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Judgment Summary — Mishra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Court considered an application by a petitioner who claimed to be a third party seeking leave to review this Court's judgment in W.P. No. 7656 and other analogous writ petitions decided on 24.7.1992. A learned Single Judge of this Court had on 10.8.1992 passed orders in a batch of writ petitions (W.P. Nos. 10337 etc. of 1992). Those orders, it was brought to the Division Bench's notice, appeared to be attempting collaterally and indirectly to secure a review of the Division Bench judgment in W.P. No. 7656 of 1992.

The Division Bench proposed to hear the respondents and ordered notice of motion returnable in one week as to why leave should not be granted to the petitioner claiming third-party status. The Single Judge had relied upon a Division Bench decision in Rathnaswamy, Dr. V. v. Director of Medical Education (1986 Writ L.R. 207) regarding the scope and effect of conditions prescribed in a prospectus, and had quoted that decision at some length.

The Division Bench noted a Full Bench decision in Mayavaram Financial Corporation Limited v. The Registrar of Chits, Pondicherry (1991 Writ L.R. 519) on the limited availability of review in writ proceedings and observed that collateral proceedings used to effectuate review are incompetent. The Court also noted that Special Leave Petitions had been filed in the Supreme Court (S.L.P. No. 9481 of 1992) against the Division Bench judgment in W.P. No. 7656 etc., and that the Supreme Court had declined some interim relief sought in those SLPs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a petitioner claiming to be a third party may be granted leave to seek review of this Court's judgment in W.P. No. 7656 etc. of 1992 by resort to collateral writ proceedings (specifically W.P. Nos. 10337 etc. of 1992).
  2. Whether proceedings instituted in collateral form (not being formal review petitions) are competent or maintainable for the purpose of reviewing a judgment in a writ proceeding.
  3. What is the scope and effect of representations and conditions contained in an admissions prospectus (as raised by parties), and whether such prospectus representations can be treated as binding in the circumstances of the present litigation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • A petitioner (or petitioners) claimed third-party status and sought leave to review the earlier Division Bench judgment in W.P. No. 7656 etc.
  • Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, appearing for one of the petitioners (and acting as amicus curiae), argued that the petitions before the Single Judge did not actually seek review of the Division Bench judgment but only asked for a direction to accommodate petitioners in accordance with the prospectus, because they had prepared for admission relying on representations made in the prospectus.

Single Judge's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The Single Judge relied on the Division Bench decision in Rathnaswamy, Dr. V. v. Director of Medical Education (1986 Writ L.R. 207) to the effect that conditions prescribed in a prospectus should be followed and that norms and rules set out in a prospectus have significance in admissions contexts.

Court's Observations Addressing Those Arguments

  • The Division Bench observed that prospectus representations alleged by petitioners were not confined to H.S.C. students but were equally applicable to C.B.S.C. students, and that the Court in W.P. No. 7656 found that the equation between C.B.S.C. and H.S.C. students had been seriously disturbed owing to doubts about extra marks allotted to C.B.S.C. students.
  • The Court noted that if the petitions before the Single Judge were attempting collateral review of the Division Bench judgment, such proceedings would be incompetent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rathnaswamy, Dr. V. v. Director of Medical Education, 1986 Writ L.R. 207 (Division Bench) Consideration of the scope and effect of conditions prescribed in an admissions prospectus; statement that norms and rules in a prospectus ought to be adhered to and that omission in prospectus does not erase existing norms and rules. The Single Judge relied on this decision to support the view that prospectus conditions should be followed; the Division Bench in the present opinion explained that Rathnaswamy dealt with prospectus norms but was not necessarily concerned with the particular factual situation (reservation confining C.B.S.C. students to 2% and disturbed equations) in W.P. No. 7656.
Punjab Engineering College, Chandigarh v. Sanjay Gulati, (1983) 3 SCC 517 : A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 580 (Supreme Court) Cited (in Rathnaswamy) as supporting the principles regarding prospectus and admission norms; treated as authority countenancing the principles under discussion. The Division Bench noted that this Supreme Court decision was relied upon by counsel and was referenced in Rathnaswamy to support the general principles about prospectuses; the present Court did not apply it afresh but recorded that it had been relied upon in earlier discussion.
Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. v. The Registrar of Chits, Pondicherry, 1991 Writ L.R. 519 (Full Bench) Full Bench treatment of the issue of review of an order passed in a writ proceeding; established limits on review in writ proceedings and disfavoured collateral review/interference. The Division Bench invoked this Full Bench decision to assert that collateral proceedings aimed at reviewing a writ judgment are ruled out and incompetent; it was used as a direct basis for holding that the collateral proceedings in W.P. Nos. 10337 etc. are not maintainable insofar as they attempt to obtain review of W.P. No. 7656 etc.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, expressed in the opinion:

