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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These two appeals arise from execution proceedings in two separate execution petitions concerning the same parties: the same judgment debtors and the same Court auction purchaser. One appeal (C.M.A No. 806 of 1990) concerns E.P. No. 47 of 1987 (in O.B. No. 1767 of 1985), where the proclamation stated the decree amount as Rs. 39,774.09 and the property was put up for sale on 2-11-1988. Two lots were intended to be sold: Lot 1 (a house and ground) valued by the decree-holder at Rs. 50,000 and by the Court at Rs. 2,50,000; Lot 2 valued by the decree-holder at Rs. 1,00,000 and by the Court at Rs. 10,00,000.

The other appeal arises out of E.P. No. 49 of 1987 (in O.S. No. 1769 of 1985). The proclamation stated the decree amount as Rs. 80,334.98. The same two lots were proceeded against in that execution. On 2-11-1988 Lot 1 was sold in E.P. No. 47/87 for Rs. 2,95,000 and Lot 2 was sold in E.P. No. 49/87 for Rs. 10,01,000.

The appellant filed E.A. Nos. 12 and 13 of 1989 seeking to set aside the sales, alleging irregularities including close relationships between the auction purchaser and one judgment debtor and a relationship between the auction purchaser and a partner of the decree-holder firm. The court below dismissed the applications. These appeals challenge that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the auction sales should be set aside on the ground that the appellant proved the market value of the properties to be much greater than the sale prices obtained at the Court auction.
  2. Whether the sales should be set aside on the ground of relationship/collusion between the auction purchaser and one or more judgment debtors (and a partner of the decree-holder firm).
  3. Whether the sale of Lot 2 should be set aside because the sale proceeds from Lot 1 alone were sufficient to satisfy the amounts due under both decrees, and therefore the executing Court ought to have stopped after the sale of Lot 1 under O.21, R.64 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  4. Whether the objection that should have been raised at the time of settlement of the sale proclamation precludes the judgment debtor from raising the point later (invoking O.21, R.90(3) CPC).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that he had proved that the property values were much more than the sale prices and therefore the sales should be set aside.
  • He alleged irregularities including a close relationship between the auction purchaser and one of the judgment debtors, and that a partner of the decree-holder firm was related to the auction purchaser, suggesting collusion to the appellant's detriment.
  • Alternatively, he argued that at least the sale of Lot 2 should be set aside because Lot 1 alone fetched an amount that was much more than the decretal amounts under both decrees combined.

Decree-holder / Auction Purchaser's Arguments (Respondents)

  • The respondents contended that because there were two different decrees and two different proclamations, the executing Court was entitled to direct the sale of both items (i.e., proceed with execution under each proclamation).
  • They also argued that the judgment debtor should have objected at the time of settlement of the proclamation, and having failed to do so the judgment debtor is precluded under O.21, R.90(3) CPC from raising the objection at the present stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma, (1977) 3 SCC 337 : AIR 1977 SC 1789 Interpreting O.21, R.64 CPC: When the amount specified in the sale proclamation is fully satisfied by the sale of attached property, the executing Court should stop further sales; sales beyond what is necessary to satisfy the decree vitiate the sale of further items. The Court applied the principle to hold that once Lot 1's sale proceeds were sufficient to satisfy the decretal amounts (both decrees held by the same decree-holder against the same judgment debtors), the executing Court ought to have stopped and should not have proceeded to sell Lot 2; accordingly, the sale of Lot 2 was set aside.
Ambati Narasayya v. M. Subba Rao, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 693 : AIR 1990 SC 119 Reiterated the proposition under O.21, R.64 CPC that sale of property beyond what is necessary to satisfy the decretal amount is contrary to law and liable to be set aside (example: large sale amount fetched even though decretal amount small). The Court relied on this authority to reinforce the conclusion that the sale of the second lot was contrary to O.21, R.64 where the first lot's sale had already fetched sufficient funds to satisfy the decrees.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined each of the appellant's contentions sequentially:

