1. The tenant in R.C.O.P. No. 4 of 1981, on the file of the Rent Controller, Tindivanam, is the revision petitioner herein. The revision is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. Eviction was sought by the landlord, first respondent herein, on the ground that he requires the building for his own occupation. The tenant denied title of the landlord and claimed that he is entitled to the benefits of City Tenants Protection Act. He wanted that the matter should be heard at the preliminary stage itself. The Rent Controller found the point in his favour. But in the subsequent stages, namely, appeal and revision, and ultimately, in the Supreme Court it was held that the relationship between the revision petitioner herein and the first respondent is that of tenant and landlord, coming with the provisions of Rent Control Act.

3. Thereafter, the landlord, first respondent herein, filed I.A. No. 32 of 1993 seeking permission to incorporate certain amendments in the petition for eviction. The amendments proposed were, that since the tenant denied the landlord's title without any good faith, he is liable to be evicted, and further, the landlord wanted to add one more paragraph explaining the reason why he wanted the building in question for his own occupation.

4. The same was objected by the tenant.

5. The Rent Controller allowed the application. It is against that order, the present revision is filed, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

6. Since the landlord (first respondent herein) had entered appearance by filing caveat, his counsel was also heard at the time of admission itself.

7. The only point urged by learned Counsel for the revision petitioner was that being a functionary under a Statute, Rent Controller has no power to allow the amendment application, and Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. has no application, and that by allowing the amendment, the Rent Controller has acted beyond the jurisdiction vested in him.

8. I cannot agree with the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner. It is true that the Rent Controller has to function within the four corners of the Statute and that it is a tribunal.

9. In the decision reported in (Associated Cement Co. Limited v. P.N. Sharma and Ors. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1595 : (1964-65) 27 F.J.R. 204 : (1965) 1 S.C.A. 723 : (1965) 1 Lab. L.J. 428 : (1965) 11 Fac. L.R. 77, their Lordship considered the distinction between a court and a Tribunal. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the said decision are relevant for our purpose, and they read thus:

...The expression "court" in the context denotes a tribunal constituted by the State as apart of the ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the State's inherent judicial powers. A sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. Under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State are primarily conferred on the ordinary courts which have been constituted under its relevant provisions. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of courts and to their adjudication are normally entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These courts can be described as ordinary courts of civil judicature. They are governed by their prescribed rules of procedure and they deal with questions of fact and law raised before them adopting a process which is described as judicial process. The powers which these courts exercise, are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions. In every State there are administrative bodies or authorities which are required to deal with matters within their jurisdiction in an administrative manner and their decisions are described as administrative decisions. In reaching their administrative decisions, administrative bodies can and often do take into consideration questions of policy. It is not unlikely that even in this process of reaching administrative decisions, the administrative bodies or authorities are required to act fairly and objectively and would in many cases have to follow the principles of natural justice; but the authority to reach decisions conferred on such administrative bodies is clearly distinct and separate from the judicial power conferred on courts, and the decisions pronounced by administrative bodies are similarly distinct and separate in character from judicial decisions pronounced by courts.

Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the courts one common characteristic; both the courts and the tribunals are

"constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative of executive functions."

vide: Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh . They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the Courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts, and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they discharge.

Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the courts, and features, which are distinct and separate. The basic and fundamental feature which is common to both the courts and the Tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State.

The same was followed in the decision reported in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore. v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 430. The question that came for consideration was, whether under the Income-tax Act, Income-tax Tribunal has got power to grant stay while exercising appellate powers. The Act or Rule does not provide that stay could be granted while appeal is admitted. While considering the same, their Lordships held thus:

Ah express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. The powers which have been conferred by Section 254 on the appellate tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective.

Section 255(5) of the Act does empower the Appellate Tribunal to regulate its own procedure, but it is very doubtful if the power of stay can be spelt out from that provision. But the Appellate Tribunal must be held to have the power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. This is particularly so when Section 220(6) deals expressly with a situation when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but the Act is silent in that behalf when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal. When Section 254 confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedly grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution, and that the statutory power carries with it the duty in proper cases to make such orders for staying proceeding as will prevent the appeal if successful from being rendered nugatory....