  1. Administrative step: The Court first ordered that respondents be heard and a notice of motion be made returnable in one week to address whether leave should be granted to the petitioner claiming third-party status.
  2. Identification of the procedural irregularity: The Court observed that a number of writ petitions (W.P. Nos. 10337 etc. of 1992) had been disposed of by a Single Judge on 10.8.1992 in a manner that suggested an attempt to collaterally review the Division Bench judgment in W.P. No. 7656 of 1992. The Single Judge had relied on Rathnaswamy for the proposition that prospectus norms are to be followed.
  3. Principle of finality/remedy: The Court reiterated that a judgment is final subject to appeal or review under the prescribed procedures, and that errors in a judgment are to be corrected by appellate processes or by formal review mechanisms recognized by Courts in India.
  4. Authority on review limits: The Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. (1991 Writ L.R. 519) to hold that collateral proceedings attempting to effect a review are barred; collateral proceedings, unless they are true review petitions, are incompetent.
  5. Consequences of pending appellate process: The Court observed that Special Leave Petitions (S.L.P. No. 9481 of 1992) had been filed in the Supreme Court against its judgment in W.P. No. 7656 etc., and explained the different outcomes depending on whether the Supreme Court affirms or reverses — underlining that this Court's competence to review would be affected accordingly. It also noted that the Supreme Court had declined some interim relief in those SLPs.
  6. Assessment of the prospectus argument: Addressing the contention advanced (by Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram acting as amicus curiae) that petitioners only sought accommodation per the prospectus representation, the Court concluded that the representation in the prospectus was not limited to H.S.C. students but equally applied to C.B.S.C. students. The Court pointed out that the Division Bench in W.P. No. 7656 found that the equation between C.B.S.C. and H.S.C. students had been disturbed (including a governmental step confining consideration of C.B.S.C. students to 2% of seats), rendering straightforward application of prospectus norms inappropriate in that factual matrix.
  7. Limits on what a Judge in collateral proceedings may consider: The Court clarified that a Judge sitting in collateral proceedings may examine whether earlier reasoning was merely obiter or per incuriam for the narrow purpose of determining precedential bindingness, but not for the purpose of effecting a review of an earlier judgment on the ground that one judgment is wrong and another is right.
  8. Conclusion on competence and maintainability: For the reasons above, the Court concluded that collateral proceedings (specifically W.P. Nos. 10337 etc. of 1992) attempting to obtain review of the Division Bench judgment in W.P. No. 7656 etc. are not competent and are not maintainable; to that extent those proceedings must remain stayed. The Court further observed that any proper review can be moved by a person before this Court by the established review process, and aggrieved persons can still approach the Supreme Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court held that the proceedings in W.P. Nos. 10337 etc. of 1992 are not competent and are not maintainable insofar as they attempt to obtain a review of the Division Bench judgment in W.P. No. 7656 and other analogous matters; those proceedings must remain stayed to that extent. The petition was ordered.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The writ petitions decided by the Single Judge (W.P. Nos. 10337 etc.) cannot, by way of collateral proceedings, effect a review of the Division Bench judgment in W.P. No. 7656 etc.; such aspects of those petitions are stayed. Any attempt to use collateral procedures to achieve review is therefore barred.
  • Available remedies preserved: Persons aggrieved by the Division Bench judgment in W.P. No. 7656 etc. retain the ordinary appellate or review remedies: they may approach the Supreme Court (as some have already done by way of SLP No. 9481 of 1992) or, if a proper case for review is made, may move this Court for review by the prescribed procedure.
  • Scope of prospectus-based claims limited by facts: The holding emphasizes that the binding force of prospectus representations depends on the factual matrix; where governmental action (for example an asserted reservation limiting consideration of C.B.S.C. students to 2% of seats) has disturbed the competitive equation between classes of candidates, straightforward application of prospectus norms may be inappropriate.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion applies existing precedents (including a Full Bench decision on the limits of review) to declare the incompetence of collateral review; it does not purport to create a new, broad precedent beyond the application of those principles to the facts before the Court.
  • Administrative direction: The Registry was directed to place the noted cases before the Chief Justice for consideration of posting before a larger Bench for final disposal (in order to set a uniform criterion, having regard to the law as laid down by the two Division Benches on related points).