  1. On the contention that the appellant proved the properties' value to be much higher than the sale price, the court found no admissible evidence worthy of acceptance. The only documents relevant to valuation on record were Exhibits A.3 and B.1, but both were filed after the petitions for setting aside the sale had been filed, and therefore could not be relied upon by the Court. In the absence of acceptable evidence from the appellant, this contention failed.
  2. On the contention of relationship/collusion, the court noted that even if it were assumed the auction purchaser was a relative of one of the judgment debtors and a relation of the decree-holder, there was no evidence of collusion between the other judgment debtors. The evidence on record was not sufficient to establish collusion, so this contention also failed.
  3. The court accepted the third contention (regarding Lot 2) as having merit. It noted that both lots were sold on the same day and Lot 1 alone fetched Rs. 2,95,000, which exceeded the amounts due under the two decrees. The court determined that the executing Court should have stopped after Lot 1 because, applying O.21, R.64 CPC and the Supreme Court decisions cited, once the amount specified in the sale proclamation (and/or the amount necessary to satisfy the decree) is fully satisfied by sale of attached property, sale of further items should be stopped. Consequently, the sale of Lot 2 was held to be improper.
  4. The court addressed the respondents' submission that two separate decrees and two proclamations justified sale of both items. The court disagreed, reasoning that because the same decree-holder obtained both decrees against the same judgment debtors and the sales related to the same properties, the executing court should have taken into account that the first sale satisfied both decrees and therefore should not have proceeded with the second sale.
  5. On the contention invoking O.21, R.90(3) CPC (that the judgment debtor should have objected at proclamation settlement and is therefore precluded), the court found no substance in the argument. The court noted that at the time the proclamation was settled the decree-holder had stated the value of Lot 1 as only Rs. 50,000, which was vastly lower than the Amin's valuation; given this disparity and the fact that the decretal amounts exceeded Rs. 1 lakh, the judgment debtor could not reasonably have contended then that the sale of Lot 1 alone would satisfy both decrees. For these reasons the court held the late objection did not fall foul of the preclusion argument.

Holding and Implications

The court's operative decisions are recorded in the opinion as follows:

  • The sale held in E.P. No. 49 of 1987 (Lot 2) is set aside.
  • The court recorded the following dispositions (as stated in the opinion): "In the result, C.M.A No. 806 of 1990 is dismissed and the order of the subordinate Judge, Karur in B.A No. 12 of 1989 is confirmed. C.M.A No. 806 of 1990 is allowed and the order in E.A No. 13 of 1989 is set aside."
  • There will be no order as to costs in either of the appeals.
  • The fourth respondent/decree-holder is permitted to withdraw the amounts due under the two decrees from the sale proceeds of Lot 1 in the executing Court, subject to any claim for rateable distribution under Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The auction purchaser (fifth respondent) is permitted to take back the amount deposited by him as the sale consideration for Lot 2; the executing court is directed to return the amount on production of a steno copy of this Court's order.

Implications: The direct effect is that the sale of Lot 2 is set aside and the decretal amounts may be realized from Lot 1 proceeds subject to competing claims under Section 73 CPC; the purchaser of Lot 2 may recover his deposited amount. The court applied existing Supreme Court authorities interpreting O.21, R.64 CPC and did not purport to lay down a new precedent.

Order

Order accordingly.

    P. Somasundaram v. A. Ponnusamy And Others

    1. These two appeals arise out of execution proceedings in two suits between the same parties the Judgment debtors in both the suits are the same and the Court auction purchaser in both the cases is the same. In C.M.A No. 806 of 1990, the property was brought to sale in E.P No. 47 of 1987 in O.B No. 1767 of 1985. The amount due under the decree is stated in the proclamation is Rs. 39,774.09. The property was brought to sale on 2-11-1988. Two items were intended to be sold. The first lot comprising of a house and ground was valued by the decree-holder at Rs. 50,000/- and by the Court at Rs. 2,50,000/-. The second lot was valued at Rs. 1,00,000/- by the decree-holder and Rs. 10 lakhs by the Court.

