Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

645 of 1986

Judges

Mr. Justice Srinivasan
Mr. Justice Thangamani

Acts

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act 1963,

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Concise, Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 28.11.1977 the plaintiff entered into a written agreement with Sri Saravanaperumal Nadar to purchase 35 acres 12 cents at Rs. 5,000 per acre (total Rs. 1,75,600). The plaintiff paid an advance of Rs. 10,006 and the agreement fixed 30.6.1978 as the latest date for execution of the sale deed. Although title deeds were handed over on the date of agreement, they were subsequently taken back with the assurance they would be returned a week before the sale deed execution date. The plaintiff asserted he remained ready and willing to pay the balance but alleged repeated delays and evasions by the vendor and that the vendor's son demanded a higher price. The plaintiff sent notices and ultimately alleged that the property was sold to the third defendant and that sale deeds in the names of defendants 3 to 11 were sham transactions.

The vendor Saravanaperumal Nadar later died, and his wife, son and daughter became defendants in the suit. The plaintiff sued for specific performance (and alternatively for refund of the advance). The trial court heard evidence and dismissed the suit, finding that the plaintiff had not proved readiness and willingness to perform and that defendants 3 to 11 were bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The plaintiff appealed against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiff had proved that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract (including throughout the period of the suit) so as to be entitled to a decree for specific performance.
Whether defendants 3 to 11 acquired the property as bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the plaintiff's prior agreement.
Whether the advance of Rs. 10,006 paid by the plaintiff should be refunded (alternatively, whether it should be forfeited for the plaintiff's default).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff / Appellant's Arguments

The plaintiff contended that he had entered into a valid contract on 28.11.1977 and had paid the advance of Rs. 10,006, and so was entitled to specific performance.
He asserted he was always ready and willing to perform his part, repeatedly pressed for execution of the sale deed, obtained survey and encumbrance certificate, and sent notices (including a registered notice on 22.3.1979).
The plaintiff alleged that the subsequent sales to defendants 3–11 were not bona fide and involved false consideration; the sale deeds were "make believe" arrangements.
As alternative relief, the plaintiff sought refund of the advance if specific performance was not granted.
On deposit of the balance the plaintiff argued (through counsel reliance on precedent) that deposit may not always be necessary unless directed by the court. (Reference was made to Ramani Ammal v. Susilammal.)

Defendants' Arguments

First defendant (and other defendants by written statement) maintained the plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform the agreement within the time fixed and did not tender or offer the balance consideration within the stipulated period.
It was asserted the plaintiff had no separate funds and relied upon his father-in-law; moreover, employment conditions required prior permission to purchase immovable property, undermining the plaintiff's readiness to perform.
Defendants argued the plaintiff had forfeited his rights under the agreement and the advance.
Defendants 3 to 11 pleaded that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the plaintiff's agreement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Sardar Gurbaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and another, 53 M.L.J. 392 (Privy Council)	It is the duty of a party who personally knows the circumstances to give evidence on his own behalf; non-appearance is a strong circumstance discrediting his case.	The court relied on this authority to support drawing an adverse inference from the plaintiff's failure to testify personally without satisfactory explanation.
H.G. Krishna Reddy and Company v. M.M. Thimmiah (1983) 1 M.L.J. 467; A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 169	In suits for specific performance the plaintiff must prove readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, including continuity of such readiness until the date of decree; absence from the witness box undermines this proof.	The court applied this principle to find that, in the absence of the plaintiff's testimony, the plaintiff had not discharged the burden under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, to establish readiness and willingness.
Ramani Ammal v. Susilammal (1991) 1 M.L.J. 1	Addressed circumstances in which deposit/tender of balance may not be required unless the court so directs.	The court held that the ruling was inapplicable on the facts before it because there was no evidence of the plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform.
Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar and Govind Prasad v. Hari Dutt (Supreme Court)	Matters concerning time being or not being of the essence of contract and consequences on relief of specific performance.	The court noted these Supreme Court judgments had no bearing on the present case because the factual finding was that the plaintiff was not ready to perform even after the stipulated date.
Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Velloji Rao; Ramesh Chandra v. Chuni Lal; Prag Datt v. Smt. Saraswati Devi; Viswanathan v. K.M. Palaniswamy Gaunder ((1991) 2 L.W. 140)	Authorities cited by appellant's counsel (specific principles not restated in detail in the opinion).	The court stated these rulings would not assist the plaintiff in view of the facts found by the court in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court evaluated the evidence and proceeded in two primary strands of analysis: (A) whether the plaintiff had proved continued readiness and willingness to perform the contract, and (B) whether defendants 3 to 11 were bona fide purchasers without notice.