Order pronounced: "Petition ordered."

    M. Shakur Chathik v. Association Of Private Schools

    Mishra, J.:— Before we order whether to grant leave to the petitioner, who is claimed to be a third party to seek review of the judgment in W.P Nos. 7656 etc. of 1992, we propose to hear the respondents and accordingly order notice of motion a returnable in one week as to why leave be not granted.

    2. It has been brought to our notice that a number of writ petitions in W.P Nos. 10337 etc. of 1992, have been ordered by a learned single. Judge of this Court on 10.8.1992, it appears, for collaterally and indirectly seeking a review of our judgment in W.P No. 7656 of 1992 and other analogous cases. Our attention has been drawn to the order of the learned single Judge dated 10.8.1992, who it seems, has not passed any positive order, but has stated as follows:

    “A Division Bench of this Court in Rathnaswamy, Dr. V. v. Director of Medical Education, 1986 Writ L.R 207, considered the scope and effect of the conditions prescribed in the Prospectus and held,

    “Then the question is what is the place and significance of a prospectus with regard to admissions to educational courses. We shall not mix up and confuse the prospectus as understood in Company law parlance with the prospectus for educational courses……………Forgetting the notion of the prospectus in the Company law parlance, we must deal with the matter from the practical angle of selection of candidates for educa tional courses offered by institutions run by the State. The principle has been uniform that violation of the norms of admission laid down and rules and regulations governing the same with impunity have been frowned upon and many times have been struck down. These rules and norms are there to be strictly and solemnly adhered to They alone should be the guidelines for such admissions. In fact, the very decisioin of the Supreme Court in Punjab Engineering College, Chan digarh v. Sanjay Gulati, (1983) 3 SCC 517 : A.I.R 1983 S.C 580, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, countenances the principles. The word prospec tus is derivative from the word prospect. One of the dictionary meanings for the word prospect is to look around, to make a search, to explore. A prospectus issued with regard to admission to educational courses is a declaration to the candidates that a field for development of educational potentialities is available for exploration and that there could be a chance of success. It is a piece of information. But, at the same time, we shall not belittle the significance of the need to set out in the prospectus itself a summary or an essence of the norms and rules which should guide and which will be adopted for selection of the competitors in the field of exploration in educational development or at least indicate in the prospectus that there are norms and rules which shall govern. It is highly desirable that a summary or an essence of the relevant norms and rules governing such admissions are set out in the prospectus themselves or their existence at least is indicated therein. But an omission to do so shall not be taken advantage of by any one to negate and ignore the very norms and rules. The very rules and norms have come to be laid down only to govern and to be adhered to and not to be ignored and breached. It is true that if the relevant norms and rules are set out or referred to in the prospectus, a controversy of the present nature would have been very wisely avoided. But the omission in the prospectus is not an omission or erosion or deletion of the very norms and rules themselves. The norms and rules subsist and they have to hold the field.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    3. In view of the above decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Rathnaswamy, Dr. V. v. Director of Medical Education, 1986 Writ L.R 207, the claims of the petitioners that the conditions prescribed in the prospectus should be followed, cannot be ignored. The cases referred to hereinabove, not only relate to the scope and effect of the conditions laid down in the prospectus, but also relate to the other points raised, as set out hereinabove. The later decision of the Division Bench of this Court dated 24.7.1992 in a batch of writ petitions (W.P No. 7656 of 1992 etc.) has had no occasion to consider the scope and effect of the conditions laid down in the prospectus and the other points set out hereinabove. It cannot be said that these two decisions of two Division Benches of this Court are in conflict with each other with reference to the same issue. In order to set an uniform criteria to be followed, having due regard to the law as laid down by the two Division Benches with reference to the points considered and decided therein, the Registry is directed to place the above cases before My Lord, the Chief Justice for orders for being posted before a larger Bench for final disposal.”

    4. It seems, attention of the learned single Judge was not brought to the fact that a judgment of the Court is final subject to appeal and if there is any mistake or error therein is found, it is corrected by the appellate Court or by way of review in accordance with the procedure prescribed therefor and constructively recognised by the Courts in India and accordingly applied to the writ proceedings. A Full Bench of this Court has gone into the issue of review of an order passed in a writ proceeding in the case of Mayavaram Financial Corporation Limited, Mayiladuthurai v. The Registrar of Chits, Pondicherry, 1991 Writ L.R 519. This competely rules out any collateral review and interference thus in the order or directions issued by a Bench of the Court.