    2. The other appeal arises out of E.P No. 49 of 1987 in O.S No. 1769 of 1985. The amount due under the decree as stated in the proclamation is Rs. 80,334.98. The same two items which are proceeded against in E.P No. 47 of 1987 are also proceeded against in these execution proceedings. The values given by the decree-holder and the Court are the same. On 2-11-1988, lot No. 1 was sold in E.P 47/87 and a sum of Rs. 2,95,000/- was realised. On the same day, lot No. 2 was also sold in E.P 49/87 for a sum of Rs. 10,01,000/.

    3. The appellant filed E.A Nos. 12 and 13 of 1989 for setting aside the sales. He had mentioned certain irregularities including the close relationship of the auction purchaser and one of the judgment debtors. It was also alleged that a partner of the decree-holder firm was also related to the auction purchaser. The Court below held that there was no ground made out by the appellant for setting aside the sales and dismissed the applications.

    4. In these appeals, it is contended that the Court ought to have set aside both the sales as the appellant has proved the value of the properties to be much more than the value for which they have been sold in Court auction. It is also contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the auction purchaser being related closely to one of the judgment debtors and the other judgment debtors having colluded against him, the sales ought to have been set aside. Lastly, it is contended that, in any event, the sale of lot 2 should be set aside’ as the, sale of lot by itself fetched an amount much more than the amounts due under the two decrees.

    5. I do not accept the first two contentions of learned counsel for the appellant. There is absolutely no evidence worthy of acceptance to prove the value of the properties as contended by the appellant. The only two documents which are relevant are Exs. A. 3 and B. 1 both of which, being after the filing of the petitions for setting aside the sale, cannot be relied on by the Court. Hence, in the absence of any evidence on the side of the appellant, the first contention has to fail. With regard to the second contention also, the evidence on record is not sufficient. Even assuming that the auction purchaser is a relative of one of the judgment debtors and the decree-holder, there is no evidence of any collusion between the other judgment debtors. In the circumstances, that contention has to fail.

    6. However, there is substance in the third contention. As seen already, both the lots were sold in execution on the very same day and lot No. 1 itself fetched a sum of Rs. 2,95,000/-. That is much more than the amounts due under the decrees in O.S Nos. 1767 of 1985 and 1765 of 1985. As the decree-holder and the judgment debtors are the same, the executing Court ought to have stopped with the sale of lot No. 1 and should not have proceeded to sell lot No. 2.

    7. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider a similar situation in Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma, (1977) 3 SCC 337 : AIR 1977 SC 1789. In that case, there was only one decree and not two decrees, as in this case. But, in my view, the position by the same person against the same judgment debtors. In the case before the Supreme Court, the amount due under the decree as mentioned in the proclamation was Rupees 16,715.80. The sale of lands in one village alone fetched a sum of Rs. 16,880/-. Despite that, the Court Proceeded to sell the properties of the judgment debtor in another village which fetched a sum of Rs. 12,500/-. When the Court auction sale was sought to be set a side, the High Court accepted the contention of the judgment debtor and set aside the sale: On appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed the same. The law on the subject was stated thus by the Supreme Court (at p. 1791 of AIR):

    “In these circumstances, therefore, under the provisions of O. 21, R. 64 of the Code when the amount as specified in the sale proclamation was fully satisfied by the sale of the properties in village Devanoor, the Court should have stopped the sale of further items of the properties. It is manifest that where the amount specified in the proclamation of sale for the recovery of which the sale was ordered the sale of further items should be stopped. This, in our opinion, is the logical corollary which flows from O. 21, R. 64 of the Code which may be extracted thus:

    “Any Court executing a decree may order that any property attached by it and liable to sale, or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be sold, and that the proceeds of such sale, or a sufficient portion thereof, shall be paid to the party entitled under the decree to receive the same.”