(A) Readiness and willingness

The plaintiff did not testify personally. His explanation of absence (being abroad) was examined against the record: evidence showed the plaintiff was in India at relevant times (he executed a power of attorney on 10.7.1985 and P.W.2 saw him in Feb. 1982), and there was no satisfactory reason why he could not have given testimony while the suit was pending. The court drew an adverse inference based on authorities that a party who knows facts must give evidence and submit to cross-examination.
The court found the documentary evidence the plaintiff relied on (a series of letters and certificates of posting: Ex.A-24, Ex.A-25, Ex.A-26, Ex.A-27) to be suspicious: the letters were not referred to in the plaint or in prior notices, the method of transmission (certificate of posting instead of registered post) was implausible in the circumstances, and the appearance of the documents created a strong suspicion of fabrication. P.W.1's explanations for handling and posting those letters were not convincing.
The plaintiff delayed taking stronger measures (such as sending lawyer's notices earlier, seeking an injunction, or filing suit promptly) despite asserting urgent reasons — e.g., knowledge of negotiations with third parties in March 1979 but sending only a certificate-of-posting letter rather than immediate legal steps; the first lawyer's notice was issued only on 22.3.1979 and the suit was filed on 26.3.1980, over a year later without explanation.
There was no documentary or oral evidence proving the plaintiff had sufficient funds available between the date of contract and the suit, nor evidence proving the alleged availability of funds from his father-in-law. The court rejected reliance on unsupported admissions about the father-in-law's wealth.
The plaintiff did not deposit the balance in court after filing suit, despite claiming readiness; the court found that the factual matrix did not permit application of the precedent relied on to excuse such a deposit.
On the cumulative effect of these matters—non-appearance, suspicious documents, delay, absence of proof of funds—the court concluded the plaintiff had not discharged the burden of proving continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

(B) Bona fide purchaser issue (defendants 3 to 11)

The court examined the evidence led by the third defendant (D.W.2) and found it credible: an agreement in favour of the third defendant dated 19.2.1979 (Ex.B-69), contemporaneous purchase of stamp papers between 10–12 March 1979, production of account books showing payment of advance of Rs. 10,001 to Saravanaperumal Nadar on 19.2.1979, auditors' reports and income-tax certificates, and registration copies of sale deeds (Exs.B-4 to B-12) evidencing payment of consideration at registration.
Cross-examination did not discredit these accounts; the registration process itself had involved an assessment for deficit stamp duty indicating transaction genuineness rather than sham.
The plaintiff failed to prove that defendants 3 to 11 had notice of the plaintiff's alleged agreement. The only document purporting to show notice was Ex.A-27, which the court already rejected as unreliable. Witnesses for the plaintiff (P.Ws.1–3) were found to be interested and their evidence to be inconsistent and not credible.
On these findings, the court accepted the trial court's view that defendants 3 to 11 were bona fide purchasers for value without notice.

After applying the legal principles (including those cited in authorities about the plaintiff's duty to testify and to prove readiness and willingness), and assessing documentary and oral evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to discretionary relief of specific performance. The court also determined that, having committed default before 30.6.1978, the plaintiff was liable to forfeit the advance under the contract.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the judgment of the trial court (dismissing the suit for specific performance) is upheld. The court further held that the plaintiff's advance of Rs. 10,006 is forfeited because the plaintiff committed default before 30.6.1978. The suit for refund of the advance was refused. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

Direct effect: The plaintiff remains without relief for specific performance; defendants 3 to 11 are treated as bona fide purchasers for value without notice and retain their registered titles. The advance paid by the plaintiff is forfeited under the contract due to the plaintiff's default.
The court did not state that a new legal principle or binding precedent was established; it applied established principles (duty to testify, burden to prove readiness and willingness, bona fide purchaser protections) to the facts and affirmed the trial court's factual findings.

Note: This summary is strictly based on the facts, findings and reasoning contained within the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond the text of that opinion.

Show full summary ...

S.K.M. Mohammed Amanullah Represented By His Power Agent A. Ali Akbar Aziz v. T.C.S. Ramasangu Pandian And Ors.