10. In Mst. Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari Sharma and Ors. , the question that came for consideration was under the Motor Vehicles Act. In that case, the applicant for permit died. The question raised was, whether legal representatives could be impleaded, and whether authorities under the Act could impleaded or substitute a person, for which there is no provision. Their Lordships held thus:

In the case of death of the applicant before the final disposal of his application for the grant of a permit in respect of his vehicles the Regional Transport Authority has power to substitute the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles in place of the deceased applicant and to allow the successor to prosecute the application. As the relief sought for in the application is dependent upon and related to the possession of the vehicles, the application is capable of being revived at the instance of the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles.

Where the successor is allowed to prosecute the application, the Regional Transport Authority may have to take into consideration many matters personal to the successor, such as his experience the facilities at his disposal for operating the services and his adverse record, if any.

The matters personal to the deceased applicant can no longer be taken into account. The rival applicants should, if necessary be given suitable opportunity to file objections against the grant of the permit to the successor. Section 57 does not deal with the situation arising on the death of an applicant nor has it prescribed any time for the making of an application for substitution of the successor or for the filing of objections against the grant of the permit to him. In the absence of any statute or statutory rule the Regional Transport Authority may devise any reasonable procedure for dealing with the situation.

[Italics supplied]

11. In Cheru Ouseph v. Kunjipathumma 1981 K.L.T. 495, the question that came for consideration was, whether Rent Controller has power to restore an application which was dismissed for default. The Act or Rule did not provide for the same. While considering the question, the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court held thus:

We hear of 'special tribunals', 'statutory tribunals', and "administrative tribunals'; despite the difference in names many of them are adjudicatory bodies, pure and simple. They dispense 'administrative justice' doing exactly the same kind of work, in a specialised field, as ordinary courts of law, with the same degree of freedom from political pressure or official influence. In regard to this category atleast, the proposition that a tribunal can exercise only those powers conferred by the statute creating it, has to be understood with caution, and its application limited to exercise of substantive powers, as distinct from matters which are purely procedural. The administration of justice, or at any rate, a substantial part of it is now patterned in a manner different from what it was some half a century ago. The special tribunals which constitute the core of this new pattern are exercising judicial functions inherent in the sovereign state. The powers exercised by them are in many cases indistinguishable in content from those exercised by courts of justice. Exercise of such powers by them is also vital to the citizen despite the supervisory powers of superior courts over such exercise. If this be the true position. The reality which cannot be overlooked from the functional point of view, how are we to proceed in delimiting the powers of these bodies in matters of procedure, at least in areas not directly covered by statutes? What, after all, is the inherent power saved by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure? A court is constituted for doing justice and must be deemed to possess all powers as may be necessary to do the right and undo wrongs in the course of administration of justice. Of course, the court must have jurisdiction over the proceedings, before it can exercise the inherent power; but when that is granted, its power to advance the course of justice by relying on unenumerated powers - on inherent power or residuary power, as it is often called - cannot be denied to it. And therefore, where a tribunal exercises the same kind of power i.e., part of the judicial power of the State, why should it be denied similar inherent or residuary powers? If you do not like the name, call it by another; but so long as the tribunal is deciding legal disputes and determining the rights of citizens as any other court, you cannot, without endangering its efficiency, deny to it all powers which are necessary for the administration of justice. This is not to convert every tribunal into a tyrant, but only to recognise the reality that tribunals have come to stay as instruments of administration of justice, and that occasions may arise where they too will have to step into areas unchartered by the statute and the rules, in the interests of justice. If a tribunal goes out of its way in the fullness of its powers, the superior courts are there to correct it; but the first adjudication is more important to the litigant than the last. Therefore in respect of procedural matters, all powers which are not specifically denied by the statute or the statutory rules, should be vouchsafed to a tribunal so that it may effectively exercise of its judicial function.