    Under this provision the Executing Court derives jurisdiction to sell properties attached only to the point at which the decree is fully satisfied. The words “necessary to satisfy the decree” clearly indicate that no sale can be allowed beyond the decretal amount mentioned in the sale proclamation. In other words where the sale fetches a price equal to or higher than the amount mentioned in the sale proclamation and is sufficient to satisfy the decree, no further sale should be held and the Court should stop at that stage. In the instant case, we have already indicated that the sale of lands in village Devanoor alone fetched a sum of Rs. 16,880/- which was more than sufficient to satisfy the amount of Rs. 16,715.85 mentioned in the sale proclamation. It is true that the decree-holder had obtained another decree in O.S No. 19 of 1985 but, there is nothing to show that the decree-holder had approached the Court for including the second decretal amount in the proclamation of sale. In these circumstances, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that the Executing Court was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case in selling the properties, situated in village Gudipadu. The fact that the judgment-debtor did not raise an objection on this ground before the Executing Court is not sufficient to put him out of Court because this was a matter which went to the very root of the jurisdiction of the Executing Court to sell the properties and the non-compliance with the provisions of O. 21, R. 64 of the Code was sufficient to vitiate the case so far as the properties situated in village Gudipadu were concerned. For these reasons, the contentions raised by counsel for the appellant must be overruled.”

    8. The same proposition was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Ambati Narasayya v. M. Subba Rao, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 693 : AIR 1990 SC 119. In that case, 10 acres of land was sold in auction for Rs. 17,000/- in execution of a decree for Rs. 2,000/-. The Court held that the sale was in contravention of the provisions of O. 21, R. 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure and liable to be set aside. The Supreme Court made a reference to its earlier decision in Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma, (1977) 3 SCC 337 : AIR 1977 SC 1789 and applied the principle set out therein.

    9. If the judgments of the Supreme Court are applied to the facts of this case, the sale of lot 2 cannot stand. As pointed out already, the sale of lot 1 having fetched an amount requisite for satisfying both the decrees of the same decree-holder, the Court ought to have stopped and should not have proceeded further with the sale of the second lot.

    10. It is contended by learned counsel for the auction purchaser and the decree-holder that there being two different decrees and two different proclamations, the Court was cer-tainly entitled to direct sale of both the items. Learned counsel submitted that, when the first item was sold in execution of one decree, there was only one other item available for feeing proceeded against in execution of the Cither decree. According to the learned counsel, in these circumstances, there was no error on the part of the executing Court in proceeding with the execution of second decree. I do not agree with this contention. If the decree-holders had been different, the position might have been different. But, in this case, the same decree-holder had obtained two decrees against same persons and proceeded against the same properties in both the executions. In those circumstances, the Court ought to have taken into account the fact that one sale had fetched the amounts due under both the decrees with same amount to spare and ought to have stopped the sale of the second item.

    11. Learned counsel for the decree-holder and auction purchaser also contended that the objection should have taken by the judgment debtor at the time of settlement of proclamation that it was not necessary to sell both the lots. Having failed to do so the judgment debtor is precluded by the provisions of O. 21, R. 90(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, from putting forward the same at the present stage. There is no substance in this contention.

    12. When the sale proclamation was settled, the value of lot 1 as stated by the decree-holder was only Rs. 50,000/-. There was great disparity between the value stated by the decree-holder and the Amin's valuation. Hence, it could not have been contended by the judgment-debtors at that time that sale of lot one would satisfy both the decrees as the amount due under the two decrees exceeded Rs. 1 lakh and odd. Hence, the contention is overruled.

    13. In the result, C.M.A No. 806 of 1990 is dismissed and the order of the subordinate Judge, Karur in B.A No. 12 of 1989 is confirmed. C.M.A No. 806 of 1990 is allowed and the order in E.A No. 13 of 1989 is set aside. The sale hold in E.P No. 49 of 1987 is set aside. There will be no order as to costs in either of the appeals.

    14. The fourth respondent/decree-holder is permitted to withdraw the amounts due under the two decrees from out of the sale proceeds of lot one in the executing Court, subject to any claim of rateable distribution u/S. 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The auction purchaser, the fifth respondent in the appeals, is permitted to take back the amount deposited by him as sale consideration for lot 2. The executing court is directed to return the amount to him on production of a steno copy of the order of this Court.

    15. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    P. Somasundaram v. A. Ponnusamy And Others
    (Sep 17, 1991)