1. The plaintiff, who lost in the trial court in a suit for specific performance, has preferred this appeal. The case of the plaintiff is as follows: On 28.11.1977 he entered into an agreement with Sri Saravanaperumal Nadar, father of the first defendant and husband of the second defendant, for purchasing the suit properties of an extent of 35 acres 12 cents at the rate of Rs. 5,000 per acre. The total consideration works out to Rs. 1,75,600 out of which a sum of Rs. 10,006 was paid as advance on the date of agreement. The agreement provided that the sale deed should be executed before 30.6.1978. Though the title deeds were given to the plaintiff on the date of agreement, they were taken back with the promise that they will be handed over to the plaintiff a week before the date of sale deed. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to pay the balance amount. But, Saravanaperumal Nadar was delaying the transaction by giving one excuse or other. His son was telling the plaintiff that his father was unwell and would be executing the deed as soon as he recovered fully. On 28.2.1979 when the plaintiff pressed for early execution of the sale deed, Saravanaperumal Nadar and his son promised to complete the sale positively on 19.3.1979 and the plaintiff arranged to measure the properly through a surveyor and obtained encumbrance certificate. By the second week of March, 1979 when the plaintiff requested Saravanaperumal Nadar to give the original title deeds, he was told that the same was with his son, the first defendant and the latter was demanding higher amount for sale. He was also assured that the first defendant would be persuaded to hand over the documents in three or four days i.e., positively before 18.3.1979, for preparation of the sale deed. Though thereafter the plaintiff and his brokers approached the vendor and the first defendant several times to give the prior deeds and complete the sale they were evading. The plaintiff did not arrange to get the necessary stamp papers in view of the reluctant attitude of the vendor and his son. The plaintiff learnt that the first defendant was negotiating with third parties to sell the property for higher value and on 223.1979 sent a registered notice through his advocate to the vendor expressing his readiness to pay the balance amount due and requiring completion of the transaction. On the same day, another copy was sent to the address of the vendor by certificate of posting and a third copy was sent to his permanent address at Madurai. The vendor evaded to receive the same. The plaintiff learnt that the property was sold to third defendant, who is a close relation and family friend of the vendor. Defendants 4 to 11 are family members of the third defendant and sale deeds have been taken in their names. The consideration mentioned in the sale deeds is false and it is only a make believe arrangement. The sale deeds are not bona fide. Saravanaperumal Nadar died later leaving his wife, son and daughter as his legal representatives. They are respectively defendants 2,1 and 12. The plaintiff is entitled to enforce the specific performance and prays for the grant of the same.

2. In the written statement the first defendant contended that the plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement and within the time specified in the agreement, he did not tender the balance or offer to pay the same. It was found that the plaintiff had no separate funds to finalise the transaction and had to rely upon his father-in-law and according to the service conditions with his employers, the plaintiff was not authorised to buy any immovable property without getting the prior permission of the employers. Hence, the plaintiff never turned up for completing the transaction. Thus, he has forfeited his rights under the agreement and the advance paid. The plaintiff was also aware of the sale deeds executed in favour of defendants 3 to 11, who were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the agreement. The plaintiffs father-in-law was having an interest in the sale agreement and he was well versed in litigation and this suit has been filed with ulterior motive to blackmail the defendants.

3. Defendants 3 to 11 have raised a plea that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff.

4. Pending suit, the second defendant died and defendants 1 and 12 are recorded as her legal representatives. The trial court considered the entire evidence on record and held that the plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The trial court has also held that the defendants have proved that they are bona fide purchasers for value and they had no notice of the suit agreement. Hence, the trial court dismissed the suit.

5. The plaintiff has not entered the witness box to speak in support of his case, the reason for his absence from the witness box is said to be that he was not in India at that time and he was in Saudi Arabia eking out his livelihood. This explanation cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the plaintiff was admittedly in India at the time of filing the plaint. P.W.2 has stated in his evidence that he saw the plaintiff six months prior to the date of his deposition. His evidence was recorded on 24.8.1982, which means the plaintiff was seen by him in February, 1982. He has also stated that the plaintiff went outside the country about four months prior to that. That means the plaintiff left India in about April, 1982. Assuming that to be true, the plaintiff has admittedly come back to India before the suit was concluded. He was present in India on 10.7.1985 as evident from the power of attorney executed by him in favour of his father-in-law in supersession of his earlier power of attorney executed in favour of his brother-in-law who has been examined as P.W.1. A copy of the power of attorney has been filed in this appeal. It is seen from the judgment of the trial court that a copy was filed in the trial court also at the time of trial though it has not been marked as an exhibit. The suit was pending in July, 1985 and was dismissed only on 18.10.1985. In fact D.W.1 was recalled and examined and further cross-examined on 3.10.1985. There is nothing on record to show as to why the plaintiff was unable to examine himself as a witness when the suit was pending before court.

