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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking issuance of a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ calling upon the respondent to show under what authority he was holding the office of the Governor of Tamil Nadu. The petitioner described himself as a social worker and an erstwhile participant in the freedom movement. He alleged that the Governor (the respondent) was delaying files sent for his approval, deliberately postponing assent to laws passed by the Legislature, was making public speeches creating apprehension that he would dismiss the Government, was identifying with the Congress-I and acting at the instance of its leaders, and thereby was violating his oath under Article 159 of the Constitution.

The petition principally relied on a newspaper report published in The Hindu dated 6 February 1994 (captioned "Action at proper time: Governor") which the petitioner placed before the Court and on which his counsel relied at the hearing. The petitioner filed an affidavit repeating these allegations and appended the newspaper cutting.

At hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner relied primarily on the newspaper report and cited several judicial decisions in support. The Court considered whether a newspaper report by itself is admissible evidence and whether the allegations could be entertained against the Governor in view of constitutional immunity. After addressing admissibility principles and prior authority on gubernatorial immunity, the Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court ordered that there would be no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner may attack the Governor's fitness to hold office or call upon the Governor to show authority to hold that office based on the material presented.
  2. Whether a newspaper report (press report) by itself is admissible as evidence to prove the facts reported therein in support of a writ petition challenging the Governor's conduct.
  3. Whether the constitutional immunity accorded to the Governor (Article 361 and related provisions) is displaced where mala fides or lack of bona fides are alleged.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner alleged that the Governor was delaying files and withholding assent to legislation passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislature, thereby disregarding the Government of the day.
  • He alleged that the Governor made public speeches (specifically referenced a speech reported in The Hindu on 6.2.1994) that, without provocation, expressed an intention to take action against the Government and created apprehension of dismissal of the Government.
  • The petitioner asserted the Governor had identified himself with the Congress-I and was acting at the instance of its leaders, using the office of Governor to favour Congress-I and to embarrass the incumbent Chief Minister.
  • He contended that these actions violated the oath under Article 159 and rendered the respondent not fit to hold office.
  • At hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner relied principally on the newspaper report in The Hindu dated 6.2.1994 and placed reliance on several judicial decisions to support locus standi and admissibility/contentions.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.A. Mathialagan v. The Governor, (1973) 1 M.L.J. 131 : A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 198 (Full Bench) The decision was cited by the petitioner to suggest that the personal immunity under Article 361(1) would not avail where the Governor's bona fides were questioned. The Full Bench itself was discussed in the opinion as addressing the extent of gubernatorial immunity. The Court noted that the Full Bench in fact took the view that the Governor's personal immunity extends even where bona fides are questioned and highlighted that the Full Bench considered that the personal immunity afforded by Article 361(1) to the Governor would still apply. The precedent was used in the Court's analysis of constitutional immunity of the Governor and was relied upon to show the scope of that immunity.
G. Vasantha Pai v. C.K. Ramaswamy, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 342 To establish that the immunity under Article 361 is in respect of the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of the Governor's office and applies to acts done in that capacity. The Court cited the principle to support its conclusion about the nature and extent of the Governor's immunity from answerability to courts for acts done in the course of performing official duties.
Hardwari Lal v. Bhajan Lal, A.I.R. 1993 P. & H. 3 Cited by petitioner to support the proposition that a petitioner has locus standi to maintain a writ when information conveyed by the Governor is such as to require court protection of citizens' rights and liberties. The Court noted the precedent but found the present petition lacked admissible evidence (being based solely on newspaper reports) and therefore the proposition did not avail the petitioner in the present case.
Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1988) 3 S.C.C. 319 Authoritatively establishes that news items in newspapers are hearsay, are not among documents specifically admissible under Section 78(2) of the Evidence Act, and cannot be the basis for judicial notice of facts unless proved by evidence aliunde; the presumption under Section 81 is not sufficient to prove the facts reported. The Court applied this principle directly: it held that the newspaper report relied upon by the petitioner was hearsay secondary evidence and inadmissible unless proved by evidence other than the report itself. This formed a central plank of the Court's reasoning to reject the petitioner's case.
Quamarul Islam v. S.K. Kanta, (1994) 1 J.T. 452 Affirmed that newspaper reports are hearsay and that mere production of copies of newspapers (or production by the editor/publisher) does not amount to proof of the contents; the maker of the report or other evidence must be produced to prove the facts reported. The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that production of the newspaper article alone could not be treated as proof of the Governor's reported statements; the reported facts required proof by the maker of the report or other admissible evidence, which was not furnished in the present petition.
Kasturi Radha Krishnan v. President of India, AIR 1990 Mad. 217 Used to show that public interest litigations based only on newspaper reports without definite allegations and material are not maintainable, and that allegations in affidavits should not be predicated solely on newspaper reports. The Court quoted and applied this reasoning to reinforce that allegations based solely on press reports could not sustain the writ petition challenging the Governor's conduct.
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 1 L.W. 145 (Division Bench) Division Bench observation that Article 361(1) of the Constitution is absolute and does not distinguish between bona fide and mala fide acts of the Governor; immunity will apply even if mala fides are alleged. The Court cited this pronouncement to support its conclusion that Article 361 grants absolute immunity to the Governor from being subjected to the process of the court even where mala fides are alleged, and used it as part of the reasoning for dismissing the petition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following logical steps, staying strictly within the material before it:

