JUDGMENT — Thangamani, J.
The appellant is the plaintiff before the trial court. He instituted the suit for specific performance on the basis of Ex. A1 the agreement dated 16.1.1973 entered with Manicka Naicker the first defendant (since deceased). His case is that he is carrying on joint family business under the name and style of Chellaiah Nadar and Sons. The first defendant acting for himself and on behalf of his wife and the second defendant (since deceased) entered into an agreement with him under Ex. A1 for the sale of the premises bearing Door No. 4, Kalmandapam Road, Royapuram, Madras for Rs. 57,000/- on 18.1.1973 So far the first defendant had received Rs. 22,000/- as advance. As per the agreement the appellant who is in occupation of a portion of the house was authorised to receive rents from the other two tenants in the building. Under the terms of the agreement the balance of the purchase money has to be paid and sale deed registered within 11 months from that date. However, the first defendant in collusion with the third defendant/first respondent and Chandra Bose one of the sons of the appellant attempted to resile from agreement. Thereupon, the appellant sent the original of Ex. A3 notice on 4.7.1974 He also caused a publication to be made in ‘Malai Murasu’ dated 7.7.1974, as per Ex. A2. At the instance of the third defendant first respondent, defendants 1 and 2 have conveyed the property in favour of the 4th defendant/2nd respondent under Ex. B1 dated 11.7.1974 This appellant has performed his part of the contract and he is always ready and willing to comply with the terms of the agreement. Ex. B1 sale deed cannot confer any right, title or interest in derogation of the rights of the appellant under Ex. A1. The 3rd respondent is the legal representative of deceased second defendant.
2. Defendants 1 and 2 resisted the action pleading that they ever entered into any agreement of sale with the appellant. They did not hand over possession of the suit house to the appellant at any time. Their agreement of sale was only with Chandra Bose, the son of the appellant. Since the latter could not complete the transaction within the stipulated time, he expressed his inability to go through the same and released his rights under Ex. B7 dated 25.3.1974 He requested for the return of the advance amount after selling the suit property to third parties and surrendered possession. Thereupon, these defendants conveyed the property in favour of the fourth defendant under Ex. B1 sale deed dated 11.7.1974 and returned the advance amount paid by the Chandra Bose on the same day. Ex. B8 is a receipt passed by Chandra Bose. They also contended that the original agreement entered into between them and the said Chandra Bose differs from their copy of the agreement. It has been forged by the appellant by adding words suitable to him and the same appears to have been filed in criminal proceedings instituted against him and others for forgery. Obviously for this reason the appellant has instituted the suit with a photostat copy of the agreement. The fourth defendant claims that only after satisfying himself of the title deeds and the letters written by Chandra Bose, he got the property conveyed in his favour.
3. The trial court held that Ex. A1 agreement could have been executed only in favour of Chandra Bose in his individual capacity and he has later on given it up and that the appellant had no funds to complete the sale and so other questions did not arise for consideration. Accordingly, it dismissed the suit with costs of the defendants.
4. The appellant states in his evidence that Ex. A1 sent for from the criminal court and marked is the agreement entered into between himself and the first defendant. He has based his claim for specific performance only on this document. This purports to be an agreement dated 16.1.1973 executed by first defendant Manicka Naicker in favour of Chandra Bose representing Chellaiah Nadar and Sons. The defendants assailed this agreement on the ground that initially the document was executed in favour of Chandra Bose only. Later on by interpolation and forgery the appellant has introduced suitable words so as to make it appear that it was in favour of Chellaiah Nadar and Sons.
[Discusstion of evidence is omitted-.]
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11. So, it is highly doubtful whether Ex. A1 as it stands is the agreement entered into between the parties for the sale of the suit property. In any event, we find from the recitals in Ex. A1 that the sale deed has to be completed within 11 months from the date of agreement which takes us to 16.12.1993 We have already seen that as per the evidence of P.W 1 his son had squandered away the money entrusted by this witness with him for the purpose of sale. Admittedly, he had returned from the village in December 1973 and learnt that money was no longer available. Yet, he had not requested first defendant Manicka Naicker to give him further time to mobilise money. According to him, the first defendant was unwell and he promised to execute the deed later on. However, this witness had not sent any notice to Manicka Naicker asking him to execute the sale deed. He admits that he sent notice only to third defendant Periasami on 4.7.1974 He further concedes that in February, 1974 he became aware of the fact that third defendant Periasami was making attempt to purchase the property. But only on 4.7.1974 he had sent notice to him. So as it has been rightly observed by the trial Judge only because the appellant was not possessed of sufficient funds, he did not take any steps in time to get the sale deed executed.
12. In Ramasamy v. Venkatachalam (1976 (1) M.L.J 243) Ismail, J. has refused specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff had filed the suit making false allegations. He held that the falsity of the case directly impinged on the essential ingredients and elements necessary for claiming the relief. The falsity of the case put forward by the plaintiff disentitled him from obtaining the discretionary relief of specific performance of agreement. In Vyapuri v. Vijayan (1978 T.L.N.J 62) the court found that a sum of Rs. 11,000/- was not paid as advance as contended by the plaintiff and that what was paid was only a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. The Division Bench comprising of Ismail and Nainar Sundaram, JJ. pointed out that the remedy of specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the discretion of the court, which discretion has to be exercised according to recognised principles of law and not arbitrarily. The plaintiff who came to the court with a false case in material ingredients necessary for the grant of relief of specific performance will not be entitled to the equitable relief at all. It is obvious that in the present case the appellant has based his relief on Ex. A1 after making interpolation so as to make it appear that he has a right in it. And on the ratio laid down in the decisions referred to above, even this is sufficient to refuse the relief to the appellant. In addition, we have already seen that there is unexplained delay on the part of the appellant in seeking the remedy. In the circumstances, the learned trial judge rightly refused specific performance.
13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. with costs.
RR/VCS