6. It has been held in Sardar Gurbaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and another, 53 M.L.J. 392, by the Privy Council that it is the bounden duty of a party, personally knowing the whole circumstances of the case, to give evidence on his own behalf and to submit to cross-examination and his non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance going to discredit the truth of his case. In H.G. Krishna Reddy and Company v, M.M. Thimmiah (1983)1 M.L.J. 467: A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 169, a Division Bench of this Court has laid down that in a suit for specific performance it is the duty of the plaintiff to prove that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract including the period of the suit. In that case, the plaintiff was absent from the witness box and the court relied on the circumstance to hold against the plaintiff. The Bench observed:

29. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence on the side of the first respondent to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and such readiness "and willingness continued till the date of the decree. It is certainly the duty of the first respondent to have gone into the box and given formal evidence that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and subjected himself to cross-examination. In the absence of the first respondent from the witness box, we are unable to find that the first respondent plaintiff has discharged the duty enjoined on him under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act 1963, entitling him to a decree for specific performance.

7. In the present case, in the absence of any valid explanation for the plaintiffs non-examination of himself as a witness, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference against him. Moreover, the evidence on record is hardly sufficient to prove that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. There is absolutely no evidence on record to prove the availability of sufficient funds with the plaintiff after the date of the contract and before the date of suit. The plaintiff has not chosen to produce any document to support His claim that he had the necessary money with him. It is argued by learned Counsel for the appellant that it was admitted on the side of the defendants that the father-in-law was a rich man and the plaintiffs was depending on the plaintiffs father-in-law. It is contended that the plaintiff could have commanded the necessary funds at any time and based on the admission of the defendants, the court below should have accepted the case of the plaintiff that he had necessary wherewithal with him to complete the transaction. We are unable to accept this contention. There is absolutely no evidence to show either the property owned by the plaintiffs father-in-law or the funds available with his father-in-law. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he was depending on his father-in-law for the purpose of completing the transaction. He has not produced any evidence either to prove his own wealth or the affluence of his father-in-law. Hence, the case of the plaintiff that he had sufficient funds to complete the transaction has to be rejected.