  1. Identification of the petition's foundation: The Court observed that the petitioner's case was based solely on a newspaper report published in The Hindu dated 6.2.1994 and the averments contained in the petitioner's affidavit which expressly referred to that report.
  2. Admissibility of newspaper reports: The Court analysed whether a newspaper report standing alone is admissible evidence. It relied on binding Supreme Court authority (Laxmi Raj Shetty) and subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements (Quamarul Islam) to state the settled legal principle that newspaper reports are hearsay secondary evidence and cannot be the basis for judicial notice of facts unless the maker of the report or other admissible proof is produced.
  3. Application of the principle to the facts: The Court observed that the petitioner did not lead any evidence aliunde to prove the facts reported in the newspaper, did not produce or examine the reporter or maker of the report, and the learned counsel for the petitioner expressly relied only on the newspaper report. Consequently, the Court held the contents of the press report were inadmissible for proving the material allegations against the Governor.
  4. Consideration of gubernatorial immunity: The Court examined prior case law concerning the Governor's immunity (notably the Full Bench in K.A. Mathialagan and the Division Bench decision in Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) and the Supreme Court pronouncements (G. Vasantha Pai). It emphasised that Article 361(1) confers immunity in respect of acts done in the exercise and performance of the Governor's official duties and that authority had been taken to indicate that this immunity extends even where mala fides or lack of bona fides are alleged.
  5. Assessment of locus standi and available remedies: Although the petitioner cited Hardwari Lal v. Bhajan Lal to suggest locus to challenge gubernatorial information when required to protect citizens' rights, the Court found that in the absence of admissible evidence to substantiate the allegations, that principle could not assist the petitioner in the present circumstances.
  6. Conclusion on merits: Because the petition rested solely on inadmissible newspaper material and the petitioner produced no other material or witnesses, the Court concluded that there was no merit in the writ petition and that it should be dismissed. The Court also warned against making wild and reckless allegations in public interest litigation that besmirch persons occupying high constitutional office.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's challenge to the Governor's fitness to hold office was rejected for want of admissible evidence; the petition is dismissed and there will be no order as to costs.
  • Evidence law implication reiterated: The Court reaffirmed the settled principle that newspaper reports are hearsay secondary evidence and cannot, by mere production, prove the facts reported unless supported by evidence aliunde (such as the maker of the report or other admissible proof).
  • Constitutional immunity implication: The Court, relying on precedent, reiterated that Article 361 provides immunity to the Governor for acts done in the exercise of official duties and that earlier authorities have indicated the immunity is not displaced even if mala fides are alleged. The opinion did not purport to lay down a new rule of law or depart from existing precedent.
  • No new precedent: The Court did not indicate that it was creating or announcing any new legal principle; it applied existing authorities to dismiss the petition.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond that opinion has been added.

    S.P Shenbagamoorthy v. Dr. Cheena Reddy, The Governor, State Of Tamil Nadu, Madaras.

    The prayer in the writ petition is as follows:

    “. . . . to issue a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of writ, calling upon the respondent to show as to under what authority the respondent is holding the office of the Governor of Tamil Nadu and pass such further or other orders.”