The said decision was followed in Abdulla v. Rent Controller 1984 K.L.T. 865. There, the question was, whether Rent Controller has got power to allow amendment. A learned Judge of the Kerala High Court held thus:

It is true that courts have always taken the view that statutory tribunals which are creatures of statutes have only those powers conferred on them specifically by statutes. But the role of such tribunals as decision making bodies in the field of administration of justice is being recognised more and more. There is a line of thinking that in regard to such statutory tribunals, this approach to their power should be understood with caution and the application of these principles be limited to the exercise of substantive powers as distinguished from matters which are procedural. These tribunals which are playing a more and more important roles in the field of administration of justice are exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions inherent in the State. Many a time, it is difficult to distinguish the powers exercised by tribunals from those exercised by courts. Functions of tribunals are vital in the life of the people as functions of courts. It is therefore increasingly being recognised that such tribunals must be treated as possessing inherent power for the performance of their duties and for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Whichever way one looks at it, there could be no doubt what the Rent Controller has jurisdiction or power to allow amendment of pleadings in appropriate cases. The source of power could be traced to Section 23(1)(j) of the Act or the inherent or residuary powers of the Rent Controller as a court. If it be the former, where the existence of a defect or error is made out, the Rent Controller is competent to allow an amendment to cure the defect or error; if it is the latter, the Rent Controller has always the jurisdiction to allow an amendment as long as it is bona fide and necessary to do justice between the parties and as long as it does not lead to irreparable injury to the opposite party.

12. It is in this connection we have to consider the purpose of the amendment. An amendment to a pleading is necessitated to avoid multiplicity of litigation and also to explain the vagueness, if any, in the pleadings. To decide the real matter in controversy, parties are permitted to amend the pleadings. In certain circumstances, the existing pleadings becomes insufficient or inappropriate due to subsequent events. If amendment is refused and if the party is directed to file another suit or proceeding, the very purpose of coming to court will be defeated. We must understand that both courts and tribunals are intended to administer justice.

13. In view of the decisions cited above, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted.

14. When the Act or Rule confers certain powers on the authorities concerned, it does not follow that those are the only powers that could be exercised by them. It cannot be expected that the powers exercised by the tribunals should always be enumerated. All future contingencies cannot be exhausted while drafting a statute or rule. It is in that view, we have to consider whether a tribunal can exercise a power which is not specifically excluded. When a tribunal is more or less a court and is discharging judicial functions, even though it is a creature of a Statute, unless it is specifically prohibited, we have to presume that the tribunal also will have the same powers as a court, and it can discharge those functions as well.

15. Now let us consider how far the proposed amendments have affected the petitioner herein.

16. In the amendment petition, in the first paragraph, it is stated that since the tenant has denied the title, he is entitled to get an order of eviction. According to me, even without an amendment, such a contention can be put forward at the time of arguments. In taking this view, I am supported by the decision reported in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K Krishna Rao (Deceased) By Lrs.. A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2187. In that case, their Lordships said that the question of title need not be anterior to the institution of the suit. Eviction can be ordered on the ground of denial of title if it was found to be not bona fide, even in the course of eviction petition. Their Lordships said that even if such a contention is taken in the written statement for the first time, that can be a ground for eviction. The relevant portion of the said decision reads thus:

To insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entitled by the tenant's denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement....

The other amendment that the landlord wants to incorporate in the original petition for eviction is, in the nature of an explanation about his bona fide requirement of the premises for his own use. He wants to explain the aspect of bona fide requirement for own use, by adding one more paragraph to the petition. It is not an inconsistent or new plea that gives a fresh cause of action to the landlord, as alleged by the tenant.

17. The revision petitioner has filed this revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Only if this Court finds that the Tribunal has exceeds its jurisdiction, this Court is entitled to invoke the judicial supervisory jurisdiction under that article. When the Tribunal has passed an Order only after taking into consideration the interests of justice, I do not find any ground to interfere with the same. The revision petition which is devoid of any merits is liable to be dismissed.

18. The eviction petition which was filed in the year 1981 has not yet been taken up even for trial, though more than fourteen years have elapsed. I am of the view that this revision is filed only to protect the proceedings so that the landlord may not get possession of the building atleast during his lifetime.

19. For the reasons stated above, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Rent Controller shall dispose of R.C.O.P. No. 4 of 1981 on or before the court closes for summer vacation and report compliance to this Court.