8. The conduct of the plaintiff as evident from the records will also show that he was never ready to perform his part of the contract. The total consideration is Rs. 1,75,600. The plaintiff had paid only a sum of Rs. 10,000 as advance. He. was bound to pay the balance of Rs. 1,65,594. The contract was entered on 28.11.1977. The last date fixed in the agreement was 30.6.1978. The plaintiff claims to have written a letter on 6.5.1978 to his vendor. A copy of the letter is marked as Ex.A-24. According to the letter, the vendor authorised the plaintiff to appoint a watchman and take care of the trees on the land. The letter reads that the plaintiff had appointed a watchman by name Subbiah Thevar to take care of the land. It is alleged that the vendor was postponing the execution of the sale deed. The letter is said to have been sent under certificate of posting to the vendor. No doubt, there is a postal seal over the stamp affixed to the certificate of posting bearing the date 6.5.1978. But the appearance of the letter as well as the certificate of posting creates a strong suspicion in the mind of the court. This letter has not been mentioned in any of the subsequent notices, nor in the plaint. Apart from that, the matter mentioned in the letter would certainly have been set out in the notices issued prior to the suit and the plaint if that is correct. If the plaintiff had appointed a watchman to take care of the property as authorised by the vendor, he would have referred to that in the subsequent notices as well as in the plaint. There is absolutely no reference to it and there is no explanation therefor. There is no evidence also to prove it. P.W.1, a brother-in-law of the plaintiff, who has also a power of attorney in his favour at that time, has deposed that it was he who filled up the certificate of posting and posted the letter. But, he admits that there is no explanation as to why the letter was not mentioned either in the lawyer's notice issued prior to the suit or in the plaint. A specific suggestion was put to him in the cross-examination that the certificate of posting as well as the letter have been fabricated. No doubt he has denied the same. But in the absence of any explanation as to the failure to refer either to the letter or to the contents thereof in the plaint, we are not inclined to accept the case of the plaintiff that the letter was really posted and was sent to the vendor. Assuming that the letter was sent to the vendor and it reached him and there was no reply by the vendor to the plaintiff as alleged by the plaintiff, the latter would not have again sent another letter by certificate of posting. He would have certainly sent the next letter by registered post so as to ensure the delivery of the letter to the vendor. According to him, he sent the second letter on 15.6.1978 a copy of which is marked as Ex.A-25. P.W. 1 claims to have posted that letter also under certificate of posting. The appearance of that letter as well as the certificate of posting creates a suspicion. The evidence of P.W.1 as regards the letter and certificate of posting is not convincing. These two letters are obviously fabricated for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part even before the date fixed in the agreement. If for the sake of argument we assume that the plaintiff was ready to perform his part even before 30.6.1978, there is no explanation as to why he waited till March, 1979. According to the plaintiff, the next letter written by him is on 15.12.1978 under Ex.A-26. That letter was also sent only under certificate of posting. In that letter it is alleged that the plaintiff heard that third parties were giving bad advice to the vendor. It is stated that the plaintiff was hoping that the vendor would honour the agreement. There is no explanation as to why that letter was not sent by registered post when according to the plaintiff he found that the earlier two letters had no response. As the two prior letters, this letter as well as the certificate of posting give rise to suspicion. The next letter is said to have been written on 9.3.1979 under Ex.A-27. According to that letter, the vendor was making arrangements hurriedly to sell the property to Thangapandi Nadar and others. It is also stated that the vendor had agreed when the plaintiff, P.W. 1 and P.W.2 met him. They were assured that the sale would be completed before 19.3.1979. If the alleged meeting was true and the plaintiff was assured that the transaction would be completed by 19.3.1979 and if he came to know that the vendor was arranging to sell the property to third party by name Thangapandi Nadar and others, the plaintiff would not have merely sent a letter under certificate of posting and on the other hand he would have issued a lawyer's notice. He would have also rushed to the court and sought for an injunction restraining the sale of the property, as rightly pointed out by the trial court. A curious feature in the Certificate of Posting is that it bears the address of the third defendant also. If the plaintiff was aware of the addresses of the third defendant and had sent a copy of his letter to the vendor, he would have certainly issued a notice through a lawyer or filed a suit as stated earlier. He would not have contented himself by merely sending a copy of the letter under certificate of posting. Obviously, this document has been prepared for the purpose of contending that the defendants were not bona fide purchasers without notice.

9. The first notice through lawyer is issued only on 22.3.1979 under Ex.A-3. The notice was sent to Madurai address as well as to Tuticorin address. The other documents show that the plaintiff was aware that the vendor was residing only in Tuticorin. There is no reason why a notice was sent to Madurai address. The notice sent to Tuticorin address has been received by the vendees on 28.3.1979 as evident from Exhibit. No copy of the said notice was issued to the third defendant other purchasers. If the letter dated 9.3.1979 marked as Ex.A-27 is true, the plaintiff would have instructed his lawyer to send notices to the purchasers also. A notice would have been sent to the third defendant through the lawyer when Ex.A-3 has been sent to the vendor Saravanaperumal Nadar. There is no reason as to why such a notice was not sent to the purchasers. There is not even a reference to the third defendant or any of the other purchasers in Ex.A-3. That itself falsifies the version that a letter was sent to the third defendant on 9.3.1979.

10. The suit was filed only on 26.3.1980, more than a year after the issue of notice through the lawyer. There is no explanation by the plaintiff as to why the suit was not filed earlier. If all the above circumstances are considered cumulatively, the conduct of the plaintiff shows that he was not ready to perform his part of the contract at any time prior to the suit. There is no evidence to prove that after the filing of the suit he was ready to perform his part of the contract. He has not chosen to make a deposit of the balance of consideration in court even though there is an allegation that he is ready to deposit. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that there is no need to deposit or tender the amount and only if a direction is given by court, such a deposit need be made. Reliance is placed on a decision of .this Court in Ramani Ammal v. Susilammal (1991)1 M.L.J. 1. The ruling will have no application to this case, as on the facts we find that there is no evidence to prove the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract.

11. It is submitted by the appellant's counsel that time is not the essence of the contract in this case. It is not necessary for us to consider the question whether time was the essence of the contract or not. The fact remains that the document fixed a specific date for completion of the contract and the plaintiff was never ready, even after the expiry of that date, to perform his part of the contract. Hence, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar and Govind Prasad v. Hari Dutt no bearing in the present case.