    2. It is claimed by the petitioner that he is a social worker doing social work by collecting old clothes and giving them to the poor and needy. He also claims to have participated in the freedom movement. The case of the petitioner is as follows:

    According to the petitioner, the respondent has been delaying the files that have been sent for his approval and is deliberately postponing to give assents to laws that have been passed by the Legislature sent for his consent in absolute disregard to the present Government and that he is making speeches at functions attended by him on several occasions, creating apprehension in the mind of the people of Tamil Nadu that he would dismiss the Government and that he is identifying himself as a politician and has got affinity of the Congress-I and acting at the instance of the leaders of the Congress-I and the leaders of the Congress-I are making use of the Office of the Governor to dismiss the Government of Tamil Nadu. It is further stated in para 6 of his affidavit as follows:

    “I submit that during his latest speech by the respondent herein namely the Governor of Tamil Nadu at Salem Published in Hindu under the caption ‘Action at proper time: Governor’ dated 6th Feburary, 1994 he has openly stated ‘I do not know where the recent University Bill, re-structuring of the Legislative Assembly Business Rules, were all heading to’. He further stated ‘I am aware of the people and will take action against injustice before damage is done. No wrong, nor person, who has done it, can get away”.

    All these things would go to show that in a function where he has attended as chief guest made all these speeches without any provocation whatsoever from the Government, diverting from his usual speech of the social function, made the abovesaid comments and thereby expressed his intention to dismiss the present Government of Tamil Nadu at any time and thus created an apprehension in the minds of the people of Tamil Nadu as well as the Government of Tamil Nadu would be dismissed without any reason on an improper and illegal ground and thus to cause embarrassment to the present Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and to favour of the leaders of the Congress-I of the Tamil Nadu and thus he has violated the oath that he has taken under the Art. 159 of the Constitution of India”. According to the petitioner, the comments made by the respondent are unwarranted. Therefore, the respondent is not fit to hold the office of the Governor for the reasons stated above since he is acting against the interests of Tamil Nadu and acting to the dictates of the leaders of the Congress-I of Tamil Nadu. Along with the writ petition, the petitioner has also filed a newspaper cutting in ‘The Hindu’ issue dated 6.2.1994

    3. Mr. T.K Sampath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner at the time of hearing would only rely on the news item published in the Hindu dated 6.2.1994 under the caption ‘Action at proper time-Governor’ and would submit that the respondent has violated the oath he has taken under Art. 159 of the Constitution of India. He has also reiterated the other allegations made in the affidavit. In support of his contentions, Mr. T.K Sampath, placed reliance on the following decisions:

    K.A Mathialagan v. The Governor, (1973) 1 M.L.J 131: 86 L.W 365: AIR. 1973 Mad. 198 (F.B); G. Vasantha Pai v. C.K Ramaswamy, A.I.R 1978 S.C 342; Hardwary Lal v. Bhajan Lal, AIR. 1993 P. and H. 3.

    4. K.A Mathialagan v. The Governor, (1973) 1 M.L.J 131: 86 L.W 365: A.I.R 1973 Mad 198, Full Bench decision was relied on to show that personal immunity afforded by Art. 361 (1) to the Governor did not avail where his bona fides were questioned. Courts have held that where his bona fides are questioned he can personally be called to enter his defence and that mala fides or want of bona fides is made against the Governor in respect of his official act, there is an obligation or duty on the Governor to make an affidavit for assistance of the Court in deciding the question.

    5. G. Vasantha Pai v. C.K Ramaswamy, A.I.R 1978 S.C 342 was cited to say that the immunity given to the Governor under Art. 361 against answerability to any court is in respect of the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those duties.

    6. Hardwari Lal v. Bhajan Lal, A.I.R 1993 P. and H. 3, was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to show that the petitioner has locus standi to maintain the writ petition when information conveyed by the Governor is such as justly requiring the court to exercise jurisdiction to protect rights and liberties of citizens.

