Government Order.

    2. The said Government Order (Translated copy) reads thus:

    GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU:

    ABSTRACT

    Municipalities and Corporation — records — sending of objection to the Registration Department within 45 days when layout sites are sold or brought to Registration — Instructions — issued — order.

    MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND WATER SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

    G.O.Ms No. 542 Dated: 29-4-1986

    It is felt that an amendment need to be brought so as collect the development charges from the plot owners for the purpose of providing street roads, street lights and drainage facilities etc. at the time of registering the documents. It is seen that the property developers, taking advantage of the prevailing rules and regulations are selling the lands which are outside the town without adequate facilities like drainage etc. and by buying them for lessor price and selling for good price and thus they earn very good profit. Therefore, the buyers of the said house plots are forced to bear the expenses for providing the facilities mentioned above. However, not every one of the owners is in a position to bear the same. Therefore, it has been decided that unless and until an amendment is brought to the Registration Act to the effect that the registration of house sites should be done only after getting No Objection Certificates, from the concerned Panchayat/Municipality or Corporation, no useful purpose will be served.

    Since the proposed amendment to the Registration Act would affect the number of documents to be registered, pending appropriate amendments to the Municipalities, it has been decided to follow the undermentioned advice.

    It has been advised to the respective Commissioners of Panchayat, Town Panchayat, Municipality and the Corporation concerned to inform about their objections or no objections within 45 days to Ae Sub-Registrar from the date on which the Sub-Registrar's notice is received to the effect whether there is any objection to the proposed registration of sale of house sites.

    Similarly, the Registration Department is advised to await for the objection from the concerned Municipality/Panchayat Town Panchayat and Corporation etc. for a period of 45 days from the date on which the notice has been served on them and then register the documents.

    It is hereby ordered that the Municipalities and Corporation should follow the instructions given above.

    3. It is relevant to notice that registration of documents governed by the Registration Act (Central), (for short the Act) and the Rules framed thereunder. The Act and the Rules framed thereunder prescribe the procedure to be followed for registration of documents. Thus, this is a field which is covered by Law of Registration. However, the State Government, in the purported exercise of their power under Art 162 of the Constitution, as contended by the leamed Government Pleader, has issued the impugned Government Order. In the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent, it has been stated in categorical terms thus:

    In this connection, I submit that action has already been taken for amending the provisions of the relevant Act giving effect to the central idea contained in the Government Orders above referred to and it is needless to say to the context tiiat the departments concerned have taken necessary action to amend the relevant provisions of the Act suitably. This course of action will no doubt consume considerable time to achieve the object. In view of the anxiety in giving effect to the decision of the Government, it was thought fit to issue executive instructions and accordingly orders were issued in the above Government Order.

    Thus, the State has tried to exercise its executive power in respect of the matter, which is covered by the Registration Act and the Rules framed thereunder. There is no doubt that the legislative power of the State extends to all matters in respect of which the State Legislature has power to make laws. But from this, it does not follow that the executive power of the State can be exercised in respect of the matter which is covered by the law enacted by the competent Legislature and the Rules framed thereunder. The law so enacted by the competent Legislature and the rules framed thereunder are to be scrupulously followed by all concerned including the State Government. Thus the executive power of the State cannot be exercised over the subject occupied by law passed by the competent Legislature which is otherwise known as Theory of Occupied Field. The Supreme Court in K.N Nagarajan and others v. State of Mysore and others, AIR 1966 S.C 1942 while considering the scope of executive power of the State under Art. 162 of the Constitution, has observed thus:

    It is hardly necessary to mention that if there is a statutory rule or an act on the matter, the executive must abide by that Act or rule and it cannot in exercise of the executive power under Art. 162 of the Constitution ignore or act contrary to that rule or Act.

    Similar question arose before a Division Bench of this Court to which both of us were parties, in V. Chandra v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, I.L.R 1996 (1) Mad. 1007 in which the State Government in the purported exercise of their executive power had issued Government Orders in respect of the matters covered by the laws enacted by the State Legislature. It has been held by us as follows:

    We have adverted to these provisions contained in these aforesaid three enactments and also the rules framed under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, only to show that the subject with which the impugned Government Orders have dealt with is covered by the statutes passed by the State Legislature. It is the settled position of law that the executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution is not available in respect of the subject, which is already covered by the legislation. In other words, a field covered by the enactment which is known as covered field cannot be meddled with the executive in the purported exercise of their power under Article 162 of the Constitution. This has been specifically provided for with a view to ensure that the State also is not above the Rule of Law and above the provisions contained in the Constitution.

    The Supreme Court in Ram Jaaway v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549 at 556 considered the scope and ambit of the executive power, under Article 162 of the Constitution and also the executive functions of the State Government. The relevant portion of the judgment contained in para 13 is as follows:

    The limits within which the executive Government can function under the Indian Constitution can be ascertained without much difficulty by reference to the form of the executive which our Constitution has set up. Our Constitution though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British Parliamentary System where the executive is deemed to have the primary responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislative branch of the State.

    The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution. This evidently includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, the promotion of social and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying or on supervision of the general administration of the State.

    Subsequently, in R.N Nagarajan v. State of Mysore, A.I.R 1966 S.C 1942 the Supreme Court has observed that it is necessary to mention that if there is a statutory rule or an Act on the matter, the executive must abide by that Act or rule and it cannot in exercise of the executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution ignore or act contrary to that rule or act. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned Government Orders not only to cover the field covered by the legislature by enacting statutes as pointed above, but are also contrary to the provisions contained in those statutes. There is no such procedure or condition imposed by the various enactments referred to by us above. Thus, this is a case in which the executive has not only tried to exercise the power which was no more available to it, but also exercise such power quite contrary to the provisions contained in the aforesaid enactments. This is sufficient for the purpose of disposing of these writ petitions. Though several contentions have been urged above the validity of the several provision contained in the Government Orders, we do not propose to deal with any one of them as the very exercise of the power under Article 162 of the Constitution, is bad in law and as such we keep open all other contentions.

    Thus, the State Government has overstepped their power by issuing the impugned Government Order in their purported exercise of power under Art. 162 of the Constitution. If the State Government felt that there was urgency in the matter it would have very well resorted to the provisions relating to the issuance of ordinance. It is also very interesting to notice that even after a lapse of 10 years, no such law is passed- Fortunately for the petitioners, interim orders have been passed in these writ petitions. Therefore, the registration of documents is taking place in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act and the Rules framed thereunder and any other law governing the matter.

    4. In this view of the matter, we find it difficult to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the Government Order has been issued in exercise of the executive powers in order to urgently meet the situation, therefore it is valid. Accordingly, the contention of the learned Government Pleader is rejected.

    5. For the reasons stated above, these writ petitions are allowed. The impugned Government Order G.O.Ms No. 542, Local Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 29.4.1986 is quashed. Of course it hardly requires to be clarified that our decision does not come in the way of the competent legislature enacting appropriate legislation. No costs.

    6. We make it clear that the actions taken pursuant to the interim orders passed in these cases are not liable to be disturbed.

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