12. Learned Counsel invited our attention to the rulings in Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Velloji Rao , Ramesh Chandra v. Chuni Lal , Prag Datt v. Smt. Saraswati Devi and Viswanathan v. K.M. Palaniswamy Gaunder (1991)2 L.W.140. Those rulings will not help the plaintiff in the present case in view of the facts found by us above.

13. The next question is whether defendants 3 to 11 are bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the said agreement D.W.2 is the third defendant. He has spoken to the fact that the. agreement between himself and Saravanaperumal Nadar was entered on 19.2.1979 under Ex.B-69, Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to make us disbelieve his version. He has also deposed that the stamp papers for completing the sale transaction were purchased between 10th March, 1979 and 12th March, 1979. He has produced all the relevant accounts to show that money was spent on the relevant dates for purchase of stamp papers as well as payment of advance of Rs. 10,001 to Saravanaperumal Nadar on the date of the agreement viz., 19.2.1979. The books of account are regularly kept and nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to discredit the account books. The third defendant has also produced the reports of the auditors and the income-tax certificates which show that the accounts are kept in the regular course of business. The trial court has accepted those documents and we do not find any reason whatever to differ from the same. The accounts also prove that consideration was paid for the purpose of sales in favour of defendants 3 to 11. The registration copies of sale deeds have been marked as Exs.B-4 to B-12. The plaintiff has also marked similar copies as Exs.A-6 to A-l.4. As seen from the documents, the entire consideration was paid before the Sub Registrar at the time of registration. It is also seen that the registration department took proceedings against the purchasers for collecting deficit stamp duty on the ground that the value mentioned in the documents was lesser than the market value of the property as per the Stamp Act. Thus, the evidence adduced by the third defendant proves that she transaction in favour of defendants 3 to 11 are genuine and supported by consideration.

14. There is no evidence on the side of the plaintiff to show that defendants 3 to 11 had any notice of the plaintiffs agreement. The only document relied on by the plaintiff is Ex.A-27. We have already said enough to show that Ex.A-27 cannot be true and no copy of the said letter would have been sent to the third defendant as claimed. P.W. 1 says that the third defendant was present whenever he met Saravanaperumal Nadar or the first defendant. But, this circumstance has not been mentioned either in the notice prior to suit or in the plaint. That is a crucial fact which would have been mentioned in the plaint, if it is true. Obviously, it is an after-thought on the part of P. W. 1. A perusal of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 shows clearly that they are prevaricating. They are interested in the plaintiff and they are not speaking the truth. P.W.2 has blurted out that the plaintiff sent notice to Saravanaperumal Nadar only after the conclusion of the sales in favour of defendants 3 to 11. P.W.2 claims to have been present at the time of agreement in favour of the plaintiff, but there is no evidence as to why he did not attest it. The explanation is, because already three other persons had attested the document, the plaintiff told him that it was not necessary for him to attest it. That explanation is not acceptable. P.W.3 claims to have introduced P.W.2 to the first defendant. But, in the cross examination he gave contrary evidence by stating that he told P.W.2 to go and meet the first defendant and that he never introduced P.W.2 to the first defendant directly. It is clear that P.Ws.1 to 3 have foresword and their evidence cannot be accepted. In the result, there is no evidence whatever to show that defendants 3 to 11 had any notice of the contract in favour of the plaintiff.

15. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that there is no reference to the agreement dated 19.2.1979 (Ex.B-69) in the sale deeds in favour of defendants 3 to 11. The other evidence on record is sufficient to prove that the agreement is true and just because it is not mentioned in the sale deed, it cannot be rejected.

16. We have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance on the facts and circumstances of this case. Hence, the dismissal of the suit by the trial court is correct and it has to be upheld.

17. Ultimately, learned Counsel for the appellant put forward an alternative argument that the plaintiff should not be made to lose the sum of Rs. 10,006 paid as advance under the agreement. He prays for a decree for refund of the said amount as against defendants 1 and 12 We have found in the course of our discussion that documents have been fabricated and prepared for the purpose of this case. We also found that the plaintiff has come forward with a false case and did not have the courage to enter the witness box and face cross-examination. In those circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case of direct refund of the advance paid by the plaintiff. As per the contract, he has to forfeit the sum if the contract is not completed on account of his delimit before 30.6.1978 We have found that the plaintiff has committed default and, therefore, the amount paid as advance has to be forfeited.

18. In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.

S.K.M. Mohammed Aman... v. T.C.S. Ramasangu Pan...