    7. To my query as to the basis or foundation of the present writ petition, Mr. T.K Sampath, would submit that it is based only on the news item published in the English daily ‘The Hindu’. He also invites my attention to para. 6 of the affidavit wherein the petitioner has referred to the latest speech of the respondent at Salem and published in ‘The Hindu’ under the caption ‘Acion at proper time-Governor’ dated 6th February 1994. In view of the above submission, it becomes necessary for this Court to consider whether a newspaper report by itself is admissible in evidence. It is settled principle of law that news-items published in the newspapers are only hearsay evidence and no judicial notice can be taken of the news-items which are in the nature of hear-say secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence. In this context, I may usefully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1988) 3 S.C.C 319. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court has considered the question of admissibility of the news-items appearing in a press report in the newspaper and opined as follows:

    “We cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in a news-item being in the nature of hear-say secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a newspaper is only hear-say evidence. A newspaper is not one of the documents referred to in Sec. 78 (2) of the Evidence Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The presumption of genuiness attached under Sec. 81 of the Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be treated as proved of the facts reported therein. It is now well settled that a statement of fact contained in a newspaper is merely hear-say and therefore in admissible in evidence in absence of the maker of the statement appearing in court and deposing to have perceived the fact reported.”

    8. In a reent pronouncement in the case of Quamarul Islam v. S.K Kanta, (1994) 1 J.T 452, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

    That was a case of an election dispute. The appellant before the Supreme Court was the successful candidate in the election whose election was set aside by the High Court of Karnataka by allowing the Election Petition filed by the defeated candidate S.K Kanta. The aggrieved unseated candidate filed the appeal before the Supreme Court under Sec. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The appellant contested the election as a candidate of Muslim League from 10 Gulbarga Assembly Constituency. The defeated candidate S.K Kanta questioned the election of the appellant in the election petition on various grounds alleging commission of corrupt practice by him within the meaning of Secs. 123 (2), 123 (3), 123 (3-A) etc., of the Act. The learned single Judge considered the election petition found that the appellant had committed corrupt practices defined under Secs. 123 (2), 123 (3), 123 (3-A) and 123 (4) of the Act and therefore declared the election of the appellant void. The election petition was allowed with costs. Reliance was also placed on certain advertisements and messages issued by the Iuml seeking vote for the appellant. Reference was also made to the Bahmani News, and Urdu newspaper, published from Gulbarga and it was contended that the advertisements issued and published therein were aimed at furthering the election prospects of the appellant. Reliance was also placed on the alleged speeches delivered by the appellant and his election agent and other agents with his consent, seeking votes on ground of religion etc., as published in the newspapers. The High Court of Karnataka dealt with issues 1 to 4 and decided in the affirmative and held that the appellant had committed corrupt practices attracting provisions of the Representation of People Act. It was argued on behalf of the appellant among other things the newspapers referred to and relied upon by the election petitioner had not been filed alongwith the petition and the copies of the newspapers and some other documents have been filed subsequently and that those documents were filed after the evidence is commenced. The returned candidate, viz., the appellant raised objection to the production of those documents at that last stage. Amongst the documents which the election petitioner sought to produce at that late stage were some advertisements allegedly issued by the IUML and MYL in the newspapers between 1.11.1989 and 24.11.1989 as also reports of speeches allegedly made by the appellant during the election campaign. The learned Judge however allowed the application of the election petitioner. The Supreme Court however observed that the approach of the trial court was not correct and that he was treating the trial of the election petition in a rather casual manner, unmindful of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder as also the law laid down by the Supreme Court on the relevant aspect.

    9. The following question was raised before the Supreme Court for its consideration. Can the mere production of the copy of the newspaper be treated as proof of the report of the speech (news item) contained therein?

    10. The Supreme Court answered the said question as follows:

    “Newspaper reports by themselves are not evidence of the contents thereof. Those reports are only hear-say evidence. These have to be proved and the manner of proving a newspaper report is well settled. Since, in this case, neither the reporter who heard the speech and sent the report was examined nor even his reports produced, the production of the newspaper by the Editor and publisher, P.W 4 by itself cannot amount to proving the contents of the newspaper reports. Newspaper, is at the best secondary evidence of its contents and is not admissible in evidence without proper proof of the contents under the Indian Evidence Act. The learned trial Judge could not treat the newspaper reports as duty ‘proved’ only by the production of the copies of the newspaper. The election petitioner also examined Abrar Razi, P.W 5 who was the polling agent of the election petitioner and a resident of the locality in support of the correctness of the reports including advertisements and messages as published in the said newspaper. We have carefully perused his testimony and find that his evidence also falls short of proving the contents of the reports of the alleged speeches or the messages and the advertisements, which appeared in different issues of the newspaper. Since, the maker of the report which formed basis of the publications, did not appear in the court to depose about the facts as perceived by him, the facts contained in the published reports were clearly inadmissible. No evidence was led by the election petitioner to prove the contents of the message and the advertisements or the messages were not produced at the trial. No witness came forward to prove the receipt of the manuscript or any of the advertisements or the messages or the publication of the same in accordance with the manuscript. There is no satisfactory and reliable evidence on the record to even establish that the same were actually issued by IUML or MYL ignoring the time being, whether or not the appellant had any connection with IUML or MYL or that the same were published by him or with his consent by any other person or by any other person with the consent of his election agent”.