    5. The collateral proceedings, unless are in the nature of review petitions, are incompetent and no court can make any order of any kind in such proceedings, whether a single Judge or a larger Bench.

    6. We are informed at the Bar that a number of Special Leave Petitions have been filed in the Supreme Court (S.L.P No. 9481 of 1992) against our judgment in W.P No. 7656 etc. of 1992. It goes without saying that if our judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court, it will merge in the judgment of the Supreme Court. This Court then shall not be competent to review the judgment. If, however, our judgment is reversed by the Supreme Court, nothing will survive for a review. Any attempt, however, at this stage to review the judgment may be found incompetent for another reason that some interim orders where sought for in the Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has declined the same.

    7. Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, appearing for one of the petitioners in the batch of writ petitions aforementioned in which orders have been passed by the learned single Judge, has tried to convey that there is no attempt in the writ petitions to seek any review of our order and that all that the petitioners have mainly asked for is a direction to accommodate them in accordance with the prospectus, for they prepared themselves for the prospectus, for they prepared themselves for admission to the professional courses only in accordance with the representations in the prospectus. Since Mrs. Nalini Chidamabaram, however assisted only as amicus curiae, if we pronounce our opinion upon this, that may prejudice the case of the petitioners in the writ petitions. We, however, cannot desist from saying that the plea that the representations in the prospectus is binding upon the respondent/State Government has been raised under some serious misapprehensions. Representation, if any, in the prospectus was not confined to the H.S.C students only. It was equally applicable to the C.B.S.C students. We have already noticed in our judgment that the equations between the C.B.S.C and H.S.C students stood seriously disturbed on account of the doubts that were created as to the extra marks allotted to the C.B.S.C students. Where then the representation in the prospectus existed?

    8. It is the above argument upon which learned single Judge has thought that a conflict has arisen on account of our directions in W.P No. 7656 and etc. of 1992 and a Division Bench of this Court in Rathanaswamy, Dr. V. v. Director of Medical Education, 1986 Writ L.R 207. If we may point out, a Judge sitting, in a collateral proceeding can go into the question of any obiter dicta or the judgment being per incuriam only for the purpose whether he would be bound by one or the other judgment as the rule of obiter dicta and per incuriam are the rules attached to the ratio decidenti of the judgment and thus for deciding whether one or the other judgment is a binding precedent and not for the purpose of review of any of the two judgments on the plea that one is wrong and the other is right.

    9. It is unfortunate that it was not clarified to the learned single Judge by any party that the judgment in the case of Rathnaswamy, Dr. V. v. Director of Medical Education, 1986 Writ L.R 207, in which this Court said that the norms and rules in the prospectus have alone to be obeyed, was not concerned with the issue how far the promise or representation in the prospectus would hold the field in view of the charged circumstance that the Government of the State found that a reservation should be applied confining consideration of the C.B.S.C students to 2% of the seats only and the court in W.P Nos. 7656 and etc. of 1992 found that the equations which alone could enable the candidates seeking admission in accordance with the prospectus between the C.B.S.C students and H.S.C students had been seriously disturbed, a situation in which norms and rules in the prospectus could not be applied.

    10. For the reasons as above, since we are of the opinion that there could be no review of our judgment in W.P Nos. 7656 and etc. of 1992 in the collateral proceedings and the review proceedings have not been started at the instance of any party except the instant petitioner, it will be necessary to hold that the proceedings in W.P Nos. 10337 and etc. of 1992 are not competent in so far as they attempt to get the review of the judgment in W.P Nos. 7656 and etc. of 1992 and they are not maintainable. The proceedings in the said w???t petitions to the said extent thus must remain stayed. This, however, will not mean that any person aggrieved, cannot approach the Supreme Court against our judgment in W.P Nos. 7656 and etc. of 1992. If there is a proper cage for review, any person can move this Court for the review-of our judgment in W.P Nos. 7656 and etc. of 1992. It will;be appropriate, however, that since the Supreme Court has already passed some orders in the Special Leave Petition with respect to the current admission, no attempt is made to interfere with that.

    11. Petition ordered.

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    M. Shakur Chathik v. Association Of Private Schools
    (Aug 14, 1992)