    11. Again at page 474 it has been observed as follows:

    “In the present case, we find that no legally admissible evidence has been led by the respondent election petitioner, in proof of the facts contained in the newspaper reports (news items), messages and advertisements. The appellant, returned candidate, denied the making of the offending statements. The various newspaper reports, advertisements and messages as published in Bahmani Newspaper cannot be treated as proof of the facts stated therein and cannot be used against the appellant in the absence of any evidence aliunde”.

    12. In the case reported in Kasturi Radha Krishnan v. President of India, AIR 1990 Mad. 217, my learned brother Justice K.S Bakthavatsalam, while dismissing a public interest litigation filed on the basis of newspaper reports has stated as follows:

    “As has already been stated, the Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President under Art. 156 of the Constitution. As such, it is not open to the petitioner to make allegations in an affidavit based on mere news-paper reports and come to this Court as if it is a public interest litigation. Further, before approaching this Court for issuance of a writ of mandamus, there should be definite allegations made in the affidavit. The allegations made in the affidavit are based only on newspaper report and nothing else.”

    13. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing judgments that the contents of news items can be treated only as hear-say secondary evidence. In the present case, the petitioner is completely basing his case solely on the news items published in the daily newspaper ‘The Hindu’ dated 6.2.1994 The petitioner has not given any other materials before this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the newspaper report only in support of his contention in this writ petition. Consequently, I have to repel his contention based only on the news item published in the daily newspaper. Admittedly, the allegations made against the respondent are not based on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. I don't find any merit in the writ petition, and the writ petition is therefore liable to be dismissed.

    14. Before concluding, I would like to emphasise the following aspects in a public interest litigation. No body should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others, particularly persons who are occupying very high constitutional positions. Further, it is worth noticing of the view observed by the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Srinivasan and Thangamani, JJ. reported in The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. Governor Of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 1 L.W 145, which runs as follows:

    “It is next contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the immunity will not be available in the case of mala fide. According to him, mala fide have been alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the petition from paragraph 20 onwards. Allegations have been made as against the Governor that he has acted mala fide. It is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the allegations would amount to acts of mala fide on the part of the petitioner. But we are of the view that even in case in mala fide no writ petition can be maintained as against the Governor and no relief can be sought against him. He will not be subjected to the process of court. Art. 361 (1) of the Constitution of India is absolute in terms and does not make a distinction between the bona fide act and mala fide act and in fact the article applied even if the Governor purports to have done something in the performance of the powers and duties of the office”.

    The Full Bench of this Court in K.A Mathialangan v. The Governor, (1973) 1 M.L.J 131: 86 L.W 365: A.I.R 1973 Mad. 198 (F.B). He considered the position and taken the view that even if the Governor acts mala fide he will be entitled to the protection under Art. 261 of the Constitution of India. The relevant passage reads as follows:

    “Neither the Supreme Court in this case, nor the other cases we referred to of the High Courts, was held that the personal immunity afforded by Art. 361 (1) to the Governor did not avail where his bona fide were questioned. They have not held that where his bona fides are questioned, he can personally be called to enter his defence. In our opinion, his personal immunity extends to such a case as well”.

    15. As pointed out by me earlier, Art. 361 of the Constitution of India, is absolute in terms and even in the case of mala fide the protection of immunity will apply. Courts have considered the question of admissibility of news items appeared in press reports in the newspapers in the two Supreme Court judgments referred to supra, as observed by the Supreme Court, I cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in the news items they being in the nature of hear-say secondary evidence which is not proved by any other material. Since the statement of fact contained in the newspaper is merely hear-say, the same is inadmissible in evidence. The petitioner has also failed to let in any other material in proof of the facts contained in the newspaper. Further, the learned counsel has not also put forward any other points before this Court. The writ petition therefore fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.

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    S.P Shenbagamoorthy v. Dr. Cheena Reddy, The Governor, State Of Tamil Nadu, Madaras.
    (Mar 3, 1994)